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The projecT of this volume began with a panel, “Rereading the New Criticism,” that we co-organized for the Modernist Studies Association 
conference of 2006. The responses to our call for papers were so numerous, 
varied, and interesting that, over the next two years, we followed with a sec-
ond panel for the MSA in 2008 and then a more general call for papers for 
a collection, which yielded an even larger, more diverse set of strong essays.
 There was clearly keen interest in reevaluating the significance and legacy 
of the New Criticism, which has since the 1980s been regarded as superseded 
in literary studies—and has generally been read as emblematic of the apoliti-
cal, ahistorical practices of the discipline that had to be overcome through the 
revolutions in theory, historical scholarship, and politically engaged criticism 
of the last four decades. But over e-mail and at conferences, people in con-
versation with us underscored the value of revisiting a movement that was 
crucial to the foundation of the discipline as we know it now, especially to the 
development of “close reading” central to its development; and that merited 
reassessment toward reconsideration of the criticism, classroom practices, 
and commitments of our field. Ultimately, we had difficulty choosing the 
essays included in this volume from among the bounty that came our way.  
 We greatly appreciate the assistance of the Social Sciences and Humani-
ties Research Council of Canada, whose support facilitated the production of 
this collection.  Our thanks go to the many colleagues who offered supportive 
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commentary on this project as it evolved, including Tim Newcomb, Leonard 
Diepeveen, Jessica Pressman, John Tiedemann, Elizabeth Loizeaux, Stephen 
Adams, and Ted Bishop. Above all, we are grateful to the contributors to this 
volume, the excellence of whose essays far exceeded our initial hopes.
Miranda B. Hickman, McGill University
John D. McIntyre, University of Prince Edward Island
In 2008, Garrick Davis published an edited volume entitled Praising it New: The Best of the New Criticism, which gathers in one paperback a 
collection of landmark essays by leading figures of the New Criticism, the 
mid-twentieth century American movement in literary criticism fabled for its 
formalist approach to literature, and especially for its techniques of “close 
reading” that would become integral to academic literary studies in North 
America. The collection includes work by such major New Critics as John 
Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Penn Warren. Noting the pub-
lication in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Mark Bauerlein recognized 
the cultural currents against which Davis was swimming to bring out such a 
volume: the project turns back to critics central to the foundations of literary 
studies as we now know it in North America, before the rise of poststruc-
turalist theory in the literary academy of the late 1960s displaced their work 
from prominence. By the 1970s, New Critical influence had waned; the next 
decades of the literary academy would belong to theorists associated with 
poststructuralism and postmodernism, such as Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, 
Kristeva, Lacan and Lyotard. As of the 1980s, New Critical work, relegated 
to the status of superseded paradigm, was generally mentioned only in brief 
excerpts and caricatured shorthand terms. Davis’s book thus makes widely 
available many essays that have been difficult to come by for decades, espe-
cially as an ensemble: its back cover frames the project as the “first anthology 
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of New Criticism to be printed in fifty years.” Our volume of critical essays, 
Rereading the New Criticism, participates in the recent wave of renewed 
attention to the New Criticism that Davis’s project reflects. Contributors to 
this collection seek to reexamine in an interrogative spirit the development 
of the New Criticism, its significance, and its chief lines of thought, as well 
as to consider dimensions of its work relevant for contemporary literary and 
cultural studies.
 The tale of the New Critics’ ascent and decline is a familiar one: dur-
ing the 1930s and 1940s, the New Criticism rose to preeminence in North 
American academic contexts during a time of rapid expansion and profes-
sionalization for academic departments of English. As the essays in this vol-
ume address, for more than two decades, New Critical methods would exert 
enormous influence in both criticism and classrooms across North America. 
The events of an international symposium on structuralism held at Johns 
Hopkins University in 1966 are often used to exemplify the poststructural-
ist turn in Anglo-American literary studies that would inaugurate the era, 
in Frank Lentricchia’s phrase, “after the New Criticism.” The widespread 
theorization of Anglo-American literary studies would follow—inspired by 
theoretical models from continental Europe and political developments of 
1968 in France; informed by work in fields such as linguistics, psychoanaly-
sis, philosophy, Marxism, and feminism; and fueling the rise of interest in 
deconstructionist and other forms of poststructuralist thought. As a wealth 
of new theoretical approaches in the literary academy sought to move, as 
Geoffrey Hartman’s put it 1970, “beyond formalism,” the New Criticism fell 
from authority; and as newer schools of thought often involved critique and 
even censure of New Critical techniques and assumptions, the New Criticism 
assumed a controversial status. In subsequent years, for many, the New Criti-
cism came to emblematize irresponsibly formalist approaches to literature 
that showed critical practice at its narrowest. Focused on “the work itself,” 
and “literature qua literature,” New Critical methods were understood as 
unfortunately insensitive to authorial intentions and readerly response; to the 
historical conditions of literary production and reception; and to the cultural 
relevance and political significance of literary work.
 More recently, however, a diverse body of critics have issued calls for 
a reassessment of the New Criticism and its legacy. Historicist scholarship 
from commentators such as Gerald Graff (1979, 1987) and Mark Jancovich 
(1993) has enlisted rereadings of New Critical work in its original cultural 
contexts to contest widely circulated misrepresentations of its assumptions, 
politics, and projects. Newer work from commentators such as Camille 
Paglia in Break, Blow, Burn (2006), Terry Eagleton in How to Read a Poem 
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(2007), and Jane Gallop in “The Historicization of Literary Studies and the 
Fate of Close Reading” (2007) likewise urges such reevaluation, emphasizing 
how New Critical methods of close reading inform contemporary practice in 
literary studies—often without acknowledgment—and considering how these 
might be adapted for today’s climate. Other groups associated with an effort 
called the “New Formalism” seek to redirect attention to literary form, which 
they read as neglected in literary study of recent decades, and often point 
to the work of the New Criticism as important to this endeavor (see Mar-
jorie Levinson’s 2007 review essay “What Is New Formalism?”). The essay 
collection Reading for Form (2006), edited by Susan Wolfson and Marshall 
Brown, considers what a commitment to “reading” literature “for form” in 
these times might involve, at a point when not only the New Criticism, but 
also critical formalism more generally, is often construed as having “‘out-
lived its usefulness’” (as the editors quote W. J. T. Mitchell as observing). 
Frank Lentricchia and Andrew Dubois’s collection Close Reading (2003), 
meanwhile, recognizing the centrality of close reading to literary and cultural 
studies (despite its sometime relegation to the dustbin with the New Criti-
cism), traces discussions and demonstrations of close reading from the New 
Critical heyday to the present, noting a continuity of interest in formalism 
where others have seen diminishment and rupture. Observing how responses 
to the specter of New Critical formalism have guided literary–critical evolu-
tion since the mid-twentieth century, DuBois maintains that “perhaps the 
central . . . debate in twentieth-century literary criticism is a debate between 
formalist and non-formalist modes of response” (1).
 Inspired by this range of commentary reconsidering the New Criticism, 
the essays of this volume aim to reevaluate the New Critical corpus, trace 
its legacy, and explore resources it might offer for the future. More specifi-
cally, these essays shed new light on the genesis of the New Criticism; revisit 
its chief arguments for little-noticed dimensions and subtexts; illuminate its 
internal heterogeneity; interrogate received ideas about it; and consider how 
its theories and techniques might be drawn upon toward the reinvigoration 
of contemporary literary and cultural studies. Our collection follows a path 
highlighted by William J. Spurlin’s and Michael Fischer’s The New Criticism 
and Contemporary Literary Theory (1995), whose articles reflected on the 
implications of New Critical theory and practice and considered new ways 
of engaging New Critical methods in view of contemporary theory of that 
moment. A decade and a half later, in a different literary–theoretical climate, 
it is time for another such reexamination.
 Through this project, we seek to facilitate reassessment of the New Criti-
cism’s significant contributions to the development of academic literary 
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studies in North America; foster subtler understanding of the complex devel-
opment of the work of the New Critics from their early Southern Agrarian 
commitments to their later association with supposedly apolitical and ahis-
torical critical formalism; clarify the central theories and methods associated 
with the New Criticism—which will often require reading past and against 
commonplaces about New Critical thought; and consider what New Critical 
theories and critical methods might offer for both literary and cultural studies 
in the twenty-first century.
Recovering the New Criticism
Accordingly, this collection aims to resist reductive understandings of what 
the New Critics did and stood for that have often pervaded accounts of them 
since their fall from disciplinary dominance. Although they are frequently 
invoked in today’s climate, the abbreviated ways in which they are usu-
ally mentioned contribute to an occlusion of important dimensions of their 
work. And as Davis’s project implies, such misunderstandings are frequently 
perpetuated by the limited repertoire of New Critical texts represented in 
prominent textbooks: generally, examples from New Criticism included in 
current anthologies feature only a small portion of their wide and diverse cor-
pus. In the Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (2001), for instance, 
articles by John Crowe Ransom and Cleanth Brooks appear, along with W. 
K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s classic “The Intentional Fallacy” and 
“The Affective Fallacy.” Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan’s Literary Theory: 
An Introduction (1998) includes two selections by Brooks, one an excerpt 
from his famous The Well Wrought Urn, the second an essay by Wimsatt on 
the “concrete universal.” Thus while these two volumes do highlight widely 
known New Critical commentary, the selections included suggest much more 
homogeneity of thought within the New Criticism than actually obtained, 
indicating only a few of the many issues—philosophical, aesthetic, and cul-
tural—with which the New Critics engaged. Also contributing to an atmo-
sphere of misprision and cultural forgetting is the attitude with which the 
New Critics are generally noted in academic discourse: at best, they are pre-
sented as quaint and superseded, at worst derided as what Frank Lentricchia 
calls “repressive father figures” (After the New Criticism, xiii) and the disci-
pline’s favorite “whipping boy” (Suleiman, 5). And despite the historicization 
of scholars such as Graff and Jancovich that seeks to counter caricatures of 
the New Critics, New Critical work is still widely misrepresented as ahistori-
cal, apolitical, and acontextual. The essays of this collection investigate these 
Hickman, “Rereading the New Criticism” • 5
still tenacious assumptions about the nature and implications of New Critical 
approaches—to clarify their origins, redress distortions, and deepen under-
standing of their range and complexity.
 In many contexts, the very gesture of returning to the New Criticism after 
the watersheds of theory and cultural studies can be construed as suggesting 
literary conservatism, even rearguard entrenchment. In part, this stems from 
a reflexive association between the New Criticism and “dead white male” 
cultural conservatism, and the way in which, as Jane Gallop notes, the “ahis-
toricism” widely connected with New Critical methods, along with the canon 
of literary work they tended to promote, have come to be “persuasively 
linked to sexism, racism, and elitism” (181). This volume contends, however, 
that the convictions and political perspectives associated with the New Criti-
cism were multiple, diverse, and complex; that they were not always as we 
now often understand them to have been, nor as they later became as they 
evolved; and that, accordingly, they stand in need of reevaluation. Moreover, 
the project of rereading the New Criticism to which this volume is commit-
ted carries no one set of literary–political valences. In an article for PMLA 
(2007), Marjorie Levinson takes census of the trend known as the “New 
Formalism,” composed of a diverse body of critics and scholars interested 
in revitalizing formalist approaches to literary analysis and interpretation, 
some of whom revisit the New Criticism for techniques and models. Her 
article emphasizes the coalitionary nature of this endeavor: New Formalists 
hail from widely varying schools of thought and political perspectives; what 
unites them is a conviction about the importance of formalist methods to lit-
erary study. A comparable range of viewpoints and political positions charac-
terizes the contributors to this volume.
 At this point, forty years after the fall of the New Criticism, it is impor-
tant to revisit the papers in the disciplinary attic—to return, first, to both the 
letter and the spirit of what the New Critics actually said. They have often 
been misconstrued as presenting a monolithic school of thought, and accord-
ingly, read as what Frank Lentricchia calls an “inconsistent and sometimes 
confused movement” (xii–xiii). The essays in this volume suggest instead that 
the New Criticism comprised a diverse collection of allied critics addressing 
shared questions and often contending with and contesting one another’s 
claims. Through a widely circulated repertoire of myths, the diversity and 
subtlety of their arguments have often been elided, their debates and points 
of principled difference effaced. Many of the essays in this collection thus 
aim through historical analysis to recover the internal complexity of the New 
Critical effort, restoring to view important episodes and conversations in the 
history of the academic discipline of English in North America. Moreover, 
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taking advantage of our retrospective position on the New Critics, these 
essays bring to the surface implicit or subtextual aspects of their arguments 
and cultural politics that the New Critics themselves did not emphasize and 
in some cases may not even have recognized—ones which chronicles of their 
work have overlooked.
 Out of this work of reconsideration, several of these essays reflect upon 
what might now be derived from the examples, conversations, and debates of 
the New Critics toward the future of both literary studies, which finds itself at 
an early-twenty-first-century moment of reassessment and reorientation, and 
its sibling field of cultural studies. What we might now draw upon toward 
today’s work are not only the techniques of “close reading” and “reading for 
form” widely associated with New Criticism (which can as easily be directed 
toward semiotic play in cultural texts in diverse media as toward forms of 
irony and ambiguity in texts marked as “literary”): also emphasized in the 
following articles are the New Critical commitment to pursuing ethical proj-
ects through approaches to aesthetics (Archambeau); the cultural politics ani-
mating their work and methods (Morrison, Shaheen, Hammond); and their 
pedagogical assumptions and approaches (Lockhart).
The Genesis of the New Criticism
What later became known as the New Criticism first emerged in the late 
1930s, as a group of American Southerners—John Crowe Ransom, a profes-
sor at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee, along with a cluster of his former 
students (Robert Penn Warren, Allen Tate, and Cleanth Brooks)—gathered 
forces toward invigorating the practice of literary criticism and legitimating it 
within academic contexts. As of the early 1920s, Ransom, Tate, and Warren 
were all affiliated with a group of poets at Vanderbilt called the “Fugitives,” 
devoted to discussion and critique of poetry, often new modernist verse and 
often their own, in the name of renewing the literature of the American 
South. Between 1922 and 1925, they published their verse and criticism in a 
journal entitled The Fugitive. Ransom was one of the earliest members of the 
group in the late 1910s; Tate and Warren would later join as undergraduates 
in the 1920s. Later that decade, all three came to be associated with South-
ern Agrarianism, a cultural movement catalyzed most immediately by the 
“Scopes Monkey Trial” of 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee, and the denigration of 
the American South which it fueled in many quarters. Spurred to organize by 
such attacks, the Southern Agrarians sought to defend distinctively Southern 
values and customs against what they perceived as the increasing hegemony 
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of the industrialized North. Ransom, Tate, and Warren would all contribute 
to the symposium of articles that, in aggregate, became the Agrarians’ major 
manifesto: I’ll Take My Stand (1930).1
 By the late 1930s, the nucleus around Ransom—with the addition of the 
slightly younger Brooks, then collaborating with Robert Penn Warren at Lou-
isiana State University—had evolved into a group of allies making common 
cause. At that point, they turned energies to an effort to reform the discipline 
of English in the direction of greater rigor, prominence within the academy, 
and cultural authority—an endeavor that would eventually coalesce in the 
New Criticism. Specifically, they saw themselves as champions of rigorous 
literary criticism focused on aesthetics, which they opposed to approaches to 
literary study that emphasized historically-focused scholarly research, mor-
ally-oriented readings like those of New Humanists such as Irving Babbitt, 
and Marxist sociological analysis.2 As distinct from such approaches, their 
criticism concerned itself with the literary “work itself” rather than with the 
author or historical conditions of its inception or reception; and with the aes-
thetic form of a literary work rather than just its thematic content: in their 
view, form and content were inextricably intertwined.
 As of 1937, Ransom was drawn by an attractive offer to Kenyon College 
in Ohio, a congenial setting for his teaching and criticism, but one remote 
from the American South, signaling a removal from his former interests and 
allegiances. As of 1940, Allen Tate was at Princeton, his position suggest-
ing and fostering a comparable distance on the American South. Alexander 
MacLeod’s essay in this collection notes the pattern this indicates among the 
New Critics of turning away from their Southern Agrarianism as their com-
mitments to literary criticism intensified. Rather than an abandonment of the 
Agrarian project, however, cultural historian Mark Jancovich reads this move 
from Agrarianism to New Criticism on the part of many nascent New Crit-
ics as a transposition into a different key of the group’s ongoing refusal of 
the utilitarian, capitalist values they associated with the American North—a 
change of strategy rather than objectives (Jancovich, 208). In their articles for 
this collection, Aaron Shaheen and James Matthew Wilson likewise address 
this question of the relationship between the New Critics’ Southern Agrarian 
and later literary–critical work.
 As they sought to endow the academic study of English literature with 
greater precision and legitimacy, again, the proto–New Critics saw themselves 
as counterposed against the “historians,” or “scholars”—i.e. those in literary 
studies devoted primarily to historical scholarly research. As Gerald Graff 
notes, historically-minded, research-oriented approaches to literary study had 
gained prominence in the American academy as “English” had emerged as a 
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distinct discipline in the late nineteenth century, at a moment when academe 
was undergoing professionalization and accordingly increasingly favored a 
German research-specialist model of practice. In literary studies, this prefer-
ence often resulted in the rejection of liberal-humanist, Arnoldian approaches 
to the study and teaching of literature in favor of data-oriented philological 
methods. In Defining Literary Criticism, Carol Atherton notes parallel devel-
opments in England at this time at Oxford and Cambridge.
 In both the United States and England, however, from the time of the 
emergence of English as an academic discipline, the importance of philologi-
cal study of literature had also been contested by many who were trying to 
establish the new field—sometimes for methodological and sometimes anti-
German nationalist reasons. As Atherton observes of Oxford and Cambridge, 
“The evolution of English at both universities can be seen in terms of a grad-
ual movement away from these philological beginnings” (37). In the context 
of the 1930s, the rising New Critics thus reprised in a new context and new 
moment this resistance to an approach to English literature focused primarily 
on philological and other forms of historical research.
 As Graff observes, as they formed their sense of mission, the New Crit-
ics were also reacting against a number of other forces of the cultural cli-
mate, sometimes pressed by various adversaries in “conflicting directions” 
(146). They sought to define their program, for instance, against “generalist” 
approaches to literature prevalent in early-twentieth-century undergraduate 
classrooms, which often featured surveys of biographical and historical back-
ground rather than close engagement with the specifics of literary texts; as 
well as against what they read as merely impressionistic commentary on liter-
ature. They also sought to dissociate themselves from Marxist and Humanist 
readings that, in their view, focused on moral themes at the expense of atten-
tion to the implications of literary form.
 And in the spirit of their work as Southern Agrarians, they were also 
reckoning with work in the sciences that enjoyed significant influence in the 
academy of this moment—which, as Steven Schryer suggests, they rejected as 
fostering “technocratic rationalism” associated in their view with the cultural 
power of the American North (670). But out of awareness of the pressures in 
their academic and cultural climate to gain legitimacy through scientific rigor, 
even as they resisted scientific values and perspectives, they also pursued 
their work with scientific precision. Specifically, Ransom and his compatriots 
sought precision in the theory and practice of literary criticism, at the time 
widely regarded as a merely subjective and lax endeavor unworthy of serious 
academic attention (Graff, Professing Literature, 124; Green, 62–63). In one 
of his essays designed to legitimate the work of literary criticism, “Criticism, 
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Inc.,” included in The World’s Body (1938), Ransom noted that he had heard 
“the head of English studies in a graduate school” observe, “‘Well, we don’t 
allow criticism here, because this is something which anybody can do’” (335). 
Ransom’s ringing rejoinder in this essay—“It is not anybody who can do criti-
cism” (336)—represented a shared line of thought, and a pivotal assumption, 
among the incipient New Critics.3 In this essay, Ransom defined criticism as 
“the attempt to define and enjoy the aesthetic or characteristic values of lit-
erature” (332): to treat literary texts as art, rather than texts documenting 
history, social developments, ethics, or philosophy. In his vision, what was 
needed to make of criticism a newly rigorous, aesthetically focused endeavor 
was a new cadre of trained professionals, drawn from the university profes-
soriate (“it must be developed by the collective and sustained effort of learned 
persons—which means that its proper seat is in the universities” [329]), as 
well as a scientifically inflected approach: “Criticism must become more sci-
entific, or precise and systematic” (329).
 As Gerald Graff points out, in view of such statements as the latter, the 
New Critics often came to be associated with, and “denounced for,” “arid 
scientific empiricism” (Literature against Itself, 133). But given the cultural 
convictions informing their literary criticism, he maintains, in many respects 
the New Critics could not have been more distant from an allegiance to “sci-
ence”: science was “in fact one of the chief cultural ills that the New Crit-
ics themselves sought to combat. The New Criticism stands squarely in the 
romantic tradition of the defense of the humanities as an antidote to science 
and positivism” (133). As Southern Agrarians, the New Critics were com-
mitted to asserting in the face of the powerful North—which they read as 
industrial, capitalistic, technocratic and hyper-rational—the distinctive cul-
tural practices of the South, whose way of life, in their reading, had been 
badly eroded during postbellum years by the Northern juggernaut. As their 
“Statement of Principles” in I’ll Take My Stand observed,
The capitalization of the applied sciences has now become extravagant and 
uncritical; it has enslaved our human energies. . . . [T]he act of labor as one 
of the happy functions of human life has been in effect abandoned, and is 
practiced solely for its rewards. (xxxix)
Thus although these critics’ involvement in the rising New Criticism entailed 
a turn away from their earlier, more overtly Southern commitments, their 
critique of the “extravagant” “capitalization” of the “sciences” would con-
tinue to inform their literary–critical work. Ransom’s claims in essays such 
as “Poetry: A Note on Ontology” certainly attest to an ongoing quarrel with 
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the cultural practice of what he calls “sciencing and devouring” (52), which 
Ransom associated with the North, and which the approach to literature 
he advocated was intended to resist. The methods, epistemological claims, 
and values of the New Critics were often constructed in their work as a shoe 
thrown in the machine of industrial capitalism, Northern or otherwise, and 
the rational, scientific discourses it involved. When Ransom asserts that 
“Criticism must become more scientific, or precise and systematic” (World’s 
Body, 329), then, the “precise and systematic” should be read as a qualifica-
tion: Ransom means here that the rigor to which literary criticism aspires in 
the process of “sett[ing] up its own house” (345) should match that displayed 
by science, widely respected in the cultural climate of 1938, in order to gain 
legitimacy—but ultimately in order to achieve objectives that would counter-
vail those of science.
Predecessors at Cambridge
In the mid-twentieth-century American context, as the New Critics-in-for-
mation sought to legitimate literary criticism as an integral part of academic 
study of English literature, they were renewing an effort associated with the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century in England.4 As of the 1920s, 
criticism had been especially championed at Cambridge University, whose cli-
mate shaped the work of several critics from whom many New Critics would 
draw inspiration, such as I. A. Richards, William Empson, and F. R. Leavis.
 When the emergent field of “English Studies” was reinvigorated at Cam-
bridge after the Great War with the establishment of the English Tripos in 
1917, I. A. Richards, like the New Critics who later followed his lead, sought 
to develop stringent techniques for analysis of literary work that would dis-
tinguish such analysis from and carry it beyond philological study, impres-
sionistic belletristic commentary, and the “survey” style study of literature 
common in university programs. In the next generation of Cambridge 
English, F. R. Leavis would pursue a similar path.
 Richards, trained in the mental and moral sciences, was concerned with 
the cultural health of an England struggling with the aftermath of war; 
accordingly, he argued that close, careful, trained engagement with literature 
could help readers to attain mental “balance,” “poise,” and “equilibrium” 
and promote forms of cultural healing. In an Arnoldian spirit, Richards main-
tained that work with literature could guard against a slide into “chaos” to 
which he read England as vulnerable during the postwar years. As he noted 
in Science and Poetry (1926): “Tradition is weakening. Moral authorities are 
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not as well backed by belief as they were. . . . We are in need of something 
else to take the place of the old order.” Concerned that the cultural center 
would not hold, Richards feared the upsurge of “a mental chaos such as 
man has never experienced.” If this came to pass, he observed, “We shall be 
thrown back, as Matthew Arnold foresaw, upon poetry. It is capable of sav-
ing us; it is a perfectly possible means of overcoming chaos” (82–83).
 While Richards focused chiefly on the psychological and neurological 
responses of skilled, trained readers, his students, such as William Empson 
and F. R. Leavis at Cambridge, as well as the American critics who admired 
his work such as Ransom and Brooks, were more concerned with what was 
increasingly conceived of as “literature itself”: the formal features and prac-
tices read as distinctive to literature. What they drew from Richards were his 
exhortations about “how to read a page”—and his insistence on attending to 
words on the page as the primary site of consideration. As F. R. Leavis would 
put it, “literature is made of words, and . . . everything worth saying in criti-
cism of verse and prose can be related to judgements concerning particular 
arrangements of words on the page” (Leavis, 25). As Brooks would note in a 
1981 retrospective about the impact of Richards on the generation of Ameri-
can critics who succeeded him, Richards offered “a pioneering effort that 
broke with the literary training of the time—with the traditional British train-
ing as well as the American” (587). Brooks recalls becoming aware of Rich-
ards’s books during his first academic year as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford in 
1929–30:
As I remember, it was Robert Penn Warren, then at Oxford also, who called 
my attention to Principles of Literary Criticism and Practical Criticism. I 
read both books eagerly. In Practical Criticism I was especially interested in 
the students’ comments on thirteen selected poems. Richards had omitted 
the titles of the poems and the names of their authors to see what the stu-
dents could make of the naked texts. (587)
The critics who would become the New Critics were thus primarily concerned 
with “the naked texts,” rather than, as was Richards, in what occurred in 
students’ minds as they engaged with them. Brooks admits that he and com-
patriots were suspicious of Richards’s psychologizing (“It was Richards’s psy-
chological machinery that got in the way for me and many other theorists” 
[587])—which, when Richards’s books first appeared, was considered coura-
geous by some and by others inappropriately “scientific” for literary study. As 
Brooks notes of John Crowe Ransom’s skeptical distinction between his own 
New Critical emphases and those of Richards: “what the reader had before 
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him as positive evidence was the text itself, not certain presumed goings-on in 
the reader’s head” (591).
 Accordingly, what the New Critics would focus on and invest in was 
the construct of “the text itself” as the appropriate object of literary study. 
They also aimed for greater precision about that object of study: they sought 
to identify what literature offered that no other form of verbal communi-
cation provided and to promote systematic engagement with its distinctive 
qualities and techniques. This is why the received wisdom about the New 
Critics links them so easily, often too readily, to T. S. Eliot, who famously 
declared in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent” (among the essays of the 
Sacred Wood by which Richards was deeply influenced when first teaching 
at Cambridge) that criticism should be directed “not upon the poet but upon 
the poetry” (40). In the preface to the second edition of The Sacred Wood, 
Eliot would reinforce this point by advocating reading poetry “as poetry and 
not another thing” (viii). Eliot’s statement entailed assumptions that would 
become axiomatic for the New Critics: that poetry (here used as a metonym 
for literature) should be read as ontologically separate from other forms of 
expression and accordingly, merited a criticism equipped to do justice to its 
distinctness and autonomy. Eliot was not actually as intimately involved with 
the New Critics per se as many accounts suggest, but his essays and complex 
poetry provided a crucial impetus—one might say “catalyst”—for New Crit-
ical work, both literary and cultural.5
The Era of Consolidation
The New Critics began their project at a moment of intense debate about 
where the discipline of English would direct itself next: as Ransom noted 
to Tate in 1938, the same year that saw publication of his major study, The 
World’s Body, “I’ve just come back from the Modern Language Association 
at Chicago. The Professors are in an awful dither, trying to reform them-
selves, and there’s a big stroke possible for a small group that knows what 
it wants in giving them ideas and definitions and showing them the way” 
(Selected Letters, 236). Ransom and his “small group” would attempt this 
“big stroke” with their effort to render literary studies a more stringent aca-
demic discipline with a focus on critical practice. The movement’s name 
would emerge through the title of Ransom’s book of 1941, The New Criti-
cism, which in turn permuted the title of a 1910 essay by Joel Spingarn of 
Columbia University (Graff, Professing Literature, 153).
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 During the 1940s and 1950s, representatives of the New Criticism, both 
the former Southern Agrarians and others who became part of the move-
ment’s momentum, would gain prominent posts at a range of American uni-
versities—Ransom at Kenyon College in Ohio; Tate at Princeton, later the 
University of Minnesota; Warren at Louisiana State, the University of Min-
nesota, and Yale; Brooks at Louisiana State and then also at Yale, where René 
Wellek and W. K. Wimsatt would teach as well. As Vincent Leitch notes, 
as compared to critical schools contemporaneous with the New Criticism 
such as the Chicago Neo-Aristotelians and the New York Intellectuals, by 
the mid-twentieth century, the New Critics “influenced more colleagues and 
students, controlled more journals, had wider access to presses, and pro-
duced immensely more publications” (80). They disseminated their work 
and consolidated their program through periodicals such as The Southern 
Review, which Warren and Brooks founded in 1935; The Kenyon Review, 
which Ransom founded in 1939; and the Sewanee Review, of which Tate 
served as editor beginning in 1944. A cluster of landmark New Critical texts 
appeared in the late 1930s and 1940s: Ransom’s The World’s Body (1938) 
and The New Criticism (1941), along with Brooks’s Modern Poetry and the 
Tradition (1939) and The Well Wrought Urn (1947). Also appearing at this 
time was the group of textbooks that Tara Lockhart’s essay in this collection 
addresses—textbooks that would carry the New Criticism to high-school and 
university classrooms throughout North America and make of it a widely 
influential movement, such as Brooks and Warren’s An Approach to Litera-
ture (1936), Understanding Poetry (1938), Understanding Fiction (1943), 
and Brooks and Robert Heilman’s Understanding Drama (1945).
 In part, the New Critical effort at consolidation, toughening, systemiza-
tion, and legitimation of academic English took hold in American universi-
ties because the methods advanced by the New Critics allowed for a kind 
of democratization of literary study;6 since, unlike philological study, which 
required years of groundwork, training in the close analysis of textual par-
ticulars was available to undergraduate students of all backgrounds. This 
was especially attractive during a time when, thanks to the G.I. Bill, many 
soldiers were returning from wartime committed to completing their edu-
cations. Moreover, as Veysey notes, “The war veterans made up only one 
segment” of the “dramatic increase in the number of students from 1940 to 
1964, which more broadly reflected an awareness within a greatly enlarged 
sector of the middle and skilled working classes that some version of college 
was necessary in order to keep economically afloat” (15). While the precise, 
thoroughgoing criticism that the New Critics offered suggested a vision of 
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literary study as accessible only to an elite of highly trained specialists,7 
the techniques of New Criticism nonetheless came to be widely used by 
a large and diverse student population. By the early 1960s, New Critical 
methods of analysis and interpretation had achieved dominance in English 
departments at many North American universities, and, through the major 
New Critical textbooks, also exerted significant impact on North American 
secondary-school pedagogy.
 The rise of the New Criticism was also importantly bound up in, and 
facilitated by, the ascent of literary modernism, emergent at the same time 
that figures who would become New Critics were beginning their careers. 
Modernist literature featured complex texts for which New Critical meth-
ods of close reading were particularly apt, often even developed to address. 
In a climate of what would be widely referred to as modernist literary “dif-
ficulty,” readers sought expert guides to help them to navigate the modernist 
labyrinth. It was the work of poet-critic modernists such as Eliot and Pound 
that first inspired many of the New Critics. New Criticism and modernism 
thus quickly became involved in a cultural symbiosis, with New Critics such 
as Brooks building their reputations on readings of modernist texts such as 
Eliot’s The Waste Land and modernism enjoying wide cultural play in critical 
fora and classrooms thanks to New Critical attention. But as Adam Ham-
mond’s essay suggests, New Critical conceptions of modernism captured only 
a subset of the diversity of work associated with the modernist experiment of 
1914–45, leaving much of the work of modernism in shadow, shaping limited 
received ideas about what modernism entailed. By the same token, assum-
ing too close an alignment between the New Criticism and modernism can 
attenuate critical understanding of the many facets of New Critical work, 
some of whose animating objectives and values differed markedly from those 
suggested by modernist poetry and fiction.
Critiques of the New Criticism
Over the years, New Critics have frequently been disparaged as head-in-
the sand formalists: even before the poststructuralist revolution, they were 
charged in such terms by contemporaries such as Northrop Frye and Lionel 
Trilling—as unconcerned with, even oblivious to, anything outside the text. 
But as several essays in this collection demonstrate, their methods were in 
fact often intended to register and encourage certain attitudes toward art 
and culture, as well as certain ethical and epistemological stances; and often, 
in the tradition of Matthew Arnold, they assigned powerful cultural roles 
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to both poetry and the reading thereof. To whatever degree we are willing 
today to countenance their views on how literature and literary criticism can 
affect the world beyond the text, the New Critics did hold such views. Their 
famous devotion to the “autonomy” of both literature and literary criticism 
(for them, the “autonomy” of both placed them as independent disciplines 
operating by principles and rules distinct from those of other fields such as 
history or sociology) did not so much preclude as enable their impact on the 
world outside the literary sphere.
 But from the beginning, critiques of the New Criticism were thick and 
varied, and such critiques often misrepresented what the New Critics had 
actually asserted. Their contemporaries the Chicago neo-Aristotelians, whom 
Ransom credited with undertaking a kindred project of differentiating liter-
ary criticism from other practices, often jousted with them: Chicago critic 
R. S. Crane accused them of generating critical “monism” with their meth-
ods, failing to take sensitive account of differences among texts, especially 
those having to do with genre. Frye suggested that they had not done enough 
to make of criticism a rigorous autonomous discipline. In 1949 in PMLA, 
Douglas Bush critiqued the New Criticism for cliquishness and elitism. And 
many castigated them for generating what Eliot once wryly termed in the late 
1950s the “lemon squeezer school of criticism” (“Frontiers of Criticism,” 
537), involving mechanically reiterated readings about irony, ambiguity, and 
paradox.
 Sometimes these attacks struck home, especially when they addressed 
what the New Criticism had become once it had achieved prominance in the 
North American academy. One of this volume’s objectives is to reassess the 
aspects of the New Criticism that came under fire; another is to return atten-
tion to the New Criticism’s analyses of literature and culture before their 
methods became, in the hands of some, mere mechanical routine.
Contributors
The collection’s first four essays reread the genesis of the New Criticism to 
reveal dimensions of New Critical thought generally underemphasized or 
misrecognized in critical accounts. Robert Archambeau’s “Aesthetics as Eth-
ics” features the ethical emphases of the New Criticism’s supposedly purely 
“formalist” work that allegedly distanced them from ethical concerns: his 
essay points up the little-noted indebtedness of several figures important to 
the New Criticism to German Romantic idealism, especially to Schiller’s phi-
losophy of artistic contemplation as a means of achieving ethical balance.
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 Reassessing political diagnoses of the New Criticism, Alastair Morri-
son’s essay, “Eliot, the Agrarians, and the Political Subtext of New Critical 
Formalism” attributes to the New Critics a subversive illiberalism. Although 
the hegemony of the New Criticism in the mid-twentieth-century academy 
has sometimes led to its being regarded as exemplifying the dominant val-
ues of its liberal democratic Anglo-American culture, Morrison argues that 
through their formalism and the Southern Agrarian values underwriting it, 
the New Critics sought actively to undo a group of key liberal humanist 
assumptions.
 The third and fourth essays in the collection, bringing to light neglected 
aspects of New Critical thought, enlist these to account for turns within the 
New Criticism’s development from its Southern Agrarian beginnings to aca-
demic authority. Aaron Shaheen calls attention to John Crowe Ransom’s 
concern with two distinct forms of “androgyny”—for Ransom, one a sign 
of cultural deterioration, the other indicative of an ideal culture—for fuller 
understanding of the conservative gender politics informing Ransom’s criti-
cal work. Ransom’s struggle with these two models of androgyny, Shaheen 
argues, informed his move from Southern Agrarianism to literary criticism 
marked as apolitical. James Matthew Wilson’s “The Fugitive and the Exile” 
likewise focuses on the New Critical shift away from Agrarianism, highlight-
ing a little-considered impact of the Frankfurt School on the thought of John 
Crowe Ransom. Wilson suggests that two of Theodor Adorno’s 1940s cri-
tiques of American culture, published in Ransom’s Kenyon Review, contrib-
uted significantly to Ransom’s turn away from his Southern allegiances.
 The next three essays in the collection engage with work by the New Crit-
ics and their predecessors that significantly shaped understandings of liter-
ary modernism. Bradley Clissold’s “No Two Ways about It” reconsiders the 
work of William Empson, the Cambridge-based critic crucially influential on 
the New Critics. Clissold maintains that although Empson theorized “ambi-
guity” in response to the complexities of modernist literature, and despite 
the close association between modernist literature and New Critical work 
indebted to Empson’s, Empson himself devoted almost no critical attention to 
modernist literature. Clissold considers the implications of Empson’s surpris-
ing silence on modernist literature for how we should understand Empson’s 
impact on the New Criticism, ultimately suggesting that Empson still none-
theless might be considered an “enabler” of both New Critical and modernist 
preoccupations with ambiguity.
 Connor Byrne’s “In Pursuit of Understanding” questions the pervasive 
misconception that the New Criticism remained divorced from popular criti-
cism of its day. Byrne considers how apparent antagonisms between New 
Critics and their contemporaries occluded commonalities between their 
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approaches to modernist poetry and those of other critics in their milieu who 
reached wider audiences. For instance, although New Critical techniques 
were roundly critiqued by Louis Untermeyer, a self-styled popular critic, 
Untermeyer’s reading methods in fact shared much with those of the New 
Critics. Byrne’s case study focuses on commonalities between readings of 
William Carlos Williams’s “The Red Wheelbarrow” from, on the one hand, 
Untermeyer, and on the other, Brooks and Warren.
 Tracing the evolution of James Baldwin’s uneasy relationship to the New 
Critical vision of modernism, Adam Hammond reconsiders the New Crit-
ics’ anti-urban bias and the racist elements of Agrarian thought informing 
New Critical cultural commitments. Behind the anti-modernism of Baldwin’s 
Another Country, which for Hammond indicates both Baldwin’s self-parody 
and a rejection of the New Critical conceptions of modernism, lies a surpris-
ing history of Baldwin’s conflicted support for the New Critics’ anti-capital-
ist, anti-industrial cultural program.
 The collection’s last three essays reread New Critical thought with atten-
tion to aspects of New Critical theory and practice that might be used today 
toward revitalization of theory, criticism, and pedagogy. The first two high-
light overlooked facets of New Critical thought with a particular emphasis 
on how these might be set in dialogue with contemporary developments. 
Alexander MacLeod’s “Disagreeable Intellectual Distance: Rethinking the 
New Critics and Their Old Regionalism” focuses on the little-acknowledged 
complex theory of regionalism forged by the New Critics during the early 
Agrarian years, which MacLeod argues could benefit contemporary theoreti-
cal work on regionalism and cultural geography.
 Tara Lockhart’s “Teaching with Style” addresses New Critical peda-
gogy and its theoretical ramifications through a little-known area of New 
Critical work—on the genre of the essay. She features Cleanth Brooks and 
Robert Penn Warren’s An Approach to Literature (1936), the earliest and 
least-known of their highly influential textbooks, which, anomalously in their 
series, addresses pedagogical approaches to the essay. Generally, their text-
books featured poetry and short fiction, genres to which they most readily 
turned their methods and with which they showed greatest comfort; in con-
trast, their treatment of the essay registers a struggle, made evident through 
successive editions of An Approach to Literature, which Lockhart reads 
as especially revelatory of their commitment to teaching literature “as lit-
erature.” Calling for finer understanding of the evolution of New Critical 
pedagogical convictions, her article also suggests that contemporary literary 
pedagogy, particularly that concerned with the enigmatic category of “style” 
on which An Approach to Literature focuses in its discussion of the essay, has 
much to gain from Brooks and Warren’s example.
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 The volume’s closing essay, Cecily Devereux’s “‘A Kind of Dual Atten-
tiveness’: Close Reading after the New Criticism,” points back to the New 
Criticism in an article that, aligned with contemporary work from Jane Gal-
lop and Terry Eagleton, seeks a renewal of “close reading.” While Devereux 
remains wary of rehabilitating the kind of “close reading” advocated by the 
New Critics, “as the New Criticism represents . . . a problematic, exclusion-
ary, and deeply biased notion of the literary and of the discipline,” she none-
theless suggests that the emphasis the New Critics placed on close reading is 
one we should reconsider today. As she explains what’s at stake: “The call 
for a return to close reading is a call for English studies to define itself again” 
and clarify what constitutes the discipline’s distinctive object of study—what 
differentiates it from neighboring fields such as history, sociology, and phi-
losophy. The problem facing contemporary critics, however, is how to do so, 
and how thereby to reaffirm “the literary,” without “undermining the crucial 
late-twentieth-century expansion of the literary . . . beyond a limited, male-
dominated, Anglocentric, white canon of particular genres” associated with 
the New Criticism.
 Together, these articles seek to illuminate aspects of New Critical work 
that offer resources for rethinking contemporary approaches in literary and 
cultural studies, as well as the direction of the profession more generally. 
In 1970, retrospecting more than two decades after the heyday of the New 
Criticism, just as its academic sun was setting, Richard Ohmann reflected 
upon the “relevance” of literary culture as significantly shaped by the New 
Criticism in academic contexts of the mid- to late twentieth century. Look-
ing back on the previous two decades, cknowledging the wide impact of the 
New Criticism on the generations of readers that it had trained and inspired, 
he noted that, “[T]he New Criticism was the central intellectual force in 
our subculture during those years.” Accordingly, the educational culture in 
departments of English, he maintained, was far more robust during the New 
Critical heyday than it had been in previous generations. In 1970, however, 
acute awareness of an increasingly politicized counterculture in America and 
controversies about Vietnam was exposing the painful limits of a vision of 
the “study of literature” built from New Critical ideals. At that point Ohm-
ann meditated on the changing profession for a new wave of academics in 
English who would not be able so easily to avert attention from uncomfort-
able political realities as had academics of the 1950s and 1960s. In Ohm-
ann’s view, the New Critical vision had left professors of English—along 
with those who followed their ideas of a richly moral life derived from the 
study of literature—unfortunately insulated from the forces of the surround-
ing culture.
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 Forty years after this time of transition, this collection seeks to reopen the 
question of what the New Critics’ literary and cultural theory, approaches 
to close reading, vision of literary study, ethical directions, and pedagogical 
approaches, might offer us today. As the articles in this collection make clear, 
the New Criticism provided much of the foundation for what we still do now 
in literary studies; and if we are to reassess our situation at the outset of the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, if we are to avoid the kind of insu-
lation that Ohmann laments, we need to understand more richly the New 
Critical matrixes of conviction, professional drives, and intellectual and artis-
tic commitments from which so many of our contemporary practices derive.
Notes
 1. For useful information accounts of the Fugitives and the Southern Agrarians, see 
entries on the Fugitives and I’ll Take My Stand in The Companion to Southern Literature, 
ed. Joseph M. Flora, Lucinda Hardwick MacKethan, and Todd W. Taylor (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2002).
 2. For fuller discussion of the various schools of thought within the discipline of 
English against which the New Critics defined themselves, see Graff, Professing Literature, 
especially Chapters 8 and 9, and Graff, Literature against Itself, Chapter 5, “What Was 
New Criticism?”
 3. See also Allen Tate’s representation of this view in “Miss Emily and the Bibliogra-
pher” (141).
 4. See Atherton, Chapter 2.
 5. Eliot, in fact, would wryly distinguish himself from the New Critics in “The 
Frontiers of Criticism” (1956), deflecting the widely held belief that New Critical work 
“derived” from him: “I fail to see any critical movement which can be said to derive from 
myself” (529).
 6. On this point, see Graff, Professing Literature, 173.
 7. See Guillory, Chapter 3, “Ideology and Canonical Form: The New Critical Canon.”
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Rereading the New Criticism
P A r t  I

one of the chief objectives of this volume is to revisit and interrogate  the many myths that the concept of the New Criticism has accrued over 
the years—in order to shed new light on their origins, complicate them, and 
sometimes to overturn them. The essays featured in the volume’s first sec-
tion pay particular attention to addressing such received ideas, and other 
essays throughout the volume engage them as well. Connor Byrne’s essay 
opens by noting that this effort is certainly not new: as early as 1951, in 
“The Formalist Critics,” Cleanth Brooks famously sought to encapsulate and 
refute some of the “misunderstandings” about the New Criticism which had 
already accumulated by only a little more than a decade after its emergence. 
Many such misconceptions--what Robert Archambeau calls the “straw-man 
versions” of the New Criticism--stem from the assumption that the New 
Critics, qua formalist critics, were concerned solely with the “work itself” 
and what F. R. Leavis called “particular arrangements of words on the page” 
(by which, it is usually maintained, they meant matters of aesthetic technique 
only) at the expense of attention to all matters outside the realm of aesthetics 
that literature might address. After all, in “Criticism, Inc.,” the essay-cum-
manifesto that culminated John Crowe Ransom’s The World’s Body (1938), 
Ransom sharply differentiates the “proper business of criticism” from that 
of “historical studies,” “moral studies,” “linguistic studies,” and “personal 
registrations.” This was a book in which Ransom, later regarded as prime 
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mover behind the professional consolidation of the New Criticism, launched 
many of the ideas that would become fundamental to the New Criticism. The 
result of the New Critics’ accordance of prime attention to the “work itself” 
has been a raft of assumptions about what they ruled out of their critical 
ambit and thus are understood to have dismissed as unimportant. They have 
widely been seen as unconcerned with either authors’ intentions or readerly 
responses and as unengaged with politics, history, ethics, and societal condi-
tions relevant to a work of literature.
 The strategic disciplinary move that the New Critics made in order to 
establish the distinctness of the literary–critical endeavor also contributed 
to this widespread understanding of their criticism as dismissing what was 
beyond the text: they turned decisively away from approaches in the field 
of English that focused on literary history, read literature for philosophical 
insights, or appraised literature through overtly moral criteria. The polemical 
way in which they did so—in order to define and legitimize criticism during 
an era when criticism was widely regarded as a slight endeavor that “anyone 
could do”—often suggested that the work of these other approaches was less 
worthwhile than that of literary criticism. But according to New Critics such 
as Ransom and Brooks, New Critical distinctions between the “work itself” 
and what lay beyond it, and between criticism and other kinds of work with 
respect to literature, never implied that commentary that engaged extratex-
tual matters was without value, nor that they themselves ignored such mat-
ters altogether.
 Robert Archambeau’s opening essay focuses specifically on the myth that 
the New Critics remained aloof from ethical issues. Even when Ransom ruled 
out “moral studies” from the kind of literary criticism he supported, he was 
not banishing moral considerations from New Critical attention. Instead, 
he suggested that in order for the critic to discern the moral dimension of a 
literary text, rather than search for a moral “message” detachable from its 
aesthetic form, he had to assess what it implied morally as an organic whole, 
aesthetic dimensions and all. And as Archambeau notes, tracing the New 
Critics’ debt to German Romantic idealism—specifically to the ideas of Schil-
ler as transmitted through Coleridge, Arnold, and I. A. Richards—the New 
Critics in fact take an ethical position by way of their concern with aesthetics: 
one that reads the disinterested stance enabled by aesthetic contemplation as 
conducive to a balanced subjectivity, which in turn provides the foundation 
for ethical conduct. Other essays in this module, such as Alastair Morrison’s, 
similarly bring out the implicit ethics of the New Critics’ devotion to an anti-
instrumentalist perspective on the world, which they viewed as demonstrated 
and fostered both by the literature they admired and the critical methods 
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they espoused. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, when several figures 
who would later dominate the New Criticism were allied with the cause of 
Agrarianism in the American South, this anti-instrumentalist outlook was 
also associated by some of them with the Southern “way of life”—focused 
on art, beauty, gallantry, respect for tradition and custom, and stewardship 
of the land—which they opposed to a Northern ethos they understood as 
aridly rationalist, technophilic, pro-scientific, and capitalist.
 Morrison’s essay presses most on a second myth, related to the first, that 
the New Critics advocated a literary criticism that was “apolitical,” “politi-
cally quiescent,” or politically “neuter.” He homes in on a politics implicit in 
the New Critical formalist method—the “covert social and political agenda 
of formalism.” Even aside from the politics implied by the Southern Agrar-
ian position; apart from the commitment of Cambridge critics such as I. 
A. Richards and the Leavises to improving society through criticism (which 
Morrison reads as much more unabashedly political than the allegiances of 
their American counterparts); and besides the conservative politics suggested 
by the statements of T. S. Eliot, whose ideas often stand behind those of the 
New Critics, the political connotations of New Critical theory and formalism 
were, in Morrison’s reading, profoundly illiberal. In suggesting this, Morri-
son also addresses another prevalent misreading of the New Criticism: that 
it was the handmaiden of a hegemonic liberal democratic order. Morrison 
ultimately maintains that we need to differentiate between, on the one hand, 
what New Critical theory, manifestic statements, and practice implied as the 
movement coalesced, and on the other, what the New Criticism later became 
in the hands of those who made use of it.
 Aaron Shaheen, meanwhile, addresses the misconception that the New 
Critics were unconcerned with history and culture. Starting from Mark Jan-
covich’s contention in The Cultural Politics of the New Criticism that “the 
New Criticism never intended to divorce itself from history and culture,” 
he stresses that John Crowe Ransom, for one, should be read as grappling 
with cultural problems not only in his overtly Agrarian phase but also after-
ward, when he turned to a literary criticism only ostensibly separate from 
his Agrarian commitments. Shaheen traces a specific way in which Ransom 
carried out engagement with cultural developments of his historical moment 
through two distinct conceptions of androgyny that played out in both his 
cultural and literary criticism. Likewise focusing on Ransom, James Mat-
thew Wilson debunks the related widespread belief that, because the New 
Critics were supposedly not concerned with culture, their commitments were 
starkly different from, even opposed to, those of Frankfurt School philoso-
phers such as Theodor Adorno, and that certainly there was no commerce 
28 • Part I, Preface
between them. On the contrary, Wilson notes, as registered by a little- 
considered encounter between Ransom and Adorno in the pages of the Ken-
yon Review in 1945, Adorno’s essays significantly influenced some late-
career turns by Ransom, and the nature of the influence also reflects the 
subtle and unexpected “affinities” between Ransom’s and Adorno’s lines of 
cultural critique. Robert Archambeau observes in his essay that, given the 
New Critics’ opposition to instrumentalism, “in a meaningful sense, the New 
Critics are . . . Adorno’s cousins”; Wilson illuminates other specific ways in 
which Ransom’s and Adorno’s ideas crossed paths.
If I had belIeved everything that I was told about the New Critics when  I was in graduate school, I suppose I would have been more or less pre-
pared to conclude that they were a nefarious crowd of reactionaries, yearn-
ing for the good old days of a slaveholding American South while tuning 
out the wailings of the oppressed in order to relish a particularly convoluted 
irony, paradox, or poetic ambiguity. Among other things, I was told that the 
New Critics disdained Romanticism in favor of the complex ironies of the 
Metaphysical poets; that they were aesthetes, concerned with form but not 
with ethics; and that they had nothing in common with Continental liter-
ary theory, which spoke to our current condition in a way the New Critics 
simply could not. Such representations were not without an element of truth 
to them, of course: Eliot’s downgrading of the Romantics in favor of Donne 
& Co. was real enough, as was the turn to text over context in W. K. Wim-
satt’s The Verbal Icon, and no one would confuse the political dreams of the 
Fugitives with those of the Frankfurt School (or, for that matter, the prose of 
Robert Penn Warren with that of Theodor Adorno).
 Contrary to what I was told, though, it turns out that the New Criticism 
is in fact part of a long tradition of ethical thinking, a tradition that, in an 
apparent paradox, is ethical not despite, but because of, its insistence on aes-
theticism. Moreover, in an irony of a different kind than that so savored by 
the authors of Understanding Poetry, this tradition is fundamentally Roman-
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tic in its origins and characteristic gestures of thought. So my first thesis here 
is that the New Criticism, contrary to received opinion, is an ethically based 
criticism. My second thesis, which is really only a half a thesis, deeply pro-
visional in recognition of how much further work needs to be done before it 
could be fully embraced, is that New Critical thinking may prove to be an 
important kind of ethical thought for our time.
“N.C. = formalist”
If the ideas about the New Criticism I’d encountered in graduate school were 
so distorted, how did they become so widespread? I’m inclined to believe 
there’s some truth to Mark Bauerlein’s assessment in his article “What We 
Owe the New Critics.” Bauerlein contends that the generation of American 
critics emerging in the wake of the 1966 Johns Hopkins conference on struc-
turalism—the conference that so famously awakened the American academy 
to Continental models of criticism—still held the New Critics in some esteem, 
even when they disagreed with them. By 1980, however, the next generation 
of American critics “looked not directly at the New Critics, but through the 
eyes of their mentors, the first-generation theorists, and they assumed only 
the negative side of their mentors’ critique.” Where critics such as Frank Len-
tricchia and Geoffrey Hartman had known the New Criticism at first hand, 
and taken it seriously even as they rejected its tenets, “for younger readers 
the message lay all in the titles” of Lentricchia’s After the New Criticism and 
Hartman’s Beyond Formalism (B6). One need not engage the benighted New 
Critics directly, or so it seemed to a generation of graduate students ready to 
embrace a newer, hipper, and more European set of thinkers. As Bauerlein 
points out, direct and detailed knowledge of the New Criticism fell so much 
out of favor that, by 2001, the editors of The Norton Anthology of Theory 
and Criticism, ever-sensitive to market demand, released an edition of their 
book “whose 2,624 pages do not contain anything by the main originator of 
New Criticism, [I. A.] Richards, one of the greatest and most influential liter-
ary theorists of the century” (B6).
 Given the apparent lack of interest in exposure to Richards’s primary 
texts, it is worth considering what one would learn about Richards if one 
got one’s ideas about him chiefly from secondary sources during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century. The same holds true for the New Critics 
for whom Richards was such a formative influence. Though we must tread 
carefully here, being mindful of the important divergences not only among 
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the work of the New Critics themselves but also of the more significant ways 
in which they, individually and collectively, departed from Richards, we nev-
ertheless find the same pattern of misreading. Indeed if we take three such 
secondary sources—the entries on the New Criticism in M. H. Abrams’s A 
Glossary of Literary Terms and Roger Fowler’s A Dictionary of Modern Crit-
ical Terms and the section on the New Criticism in Terry Eagleton’s Literary 
Theory: An Introduction—as representative, we find two significant trends. 
First, all three sources make much of the most formalistic, and least ethical, 
of New Critical texts (such as Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “fallacy” essays); 
secondly, these sources pave the way for the sidelining of I. A. Richards in 
The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism by truncating his theories 
and depriving them of much of the ethical dimension they pick up from the 
Romantic tradition of thought about aesthetics and ethics.
 Abrams acknowledges the differences between various representatives 
of the New Criticism, but nevertheless holds the following to be gener-
ally accepted principles of the movement: the ideal of aesthetic autonomy, 
in which “a poem should be regarded as an independent and self-sufficient 
object”; and the embracing of formalism to the exclusion of ethics, in which 
critics “eschew recourse” to the poem’s “psychological and moral effects on 
the reader” (117). This last point is important, since it is I. A. Richards’s 
emphasis on the psychology and moral state of the reader, and his linking of 
these things to the idea of aesthetic autonomy, that most strongly links both 
him and the New Critics who followed to the Romantic tradition of aesthet-
ics and ethics. While Abrams does present Richards as central to the New 
Criticism, he doesn’t take the “reconciliation of diverse impulses” to be some-
thing that happens in the reader, as part of the ethical work of poetry. Rather, 
Abrams limits this reconciliation to textual matters, relating it to verbal irony 
and paradox (118). A reader working up his study notes for a mid-1990s 
graduate exam in literary theory from Abrams’s glossary could be forgiven 
for jotting down something like “N.C. = formalist = text only = not interested 
in ethics/world beyond text.” He might even have gone on to pass the exam 
with distinction, and perpetuate the misrepresentation at a small Midwestern 
liberal arts college for several years before discovering the error of his ways.
 Malcolm Bradbury, writing for Roger Fowler’s A Dictionary of Modern 
Critical Terms, does a better job than Abrams in presenting the Romantic 
roots of Richards’s thought, but in his essay on the New Criticism, he stresses 
the formalist applications of Richards’s thought and truncates the ethical 
theory that Richards arrived at through the treatment of the psychological 
effects of poetry:
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Richards’s development of Romantic theories of form as the systemization 
and harmonizing of elements in poetry, with its idea of the poem as a com-
plex activity of meaning, inspired many of the key terms and concepts of the 
New Criticism: ambiguity, irony, paradox, tension, gesture, etc. However, 
Richards’s attempt to locate this complexity in the psychological effects of 
poetry, rather than the linguistic structure of the work, had failed to produce 
immediately useful descriptive attitudes and terminology. (160)
With so much else in the Bradbury’s entry confirming the main hypothesis of 
a nonethical, formalist New Criticism, it doesn’t seem likely that this passage 
would much alter the notes of our hypothetical grad student as he feverishly 
crammed for his exam in his library carrel.
 But what of Eagleton? In that ne plus ultra source of conventional semi-
nar-room wisdom of the late twentieth century, Literary Theory: An Introduc-
tion, Terry Eagleton does acknowledge, albeit briefly, an ethical dimension to 
the thought of Richards and the American critics who studied his work. The 
way Eagleton depicts Richards’s ethics, though, hardly recommends them. 
The New Criticism “stopped short of a full-blooded formalism,” says Eagle-
ton, because of the interest Richards and others took in the effect of the text 
on the reader. “The literary text, “ says Eagleton, “for American New Criti-
cism as for I. A. Richards . . . was also to induce in the reader a definite ideo-
logical attitude to the world—one, roughly, of contemplative acceptance” 
(47). The ethos of the New Criticism, as rendered by Eagleton, is particularly 
passive and, in the face of the moral urgencies of the world, rather loath-
some. Our grad student may well have snorted derisively at the irresponsi-
bility of Eagleton’s New Critics, before adding “reactionary/quietist” to his 
notes.
 Particularly striking about this flattening out of our image of the New 
Criticism is how persistent it has been. Even the small number of younger 
critics who have begun, in the last few years, to advocate revisiting the New 
Critics tend not to look to them for ethical thinking, but for formalism. Bau-
erlein, for example, lauds Garrick Davis’s anthology Praising It New: The 
Best of the New Criticism, without any mention of the ethical dimension 
of the New Critical movement. He chooses instead to stress formalism, and 
Davis’s sensitivity to the New Critical “focus on a poem’s verbal detail” (B6). 
In a similar vein, Rónán McDonald praises the New Critics in The Death of 
the Critic, but without significant reference to the ethical dimension of their 
thought. His characterization of the New Critics bears a strong resemblance 
to the Abrams–Bradbury–Eagleton version:
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The central plank of the New Criticism was focusing on the text-as-text, 
without befuddling the issue with any appeals to authorial intention (let 
alone biography), historical background, or reader response. The classic 
exposition of the New Critical rebuttal of the author’s intention and the 
reader’s response are recorded in two essays by W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. 
Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy” and “The Affective Fallacy.” (97)
It is all there: the centrality of the highly formalist Wimsatt and Beardsley, the 
emphasis on text alone, and the downplaying of any reader-response dimen-
sion. With friends who see it only in these terms, perhaps the New Criticism 
needs no enemies.
Affairs of the Moral World
An advocate of the New Criticism who wished to go beyond the (certainly 
worthwhile, but just as certainly limited) emphasis on form would do well 
to place the New Criticism in the context of its intellectual tradition. That 
tradition, in its broadest compass, extends back as far as Lord Shaftesbury’s 
response to the thinking of Hobbes and Locke, but for our purposes Schiller’s 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man and Coleridge’s On the Constitu-
tion of Church and State may be taken as the foundational texts of a tradi-
tion of thinking about aesthetics as ethics, a tradition that finds its way into 
the work of I. A. Richards and, after him, many of the New Critics via Mat-
thew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy.
 When Schiller composed the letters that made up On the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Man in the mid-1790s, he had good reason to doubt the relevance, 
even the decency, of so apparently trivial and amoral an endeavor as a study 
of aesthetics. These were tumultuous times, in which the reign of terror and 
its aftermath in France seemed to render mere formal and aesthetic matters 
irrelevant. “Is it not at least unseasonable to be looking around for a code of 
laws for the aesthetic world, when the affairs of the moral world provide an 
interest that is so much keener?” he asks near the beginning of his inquiry 
(25). He provides an answer almost immediately, though, telling us that aes-
thetics are no mere frivolity in times of revolutionary bloodshed, because “we 
must indeed, if we are to solve that political problem in practice, follow the 
path of aesthetics, since it is through Beauty that we arrive at Freedom” (27). 
In addition to his political anxieties, Schiller was motivated in his aesthetic 
thinking by a sense that modern commercial and industrial society’s division 
34 • Part I, Chapter 1
of labor would damage the human psyche. New labor conditions, Schiller 
wrote, would cause “whole classes of human beings” to develop “only a part 
of their capacities” (38), a state of affairs that would reduce a manager or a 
laborer to nothing more than “the imprint of his occupation” (40). Only a 
disinterested approach to art, he argued, could give free play to all our facul-
ties and save us from such an attenuation of our human wholeness. A pow-
erful ethics, one that could ameliorate the modern political and economic 
condition, would open up to us from within an aesthetics.
 Schiller approaches this aesthetics-as-ethics in On the Aesthetic Education 
of Man through a theory of a two-sided human nature. The first part of our 
nature consists of what Schiller calls the Stofftrieb or Sinnestrieb, a kind of 
sense-oriented self-interest, a collection of appetites and desires. The second 
part of our nature is the Formtrieb, something like our reason, but more spe-
cific: it is our drive to impose order on our experience, to create moral and 
conceptual systems. Neither of these parts of our nature should be allowed to 
dominate the other, lest we become imbalanced creatures. An excess of Stoff-
trieb without Formtrieb would either reduce us to mere appetites (think of 
Charles Dickens’s image of the industrial workers of Hard Times as nothing 
but hands and stomachs), or turn us into monsters of self-interest, exerting a 
Nietzschean will to power over our rivals. For a creature of Stofftrieb all is 
interest and nothing disinterest: something exists for him “only insofar as it 
secures existence for him; what neither gives to him nor takes from him, is 
to him simply not there” (113). If we become creatures of Stofftrieb, we may 
be curbed from dangerous behavior by the agents of law, but we will experi-
ence this law “only as fetters,” neither understanding the law’s rationale nor 
respecting its agents when we can avoid or overpower them (118).
 The inverse situation, in which we have an excess of Formtrieb without 
sufficient Stofftrieb, is no better. Without an appreciation for the senses and 
the particularities of the material world, the man of Formtrieb becomes “a 
stranger in the material world” (42). Worshipping only his abstract system, 
he will be a figure as disconnected from quotidian existence as the scientists 
of Laputa in Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and a monster as ruthless as the Robe-
spierre who so terrorized the opponents of his revolution during the years 
when Schiller composed On the Aesthetic Education of Man. One imagines 
Schiller may have had Robespierre and the other bloody-handed philosophes 
of France in mind when, describing the man in whom Formtrieb triumphs 
over Stofftrieb, he wrote that such an “abstract thinker very often has a cold 
heart” (42).
 For Schiller, human development tends to follow a tripartite pattern, 
in which we leave our initial unselfconscious life as creatures of Stofftrieb, 
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pass through a phase when we are overly governed by Formtrieb, and finally 
become fully integrated creatures, in whom both urges are fully developed 
and fully reconciled. We are capable of such a reconciliation only through the 
cultivation of a third drive, the Spieltreib or play instinct. Man is “only Man 
when he is playing,” writes Schiller (80), because it is only play that allows 
for a full recognition and engagement of both the senses and the urge for rules 
and order. The whole person is recognized and fulfilled in play. And play is 
most fully available to us through art, because the “cultivation of beauty” 
will “unite within itself” the “two contradictory qualities” of our nature (55). 
Art will, by its sensuous embodiment in its medium, “secure the sense faculty 
against the encroachments of its freedom” by the Formtrieb’s desire to reduce 
everything to definitive order (anyone who has ever felt that a poem must 
not mean but be, or that a painting is not reducible to its description, has 
lived a Schillerian moment). Conversely, art will by virtue of its orderliness or 
engagement with pattern rescue us from “the power of sensation” alone (69). 
For Schiller, we become our whole selves through making or appreciating 
works of art.
 For art to function as the reconciler of our divided nature, it must be 
autonomous. That is, art that seeks to make a particular moral or ideologi-
cal point, or serve some particular useful purpose—be it ecclesiastical, finan-
cial, didactic, or political—cannot be the site where we reconcile our divided 
drives. “Beauty gives no individual result whatever . . . it realizes no indi-
vidual purpose, either intellectual or moral,” writes Schiller, “it discovers no 
individual truth, helps us perform no individual duty” and when we have 
appreciated it, nothing specific has been accomplished except that the appre-
ciator “has had completely restored to him the freedom to be what he ought 
to be,” an integrated being (101). Content itself should be of no importance 
in the work of art, because
In a truly beautiful work of art the content should do nothing, the form 
everything; for the wholeness of man is affected by the form alone, and the 
individual powers by the content. However sublime and comprehensive it 
may be, the content always has a restrictive action upon the spirit, and only 
from the form is true aesthetic freedom to be expected. (106)
It is in fact form that reforms man: the work of art’s inner balance is more 
important than any specific goal, statement, or function. The formalis-
tic appreciation of an art free of specific purpose gives us the opportunity 
to balance our drives, and so distances us from both cold reason and blind 
self-interest.
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 The experience of the aesthetic is, in Schiller’s view, of vital ethical impor-
tance, in that it constructs a subjectivity fit for the modern world of democ-
racy and industrial specialization. Aesthetic experience can prepare us to be 
citizens of a democratically reformed state because aesthetic experience is the 
surest means of enabling us to ameliorate the individual material self-interest 
represented by the Stofftrieb; and also the surest means of enabling us to 
temper the systematic excesses of the Formtrieb. If he is to choose freely to 
enter into a democratic state, the cultivation of the whole or balanced man 
is absolutely necessary. “This much is certain,” says Schiller: “only the pre-
dominance of such a character among a people can complete without harm 
the transformation of a State according to moral principles, and only such a 
character too can guarantee its perpetuation” (31). Aesthetic experience, it 
turns out, supplies the precondition for citizenship.
 Aesthetic experience also saves us from the truncation of experience 
forced upon us by modern industrial specialization. Whereas in ancient 
Greece (as imagined by Schiller) each citizen could “become a whole in him-
self,” the modern specialized world gives us a situation of specialized func-
tions, “a more rigorous dissociation of ranks and occupations” in which “the 
essential bond of human nature” is torn apart and “a ruinous conflict sets its 
harmonious powers at variance.” While Schiller was not blind to the overall 
benefits of specialization, he was also cognizant of how in “confining our 
activity to a single sphere we have handed ourselves over to a master who is 
not infrequently inclined to end up by suppressing the rest of our capacities” 
(39). To divide the economic functions was to risk dividing the human psyche 
and rendering the ethical life difficult, if not impossible.
Aesthetic Subjectivities: Bildung, Clerisy, Best Self
The path from Schiller’s Romantic aesthetics-as-ethics theory to Richards 
and on to the New Criticism runs through Coleridge, who brought so much 
of German idealism to the Anglophone world. When, in his On the Con-
stitution of Church and State, Coleridge calls for educational practices that 
support “the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that 
characterize our humanity,” he is importing Schillerian thinking to England 
(67). Balanced subjectivity is in danger of being lost in a world of specializa-
tion and commerce, and for Coleridge as for Schiller, rescue will come in the 
form of an aesthetic education or Bildung, a process Coleridge is the first in 
England to call “cultivation” (Williams, 61). Where Coleridge differs from 
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Schiller, though, is in the degree to which he foresees an institutionalizing 
of aesthetic education. Although Schiller wrote of aesthetic education as a 
prerequisite for citizenship in a peaceful state, he did not write extensively 
about the creation of institutions to support such education. With Schiller, 
the autonomous aesthetic became a path for individual cultivation in a world 
of specialization, a kind of personal salvation and a prerequisite to citizen-
ship. Coleridge, however, dreamed of a national institution devoted in large 
measure to disinterested knowledge and aesthetic contemplation and of the 
creation of a whole new class of people, the clerisy. He called, in On the Con-
stitution of Church and State, for the national “support and maintenance of 
a permanent class or order” devoted to cultivation (76). As D. J. Palmer has 
argued, Coleridge’s idea of the clerisy presaged state education in the humani-
ties, particularly literature, and would eventually give “impetus and shaping 
spirit to English studies” (40). With Coleridge, we are well on our way to the 
establishment not only of New Critical thinking, but of the kind of academic 
department that would, for decades, provide the New Critics with a home 
and an audience.
 The person who would do the most to take Coleridge’s ideas and make 
them central to an education system was Matthew Arnold. If Coleridge was a 
dreaming prophet of culture, Arnold was, in Ian Hunter’s memorable phrase, 
“the prophet of culture armed” (15). Arnold felt that individual integrity and 
the safety of his society could be preserved only by the creation, via educa-
tion, of a group of people who could cultivate a disinterested “best self.” 
Without such a disinterested class, all would fall into a Hobbesian war of 
clashing self-interest, “for we have seen how much of our disorders and per-
plexities is due to the disbelief . . . in a paramount best self” (202). As Lionel 
Trilling put it, “given divergent interests and conflicting parties” in the Victo-
rian class struggle, Arnold’s goal was to “create a perfectly fair umpire . . . to 
deal reasonably and for the good of all” (230). What was needed was a dis-
interested umpire subjectivity without strong prejudice toward any side in the 
struggle.
 How could such a disinterested umpire class come into being? The 
Arnoldian proposition is deeply reminiscent of Schiller’s ideal of aesthetic 
education: for both thinkers disinterest comes about as the realization of 
the whole person and all of his faculties, and involves the study of aesthetic 
objects (including works of literature) conceived of as autonomous. For 
Arnold as for Schiller, “culture” is no mere collection of polite knowledge. 
Rather, it is an ongoing action, a deliberate cultivation that fulfills an urge 
toward the development of “all sides of our humanity” (11). True culture 
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works toward this without regard to knowledge’s utility or potential for 
advancing our particular interests (6). The kind of study Arnold advocates 
would, he hoped, create a “disinterestedness” and an “independence of 
machinery”—that is, independence from instrumental reason—in the student 
(33). The subject of Arnoldian culture, like that of Schiller’s Bildung, will be 
able to distance his understanding from his appetites, interests, and desires, 
“subduing” the “great obvious faults of our animality” (57).
 With Arnold as with Schiller, autonomous aesthetic objects and disinter-
ested appreciations of the aesthetic—particularly of literature—play central 
roles in the creation of a relatively disinterested subjectivity. Arnold realized 
that the pursuit of aesthetics for its own sake may seem frivolous in the utili-
tarian climate of Victorian England, saying “it cannot but acutely try a con-
science to be accused, in a practical country like ours, of keeping aloof from 
the work and hope of a multitude of earnest-hearted men, and of merely 
toying with poetry and aesthetics” (96). But such apparently useless study 
is a matter of the utmost social urgency, says Arnold, for “we find no basis 
for a firm State-power in our ordinary selves”—but the disinterested study 
of aesthetic objects can lead us to “our best self,” the version of ourselves to 
which we may entrust the State (96). Indeed, Arnold comes to see poetry, the 
most apparently autonomous of literary forms, as the exemplary bearer of 
the standard of autonomous beauty that will push us in no particular ideo-
logical direction, and serve no particular useful purpose, other than helping 
us develop a fully balanced “character of human perfection” (54). For Arnold 
poetry can, in fact, serve as a model for culture as a whole, for “culture is of 
like spirit with poetry, follows one law with poetry” in its anti-utilitarian, 
anti-instrumental autonomy (54).
 The Romantic tradition of aesthetics-as-ethics launched by Schiller and 
Coleridge and developed by Arnold makes such apparently unsocial things 
as disinterest, aesthetic autonomy, and formalism central to the creation of a 
subjectivity capable of distancing itself from mere appetite and self-interested 
instrumental reason. While all this represents (to take up Terry Eagleton’s 
phrase) “a definite ideological attitude to the world,” it certainly is not an 
attitude “of contemplative acceptance” (47). It is more like an attitude of 
contemplative vigilance, such as a good administrator of a state regulatory 
agency or an officer of the law is meant to take toward those who would 
bend or break social regulations to advance their self-interests. Eagleton, of 
course, wasn’t describing Schiller or Coleridge or Arnold: he was describing 
the New Critics. But the New Criticism that he so casually dismissed embod-
ied, in some of its most influential works, exactly the Romantic tradition we 
have been examining.
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Avatars of Schiller
As he took up these strands of the Romantic tradition, I. A. Richards, like 
Schiller, saw disinterested, formalistic literary study and the autonomous aes-
thetic experience as leading to a balancing of our various drives—a balancing 
act with ethical and even political implications. Perhaps it shouldn’t be sur-
prising to find this Romantic strand in the weave of Richards’s thought: he 
did, after all, write a book on Coleridge, and his first book, The Foundations 
of Aesthetics, contains a précis of Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Educa-
tion of Man. That summary is quite sympathetic, with the caveat that Schil-
ler, lacking access to the cognitive tools of modern psychology, gave a “too 
simple” description of the different inner drives that formalist contemplation 
would balance (though Richards also notes that theorists of modern psychol-
ogy would benefit from an appreciation of Schiller’s aesthetics) (84–86).
 In some respects, Richards’s theories are very much in line with the kind of 
representation given them by commentators such as Abrams, Bradbury, and 
Eagleton. The attention of the reader, for example, is to be focused largely on 
formal matters, and “the intellectual examination of the internal coherence of 
the poem” is the method by which Richards suggests the critic proceed (Prac-
tical Criticism, 261). Matters of form, for Richards as for Schiller, are more 
fundamental than matters of content—a condition he finds just as prevalent 
among general readers as among critics:
[I]t would seem evident that poetry which has been built upon firm and 
definite beliefs about the world, The Divine Comedy or Paradise Lost, or 
Donne’s Divine Poems, or Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, or Hardy’s The 
Dynasts, must appear differently to readers who do and readers who do not 
hold similar beliefs. Yet in fact most readers, and nearly all good readers, are 
very little disturbed by even a direct opposition between their own beliefs 
and the beliefs of the poet. (255)
“Doctrine,” to use Richards’s term for the ideological content of literature, 
fades into near irrelevance here. But nowhere does Richards sound more like 
the stereotype of the New Critic than when he tells us that irony “consists in 
the bringing in of the opposite, the complementary impulses . . . that is why 
irony itself is so constantly a characteristic of [first-rate] poetry” (Principles 
of Literary Criticism, 250).
 As in the Romantic tradition initiated by Schiller, however, this apprecia-
tion of internal coherences and ironies is connected with the creation of an 
ethical subjectivity distanced from its own most immediately self-interested 
40 • Part I, Chapter 1
impulses. Richards’s thinking involves a kind of mirroring (with modifica-
tions) of Schiller’s theory of the balancing of opposed drives in the experience 
of art. Aesthetic experience tempers what Richards calls emotional belief with 
intellectual belief in a process much like the interplay of Stofftrieb and Form-
trieb in Schiller. Without such tempering, says Richards, we would behave as 
primitives, indulging self-interest and bending truth to fit our desires:
In primitive man . . . any idea which opens a ready outlet to emotion or 
points to a line of action in conformity with custom is quickly believed. . . . 
Given a need (whether conscious as a desire) or not, any idea which can 
be taken as a step on the way to its fulfillment is accepted. . . . This accep-
tance, this use of the idea—by our interests, our desires, feelings, attitudes, 
tendencies to action and what not—is emotional belief. (Practical Criticism, 
258–59)
Without a balancing of intellect and emotion, we’re left with little more than 
a crude will to power.
 By contrast, the aesthetic experience, for Richards, harmonizes our con-
flicting interests. The results are very much in the tradition of Schiller, since 
an engagement of a broader spectrum of our urges and impulses moves us 
toward a balanced subjectivity: “the equilibrium of opposed impulses” in 
“aesthetic responses,” Richards notes in Principles of Literary Criticism, 
“brings into play far more of our personality than is possible in experiences 
of a more defined emotion.” Our appreciation of the world becomes broader 
than it would have been had we made our perception and thought instru-
mental to self-interest: “more facets of the mind are exposed and, what is the 
same thing, more aspects of things are able to affect us” (251–52). Moreover, 
and in a further parallel to Schiller and the Romantic tradition, Richards 
envisions this process as leading us to a state of disinterestedness:
To respond, not through one narrow channel of interest, but simultaneously 
and coherently through many, is to be disinterested in the only sense of the 
word which concerns us here. A state of mind which is not disinterested is 
one which sees things only from one standpoint or under one aspect. At the 
same time, since more of our personality is engaged the independence and 
individuality of other things becomes greater. We seem to see ‘all round’ 
them, to see them as they really are; we see them apart from any one par-
ticular interest which they may have for us. Of course without some inter-
est, we should not see them at all, but the less any one particular interest is 
indispensable, the more detached our attitude becomes. And to say that we 
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are impersonal is merely a curious way of saying that our personality is more 
completely involved. (252)
Richards—whose experience of the broad variety of lamentable responses to 
literature is famously documented in his analysis of student responses to de-
contextualized poems in Practical Criticism—is not, of course, so naive as to 
believe that exposure to aesthetic contemplation will necessarily lead to this 
result. But in the end he shares much of the qualified optimism of the Roman-
tic tradition, writing that appreciation of formal balance in “the construction 
of the work of art” may well “predispose [us] to,” even if it is “not necessar-
ily followed by, equilibrium” (Foundations of Aesthetics, 87).
 This kind of thinking is by no means marginal to Richards’s work: argu-
ments of this kind receive full-chapter treatments in Foundations of Aesthet-
ics, Practical Criticism, Principles of Literary Criticism and in Science and 
Poetry. Even the treatment of emotive and referential meaning in The Mean-
ing of Meaning reinforces the Schillerian-Romantic tradition. As John Con-
stable has pointed out, Richards’s argument in The Meaning of Meaning is 
part-and-parcel of his later articulation of a theory of aesthetic experience 
bringing “as many of an individual’s appetencies (i.e., their interests, their 
desires) into as harmonious a balance as is possible” (Constable).
 Richards isn’t alone, either: the Romantic tradition permeates New Criti-
cal thinking itself, perhaps more thoroughly than we have been able or will-
ing to acknowledge. Consider René Wellek and Austin Warren’s position in 
their grand synthesis of New Critical thought, Theory of Literature:
When the work of literature functions successfully, the two ‘notes’ of plea-
sure and utility should not merely coexist but coalesce. The pleasure of 
literature, we need to maintain, is not one preference among a long list of 
possible pleasures but is a ‘higher pleasure’ because pleasure in a higher kind 
of activity, i.e., non-acquisitive contemplation. (31)
Whatever one may think of their hierarchy of pleasures, one has to admit that 
the idea of mingling two kinds of urges in aesthetic experience—one more 
appetitive, the other more rational—echoes the Romantic tradition, as does 
the creation (in the form of “non-acquisitive contemplation”) of a disinter-
ested subjectivity that eschews instrumental reason. Their thinking is, to a 
surprising degree, ethical—not through any emphasis on what they dismiss 
as a mere “helpful moral lesson” gleaned from the content of the work of 
art, but from a kind of contemplation that creates a new ethos in the reader 
(31). While Wellek and Warren may consider literature to be “pure of practi-
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cal intent (propaganda, incitation to direct, immediate action)” (239), they 
see the aesthetic itself, and the formalist engagement of the work of art, as 
fundamentally ethical. Apostles of Being and Time may be surprised to hear 
echoes of Heidegger’s opposition to instrumentality via poesis in Wellek and 
Warren’s advocacy of an aesthetically conditioned subjectivity, a subjectivity 
that doesn’t “endeavor to . . . appropriate or consume” (241). For that mat-
ter, those who derive their ethics and politics from Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
critique of instrumental reason in Dialectic of Enlightenment may be sur-
prised to find allied strands of thought in the New Criticism. Had the origins 
of New Critical thinking in German Romanticism been kept more in the 
foreground, of course, such surprise would be unwarranted: in a meaningful 
sense, the New Critics are, in fact, Adorno’s cousins.
 The political positions of the various New Critics, of course, don’t much 
resemble those of Heidegger, nor do they bear much resemblance to those of 
Adorno. But their political positions are not, as is often assumed, extrinsic to 
their literary theory. The anti-modern, anti-industrial agrarianism of the Fugi-
tives, for example, is predicated on the same kind of anti-instrumentalism 
we see in so much New Critical aesthetic theory. When, for example, John 
Crowe Ransom defines the enemies of his agrarian political program in God 
without Thunder as “Work, Power, Activity, Business, Industry, Production” 
(177), his principles are as profoundly anti-instrumentalist as those of any 
Frankfurt School thinker—he merely follows the vector of such ethics in a 
different political direction. Similarly, when I. A. Richards defines a just soci-
ety in liberal terms as “one in which no faction, no pressure group, no self-
interested power-seeker, can push the rest of the citizens around,” by seeking 
the “aggrandizement” of self-interest, he too derives his politics from the 
Schillerian ethics of balance and disinterest (Speculative Instruments, 107–8).
 There are, of course, instances where New Critics limit their thinking to 
formalism. Indeed, the emphasis on the balancing of opposites as a merely 
textual matter in, say, Cleanth Brooks’s “Irony as a Principle of Structure” 
may be taken as a kind of truncation of the Romantic tradition. But to privi-
lege this abridged version of the New Criticism over the version more fully in 
touch with the ethical dimensions of its Romantic roots is to give oneself a 
straw-man version of the New Criticism to attack.
Canonicity, Dialogism, and the New Criticism
Of course not all attacks on the New Criticism are attacks on straw men. 
I know of no more powerful detractor of the New Critics than William V. 
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Spanos, whose criticisms carry weight in no small measure due the fact that 
he is one of the few detractors to attack New Criticism on the level of its oft-
overlooked ethical base. Even these attacks, however, have their weaknesses, 
and it is in the face of these weaknesses that I venture to advance my second 
thesis, or half-thesis. My tentative hypothesis is this: the Romantic tradition 
as manifested in the twentieth-century Anglo-American academy by the New 
Criticism) is worth taking seriously, not only as a formalism, but as an ethics.
 Spanos is to be applauded for his understanding of the Romantic and 
ethical roots of the New Criticism, and for placing the thought of Richards in 
the context of Matthew Arnold. But the two main arguments Spanos levels 
against I. A. Richards and the New Criticism in his enormous article “The 
Apollonian Investment of Modern Humanist Education” are both funda-
mentally flawed. The first (and the less significant) argument is based on links 
between disinterest and exclusive notions of canonicity—links that turn out 
to be accidental rather than essential. The second (and far more profound) 
argument is predicated on what I take to be a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the ethical dimension of disinterest.
 The first argument maintains that inquiry aiming at formal disinterest 
will necessarily serve as a screen for received prejudices about what counts 
as a work worthy of canonical status. Advocates of disinterest, says Spanos, 
merely reaffirm “the abiding ‘touchstones’ of the logocentric humanistic 
mind—‘the best that has been thought and said in the world’ (by which, as 
the omission of reference to any other makes clear . . . means the Western 
world).” Critics committed to disinterested inquiry will always end up seek-
ing a cultural “re-centering,” a “restoration of a common body of knowl-
edge” (19–20) based on old ideas of a Western high-art canon. Assertions of 
this kind are easy enough to refute by citing empirical evidence, and such evi-
dence is easy enough to come by. Here, for example, is the testimony of poet 
and critic Stephen Burt, looking back on his graduate education in the 1990s:
[T]hose of us who follow both older kinds of art well-treated within the 
academy (e.g. written poetry in English) and newer kinds that have yet to 
find secure homes there . . . have had the odd experience of seeing “close 
reading” and structural analysis attacked by would-be authority figures 
who cover the older kinds, even as close attention to how works of art 
are made, and what happens “inside” them, are ever more in demand as 
regards the newer kinds. Ten years ago twenty-somethings in top graduate 
programs were being taught (wrongly) to look down on an influential book 
called Understanding Poetry even as they were reading, and recommend-
ing (rightly), a then-new book called Understanding Comics, a book (itself 
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in comics form) that remains the foundation for the arguments about that 
art . . . (Burt)
The facts, it seems, are against Spanos—though perhaps we can forgive him, 
given that he made his argument several years before the “odd experience” 
Burt describes took place.
 A much more serious argument against the New Criticism (and, indeed, 
the whole tradition behind it, going back to Arnold and Schiller) concerns 
the relationship between dialogism—with all of its ethical and political con-
notations—and disinterest. For Spanos, Richards’s commitment to disinter-
estedness and the balance of inner drives implies a normative subjectivity 
and, along with it, a monologic ethos. “The structure of balanced inclusion,” 
writes Spanos,
constitutes Richards’s (and, however unevenly developed, the New Critics’) 
ideal model for psyche, poem, culture, socius, state, etc. All these sites are 
implied in some degree or other in any particular one of his texts, whether 
such a text is centrally about psychology, the principles of literary criticism, 
the pedagogy of literary interpretation, the idea of the university, culture, or 
national or international politics. Further, Richards’s account of the ideal 
poem (and society) is an up-dating of Arnold’s “disinterestedness,” his Apol-
lonian commitment against intellectual provincialism, to seeing life steadily 
and seeing it whole. (54)
Intellectual provincialism, here, refers to knowledge motivated by self-inter-
ested advocacy or (in Spanos’s own somewhat unfortunate phrase) “preju-
diced knowledge.” Spanos would “rehabilitate or de-colonize prejudice, i.e., 
as the interest which activates inquiry” (55). That is, Spanos sees disinter-
est as a way of excluding dialogue and dismissing views that can be labeled 
“interested.” His language devolves into a bit of a thicket, but the point can 
still be gleaned from passages such as this:
Richards . . . categorically dismisses as inevitably activating intellectual war-
fare precisely what, given the contemporary demystification of the binary 
logic of metaphysics, now appears to the postmodern counter-memory to be 
the most suggestively valuable possibility in Plato’s discourse: an originative 
thinking or, more specifically, a hermeneutics of understanding as antago-
nistic dialogue, which is ‘grounded’ on and emerges from the acknowledged 
uncertainty of the decentered occasion of human ‘being.’ The oxymoron I 
am invoking is, of course, Mikhail Bakhtin’s. (61)
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“Understanding as antagonistic dialogue” is the key phrase here: for Spanos, 
Richards’s emphasis on disinterest implies an exclusion of the clash of view-
points. As the invocation of Bakhtin makes clear, Spanos is charging Richards 
(along with the other New Critics and, behind them, the tradition running 
back through Arnold to Schiller) with monologism.
 This, however, involves a fundamental misunderstanding of what is meant 
by disinterest. When Richards wrote of disinterested aesthetic response as 
proceeding “not through one narrow channel of interest, but simultaneously 
and coherently through many,” he was advocating a state of mind open to 
exactly the kind of Bakhtinian dialogue Spanos has in mind. One need not 
listen too hard to hear the echoes of Bakhtin when Richards says “a state of 
mind which is not disinterested is one which sees things only from one stand-
point or under one aspect,” or when he tells us that with disinterest “we seem 
to see ‘all round’ [things] . . . we see them apart from any one particular inter-
est which they may have for us (Principles of Literary Criticism, 252). This is 
very much in line with the dialogic inter-illumination of different languages 
Bakhtin had in mind when he wrote of how “languages throw light on one 
another: one language can, after all, see itself only in the light of another lan-
guage” (“Epic and Novel,” 12). The disinterested mind, as Richards defines 
it, is the dialogic mind. It is the self-interested mind, the antagonistic mind 
of the will to power, that is monologic. Bakhtin maintains that a “unitary 
language” works in tandem with “sociopolitical and cultural centralization” 
(“Discourse in the Novel,” 271) and that the reverse is also true—that dia-
logue (and here I would include the internal dialogue of disinterested inquiry 
advocated by Richards) points toward a liberal pluralism. This, of course, is 
the very politics Richards called for when he described the ideal society as 
“one in which no faction, no pressure group, no self-interested power-seeker, 
can push the rest of the citizens around” (Speculative Instruments, 107).
 It seems beyond question to me that the work of Richards, along with 
that the New Critics who take their cue from them is, contrary to much opin-
ion, deeply rooted in a long tradition of aesthetic and ethical thought. More-
over, the form of ethics we see most powerfully and persistently articulated in 
the works of I. A. Richards need not be linked with political reaction, nor is it 
anathema to pluralism of thought or of politics, as the most forceful thinker 
to criticize the ethics of the New Criticism has maintained. A rather perilous 
leap would be involved in proceeding from these conclusions to a general 
embrace of the New Criticism as a form of ethical thought. But in an environ-
ment where the New Criticism is still either dismissed outright, or advocated 
only for its formal techniques of close reading, it is important to begin a reap-
praisal of the New Critical heritage as both an aesthetics and an ethics.
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as IT Is usually remembered, New Critical formalism evokes no adjective  so powerfully as “stifling.” The focus upon “the poem itself” is gener-
ally understood to have come at the cost of personal meaning, and more to 
the present purpose, of political insight. Marianne DeKoven remembers an 
undergraduate confrontation with a New Critically minded supervisor:
When I tried, in 1969, to write my senior honors thesis on the detectability 
of fascism in T. S. Eliot’s form, I was told that I could if I really wanted to, 
and if I didn’t mind risking a lower grade, but why not write instead about 
something truly important. I ended by writing, what else, a stylistic analysis, 
a close reading of Murder in the Cathedral which subordinated the question 
of the politics of form to the truly important question, its own politics still 
well concealed, of whether or not the structure of the play is indeed organi-
cally unified. (679)
In a case like this, there is little disputing that the New Criticism was 
politically suffocating, and undoubtedly, such episodes were common. Yet 
we would be mistaken in assuming—as DeKoven, to her credit, does not 
assume—that the seminal commitments which underlie this anecdote in any 
way constituted political neuter.
 Political neuter can be both broadly and narrowly defined. As it figures 
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in William Cain’s 1984 The Crisis in Criticism, the New Criticism flourished 
specifically against the backdrop of international Communism. In this con-
text, Cain asserts, it was “apolitical,” and as such, a redoubt against a “pain-
ful, intimidating political era” (5). Mark Walhout, meanwhile, grants the 
New Criticism a much more politically agentive role, arguing that it “popu-
larized the skills of language analysis necessary for the successful conduct 
of geopolitics in the Cold War” (87). This is, in a sense, only a more robust 
version of the same thing; in both accounts, the New Criticism is a defense 
mechanism against threatening political transformation, albeit with different 
degrees of active force. As descriptions of eventual classroom praxis, I take 
no direct issue with either claim. Parts of them are even appropriate to the 
New Criticism as it was in its early years in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
The genteel cluster of Southern literary men who initially theorized it surely 
did experience their political era as painful, and it seems unlikely that the 
dead hand of Marx, any more than the living ones of Stalin and Khrushchev, 
helped to assuage their pain. But by ascribing to the New Critics merely the 
reactionary anti-communist default of the mid-twentieth century, we miss 
the expansiveness with which the inceptive documents of the New Criticism 
deplored their historical moment. 
 The reading of these documents as political neuter, as suppressing dissent 
in either the active or the passive sense, would be more credible had they rep-
resented a dominant ideology in any way. And they, or at least their associ-
ated textual practices, have sometimes been taken to represent just such an 
ideology. Terence Hawkes suggests, for instance, that the New Critical meth-
odology’s assumptions about the autonomy of reader and text are grounded 
in “liberal humanism” (155), and the adjective Peter Brooks uses to describe 
the foregrounding of the “text itself,” and the marginaliation of more obscure 
variables, like history and intertextuality, is “democratic” (512). Again, in the 
schoolroom actuality to which the New Criticism gave rise, Brooks’s adjec-
tive is justified, provided that by “democracy,” we mean the populistic rather 
than the liberal or constitutional sort. There is, after all, the affective fallacy 
to be avoided; the student is not entitled to think what she likes about a given 
text, as DeKoven’s example ably demonstrates. But the ideological direction 
of the New Criticism at its genesis is another matter altogether.
 Depoliticization is a strategy more appropriately ascribed to the Cold 
Warrior than the nascent New Critic: checking dissent is a perfectly sensible 
activity for those who represent the political status quo, however theoreti-
cally committed to “the free exchange of ideas” that status quo may be. This 
may explain the enthusiasm of classical humanists like Allan Bloom for read-
ing books “as they are.” But it cannot explain the New Critics, whatever they 
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may have thought of international communism. The figures behind the New 
Criticism were, in Raymond Williams’s terms, essentially residual in their 
ideology, and addressed the society around them with more than implicit hos-
tility. It will be the work of the present essay to demonstrate, first, that New 
Critical formalism was intended as an ideologically subversive movement, 
and furthermore, that its most meaningful descendants understood them-
selves as equally, if differently, subversive.
 A date of convenience for this subversive beginning is 1941, the year John 
Crowe Ransom published the collection entitled The New Criticism. But as 
Mark Jancovich notes, the political stripe of Ransom and his colleagues is 
most evident in work older than this. The notable text is the 1930 Southern 
Agrarian manifesto I’ll Take My Stand, which bore the signatures of Ransom, 
Robert Penn Warren, and Allen Tate, among others. And upon this eleven 
year interval I would like to overlay another critical career. I will follow it to 
1934, when an address at the University of Virginia the previous year was 
first published as After Strange Gods. It begins with a bravura series of criti-
cal essays, which begin to emerge around 1919. The career, of course, is that 
of T. S. Eliot.
 As critic no less than as poet, Eliot was invoked by the Agrarians as a 
kind of patron saint. The confident postformalism of the last few decades of 
the twentieth century has suggested that it is conservative New Critical taste, 
rather than simple unambiguous greatness, which explains Eliot’s imperial 
preponderance in the poetic canon. This relationship works the other way 
as well; as formalist criticism anoints Eliot’s verse, it depends genetically on 
his prose. The debt is evident on a number of levels; at the stage of specific 
critical proposition, the objective correlative of 1919 predicts the affective 
fallacy of 1946. In more general attitudinal terms, Cleanth Brooks’s heresy 
of paraphrase points back to Eliot’s sworn adherence to “poetry and not 
another thing” in the second edition of The Sacred Wood (viii). And in the 
more broadly political arena, there was an equally unmistakable hearkening 
to Eliot.
 What Jancovich has noted in I’ll Take My Stand can only be reinforced 
by an association with Eliot: that is, the fundamental illiberalism of the New 
Critics. I’ll Take My Stand opposed the rapaciously utilitarian technocracy 
of the modern world—and specifically, of the Northern states—as well as 
a legalistic, rational individualism which was eroding authentic community 
and faith. By 1933, Eliot had read the manifesto, and in the lecture which 
became After Strange Gods, he responded to it enthusiastically. It is from this 
address that we get the infamous statement that, in the defense of a “tradi-
tional society,” the imperatives of “race and religion combine to make any 
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large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable” (20). Whether Eliot disliked 
Jews per se is, to say the least, a matter of debate, but his opposition both to 
free thought and to cultural diversity is self-evident. It was in this spirit that 
Eliot turned south, pursuing “tradition, such as the influx of foreign popula-
tions had almost effaced in some parts of the North” (15). “I have been much 
interested,” his speaking text runs, “since the publication a few years ago of 
a book called I’ll Take My Stand, in what is sometimes called the [A]grarian 
movement in the South” (15).
 Authentic tradition to the exclusion of freedom of thought, and of cosmo-
politanism of any kind—hardly the advertised values of the American Cold 
Warrior. But how much can such illiberal, subversive ideals have counted? 
When Ransom wrote that “the philosophical critic” was interested only in 
a poem’s “being” and always “in revolt against the tyranny of ideas,” was 
he not, necessarily, segregating the cultural arguments he had made in 1930 
from the literary work he would do thereafter, thus ceding ground fertile 
with subversive potential to ascendant liberalism (World’s Body 111)? When 
Eliot pledged to focus his critical prose on “poetry and not another thing,” 
was he not at the same time pledging not to argue against social pluralism? 
Are these not promises to check subversive baggage at the literary or critical 
door?
 There were, certainly, other organic formalists with more explicitly trans-
formative agendas. We might consider another self-styled apostolate of 
Eliot’s, the Cambridge critics who consolidated around the journal Scrutiny 
in the 1930s. Many contemporary commentators have treated the English 
and American groups as essentially the same. Gerald Graff, for example, clas-
sifies I. A. Richards as a New Critic (Literature against Itself, 134). Graff is 
pointing out a valid connection, but for the present purpose I will not include 
the Scrutineers in the New Critical category. In stark contrast to their Ameri-
can cousins, this earlier group was frankly political in its use of literature.
 In a muscular summary near the beginning of Literary Theory, Terry 
Eagleton criticizes a lack of directness in the Cambridge critics’ political 
agenda. It is no doubt true that they were less openly partisan than Eagle-
ton—indeed, their politics made politicization of the Eagletonian kind abhor-
rent. F. R. Leavis once declared his willingness to consider “some kind of 
communism as the solution of the economic problem,” so long as it was 
not attended by the philistinic instrumentalism with which Marxist thought 
approached the arts (“Benzonian,” 167). Although, as Eagleton observes, the 
Cambridge critics were generally of “lower-middle-class” origins, “noncon-
formist, provincial, and hardworking” (31)—this in contrast to the landed-
gentry origins of the Agrarians—critics such as Richards, F. R. Leavis, and 
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Q. D. Leavis joined in lamenting the loss of “the organic society.” And while 
they never actually “read for politics,” or engaged literature as rhetorical or 
partisan, they certainly asserted a strong connection between aesthetic expe-
rience and socialization. I. A. Richards, taking a proto-behaviorist approach 
to the psychology of reading, was quite frank about his desire to use lit-
erature’s affective capacity to stimulate social change. Poetry could direct 
“affective-volitional attitudes” (Principles, 90). While Richards was against 
“message hunting,” he did assert that “in subtler ways the intellectual influ-
ence of the arts is all-pervasive,” and could even create “an improvement of 
[moral] response” (181, 186). In other words, the ideal society would not 
instrumentalize literature, but literary critics could use literature’s very non-
instrumentality to help bring that society about. And more to the point, the 
Cambridge critics admitted they were doing so.
 Though their social values were markedly similar to those of the Cam-
bridge group, both Eliot and the American New Critics were more circum-
spect. This has nothing to do with the creation of a Cold War “safe space,” 
in which political vexations could be put out of mind. Part of it must be 
situational having to do with the fact that these writers found themselves 
in a marginal and residual position; there is something distinctly unenviable 
in arguing, from a minority position, against social difference, in dissenting 
against the right to dissent. This is the unhappy inverse of the Cold Warrior’s 
position, which Herbert Marcuse, in a position oddly analogous to that of 
the Agrarians, called “repressive tolerance.” But a more essential reason has 
to do with organicism itself. If the Cambridge critics proposed an instrumen-
tal application of non-instrumental values, neither Eliot nor the New Critics 
would countenance even this degree of systematic intervention. Rather than 
a ceding of ground, this refusal was in fact an all the more stringent degree 
of devotion to the “organicization” of society, though one which significantly 
narrowed the avenues of critical agency.
 There are, it is true, moments when this restraint was less than perfect. 
In readings of Eliot’s own poetry, the New Critics could not always resist the 
tempting “use value” of topical content, probably because that content—
rootless paranoia in “Prufrock,” social decay in “Gerontion,” antipathy 
to the modern world almost everywhere—was so attractive to them. In his 
1953 book The Forlorn Demon, for instance, Allen Tate offered an eloquent, 
characteristic reading of The Waste Land as an assertion of schizophrenic 
decline, and provoked Northrop Frye’s memorably derisive epithet about a 
“Great Western Butterslide” (444). On this point, Eliot was more consis-
tent than his followers; confronted with this ideological reading, he told an 
audience at a Harvard lecture that while “various critics have done me the 
52 • Part I, Chapter 2
honour to interpret [The Waste Land] in terms of criticism of the contem-
porary world . . . to me . . . it was just a piece of rhythmic grumbling” (qtd. 
in Davies, 954). But on other occasions, contradiction bit the other way. In 
his benchmark reading of Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” Cleanth Brooks 
expresses displeasure at having to chastise Eliot for the comment that the 
poem “makes a statement which is untrue.” Poems, Brooks insisted, didn’t 
state anything but themselves (Urn, 152–54). Perhaps the most humorous 
instance is that of Archibald Macleish’s highly didactic poem “Ars Poetica,” 
whose ultimate line, “a poem should not mean but be,” Monroe Beardsley 
and William Wimsatt unthinkingly reproduce in “The Intentional Fallacy” as 
a statement of their own position. Perhaps it is moments like these that Graff 
has in mind when he calls the New Critics “reluctant” formalists (146).
 But more revealing than these occasional formalist faux-pas, and more 
important in the New Critical and Eliotic social strategies, are the actual 
imperatives they urged on readers—the very imperatives which kept them 
from more direct forms of social intervention. I will observe two fronts of 
engagement. The first is “impersonality.” Against a society they saw stand-
ing for self-determination, self-expression, and privacy, both material and 
subjective/psychological, the new literary-pedagogical establishment pre-
scribed a radical cult of unity.
 This effort begins with Eliot’s famous early essays. In “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” (1919) we are instructed that great works of art do not 
stand on their own, but instead participate in a kind of continuum, almost a 
chain of being, stretching back at least as far as Dante. Eliot calls his canon 
“the mind of Europe,” with the at-least-metaphorical implication of even 
more than harmonious union of parts—a single, irreducible intelligence. 
“The Metaphysical Poets” (1921) makes a comparable requirement of affec-
tive function. Successful poetry, according to Eliot, affects not only the heart, 
but also “the cerebral cortex, the nervous system, the digestive tract,” subli-
mating the rational and extra-rational components of the observer (66). And 
upon this proposed unification of the reader hangs an oblique argument for 
a more political kind of unity. The essay posits a historical volta; whereas 
a poet like Donne felt a thought “as immediately as the odour of a rose,” 
today we suffer from a “dissociation of sensibility” whose advent Eliot finds 
in the work of Milton and Dryden (64). When Eliot notes that the writers 
he admires are those “up to the Revolution,” it is in the manner of a passing 
remark, but one can hardly help concluding that the two he castigates are an 
inevitable product of English Civil War, of the end of theoretically uncon-
ditional monarchial rule, and the disestablishment of the state church to 
which Eliot would adhere so fervently later in life. The sleight of hand here 
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is astonishing. While remaining strictly “literary,” Eliot has more or less told 
us that constitutional government is a bad thing.
 Last and perhaps sneakiest is the young Eliot’s case for a homogeneity 
of feeling between readers. The now-notorious objective correlative is pro-
posed with such nonchalance in Eliot’s “Hamlet” (1919) that one might miss 
its massive implications. The essay’s highly confrontational expository argu-
ment, that Hamlet is entirely an “artistic failure,” makes this even more likely. 
Eliot’s criticism is that Shakespeare has failed to justify his protagonist’s emo-
tions to the audience, by failing to demonstrate their source. Provocative as 
it may be, this is in fact a fairly straightforward objection, which could have 
been made in any number of already-available terms: Hamlet lacks adequate 
“characterization”; we are unable to “sympathize” with him; he has not been 
given “plausible motivation”; and so on. Why Eliot felt the need to theorize 
a “set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula for 
(a) particular emotion” (48), inevitably and in everyone, which Shakespeare 
had overlooked, is not immediately clear. Unless, that is, Eliot wanted to 
posit this universal code by which human emotion is evoked for more gen-
eral reasons, and wanted the much louder claim about Hamlet as cover. The 
allegation that there is no natural reason for affective idiosyncrasy, made on 
its own, would be exactly the sort of positivist thesis, born of intellectual and 
professional segregation—in this case, probably the domain of clinical psy-
chology—that Eliot would find distasteful and “un—literary,” even though 
its actual truth might please him. It would be, in other words, precisely the 
difference between Eliot and I. A. Richards. But here, Eliot appears to come 
upon it by accident, with no motive outside his business as a critic of poetry.
 This, however, is only Eliot. In fact, the approaches of the American New 
Critics clash with Eliot’s recommendations on more than one of the preceding 
points. Eliot’s comment about the virtues of treating poetry “as poetry and 
not another thing” appears in the 1928 Introduction to the second edition 
of The Sacred Wood. It was offered retrospectively, as an explanation of the 
attitude in which he had first published these essays. But by 1928 (perhaps 
more than coincidentally, the year after his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism) 
he wanted to nuance this position; the new preface admits that “poetry cer-
tainly has something to do with morals, with religion, and even with politics 
perhaps” (viii). By the 1933 publication of The Use of Poetry and the Use of 
Criticism, he had settled on the opinion that “Every poet would like . . . to 
think that he had some direct social utility,” but that while “The doctrine of 
‘art for art’s sake’ is a mistaken one,” it “contained this true impulse behind 
it, that it is a recognition of the error of the poet trying to do other people’s 
work” (152).
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 From this series of statements, it would be fair to generalize an under-
standing of literature as a special institution which is completely different 
from other, more topical kinds of utterance, an indeed not subject to their 
rules, but which cannot be reified and segregated absolutely because it is a 
part of a shared culture. When, in “Criticism, Inc.,” Ransom maintained 
that English should regard itself as “entirely autonomous” from the claims 
of moralists, historians, and political radicals, he seems to have meant some-
thing more abstemious (1112). 
 For if the Cambridge critics outdid Eliot in the directness with which 
they pursued their social objectives, the New Critics were even more reserved 
than he. New Critical analysis is by its very nature atomizing; the literary 
text is to be approached as a discrete artifact, precluding any assessment of 
its participation in a “mind of Europe.” Nor is a New Critical reading likely 
to make ambitious claims about what organs, mind, digestive tract, or oth-
erwise, a poem will stimulate. Wimsatt and Beardsley specifically disallowed 
such “affective fallacy.” To muse, as Eliot had, that the failure of Hamlet 
resides in Shakespeare’s having felt something he couldn’t explain, was to 
commit the other of the two famous sins these critics proposed, the “inten-
tional fallacy.” Such refusals, and the clinical reserve which motivated them, 
may have prompted Eliot’s quip that his colleagues across the Atlantic prac-
ticed a “lemon squeezer criticism” (“Frontiers,” 113).
 But apparent disagreements are in fact only more pessimistic and self-lim-
iting attempts towards the same goals. The cult of unity is the same, though 
differently realized. Take the affective fallacy, which arises from the same 
impulse—a dislike of idiosyncratically subjective art appreciation—as the 
objective correlative. The difference is that Eliot appears to have believed that 
he could convince people that they ought not to feel outside of a shared rubric 
of meaning. Wimsatt and Beardsley made no such attempt. They merely 
sought to demonstrate that anything so individual as personal feeling was 
irrelevant to the proper understanding of a shared text. Eliot sought to fight 
affective individualism via literature; Beardsley and Wimsatt, though they 
belittle such individualism as much as possible, resign themselves to fighting 
it only on the subject of literature, by developing a criticism separate from the 
inevitable “relativism” of “psychological effect” (345). Eliot, of course, dis-
liked self-seeking in criticism as much as anywhere else: Goethe had “made 
of Hamlet a Werther,” he quipped, just as Coleridge had “made of Hamlet a 
Coleridge” (“Hamlet,” 45).
 Like its affective cousin, the intentional fallacy is a more timid, more 
strictly literary continuation of a highly Eliotic impulse. “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent” opposed overly individualistic understandings of the 
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artistic creator, just as “Hamlet” suggested a unified and collective reader-
ship. Much as the reader had been told to respect the objective correlative 
and avoid cultivating private irregularities of response, the author was here 
instructed to engage in a “continual surrender of himself” to the greater total-
ity of literary history (40). And just as the affective fallacy, without actually 
denying that readers’ emotions are unpredictable and individual as per Eliot, 
nevertheless concluded that such individuality was irrelevant to criticism and 
even vaguely embarrassing, the intentional fallacy admits, and simultane-
ously jettisons from literary analysis, the unique interiority of the creative 
artist. Wimsatt and Beardsley allow that A. E. Housman’s account of his own 
composition process—“drink a pint of beer, relax, go for a walk”—is the 
advice “the young poet might well take to heart as a practical rule,” though 
it is evident they find his suggestion at least a little ridiculous (338). But com-
ments like this are absolutely not to be treated as “criticism of poetry.” If 
Housman is any indication, the private silliness of authors may be inevitable. 
It has, however, no bearing on literature itself, for after the text is produced, 
it becomes “no longer the property of the poet,” but of that uniform collec-
tive, theoretically pure of the actual idiosyncrasies of its members, called “the 
public.”
 Both of the arguments just summarized—the banishment of both read-
er’s and writer’s personality from the realm of the literary via the affective 
and intentional fallacies—have direct Eliotic precedents. There is one final 
“unity” asserted by the New Critics, one more definitely of their own cre-
ation, though Eliot would likely have approved at least of the impulse behind 
it: that is, the unity of the text itself. Since questions of the kind Kenneth 
Burke called “extrinsic”—What ideals does the text endorse? What kinds of 
thinking or behavior does it valorize?—were off limits, the critic was to eval-
uate the “structural unity” of a text, its “balance,” “irony,” “tension,” even 
its “organic” connectedness.
 It is from this imperative, more than anywhere else, that the New Criti-
cism gets its reputation as ideologically staid. Take the anecdote from Mari-
anne DeKoven with which I began. It would be unsurprising had the student 
in such a case concluded that New Critical methodology was utterly apoliti-
cal, or even mean-spiritedly opposed to new ideas. DeKoven, however, makes 
a subtler observation; the compulsion to assess the text’s organic unity fore-
stalled her own political interests, she notes, while leaving “its own political 
implications totally opaque” (679). And what are New Criticism’s political 
implications? Does not a preference for unified texts align with a desire for an 
integrated, pre-capitalist society? And in training readers to bring about unity 
in highly fragmented texts, are we not also subtly encouraging them to value 
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that unity in a larger sense? This is not, of course, an overt call to politics, 
but neither is it a merely a defense of the textual status quo from revisionist 
opinions. The work of art, self-contained but perfectly balanced and cohesive 
within itself, stands as metonym for the institutions around it.
 A frequent misapprehension about these critical practices, and the near-
architectural readings they made possible, will bring me to my second 
observation about the covert social and political agenda of formalism: the 
ascription to literature of irrational, or at least extra-rational, characteristics, 
its opposite signification to forms of literal knowledge. In some lights, this 
will seem discordant with the collectivist or communitarian tendencies I have 
been asserting. An emphasis on reasoned or objective truths is sometimes 
seen as essential to the establishment of consensus, and personal subjective 
freedom, as per the Romantic and Nietzschean traditions, as its enemy—thus 
the common conjunction of “socialist realism.”
 Frank Lentricchia may be the only commentator to accuse the New Crit-
ics of Stalinism (5), but the perception of the group’s methods as technocratic 
and “anti-subjective” is fairly widespread. Gerald Graff, in “What Was New 
Criticism?” makes an impressive list of commentators who have attacked the 
New Criticism as “forcible seizure” or “rape,” and accused it of imposing a 
disciplinary violence on readers and texts (131). It is certainly true that the 
New Critics styled themselves as empirical and impersonal analysts, and the 
texts they analyzed as concrete and self-contained artifacts in need of mea-
surement and explication. Ransom used the word “scientific” to describe 
what he hoped criticism could become. But is the New Critical model of 
the literary text, mysteriously continent as the Keatsian urn, really the ratio-
nalist’s position? A really rationalist criticism—Graff’s own work serves as 
example—would treat texts as positive statements. Such a style of reading 
would have opened up significant space for the articulation of oppositional, 
Agrarian agendas. And yet the New Critics avoided it absolutely.
  Some part of their disinterest in such explicit argument comes, once 
again, from their ironic minoritarian/anti-minority position, but the more 
fundamental problem is with the positivistic statement itself. Scientific rea-
son, after all, is significantly to blame for the collapse of the organic society 
the New Critics favored. In The World’s Body (1938), a work of which cer-
tain essentialist strands of modern ecocriticism might make some major capi-
tal (or by contrast, by which they might be effectively embarrassed), Ransom 
described science as an act of violence upon a natural universe meant to be 
savored in more phenomenological terms. It was scientific liberalism, which 
Ransom as Southerner associated with Northern aggression, that was guilty 
of rape. Cleanth Brooks, even more revealingly, wrote that,
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Love is the aesthetic of sex; lust is the science. Love implies a deferring of 
the satisfaction of the desire; it implies a certain asceticism and a ritual. Lust 
drives forward urgently and scientifically to the immediate extirpation of the 
desire. (Modern Poetry, 147–48).
To love the text, therefore, was to de-instrumentalize it. In imagining the 
poem as a constellation of paradox, an object on its own terms, we give up 
the right to mine it for political payload (even in the service of a broader 
anti-instrumentalism, though again, the poem becomes an implicit metonym 
for how we should approach the world in general). Since, as Graff writes, 
New Criticism “identified personal self-expression with technological rea-
son,” the communitarianism noted earlier actually serves this irrationalist/
anti-instrumental purpose (138). The sin of the idiosyncratic reader hails 
from the same domain as that of the avaricious sexual partner or the rapa-
cious scientist.
 Eliot is again at the nascence of this trend. The poet, he wrote in “The 
Use of Poetry” in 1933, should not “meddle with the tasks of the theologian, 
the preacher, the economist, the sociologist or anybody else,” and this is not 
a sentiment the soon-to-be New Critics would have had trouble absorbing, 
opposed as it is to topically didactic uses of literature (154). When Brooks 
corrects Eliot about the “truth” of Keats’s poem in 1947, he has really only 
taken Eliot’s idea to its ultimate point. Thus Brooks’s castigation of the para-
phrase of a text’s “message” as “heretical,” and his argument that poetic 
texts are made of paradox—and accordingly, that the better they are, the less 
likely they are to say anything comprehensible in abstraction. Eliot’s lesser 
compunctiousness allowed him to profess an even bolder irrationalism. “The 
Use of Poetry,” as well as offering views on the separateness of art and eco-
nomics, disclosed that its author “should like an audience which could nei-
ther read nor write,” and that there was more to fear from “the half-educated 
and ill-educated” than the uneducated (152). Princeton historian Lawrence 
Stone once remarked that, “If you teach a man to read the Bible, he may also 
read pornography or seditious literature; put differently, if a man teaches 
a woman to read so that she may know her place, she may learn that she 
deserves his” (qtd. in Kaestle, 27).
 Stone, the Whig historian, meant this positively. Eliot, the Tory, seems to 
have been conscious of the same principle, but he must have reflected rather 
differently on its appeal. What, after all, would have been more pleasing to 
the “organic” sensibility than the compact between pious peasants, content 
to treat the work of art with hushed sensualism, and the enlightened aris-
tocrat or cleric who ministers mysteries? And what would have been more 
58 • Part I, Chapter 2
disruptive of this state of affairs than the bad middle-class habit of demand-
ing literal understanding?
 The New Critics followed Eliot’s lead, though they were more timid—or 
in another light, more absolutely dedicated. Class literacy is a fairly positivis-
tic thing to be caught discussing, whatever one feels about it. If, by contrast, 
we are limited to sensual close reading, we are forbidden from considering 
more abstractly “factual” variables, like a text’s impact upon given readers, 
or its relation to its author, or its historical circumstance. The original New 
Critics may not have intended to make these questions quite as impossible as 
they actually became for students like DeKoven—in his late essay “The For-
malist Critics,” Brooks allowed that that biography and the history of taste 
“may well be worth studying” (23)—but they certainly did hope to segregate 
them from that which was “truly” literary.
 Such marginalizations may be the consequence of any robust formalism. 
But formalism as practiced by the New Critics promoted two more peculiar 
irrationalisms. The first is a marked preference for verse over prose. Eliot’s 
“Use of Poetry” considered only that form of literature; “The Intentional 
Fallacy” focused exclusively on poets; The Well Wrought Urn was subtitled 
“Studies in the Structure of Poetry,” and the methodology it outlined, the one 
which became synonymous with the New Criticism, was tailored expressly to 
verse; the celebrated textbook which Brooks created with Robert Penn War-
ren in 1938 was Understanding Poetry. A second text, Understanding Fic-
tion, was published in 1943, but its secondary date and lower general esteem 
may say something about the demoted position of the novel in New Critical 
taste. Finally, while several of the Agrarians published poetry, Penn Warren is 
unique among them as a writer of significant prose fiction.
 There is nothing innately extra-rational about verse; Chaucer used iambic 
pentameter just as lucidly to instruct readers in the use of the astrolabe as to 
render the passions of lovers. But, for a number of reasons, the cultural posi-
tion of poetry has become more fixed since Chaucer’s fourteenth century, and 
especially since the Romantic period. No adequate history of poetry’s associa-
tions will fit into the present essay; suffice it to say that for “some time” (the 
early nineteenth century at very least), the lyric mode of poetry has assumed a 
default status.
 This is not as simple as saying that poetry comes to be “about feelings” 
and prose about facts. From the New Critical perspective, such a claim would 
assign poetry a dangerously confessional, individualized function. Indeed, 
it would miss the general atmosphere of modernist poetic formalism in 
which the New Criticism flowered. For William Carlos Williams, one of the 
foremost American figures of this phenomenon and a vigorous defender of 
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de-instrumentalized language, the opposite was true: “poetry liberates words 
from their emotional implications, prose confirms them in it. . . . Poetry 
has to do with the crystallization of the imagination, the perfection of new 
forms” (Spring, 140, 145). But however “impersonal” this formulation may 
be, it leaves no room for functional referentiality. There were, of course, a 
number of major verse epics undertaken in this period, some of which, like 
Pound’s Cantos, were New Critical favorites. But they are favorites in fairly 
direct proportion to the reader’s ability to ignore their content. Sigsmundo 
Malatesta, the meta-historical hero of the Cantos, was of great topical impor-
tance to Pound, but one needs relatively little knowledge of this Italian mer-
cenary’s actual life to read the poem successfully—the kind of knowledge one 
does need, for instance, to have of Napoleon in War and Peace. Whether we 
understand the poem as an “overflow of powerful feelings,” as “collective 
dreaming,” or as an ontological object defined above all by its form, we tend 
more and more not to understand it as referential, as explicative, as telling a 
story in any literal sense.
 The novel, by contrast, is in many ways uncomfortable ideological terri-
tory for the organic or Agrarian perspective. Its rise, since it cannot be easily 
memorized or recited, coincides with that of mass literacy, and it has been 
linked, by Mikhail Bakhtin, Ian Watt, and many others, to the rise of politi-
cal liberalism. Most vitally, we tend to hold novelists more accountable for 
the telling of stories, for the highlighting of language’s instrumental function 
in the communication of fact, than we do poets. Any number of novels have 
been written to disappoint or even bait this assumption, but it continues to 
operate.
 But for their preference to have been significant, the New Critics would 
have to have had a choice in their material, and it could be protested that for-
malism gravitates towards poetry by methodological necessity. This depends, 
however, on what we mean by formalism. It is certainly true that a careful 
analysis of syllabic accent or a search for relationships between sound effect 
and visual imagery will be more fruitful with Swinburne than with Dickens. 
If, however, we mean “formalism” to include everything that is contained 
entirely within the text as aesthetic product, everything “intrinsic” in Ken-
neth Burke’s terms, then prose fiction offers the formalist a great deal. Clas-
sical narratology, for instance, need not violate New Critical dogma about 
the separateness of the text or the intentional fallacy, though it attends to 
different formal nuances than New Criticism: Bleak House need no more 
have been a statement of actual fact, or of opinion, than Keats’s poetic claims 
about truth and beauty—but it does call more attention to language’s func-
tion in stating facts and opinions.
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 In other words, the social attributes of prose fiction are no reason why 
the New Critics could not have focused on it. They nevertheless seem to have 
been reasons why they did not. “Formalism,” supposedly an approach devoid 
of ideology, thus enfolded a discrimination which was profoundly ideological 
in its effect, and very likely in its intent. It did not simply de-instrumentalize 
the text, or ignore its function as argument. It preferred, and encouraged the 
study of, texts which themselves represented anti-argumentative and anti-
instrumental values.
 The second, and perhaps the more revealing irrationalistic tendency of 
New Critical formalism is the investment of literature, especially poetry, 
with ceremonial significance. Richard Foster, a dissenting contemporary of 
the New Critical ascension, wrote in 1959 that in light of their affiliations 
with fundamentalist Christianity, the “ritualistic” manner in which the New 
Critics read poetry was ironic; secular verse, as Foster saw the New Crit-
ics approaching it, was filling in for worship, and this confirmed Matthew 
Arnold’s prophecy that poetry would come to replace religion in Western 
society (232). Both the observation about ritual and the proposed Arnoldian 
connection are astute. But this is less of a problem than Foster imagined. 
Arnold was equivocal about his own religious convictions; Eliot was not. His 
considerable devotional poetry (Ash Wednesday, Four Quartets) and verse to 
be used for liturgical services (Choruses from the Rock), make it clear that 
he agreed with Arnold’s assessment of poetry’s spiritual potential, but his art 
was supplement to, rather than replacement for, organized religion.
 In proper irrationalist fashion, the supplement takes the form of affec-
tive persuasion rather than of theological apologetics. In the introduction to 
The Sacred Wood, Eliot wrote that “Poetry certainly has something to do 
with religion,” but in “The Use of Poetry,” “the theologian” appeared on 
the list of professions in whose business the poet was not to meddle (Wood, 
viii; Poetry, 154). With a typical Eliotic audacity, however, this preference for 
feelings of piety over doctrinal argument in poetry spills over into religion in 
general. Theism can also be rationalist; indeed, rationalized theism is one of 
the conditions of the dissociation of sensibility laid out in “The Metaphysical 
Poets.” The modern man “falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two expe-
riences have nothing to do with each other,” Eliot reasons, the implication 
being that religious experience, as provided by Spinoza, ought to be more 
sensual, more like smelling a rose, than it is in modernity (64). Eliot does not 
fault Spinoza personally for the modern man’s propensities, but his selection 
does not seem entirely coincidental. Spinoza’s theism was archetypally rea-
soned and unorthodox. What better incarnation could there be of the free-
thinking Jew?
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 Eliot’s devotional poetry proceeds along very different lines. The “three 
white leopards” of Ash Wednesday are written not to prove to readers the 
existence of a deity, but to dazzle with their strangeness. The “Lady of silences 
/ calm and distressed / torn and most whole” cannot justify the ways of God 
to Man (Milton being as much a free thinker as Spinoza), but is excellently 
suited to prompt reveries on the koanic mystery of the Christian cosmos (62). 
Again, the duplicity is impressive. On the one hand, Eliot the poet is simply 
adhering to what Eliot the critic has said the role of poetry should be. On the 
other, Eliot the sermonizer (remembering the quantities of his writing which 
were intended for, and used by, high Anglican service), gives necessary flesh to 
the collective/sensualist doctrine arrived at by Eliot the ideologue.
 The New Critics, less overtly ideologues, had little to say about how 
“modern man” experienced things, and were not, with the partial exception 
of Allen Tate, active spokesmen for specific religious institutions. Neverthe-
less, the approach to poetry they codified required “receptive” readers, rather 
than suspicious ones, just as Eliot produced mysterious texts. To Foster’s 
charge of ritualism partial exception must be taken. The best close readings, 
like Brooks’s, are perceptive and surprising accounts, in no way conducted 
mechanically or by rote, though they do remain within the realm of dumb 
sensualism. But for the average student, Foster’s diagnosis is keenly appropri-
ate, at least at the metaphoric level. The freshman close-reader runs obedi-
ently through a catechism of rhyme, meter, and metaphor, but is allowed to 
remain as mystified as to what the poem says topically as vernacular laity in a 
Latin Mass.
 If these were indeed the founding motives of the New Criticism, their 
defeat (in the academy, at least) is undeniable. This defeat is a tragedy to 
few; it was certainly none to those who perceive the New Criticism as what 
it sometimes later became—a technocratic discipline imposed by liberal hege-
mony. It is, oddly enough, precisely this turn of mind in which we most echo 
the original New Critics. I want to conclude with a parallel between the 
New Criticism and, rather than anti-communism, a certain kind of anti-anti- 
communism. In his 1968 Pulitzer Prize winning The Armies of the Night, 
Norman Mailer asked, “When was everyone going to cut out the nonsense 
and get to work, do their own real work? One’s own literary work was the 
only answer to the war in Vietnam” (9). The book is a definitive instance of 
creative nonfiction; the imposition on “real work” that Mailer resents is the 
October 1967 march on the Pentagon, in which he ends up participating. 
Sean McCann and Michael Szalay, who begin their 2006 introduction to the 
Yale Journal of Criticism with this quotation, read Mailer as exemplary of a 
counterproductive gravitation towards symbolic politics in the American Left, 
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a tendency they categorize as “libertarian”—not a term with much analogy in 
the New Criticism. There is certainly a self-centered note in Mailer’s hypoth-
esis (though his narrative demonstates awareness of this), and McCann and 
Szalay’s broader observation is a crucial one. I want to observe a difference, 
however, between the rationalist libertarianism evident in certain erstwhile 
leftists—Christopher Hitchens, Jerry Rubin—and the kind belonging to liter-
ary figures like Mailer and the others whom McCann and Szalay name.
 Mailer’s recalcitrance, for instance, was premised less on a claim of auton-
omy than on a horror of systematization. Troubled by the planned post-
Vietnam utopia discussed by his hosts at a party, he laments that “Liberal 
academics had no root of a real war with technology land itself, no, in all 
likelihood, they were the natural managers of that future air-conditioned 
vault where the last of human life would still exist” (15). And, atypically in 
a libertarian story, the egghead prison guards of the future are to go around 
removing restrictions. For people like Mailer’s hosts, “guilt was invariably 
so irrational—for it derived from the warped burden of the past” (25). In 
an unmistakable if mutated echo of Cleanth Brooks, Mailer countered that 
“Guilt was the existential edge of sex. Without guilt, sex was meaningless” 
(24).
 Though he sought re-enchantment through transgression rather than for-
bearance, Mailer was as uncomfortable with instrumental modernity as the 
New Critics. And it is his position, not that of the progressive academics, 
which comes to define anti-Vietnam protests. To the dismay of many of its 
organizers, the demonstration at the Pentagon becomes a pantheistic rite, 
approvingly designated by Mailer as “the cutting edge of primitive awe,” 
rather than a coherent piece of propaganda or intervention (123). Perhaps 
the Dionysian qualities of this scene strain its association with Agrarianism. 
Certainly, they clash with the icily punctilious personal associations of T. S. 
Eliot. But lest these differences obscure the relation altogether, we should 
note that New Left anti-instrumentalism could also take the form of evasive 
literary cattiness. Mailer recalls a letter he wrote during a spat with Old Left 
sociologist Paul Goodman, which, while not deigning to engage with Good-
man’s arguments in favor of social reform, “did nonetheless feel competent to 
comment on the literary experience of encountering Goodman’s style,” which 
“was not unrelated to the journeys one took in the company of a laundry 
bag” (23).
 In Professing Literature, Gerald Graff proposes a trajectory of “rags 
to riches to routine,” whereby the formalism developed by the Agrarians, 
quietly radical at its inception, was gradually co-opted by the political and 
institutional default. Consequently, it may sometimes have underwritten the 
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doctrines of liberalism Terence Hawkes associates with it. It may, as Cain 
suggests, have been palliative against the “politically painful” Cold War, or, 
in as Walhout’s counterargument, may have been used to train people against 
Communism. But if we allow such methodological hijackings to characterize 
the movement, we risk missing a major tendency in American literary and 
political thought, a tendency which does not stop at the borders of academic 
close reading. The riddle of literature’s “anti-instrumental potential” may in 
large part be the legacy, in Eliot and the Agrarians, of an essentially residual, 
feudal worldview. But it has gone on to belong equally to the left and to the 
right. If McCann and Szalay are correct, it is alive and well today.
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john crowe ransom’s essay “Criticism, Inc.,” included in his volume The World’s Body (1938), reads in many respects as a manifesto for the 
New Criticism that he was in the process of developing: “[I]t is from the 
professors of literature, in this country the professors of English for the most 
part, that I should hope eventually for the erection of intelligent standards of 
criticism. It is their business” (328–29).1 These professors, he suggests, will 
be armed both with a poet’s knowledge of technique and style and a phi-
losopher’s understanding of abstractions and themes. By the end of the essay, 
Ransom outlines several tendencies that such critics should avoid, includ-
ing paraphrasing the text in lieu of analysis as well as providing “personal 
registrations,” which describe the “effect of the art-work upon the critic as 
reader.” But perhaps most importantly, critics should refrain from literary 
analysis that stresses historical context or political moralizing at the expense 
of close examination of the text itself (342–45).
 As a number of critics, including Michael Kreyling and Paul Bové, have 
noted, this last directive at first glance appears odd coming from Ransom.2 
After all, in the years before his development of the New Criticism, in works 
such as God without Thunder and the Agrarian symposium I’ll Take My 
Stand, both published in 1930, Ransom concentrated his literary energies 
on cultural/historical criticism and theology—all pursued directly or indi-
rectly in defense of Southern traditionalism. Bové and Kreyling argue that 
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the New Critical method allowed critics to bypass the messiness of history, 
especially when that history was deeply immersed in issues of race and slav-
ery. Moreover, such “political quietism” gave these critics a chance to resist 
the forward lurch of time and the recognition of modernity, just as the essays 
comprising I’ll Take My Stand did by setting forth an economic and cultural 
program based on precapitalist agrarianism (Bové, 115). Striking a somewhat 
different chord, Mark Jancovich insists that the New Critical approach never 
intended to divorce itself from history and culture, though he concedes that 
the New Criticism was the logical intellectual extension of agrarianism, not 
Southern nationalism: “[I]t was not Ransom, [Allen] Tate, and [Robert Penn] 
Warren who abandoned their Agrarian ideals. They merely felt that their 
position had become overidentified with the South as a region and their shift 
to the New Criticism was a way of refocusing attention on their criticisms of 
modern society” (27).
 Despite their differences, these assessments of the historical and cultural 
context in Ransom’s New Critical method largely overlook issues of gender, 
though gender is perhaps the one cultural/political issue that retained its vis-
ibility throughout the Agrarian and New Critical phases of Ransom’s career.3 
During the Agrarian phase, Ransom’s concern about gender upheaval in gen-
eral and androgyny in particular was part and parcel of his brooding about 
the modernizing South. The blurring of gender roles that seemed to charac-
terize the end of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided 
Ransom with a point of departure for discussing a wider range of threats, 
including Southern acquiescence to industrial capitalism, the emergence of 
a Soviet-style welfare state, the evisceration of traditional Southern social 
customs, and even the breakdown of a notion of a racially cohesive organic 
Southern community.
 Thus in one sense androgyny was a symptom of a modern world that had 
lost its historical and cultural moorings. At the same time, however, androg-
yny for Ransom also served as a prescriptive measure to anchor humans to 
the landscape, to God, and to each other. In this latter prescriptive form, 
androgyny functioned for Ransom as it did for fellow modernist T. S. Eliot, 
whose The Waste Land uses the hermaphroditic Tiresias to embody poetic 
unity and historic continuity. Likewise, Ransom sought a synthesis of his 
“masculine” intellect and “feminine” sentiment as the means to create a myth 
of an organic Southern community, ironically based on clear social distinc-
tions between men and women.
 Though Ransom abandoned the South and Southern nationalism by the 
late 1930s, many of his gender formulations simply found amplification 
through aesthetics. In sorting out the differences between the two competing 
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versions of androgyny, he was able to codify and articulate the type of gen-
dered dualisms that would constitute the backbone of his later New Critical 
methodology. Perhaps without his realizing it, Ransom’s deployment of gen-
dered paradigms beyond the sexed body into the realm of aesthetics betrays 
a larger point about gender itself. As theorists Judith Butler and Thomas 
Laqueur have suggested, gender does not depend on the sexed body for mean-
ing; rather the sexed body has been made to fit preconceived notions of gen-
der.4 Controlling the world of men and women during a time of tremendous 
social upheaval first meant controlling the discourses by which masculinity 
and femininity were defined.
 Angered by the ridicule the South suffered in the wake of the 1925 Scopes 
“Monkey” Trial in Dayton, Tennessee, Ransom (then an English professor 
at Vanderbilt University in nearby Nashville) turned his intellectual energies 
from poetry to religious and cultural criticism (Jancovich, 22). Better known 
today for his contributions to I’ll Take My Stand, Ransom also wrote a full-
length study of Christianity, God without Thunder: An Unorthodox Defense 
of Orthodoxy. In it he questions how modern western society—which he 
calls the Occident—interprets Christianity. In its quest for material acquisi-
tion and scientific knowledge, the Occident has chosen to put its faith in a 
God without thunder—that is, a benevolent God who loves His children so 
much that He opens up the secrets of the universe for them to exploit for 
their own scientific and commercial gains: “[T]he new religion,” cautions 
Ransom, “presents god as a Great Man with all the uncertainties left out: a 
Great Man whose ways are scientific and knowable and whose intention is 
amiable and constant” (20). Ransom consequently believes that the West is 
bent on self-destruction, and he exhorts his readers to understand God as the 
“Orientals” (i.e., the premodern Church or the Jews of the Old Testament) 
once did, as a jealous God of contingency, one who could be “capable of evil 
as well as good” (301). Furthermore, he explains, “When God was pictured 
in the likeness of a fabulously Great Man, of marvelous technique and uncer-
tain favor, it was fairly difficult for one to be at ease in Zion; for his fiat was 
unaccountable and unpredictable; and man worshiping him was necessarily 
humble, and for the time being neglectful of the ordinary routine of practical 
life as a very vain thing” (20). Though Ransom was never a devout believer 
himself,5 he felt that only by living in fear of God as “the Orientals” once did 
could the West reverse the course of industrial capitalism’s tendency to frag-
ment traditional communities, lay waste to arts and social customs, and bring 
humans into interminable warfare with their natural environment.
 At the center of this book stands a Godhead who has been largely under-
stood in the Occident as implicitly male, but who in Ransom’s opinion should 
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be seen as androgynous. Remarkably, the gendered construction of Ransom’s 
irascible Oriental god has gone unnoticed over the years, even though it has 
everything to do with the book’s basic thrust. The God of Thunder that Ran-
som would like to reinstate in western culture is not the Trinitarian deity 
commonly worshiped in traditional Christianity; Ransom believes that Christ 
is merely a demigod, and thus the two remaining components of the Trinity 
are the true and supreme components of the Godhead.6 Ransom calls these 
coequal figures the Mother and the Father:
God is the Father, the masculine, cosmic, and rational Creator. But the mate-
rial is the Mother, who is feminine, anarchical, and irrational. (We would 
add, with Plato’s permission: The Father is the personification of Quantity, 
and the Mother is the personification of Quality.) It is upon such a Mother 
that God [the Father] must beget his children, the objective creatures which 
we now know on earth as nature. They partake of the being of both parents; 
and so far as biology can generalize them, in equal degrees. (God without 
Thunder, 300)
The Mother is for Ransom what has otherwise been known as the Holy 
Ghost. “It is a significant fact,” he says, “that the Holy Ghost for the Old 
Testament authors, and for Christ himself speaking in his native Aramaic, 
was of the feminine gender. But this was the right gender for defending the 
demonic and irrational aspect of his being” (304). These musings make for a 
heady proclamation. In short, Ransom asserts that nature (of which humans 
are a part) is the metaphysical or cosmological product of a masculine and 
feminine Godhead. Ironically the Godhead’s phallic thunderbolts come from 
the feminine, irrational side of its being. This configuration may very well 
be what Ransom had in mind when he claimed later in The World’s Body 
that the male poet is an “intellectualized woman”: he partakes of both the 
Father’s spirituality and the Mother’s mutable, sensual materiality (77).
 The Southern soil, which is at the ideological, spiritual, and imaginative 
core of I’ll Take My Stand, likewise partakes of the Father and Mother. On 
one level the soil exists as a certain quantity of atoms that can be represented 
by the rational—that is, masculine—abstraction of a molecular compound. 
Yet simultaneously the soil elicits a certain amount of sentiment from its cul-
tivator. Through daily toils on the farm the agrarian establishes a personal 
relationship with the soil, something that cannot be represented merely by 
a chemical equation. The poem “Antique Harvesters,” published in Ran-
som’s 1927 book of poetry Two Gentlemen in Bonds, invokes the land-
scape’s feminine aspect. In the first stanza the poet asks: “What shall this land 
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produce?” The answer, which comes at the end of the poem, is an image of 
a “Proud Lady” who “hath not stooped” (50–51). As the poem suggests, 
physical matter such as the soil possesses its own personality that people can 
experience in infinite varieties. The Proud Lady, though old, is the primordial 
landscape, and the (presumably male) Antique Harvesters, made in the God-
head’s androgynous image, are in touch with their feminine sides enough to 
experience the soil in more than just scientific or “masculine” ways. This dis-
tinction would prove instrumental in the development of the New Criticism 
in the 1940s.
 As a mythical object of homage, the Proud Lady becomes what Anne 
Goodwyn Jones has called the symbolic Confederate woman who dutifully 
wears Dixie’s diadem. “Rather than a person,” Jones remarks, “the Confed-
erate woman is a personification, effective only as she works in others’ imagi-
nations. Efforts to join person and personification, to make self into symbol, 
must fail because the idea of Southern womanhood specifically denies the 
self” (4). Ransom sees androgyny as a form of male prerogative. Male poets, 
alongside their agrarian brethren, mystically in touch with both their mas-
culine rationality and feminine sensibility, cultivate a female art object. As a 
result the Proud Lady is displaced from politics and the marketplace, standing 
still eternally, never disrupting the patriarchal order. In fact she becomes the 
very symbol of that order. In this sense, then, the Proud Lady’s advanced age 
is not a sign of temporal decay, but an embodiment of the sweep of (white) 
Southern myth and tradition.
 Ransom’s religious vision reflects a larger modernist interest in androg-
yny. For example, William Faulkner, H. D., James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf 
all entertained the notion that the imagination was made up of masculine 
and feminine faculties that, when combined, could produce remarkable artis-
tic achievements (Rado, 7). No doubt this affirmative version of androgyny 
was what T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land sought in its depiction of Tiresias. 
“[T]throbbing between two lives / Old man with wrinkled female breasts,” 
the aged prophet is, as Eliot’s “Notes” to the poem explain, “the most impor-
tant personage in the poem, uniting all the rest. . . . [S]o all the women [in the 
poem] are one woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias” (38, 50).
 Yet in “Reconstructed but Unregenerate,” his contribution to I’ll Take 
My Stand, Ransom addresses a dystopian version of androgyny heralded by 
a capitalist economy that has the power to uproot familiar gender and social 
structures. Though the essay rarely mentions religion, the principles of God 
without Thunder obviously serve as the essay’s philosophical basis. Placed at 
the opening of the symposium, the essay is in many ways the most general. 
While Ransom claims not to miss the Old South per se, he at least misses 
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the leisurely approach (white) Southerners supposedly took to life—one that 
allowed them to experience the aesthetic pleasures of the quotidian. Since the 
Civil War, industrial capitalism had encroached upon the South’s traditions 
and ripped them apart.
 Yet beneath Ransom’s worry about capitalism was a deeper brooding 
about socialism. The Agrarians believed, for example, that it was through the 
crisis in capitalist overproduction that the economy would slump and labor 
would organize to the point of applying government directives to the modes 
of production. Thus the Agrarians ironically believed in the Marxist dialecti-
cal narrative of history but certainly did not condone its ends. As the United 
States was sinking deeper and deeper into the Great Depression while the 
Soviet Union was reporting a surge in its economy under the first Five Year 
Plan, the Agrarians no doubt felt they had legitimate reason for concern. It is 
little wonder that Allen Tate originally proposed calling the Agrarian mani-
festo Tracts against Communism (Murphy, 63). The manifesto’s “Statement 
of Principles,” which Ransom had a direct hand in drafting, touches on these 
threats, arguing that a band of “super-engineers” will “adapt production to 
consumption and regulate prices and guarantee business against fluctuation: 
they are Sovietists. . . . [T]he true Sovietists or Communists—if the term may 
be used here in the European sense—are the Industrialists themselves” (I’ll 
Take My Stand, xxiii).
 As “Reconstructed but Unregenerate” makes clear in later passages, the 
modern age of industrial capitalism distorts the “orthodox” view of androg-
yny God without Thunder so earnestly delineates. Here Ransom speaks of 
masculine and feminine forms of ambition that operate symbiotically, yet 
destructively, in the modern world. The masculine form of ambition mani-
fests itself in a war against nature, and its bottom line is production. Ransom 
worries that men have used their intellectual grasp of chemistry, physics, and 
engineering to promote a pioneering spirit of progress that sees no end to this 
conquest. This war is sustained in large measure by an insatiable consumption:
If it is Adam’s curse to will perpetually to work his mastery upon nature, it is 
Eve’s curse to prompt Adam every morning to keep up with the best people 
in the neighborhood in taking the measure of his success. There can never 
be stability and establishment in a community whose every lady member is 
sworn to see that her mate is not eclipsed in the competition for material 
advantages. (“Reconstructed,” 9–10)
Ransom also presents here a variation on what current-day critic Christophe 
Den Tandt refers to as “corporate androgyny.” For Den Tandt this concept 
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describes male protagonists in early-twentieth-century American fiction 
“whose willingness to develop a supreme sense of masculinity paradoxically 
involves the appropriation of feminine features. . . . [They] derive their height-
ened power from an ability to bracket off their sense of individuation and to 
merge with entities modeled as feminine bodies—the urban market, the cor-
poration” (640). Clearly there are some differences between Den Tandt’s and 
Ransom’s concepts, yet both recognize that women—either as consumers or 
more abstractly as symbols of corporate entities—held a stake in the Ameri-
can marketplace that businessmen could not afford to overlook. As a fur-
ther indication of androgyny’s centrality to the modern American economy, 
Ransom states that Adam may become a consumer alongside Eve. Any strict 
dichotomy between masculine production and feminine consumption, he 
observes, “may not be without the usual exceptions” (“Reconstructed,” 9).
 Furthermore, the blurring of the masculine and feminine impulses emerges 
through the irrational fears of cultural emasculation men feel in response to 
the demands of their wives. In fact as God without Thunder explains, the 
impulse to consume so preoccupies men that readers might forget that con-
sumption had historically been understood and depicted as an innately femi-
nine activity—as Eve’s activity. In this sense corporate androgyny leads not to 
“a supreme sense of masculinity,” as Den Tandt would have it, but to a debil-
itating self-consciousness. Thus the male consumer becomes subject time and 
again to the irrational sense of lack that contemporaneous Freudian theory 
ascribed to women.
 The feminine sense of ambition goes well beyond turning men into cas-
trated individuals who fulfill their lack through consumption. As “Recon-
structed but Unregenerate” further explains:
The feminine form is likewise hallowed among us under the name of Service. 
The term has many meanings, but we come finally to the one which is criti-
cal for the moderns; service means the function of Eve, it means the seducing 
of laggard men into fresh struggles with nature. It has special application to 
the apparently stagnant sections of mankind, it busies itself with the heathen 
Chinee, with the Roman Catholic Mexican, with the “lower” classes in our 
own society. Its motive is missionary. Its watchwords are such as Protestant-
ism, Individualism, Democracy, and the point of its appeal is a discontent, 
generally labeled “divine.” (10–11)
In essence Ransom suggests that the feminine bourgeois devotion to 
“Service”—a common term in the contemporaneous discourse of the New 
Woman—evolves slowly but surely into the modern welfare state. At first 
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glance one might suspect that Ransom would be relieved if “laggard” men 
could find work; a strong employment rate, after all, might keep workers 
from organizing and rebelling. Yet Ransom is also mindful that the industrial 
economy will always have a surplus labor force that women will thus enjoin 
the state to employ. “Along with the gospel of progress goes the gospel of Ser-
vice,” he explains. “They work beautifully as a team” (“Reconstructed,” 8). 
As Ransom later explained in response to Stringfellow Barr’s indictment of 
I’ll Take My Stand, “The old Southern instinct which identifies [socialism and 
communism] is perfectly right in the long run. . . . Big business, which [Barr] 
accepts, and which every day becomes bigger business, will call for regula-
tion, which every day will become more regulation. And the grand finale of 
regulation, the millennium itself of regulated industrialism, is Russian com-
munism” (Davidson, 49).
 In fact, in positioning the “feminine form” of ambition as a key instigator 
in a specific historical sequence beginning with the Protestant Reformation 
and ending with the establishment of secular democracies, Ransom shows 
the extent to which modern women have ventured beyond the mythologi-
cal parameters of his ultrafeminine Proud Lady. The reforms established in 
the Progressive era and 1920s were largely fueled and populated by women 
activists, such as settlement house founders Jane Addams and Lillian Wald, 
Women’s Christian Temperance League president Frances Willard, feminist 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and National Consumers League general secretary 
Florence Kelley. Not surprisingly, many of these women not only promoted 
a broader base of gender and social progressivism (if not outright socialism), 
but had come under fire for being mannish and aggressive.7
 By looking at the deeper gendered implications of Ransom’s writings of 
the 1930s, one might find that the status, power, and legitimacy of the post-
war New Woman was still very much at issue. With one foot in the bour-
geois world of mass consumption and another in the world of social reform, 
the New Woman was anathema to conservative Agrarianism. Just as Ameri-
can men lived out the “pioneer doctrine” in their never-ending battles with 
nature, so did women in their striving to ameliorate the inevitable effects of 
those battles (“Reconstructed,” 11).
 Thus it would seem that Ransom had been hailed by cultural currents 
that regarded social amelioration in general as an oddly gendered ideo-
logical construct. As social historian Daniel J. Walkowitz notes, the 1920s 
proved a key decade for women who sought to make social work a viable 
career option. Women social workers effected changes in society through 
the adaptation of scientific methods for treating clients. And “because objec-
tivity and rationality were conventionally associated with male professional 
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culture . . . , the scientific model created its own tensions for female social 
workers.” The woman social worker not only had to play the Good Mother; 
she “had to adopt attributes of passionlessness and objectivity generally asso-
ciated with men, traits that easily allowed others to stereotype her as desexed 
and androgynous” (1051–56).8 By the time I’ll Take My Stand was published 
at the start of the new decade, social work had changed so much as a result 
of the “male” scientific principles it accepted that it had adopted its own 
manual for scientific research. The 1930 census, moreover, reported employ-
ment of 31,241 social workers with seventy-six different job titles; eighty per-
cent of the profession was female. By 1932 social work had moved into the 
university curricula of twenty-five different graduate degree-granting schools 
(Brown, 142–43).
 The androgynously constructed Service impulse also threatened Ransom 
because it could abstract the South well beyond the mystical organic com-
munity he so devoutly envisioned. Using Benedict Anderson’s famous term, 
Michael Kreyling understands the Agrarians’ South as an “imagined com-
munity” (3–6).9 Yet the insidiousness of the welfare state makes that cohesive 
community nearly impossible to imagine because feminine Service uses the 
masculine sense of intellect and rationality to carry out its program of uplift 
and reform. Under such positivist guises as sociology, history, anthropology, 
demography, and social work, the encroaching welfare state would demys-
tify the South’s cultural “unity,” which had relied mainly on myths of white 
supremacy and religious conservatism to keep the bond strong.
 Scholars of Southern literature have noted the ideological rift between the 
conservative Vanderbilt Agrarians led by Ransom and the liberal academ-
ics at the University of North Carolina led by sociology professor Howard 
Odum.10 This rift developed in large part because Odum and his Chapel Hill 
colleagues attempted to ameliorate the poverty and racism of the South by 
first assessing them through the use of different empirical and abstract meth-
ods. Thus industrialism and the various “-ologies” would not only create the 
pretext for a proletarian state in Ransom’s view, but would also use mascu-
line modes of science to connect seamlessly the North and the South cultur-
ally, economically, and racially. Through scientific and economic abstraction, 
the nascent welfare state would create an androgynous and miscegenated 
social body by incorporating the worst of modern masculine and feminine 
ambitions.
 The perceived racial implications of feminine Service wedded to mascu-
line rationality were far-reaching for Ransom. At the heart of the Agrarian 
movement was a cultural nationalism that was very much in keeping with 
the romantic primordialism of Johann Gottfried von Herder and Giuseppi 
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Mazzini (Reed, 52–53). The Agrarian emphasis on primordialism might 
explain, for example, Donald Davidson’s reluctance to include Robert Penn 
Warren’s essay “The Briar Patch” in I’ll Take My Stand because it spoke of 
blacks’ participation in the Southern agrarian tradition. Ransom himself is 
guilty of the same discomfort when it comes to the place of African Amer-
icans in the South. His essay awkwardly glosses over the issue of slavery, 
absurdly suggesting that the peculiar institution was “monstrous enough in 
theory, but, more often than not, humane in practice” (“Reconstructed,” 14). 
Ransom concerns himself primarily with the “vegetative aspect” of a person, 
which he asserts is the impulse to settle permanently on a piece of land, but 
which also implies in quasi-Herderian fashion that white Southerners spring 
up from their native Southern soil. Of course he fudges the lines of descent 
in his assumption, and perhaps Warren’s “Briar Patch” met such resistance 
among his colleagues because it reminded them that white Southerners were 
no more indigenous to the land than the first slaves who arrived in Virginia 
from west Africa in 1619 (“Briar,” 246).
 The inherent contradictions between Ransom’s religious and dystopian 
visions of androgyny are, I argue, an integral part of his eventual turn away 
from Agrarianism. On the one hand, androgyny was the dreadful result of 
modernity, for as the American industrial economy slumped further, it neces-
sitated a governmental intervention that put masculine rationality in the ser-
vice of feminine uplift. Yet on the other hand, androgyny in its orthodox, 
spiritual manifestation provided the antidote for a nation-state’s ills, not only 
involving a belief in a Godhead half-male and half-female, but also enjoin-
ing individuals to see themselves as a part of the Godhead’s world; like the 
natural world itself, humans are both material and spiritual, intellectual and 
sentimental. In both forms of androgyny, masculine intellect and feminine 
sentiment are present, but Ransom could never articulate just how these two 
constitutive elements veered off in such dangerously different directions. In 
other words, where was the line between artistic creation on the one side and 
social amelioration on the other if both required the use of masculine ration-
ality and feminine sentiment?
 When Ransom turned away from Southern nationalism and religious crit-
icism by the late 1930s, the larger theoretical implications of this disjuncture 
haunted him. By the end of the 1930s, he was no longer even a Southerner. 
Unable in 1937 to agree on a sufficient salary and contract with the English 
department at Vanderbilt, Ransom uprooted to Kenyon College in Gambier, 
Ohio, and took on a dual role as professor and founding editor of the Ken-
yon Review. By this point in his career, Ransom had moved so far from his 
previous promotion of religious orthodoxy that he often found himself in the 
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middle of the religious idealist and the secular “realist” camps between which 
William James tried to negotiate in his famous essays on pragmatism (Quin-
lan, 68–87).
 With this change came Ransom’s deeper ambivalence about the cultural 
legitimacy and economic viability of the agrarian South. The shift appears in 
his 1936 essay entitled “What Does the South Want?,” which was included 
in Who Owns America? A New Declaration of Independence, a companion 
piece to I’ll Take My Stand. This essay already marks some acquiescence to 
the welfare state as it had developed during the first four years of Frank-
lin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Ransom recognizes the incredible devastation 
the Great Depression has wreaked upon the South, and he admits to the 
need for a number of improvements that only a technologically advanced 
and centrally cohesive federal government can provide. Almost as though 
laughing about his militancy during the earlier Agrarian years, he remarks: 
“The Agrarians have been rather belabored both in the South and out of it 
by persons who have understood them as denying bathtubs to the Southern 
rural population. But I believe they are fully prepared to concede the bath-
tubs” (248). In fact he accepts the need for fairer income distribution, backup 
employment, hospitals, paved roads, parks, and dependable plumbing, all of 
which are “urged nowadays by the welfare workers.” One might be shocked 
to see just how much Ransom acclimated himself to the idea of the welfare 
state. Once deriding social scientists for breaking up the organic community, 
he now admonishes them much more humbly: “But I should be a little wary 
of the professional welfare workers, and not let them drill the population too 
hard in playhabits and social functions. I should give the labor community its 
rights and let it make the most of them” (251). In other words, he exhorts the 
social workers to shape up the Southern laborers, but still to be gentle and let 
them save face by keeping some of their regional-based leisure habits.
  Ransom’s essay “Poets without Laurels,” also included in The World’s 
Body, serves as a farewell to his overtly political phase of the early and mid-
1930s. In it he argues that modern poets, needing to adapt to the alienation 
of modern life, have chosen to write poetry about subjects that are largely 
divorced from the political arena. The modern poem “has no moral, political, 
religious, or sociological values. It is not about ‘res publica,’ the public thing. 
The subject matter is trifling” (59). Among these trifles are those Wallace Ste-
vens made famous, such as a blackbird, a Key West seascape, or a jar atop 
a hill in Ransom’s home state of Tennessee (Malvasi, 79). Not surprisingly, 
the critical theory that would spring from his The New Criticism (1941) and 
related writings was one that would champion such poetry, removed as it was 
from politics, history, and authorial intention.
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 But androgyny did not disappear from Ransom’s later writings. By the late 
1930s he had found a way to rechannel it back toward the aesthetic program 
suggested in God without Thunder. For example, in his essay “The Woman 
as Poet,” a review of Edna St. Vincent Millay’s poetry that is included in The 
World’s Body, he remarks:
A woman lives for love, if we will but project that term to cover all her ten-
der fixations upon natural objects of sense, some of them more innocent and 
far less reciprocal than men. Her devotion to them is more than gallant, it is 
fierce and importunate, and cannot but be exemplary to the hardened male 
observer. He understands it, from his “recollections of early childhood,” or 
at least of youth, but has lapsed from it; or rather, in the best case, he has 
pursued another line of development. The minds of man and woman grow 
apart, and how shall we express their differentiation? In this way, I think: 
man, at best, is an intellectualized woman. Or, man distinguishes himself 
from woman by intellect, but he should keep it feminized. He knows he 
should not abandon sensibility and tenderness, though perhaps he has gener-
ally done so. (77)
This distinction gets at the very heart of certain gender dynamics that reside 
just under the surface of Ransom’s earlier writings. Good poets, Ransom sug-
gests, are those who find the right balance of sentiment and intellect. In this 
case Ransom shows no anxiety about women social workers whose mascu-
line rationality threatens to override their femininity. Rather, he frets about 
those such as Millay, who allow their feminine poetic sentiment to override 
their masculine sense of discipline and precision. Likewise, he expresses con-
cern for the overly rational man, who gets no love from poetry and invests 
all his energies in the corporate or scientific world: “[N]ow that he is so far 
removed from the world of the simple senses, he does not like to impeach 
his own integrity and leave his business in order to recover it. . . . He would 
much prefer if it is possible to find poetry in his study, or even in his office, 
and not have to sit under the syringa bush” (77–78).
 In 1941, the same year The New Criticism was published, Ransom pub-
lished “Criticism as Pure Speculation” in The Intent of the Critic, a volume of 
essays edited by D. A. Stauffer. Here Ransom dichotomizes poetry into struc-
ture and texture. Likening these two components to a fully furnished home, 
he explains that the structure consists of the “beams and boards”—that part 
of a poem that can be transcribed or paraphrased seamlessly into prose. The 
structure of the poem therefore consists of its abstract theme or argument. 
The texture of the poem, however, is “the paint, the paper, the tapestry”—
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those formal elements such as imagery, rhyme scheme, meter, enjambment, 
or caesurae that provide the poem with its feel, its particularities. As Ran-
som explains, “The intent of the good critic becomes therefore to examine 
and define the poem with respect to its structure and its texture. If he has 
nothing to say about its texture he has nothing to say about it specifically as 
a poem, but is treating it only insofar as it is prose” (111). This dichotomy 
sounds suspiciously close to masculine spirituality and feminine material-
ity, the two components of Ransom’s orthodox Godhead articulated in God 
without Thunder. As the thematic core of the poem, the structure is the mas-
culine thematic abstraction—perhaps love, happiness, dejection, anger, or 
jealousy—that is given its character by feminine texture.
 In The New Criticism Ransom again explains the difference between the 
structure and texture of a poem, adding to his explanation the remark that 
understanding the tension between structure and texture gives way to a sense 
of resolution and order:
The composition of a poem is an operation in which the argument fights to 
displace the meter, and the meter fights to displace the argument. It would 
seem that the sacrifices made on both sides would be legible forever in the 
terms of peace, which are the dispositions found in the finished poem, where 
the critic may analyze them if he thinks it furthers the understanding of 
poetry. (295)11
Should my suspicions about the genders of the structure and the texture 
prove tenable, I suspect as well that Ransom attempts to do in poetry what he 
could not do in the world of time and space: find a creative means of control-
ling the rivalry between masculinity and femininity. The productive tension 
of the androgynous poem supplants the androgynous Godhead as Ransom’s 
new object of reverence. True, Ransom labels poetry fraught with tension 
between texture and structure as “impure,” but he concedes that “[t]he 
World of Appearance (or opinion) seemed to Plato inferior to the World of 
Pure Being (or reason), but he acknowledged that the former was the world 
which our perceptions took hold of, and indeed was the world of nature” 
(328). The “pure” poetry made up of structure alone is too close to mascu-
line rationality. Unchecked by feminine texture, the structure has the charac-
ter—and perhaps the potential destructiveness—of a scientific theorem.
 Though New Criticism resisted didacticism at all costs, Ransom subtly, 
albeit undeniably, makes a case for applying his method beyond the class-
room or the study. In his essay “Forms and Citizens,” also found in The 
World’s Body, he makes a general plea for the preservation of social custom 
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and ritual, though he concedes that the informality of the modern world 
seems to have the upper hand in the matter. In his defense of custom he cre-
ates the hypothetical example of the man who wishes to possess a woman 
sexually. In this example structure and texture take the respective forms of 
the man’s intention and the various rituals he performs to woo her. Ransom 
suggests that, given the lack of pretense in the modern era, the man might be 
able to simply approach the woman straightaway and engage her in (presum-
ably consensual) sexual play. “If our hero, however, does not propose for 
himself the character of the savage . . . he must approach her with ceremony, 
and pay her a fastidious courtship. . . . The form actually denies him the 
privilege of going the straight line between two points, even though this line 
has an axiomatic logic in its favor and is the shortest possible line” (World’s 
Body, 33). In other words, the “structure” of the situation is tempered by the 
logically unnecessary but nonetheless satisfying “texture” of the courtship 
ritual.
 The hypothetical woman’s sexuality is made more enjoyable for the man 
willing to travel a circuitous route to take her: “But the woman, contem-
plated in this manner under restraint, becomes a person and an aesthetic 
object; therefore a richer object” (33). The sexism in this statement is made 
all the more curious by the contention that the woman somehow becomes 
more of a person by achieving the status of aesthetic object—a poem in the 
flesh. But it is also worth remarking that in treating the man’s plight as an 
androgynous trajectory made up of masculine argument and feminine rit-
ual, Ransom’s narrative arrives at gender stability: men court; women are 
courted—and then enjoyed for their sexual richness. His concentration on 
fixity mirrors a statement he made eight years earlier in I’ll Take My Stand: 
“The arts of the [South] . . . were the eighteenth-century social arts of dress, 
conversation, manners, the table, the hunt, politics, oratory, the pulpit. These 
were the arts of living and not arts of escape; they were also community 
arts, in which every class of society could participate after its kind” (“Recon-
structed,” 12, emphasis added). Poetry is like any other formality in that it 
provides boundaries, hierarchies, and stasis.
 As an example of a culture that has already “rationaliz[ed] and 
economiz[ed] its citizens down to their baser instincts, Ransom cites Soviet 
Russia, where “there is less sex-consciousness . . . than anywhere in the 
Western world” (World’s Body, 37). Though by 1938 Ransom had come to 
embrace much of the New Deal’s welfare programs, he nonetheless preserved 
some of his earlier Agrarian reticence about the destructive form of androg-
yny. In heralding the “New Soviet Woman,” Russian feminists such as Len-
in’s wife Nadezhda Krupskaya and Alexandra Kollontai seriously questioned 
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what, if anything, constituted difference between men and women. Kollontai 
was one of the most vocal of Soviet feminists, even publishing opinions in the 
Baltimore Sun in the early decades of the twentieth century. She was particu-
larly outspoken in her advocacy of a Soviet culture that would abolish the 
notions of gender distinction promoted by the bourgeois patriarchal family. 
“In the place of the individual and egotistical family,” she argued, “there will 
arise a great universal family of workers, in which all the workers, men and 
women, will be above all workers, comrades” (Stites, 351).
 Ransom seems to suggest the same thing, though reluctantly. “I suppose,” 
he continues, “that the loyal Russians approach the perfect state of animals, 
with sex reduced to its pure biological business” (37). In other words, while 
he may believe that the differences between genders are the result of con-
vention, they are nonetheless necessary for sustaining an enjoyment of life. 
Here he readily acknowledges the relative inconsequence of sex distinctions 
between males and females in comparison to their gender distinctions, which 
are governed by culture and habit. In the absence of divinely or culturally 
enforced gender codes, men and women must choose to be different just as 
in an earlier moment Ransom was willing to submit to an irrational god in 
whom he did not personally believe. Here Ransom concedes a larger point 
made by Judith Butler that gender is performed “in an exterior space through 
a stylized repetition of acts” to perpetuate the illusion of immutability (140). 
In preferring “efficient animality,” which recognizes sex but not gender dif-
ferences, humans are bound for a life of “perfect misery” (38). While Janco-
vich believes that “[i]t would be wrong to suggest that Ransom is egalitarian 
in his sexual politics,” he states nonetheless that Ransom’s ideas evolve “from 
a profound discomfort with the distinctions between masculinity and femi-
ninity” (39). I argue the opposite, however: androgyny as Ransom defines 
it—insofar is it is made up of masculine and feminine components—is essen-
tially a conservative formulation, for it implies that there is a clear distinc-
tion between the two, even if the distinction is grounded in culture and not 
biology. Ransom’s aesthetic comfort, then, comes from his ability to articu-
late those differences if for no other reason than to keep them in a proper 
balance. Through keeping the distinctions clear he is able to conclude that 
the hyperfeminine Millay is just as flawed as the hypermasculine New Soviet 
Woman.
 For John Crowe Ransom the process by which poets create poetry is 
essentially no different than the Southern yeoman who finds in the landscape 
a substance imbued with both abstract and material qualities. In both cases 
the blending of masculine and feminine attributes provides not only a bet-
ter understanding of the world’s complexity but also a sense of order and 
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control. As the South joined the rest of the nation in experiencing the break-
down of nineteenth-century gender barriers and the rapid increase in indus-
trialization, Ransom came to realize that yearning for a Southern yeomanry 
was fruitless; but via his New Critical method he was able to articulate the 
boundaries of masculinity and femininity in ways that helped him make order 
of a dynamic and sometimes hostile world.
Notes
 1. A substantially different version of this essay appears as part of the chapter entitled 
“Reactionary and Radical Androgyny: Two Southerners Assess the Depression-Era Body 
Politic,” in Aaron Shaheen, Androgynous Democracy: Modern American Literature and 
the Dual-Sexed Body Politic (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2010).
 2. See Bové and Kreyling.
 3. Jancovich does acknowledge the intersection between gender and criticism in Ran-
som’s writing, but he only devotes two paragraphs of his book to this intersection. See 
chapter 4, “John Crowe Ransom: The Social Relations of Social Activity.”
 4. See Butler and Thomas Laqueur.
 5. See Watkins, Hiers, and Weaks. Unlike T. S. Eliot, who found personal refuge from 
the fragmentation of modernity in Anglo-Catholicism, Ransom remained fairly agnostic 
throughout his adult life. Talking with Robert Penn Warren in 1931, he made a curious 
remark about God without Thunder: “I found it very odd that I who am not a religious 
man, should write such a book; but I had to write it for the truth that was in it” (Talking 
with Robert Penn Warren, 382). The apparent “truth” for this son and grandson of Meth-
odist preachers was the cultural efficacy, though not the verifiable reality, of the wrathful 
Christian God.
 6. In Ransom’s orthodoxy, Christ plays a different role. Now relegated to the infe-
rior position of “demi-god,” he does not command nearly the authority that he does 
in the Trinitarian tradition. For Ransom, Christ was “The Demigod who knew he was 
a Demigod and refused to set up as a God” (World’s Body, 305; italics in original). In 
other words, Christ, being male and partially divine, was an emanation of the Godhead’s 
rational masculine principle, what Ransom calls the “Logos.”
 7. For analysis of Kelley’s and Addams’s purported androgyny, see the chapter entitled 
“The New Woman as Androgyne” in Smith-Rosenberg.
 8. Equally at issue in Ransom’s writings was the so-called “social gospel,” a doc-
trine of Christian-sanctioned progressivism that caught up many reform-minded men and 
women in its evangelical sweep. Middle- and upper-class Christians worked through estab-
lished church organizations and also created new outlets for reform, such as the Young 
Women’s and Young Men’s Christian Associations. This latter institution Ransom lumps in 
with “welfare establishments, fraternal organizations, and Rotary” as “philanthropic soci-
eties with a minimum of doctrine about God” (God without Thunder, 5).
 9. See also Anderson.
 10. See, for example, Chapter 3 in Hobson.
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 11. In later years Ransom would back away from these claims, arguing that such unity 
was really another term for the domination of the abstract over the particular. (See Ran-
som, “Art Worries the Naturalists,” 282–99).
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In 1945, Theodor W. Adorno published two short essays in the spring and autumn issues of John Crowe Ransom’s Kenyon Review. Ransom indi-
rectly responded to the first in the same issue, and he directly reacted against 
Adorno’s ideas in the second. This marks an improbable moment in modern 
literary history, at which the practical genius of the academic institutionaliza-
tion of American letters in the New Criticism and the anti-discursive poly-
math of the Frankfurt School crossed intellectual paths. Their essays testify 
to the subtle affinities between the literary and cultural criticism exemplified 
by the New Critics in the middle decades of the twentieth century and the 
ideology critique that came to dominate the center of academic literary–criti-
cal activity at the end of the century. An account of the meeting on the page 
between the founding editor of The Fugitive and The Kenyon Review and 
the exiled savant of Frankfurt offers more than the novelty of intersection 
between academic fashions past and present. Crucially, Ransom’s encounter 
with Adorno’s anti-teleological, western Marxism provoked him to abandon 
publicly most of the agrarian, religious, and aesthetic theories he had devel-
oped in the 1930s.
 Gerald Graff, John Guillory, and most recently, Stephen Schryer have 
made compelling arguments that the career of Ransom, as the exemplary 
New Critic, does not merely mark the decline of an ambitious but consciously 
“traditional” mode of cultural criticism into a hermetically sealed institu-
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tional form of literary pedagogy.1 As Schryer rightly emphasizes, the shift 
in Ransom’s career from that of an Agrarian agitator in I’ll Take My Stand 
(1930) and a defender of southern Christian fundamentalists in God without 
Thunder (1930) to an advocate of a professional, philosophically consistent 
and “purely” literary criticism in The World’s Body (1937) and The New 
Criticism (1941) was not one from politics to culture, nor from social forms 
to poetic ones.2 Rather Ransom’s and his colleagues’ loyalties moved from 
the region to the academy as “the critic’s primary object of identification” 
(Schryer, 670). In God without Thunder, Ransom had argued that poetry and 
religion (itself a collective concretization of poetry) were the necessary check 
on science and the totalitarian impulses of practical human action. I’ll Take 
My Stand contended that traditional southern culture was the form of soci-
ety that best expressed the proper balance among poetry, religion, science, 
and praxis; that form should be adapted to current conditions and restored 
to its place of honor. Ransom’s later two books were primarily—though by 
no means exclusively—concerned with defining the proper nature of poetry 
and the proper practice of literary criticism. Schryer highlights the continu-
ity between these projects, while observing that Ransom’s turn to the lat-
ter would eventually result in his abandonment of his earlier, anti-modern 
and anti-industrial regional politics. He would come to accept the division 
of labor because, as his essay “Criticism, Inc.” notes, only through a pro-
cess of professionalization could criticism achieve its proper levels of aca-
demic sophistication and credibility (Schryer, 673). In fact, Ransom’s gradual 
abandonment of his earlier politics in concession to a modernity that granted 
him institutional and aesthetic autonomy would have more causes than just 
an emergent academic loyalty. The most startling and direct of those causes 
would be the provocation of Adorno’s two essays. And yet no full account 
of this brief, important episode in the history of the New Criticism has been 
given until now.
 Adorno’s essays reflect his experience as a German intellectual in exile, 
living in a United States he finds culturally barbarous, while a more lethal 
barbarism devastated his native land. The first, titled “A Social Critique of 
Radio Music,” offered challenging and pessimistic insights on the dynamics 
of American mass culture. Here Adorno observed that the democratization of 
orchestral or “classical” music was in fact merely its mass commodification 
and fragmented distribution, and so fundamentally changed art itself into 
“entertainment.” Such reflections stemmed from his work on the Princeton 
Radio Project, an engagement lasting several years in which Adorno studied 
and measured, by various empirical means, the effects of music and radio on 
the American public (O’Connor, 8).
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 The second essay, “Theses upon Art and Religion Today,” was briefer 
and more elliptical. Indeed, aside from its unwavering and specific focus, 
the “Theses” offers an early example of the organization of ideas into a spa-
tial constellation rather than a specifically linear-temporal mode of composi-
tion: a style of which the dialectics of Adorno’s posthumous Aesthetic Theory 
remains the best example. Unlike the “Social Critique,” this later essay fol-
lows the typical Adorno style of avoiding the presentation of empirical evi-
dence. And yet, the “Theses” may be even more historically embedded, more 
concerned with the environment of its production than its predecessor, for in 
it Adorno challenges the interdependence, even the association, of religion 
and art as either intrinsic or even possible in contemporary western society. 
Almost certainly, Adorno was responding to the conditions of Anglo-Amer-
ican modernism, which, as Perry Anderson has noted (84), was consider-
ably more conservative in its ideological and formal practices than was its 
Continental counterpart. A significant factor in that conservatism was the 
persistence of a nebulous point of intersection between art and religion (a 
variously defined phenomenon), even a conflation of the two, that had been 
ever more anxiously theorized since the days of Cardinal Newman and Mat-
thew Arnold. Adorno’s expressed contempt for American mass culture in 
particular may have been not only part of a larger pessimism about mass 
culture per se but also part of a general distaste for the way in which modern-
ism and the avant-garde were developing in the American grain. In any case, 
both essays mark a significant, indeed formidable, intervention into American 
critical discourse.
 The appearance of both essays in The Kenyon Review seems oddly appro-
priate, given Ransom’s use of that journal to ponder the interaction between 
the social and the aesthetic spheres. In the first instance, Ransom’s essay—
perhaps coincidentally—directly follows Adorno’s; “Art Worries the Natu-
ralists” in no obvious way functions as a commentary on Adorno’s “Social 
Critique.” The “Theses,” however, are more explicitly linked to Ransom; 
they are gathered as the second contribution to a tripartite “Speculation” 
in which Ransom, exercising editor’s privilege, has the last word. His “Art 
and the Human Economy” is in substantial part a direct response to Ador-
no’s essay. It again marks a moment of transition, not in this instance one of 
critical methodology but rather of political conversion. Adorno’s essay and 
that of a more regular contributor, W. P. Southard, prompted Ransom to 
“renounce” (Young, 449) his wary advocacy of Agrarianism, the very archi-
tectonic of political, social, religious, and aesthetic concerns that had initially 
made his important criticism possible. He also thereby gave up, or at least 
radically attenuated, his career-long struggle to establish art as an ultimately 
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triumphant form of knowledge that could challenge the mere naturalism 
of science, even from its marginalized position in the secular industrialized 
world. As Mark Jancovich has noted (112–13), this essay marks the practical 
end of Ransom’s writing career. What has gone unexamined until now is the 
way in which the two essays in tandem suggest the provinciality of Anglo-
phone modernism and, within it, of the ascendant American variety typified 
by the Agrarians and New Critics. While both Adorno and Ransom always 
appeal to a form of objectivity in their critical work, these essays reveal a 
deep rift between their different forms. Adorno’s criticism is predicated on an 
attentive phenomenology of “the whole objective structure of society” (Aes-
thetic Theory, 212), whereas Ransom’s is based on an act of what Adorno 
would dismiss as “hypostatization.” Whatever the similarities between them, 
and there are many, Ransom’s concept of objectivity, and the epistemological 
security it affords, is always theo-ontological, appealing as it does alternately 
to a transcendent absolute outside of time and to a narrative of history that 
describes an ideal, normative social condition—what he would call a proper 
“human economy.”
“A Social Critique of Radio Music” and 
“Art Worries the Naturalists”
Adorno’s “Social Critique” provides a spectacular example of the close inter-
pretation of a particular phenomenon facilitating the presentation of a larger 
sociological vision. The essay commences as a counterdialectic to that posed 
by “administrative” and “market” analyses of the broadcasting of music and 
the demographic it reaches. Rather than asking “how can good music be con-
veyed to the largest possible audience,” Adorno poses a range of epistemolog-
ical and phenomenological questions that interrogate how music is listened 
to, and also, how it is transformed by wireless transmission and the very 
methods of presentation that the radio stations and disc-jockeys structure.
 As a means to such inquiry he offers four axioms: a) that society has been 
fully, or almost fully, commodified; b) society operates on a trend toward 
standardization; c) the ideological tendency of an increasingly complex soci-
ety is to maintain a status quo; and d) there is an antagonism wherein the 
forces of production are fettered by the relations of production (210–11). 
Within the complex of these axioms, Adorno is able to distill certain fea-
tures of radio music as it functions within its American social context. Music 
becomes a product to be consumed. The new or avant-garde is rejected 
as orchestral music in favor of “classical” music, meaning that which was 
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composed before the advent of radio and so carries with it a Benjaminian aura 
of high culture that the masses cannot penetrate, comprehend, or judge even 
as it becomes the significant quality that drives consumption. This “classical” 
music serves as an anodyne, or to be vulgar, an “opiate” for the masses—con-
vincing them that economic modernization, which works materially to their 
disadvantage, is desirable because it is masked by cultural democratization: 
“Toscanini compensates for low market prices for farm products,” Adorno 
notes (212); “compensatory” functions of art, like “cathartic” ones, are not 
effects of art at all, but of ideologies external to, and obscuring of, it. And 
finally, apropos of this last point, Adorno details the way in which music on 
the radio ceases to function as art at all, reduced by a plethora of ideologi-
cal delusions to subjective “infantile” emotivisms (213). American listeners 
in “The Middle West,” he notes with scorn, are incapable of mustering the 
slightest incidental judgment about orchestral music; they can only write to 
the radio stations to confess an appreciation that, in fact, merely reproduces 
the intentions of the station’s administration in its banal “public service” 
announcements. Adorno cites as evidence the piles of “fan letters” written 
to a particular station: “It widens my musical horizon and gives me an ever 
deeper feeling for the profound qualities of our great music. I can no longer 
bear the trashy jazz which we usually have to listen to” (214). The supposed 
democratization of high-culture music has not accomplished (and probably 
cannot accomplish) what its advocates claim: the medium of distribution and 
the intellectual paradigms the listeners have available to them ensure that 
this mass audience has an experience that may have any number of qualities, 
but is almost certainly nothing like the experience of the competent musician 
nor of the attentive and elite audience that traditionally filled concert halls. 
Adorno observes that they listen for isolated strands of melody in a sym-
phony rather than grasping its total orchestration. They listen to quotations 
as if these were complete “songs,” and they listen for a flute solo in the same 
way they might listen to a sax solo in a Charlie Parker tune. Their interpre-
tive ear is not inadequate by degree but rather deaf to the necessary kind of 
listening. And so they experience symphonies as entertainment, as a com-
modity, rather than as a measured and, in some sense, dialectical encounter: 
“Entertainment may have its uses, but a recognition of radio music as such 
would shatter the listener’s artificially fostered belief that they are dealing 
with the world’s greatest music” (217). Adorno insists that it is the disparity 
and contradiction between American radio listeners’ conception of what they 
are experiencing and the actual form of their perceptions that make orches-
tral musical “classical” for them. Their listening practice remains untrans-
formed even as their sense of that practice reconceptualizes it by means of a 
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vocabulary of class and moral elevation. Adorno diagnoses listeners as expe-
riencing a combination of vague feelings and programmed responses; they 
lack the knowledge necessary to experience music in any active sense: “Music 
is not a realm of subjective tastes and relative values, except to those who 
do not want to undergo the discipline of the subject matter. As soon as one 
enters the field of musical technology and structure, the arbitrariness of eval-
uation vanishes, and we are faced with decisions about right and wrong and 
true and false” (216). Such sententious remarks in Adorno’s work elide the 
difference between empirically objective and objective ethical and aesthetic 
categories of knowledge, while his historicism refuses the “objective” as a 
metaphysical category.
 It is instructive to note how Adorno’s concern with “right and wrong” 
listening and interpretation touches on the work of the predecessor to the 
American New Critics, I. A. Richards—specifically to his psychological 
theory of literary interpretation set forth in Principles of Literary Criticism 
(1924) and Practical Criticism (1929). In these works Richards reads the 
proper interpretation of a text, and the refusal of “stock” responses, as signs 
of a healthy intellect.3 Ransom criticizes Richards’s “psychologism” in The 
New Criticism on ontological grounds (11–12), suggesting that it lacks objec-
tivity. When one reduces aesthetic experience to psychological or biological 
phenomena, Ransom emphasizes, one loses the reality of the object causing 
the experience in the first place and settles for vague notions of feeling. He 
protests Richards’s “psychologism” with specific reference to music:
There are not two schools of musical appreciation, one instructing our feel-
ings and attitudes, the other, perhaps staffed by intellectual snobs, instruct-
ing our intellects. There is one school, and its method is the study of musical 
composition, as in ‘harmony’ or ‘counterpoint,’ by analysis of the objective 
sound-structures in their own terms, and it does not need to say a word 
about emotions. (20)
By refusing categories of the subjective and psychological as adequate to 
understanding music or art in general, Ransom insists, one comes to the onto-
logically objective reality of the work itself as a thing. Adorno, meanwhile 
likewise insists on objectivity, but his version of it is historical and dialectical 
rather than ontological; he refuses “essentialism” without accepting subjec-
tivism. This improbable effort to argue according to categories of the “real” 
without admitting the language of realist metaphysics proceeds by Adorno’s, 
first, analyzing the specificity of a medium—music—and its context, and sec-
ond, his insistence that such specific analysis serves as an exemplum for larger 
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social phenomena. Once Adorno’s investigation has homed in on a particu-
lar subject, it magnifies out, by suggestion and implication as much as by 
clear statement, to a general critique of modern society. This magnification 
proceeds by way of homology: the cause of poor music apprehension (not 
to say enjoyment) in the American Midwest is also the cause of “deafening” 
processes of reification in modern life as a whole.4 Adorno’s method does not 
allow him to specify the ultimate cause, but only the forms of action it under-
takes, as outlined in his four axioms.
 Ransom’s counterpart essay in the same issue of the Review, “Art Wor-
ries the Naturalists,” pursues a similar movement from specificity to more 
general social commentary based on implicit homology. However, its success 
in so doing remains far more ambiguous. It begins as something of a review 
of the minutiae found in various recent books on aesthetics by pragmatic and 
naturalist philosophers, who offer what Ransom viewed as an urbane and 
carefully limited attempt to understand aesthetic experience by means of the 
categories established by the natural sciences. By the time Ransom wrote this 
particular essay, of course, he had been reading the works of the American 
Pragmatic philosophers for many years. This helps to explain why the onto-
logical criticism he defined in The World’s Body and, more explicitly, in his 
chapter “Wanted: An Ontological Critic” in The New Criticism (republished 
in Beating the Bushes), does not simply hypostatize an opposition between 
science and poetry, but inadvertently takes natural science as the standard, 
and more importantly the form, of all knowledge even as it struggles to estab-
lish a place for criticism and poetry beyond the compass of that science. When 
Ransom attempted to understand poetry or religion (or anything threatened 
by the utilitarian and empirical movements of modern science and philoso-
phy), his efforts went into making that supposedly ineffable phenomenon of 
poetry comprehensible and acceptable to a presumed hostile scientific audi-
ence. At the beginning of “Art Worries the Naturalists,” he confesses that 
the “apologist of the arts cannot do otherwise than refer the question of their 
strange kind of activity to the current philosophies; therefore, in these days, 
to naturalism” (Beating the Bushes, 93). Hence the need to establish poetry 
ontologically was not one exclusively grounded in his prior acceptance of 
metaphysical realism; for that matter, Ransom’s prose but little suggests that 
he had rejected his early education in the idealism of F. H. Bradley for real-
ism.5 Rather, the persistent ontological focus of Ransom’s criticism seems to 
have been formed primarily in reaction to an American variety of nominalism 
and positivism that denied the reality of ideas, save those which perfectly cor-
responded to material facts.6 He wanted to establish the objective attributes 
of poetry’s being to prove to his hostile audience that in fact poetry possessed 
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some kind of existence that merited attention independent of the slush and 
subjectivity of vague feelings somehow adhering to nonsense.7
 Adorno had no compunction about asserting the objectively assessable 
qualities of music. Although the equally assessable attributes of verse—
rhyme, meter, metaphor—were available to Ransom, they only tentatively 
satisfied him as evidence that poetry had some objective existence, that it had 
a structural integrity as poetry, as more than the sum of its parts. However, 
he sometimes felt compelled to rebel against the very empirical ontology he 
advocated by leaping into the irrational. Often, he pandered to the specters of 
his insecurity—naturalist philosophers such as John Dewey—by attempting 
to harness their discourse to prove what he nonetheless asserts is unverifiable 
within its bounds. In “Art Worries,” however, this strategy is inverted. Here, 
he will not convict science of limitations whose lines of demarcation poetry 
exceeds and “worries.” Rather, he optimistically suggests that Dewey’s natu-
ralism is richer than that of his younger colleagues and might mature beyond 
the reductive vision characteristic of that school of philosophy. Unlike that 
of his colleagues, Dewey’s writing exhibits “a tangle of bold philosophical 
speculations which are religious as well as aesthetic, and do not yield any 
firm or demonstrable results” (97). If his naturalism only continues to evolve 
it will move beyond the material and the empirical to the “supernatural” 
and the speculative. Ransom does not observe that it would then cease to be 
naturalism.
 Ransom does confess, however, that this optimism replaces a former hos-
tility—and this shift in thinking marks the distinctive importance of the essay 
and suggests the role Adorno’s cultural criticism played in his intellectual 
development. Years of effort suddenly begin to unravel. In a subtle apology 
for his early God without Thunder, where his suspicion of science reached its 
most indignant pitch, Ransom notes the need for “supernaturalists” to bone 
up on their “naturalist” philosophy before speaking. “If it seems impertinent 
in me to say this,” Ransom interrupts himself, “let me remark that I have 
myself come down a long and rather absurd hill. Like my preceptors I used 
to regard naturalism as a specially malignant heresy, if not an abomination 
unto the Lord” (Beating the Bushes, 94). After nearly fifteen years of com-
bating, while making concessions to, the reductive nature of modern science 
and philosophical naturalism, Ransom’s only intellectual option left was a 
strategic surrender to the naturalists, in hopes that by admitting their terms of 
debate he might coax some margin of the field of “knowledge” to be left for 
poetry to till.
 Ransom’s essay makes no mention of Adorno’s “Social Critique of Radio 
Music” appearing in the same issue, yet Ransom’s retraction of his early 
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defense of southern Christian fundamentalism seems to be provoked by 
Adorno’s pessimistic vision of the American Midwest as a landscape desolate 
of proper aesthetic understanding. As Aesthetic Theory’s occasional dives 
into American slang would later hint, Adorno’s characterization of rational-
ized, administered society finds its unhappy apotheosis in the America he 
came to know as an exile. When Adorno explains in “Social Critique” that 
music has “ceased to be a human force and is consumed like other consum-
ers’ goods,” he observes,
This produces “commodity listening,” a listening whose ideal is to dispense 
as far as possible with any effort on the part of the recipient—even if such an 
effort on the part of the recipient is the necessary condition of grasping the 
sense of the music. It is the ideal of Aunt Jemima’s ready-mix for pancakes 
extended to the field of music. (211)
The move into particularity—a particular brand, a particular product—is 
not incidental. The “society of commodities” that Adorno generally discusses 
with conscientious abstraction is revealed as the home of instant pancake 
mix, Benny Goodman, of “giving the people what they want” (216), and a 
“mass-culture” incapable of hearing Bach (213) or articulating its experi-
ence of music except in prefabricated, stock terms (215). In short, Adorno’s 
“Social Critique” of mass-culture is specifically one of American culture, of 
flatlands rural and primitive in appearance but commodified in fact.
 Ransom’s apologia of a mature philosophical naturalism likely responds 
to this attack on his country. Adorno’s essay impugns two ideas precious 
to Ransom. His suspicion of popular “taste” undermines Ransom’s demo-
cratic populism, a belief which had led Ransom to write God without Thun-
der, an “unorthodox” defense of Southern Christian fundamentalism, and 
to organize the symposium, I’ll Take My Stand, in defense of Southern cul-
ture against Northern industrialism. Second, Adorno insists that all efforts 
to disseminate serious music, or great art in general, are futile, because the 
mode of dissemination transforms the attributes of the work (217) and the 
categories of perception under which it is received. This last assault would 
have struck Ransom as particularly threatening, because he was already in 
the process of abandoning his religious and cultural populism in favor of a 
democratic theory of the professionalization of literary criticism and edu-
cation. Ransom had already prepared, in nuce, a response to such strikes 
against his two cardinal ideas. In The New Criticism, just before demolish-
ing I. A. Richards’s “psychologism,” he defends the naturalist, positivist, and 
skeptical methodology behind it. He finds Richards’s methods to “suit a sort 
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of pioneering, start-at-the-bottom Americanism, and are an excellent strat-
egy for us, as I idealize our national temper and prospects of knowledge” 
(6). Whatever his anxieties over the method, he admits it is appropriate to 
the American “empirical” character. So too, in “Art Worries,” he abandons the 
anti-rationalist defense of fundamentalism in his earlier writing to laud the 
suitable, even patriotic, character of philosophical naturalism: “If there is 
anywhere a philosophy indigenous to our local climate, it is naturalism; 
whereupon, even if America were not my country, I think I should not care 
to convict this philosophy of inherent viciousness, but at most of an immatu-
rity” (94). As many intellectual historians at home and abroad had already 
claimed, naturalism was the “American Philosophy.” Ransom’s theory of 
poetry had largely been geared toward proposing art as beyond the grasp 
of science and as resisting the rationalism of “northern industrialism.” This 
shift towards the naturalism he had previously reviled reconfigures Ransom’s 
aesthetic and critical theory so that it appears concerned with finding a suit-
able “indigenous” philosophy for the American psyche—one that is national 
rather than regional in character. Surely this change is rooted in Ransom’s 
departure from the South for Kenyon College in the late 1930s, and in a felt 
imperative of patriotism imposed during the Second World War, which ended 
the same year Ransom wrote the essay. No less likely, Adorno’s double alien-
ation—exile from Germany in consequence of the war, and repulsion by the 
American cultural landscape in which he was forced to abide—prompted the 
scathing attacks of “Social Critique.” These provoked Ransom, in response, 
to take up an intransigently American apologetic for even those aspects of 
American culture he had once found most threatening. If immature natural-
ism seemed reductive to him, it nonetheless seemed a philosophy that gave 
Americans what they “wanted.”
 Ransom’s new sympathy for naturalism required intellectual compromise 
on both sides. Particularly, Ransom’s mature naturalism had to avoid the pos-
itivist reduction of knowledge to science, and the definitive naturalist reduc-
tion of reality to matter. Again, Dewey’s philosophy makes “a tangle of bold 
philosophical speculations which are religious as well as aesthetic” (97). Ran-
som succeeds (if that is the right term) in luring the naturalists into his own 
native territory. The writers to whom he replies seem to have formulated in 
the language of biology, indeed with a literal use of the concepts of biology, 
an argument for the organic unity, or “fusing,” of works of art (103). Ran-
som out empiricizes the empiricists by arguing that the artwork is not a unity 
of any kind. Against this naïve claim of organicism, Ransom argues that art-
works are the product of “funding,” a word he finds expressive of the central 
axiom of his poetic theory that a poem consists of a logical structure over-
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loaded with “irrelevant textures” of meaning and meter. He urges that the 
naturalists are saying what he has always said. His exemplum and metaphor 
is that of a Christmas tree:
. . . I will risk some absurdity, to suggest that it might be wholesome for us 
to see [the work of art] as something like a Christmas tree. For, on Christmas 
morning when the switch is turned on, and the Christmas tree bursts upon 
our prepared vision in its beauty, we have the almost instantaneous sense 
of an intelligible object, and we feel such assured satisfaction and comple-
tion as may amount to the ‘ecstasy’ or the ‘seizure’ which qualitists, from 
Dewey on, desiderate for their arts. But I think the experience is not too 
spectacular when examined. There is the strong and steady tree, beneath 
the lights and ornaments and gifts which are so thickly strung upon it. . . . 
And at once we sense enough of the frequency and the quality of the acces-
sories to know that the total object is of great magnitude and dimension of 
its density . . . here is the moral. It is only the sturdy frame of a small cedar 
which holds everything together to make an object that is technically and 
sufficiently one, and, looking for the ‘unifying principle,’ we say comfortably 
that this framework will do. (111)
Ransom consistently argued for the organic unity of artworks, but that unity 
referred to a specific logical structure held in tension with a potentially vast 
series of local textures. Much like Adorno’s theory of artworks as constella-
tions, this argument for the “funding” of disparate elements into a complete 
thing suggests that the ineffable qualities of art reside not in its “organic” 
analogy to biology or in its otherness from science, nor does it lie in some 
romance of the supernatural, but in the almost supernumerary number of 
elements operating simultaneously. Science cannot suffice because there is 
no such thing as “Science”: there is biology, physics, psychology, etc., but no 
one discourse that can embody and articulate the totality of experience. That, 
for Ransom, is the point: art worries the naturalists because it reminds them 
that our experience of the world is neither univocal nor mono-vocal. We 
may try to understand the world by means of discrete disciplines, but we do 
not encounter it within them; they must arise only retrospectively. Ransom 
therefore recuperates the theory of art he had always maintained, but in a 
context hospitable to the naturalism he had previously refused. In the pro-
cess, he abandons his earlier, deliberate “fundamentalist” anti-rationalism, 
and implicitly his Southern regionalism, for an American national imperative 
intended to resist the indictment of American culture found in Adorno’s dia-
lectical social critique.
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“Theses upon Art and Religion Today” and 
“Art and the Human Economy”
The second exchange between Adorno and Ransom in The Kenyon Review 
was a far more direct confrontation. In the spring 1945 issue, Ransom may 
have abandoned his defense of Christian fundamentalism, but he maintained 
a fierce attachment to a necessary link between poetry and religion. The 
“Theses” testify to Adorno’s frustration with just such modernist theories of 
poetry as a hieratic art form, and target Rilke’s poetry in particular because 
it lingered on deteriorated “religious symbols” (678). Adorno generally 
excluded the Marxist doctrines of historical necessity from his work, find-
ing its teleological thrust toward totality barbaric, but he evidently preserved 
a hint of that barbarism in believing that religion was vestigial and that art 
must abandon its ornaments to reflect accurately the historical truth of the 
present. Surely his experience in America had taught him that the residual 
nature of Rilke’s religion was not merely “retrograde,” but rather exemplary 
of a typical promise of modernist literature to manifest reality though a sym-
bolism that was at least a “secular” analogy of the Catholic sacraments and 
at most their consubstantial manifestation.8 Adorno could scarcely approve 
what he saw as a project that was retrograde, patronizing, facetious, and of 
course, hypostatizing.
 The theses themselves run as follows:
I)  The unity between art and religion was the contingent product of 
specific historical conditions that cannot be recovered simply because 
western society has awakened to a crisis “involving individuality and 
the collectivistic tendencies in our society” (677).
II)  The unity of art and religion was never tranquil and is not aboriginal; 
only romanticism posits a late and unusual break between them; art 
is a protest of the humane against any and all institutions; the protest 
would not end by establishing a “right” or religious society any more 
than that society would be established by the simple reunification of 
art and religion.
III)  Modern artists who add religious content to their work are not doing 
the same thing as artists of earlier periods, but are merely adding futile 
ornamentation: “It glorifies religion because it would be so nice if one 
could believe again” (678).
IV)  The borrowing of religious forms, such as “the mystery play” is 
“equally futile,” (679) and fails to effect a union between form and 
content or subject and object.
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V)  The loss of a hegemonic or universal religion or philosophy does not 
mean that their forces “should have passed on to art” (679). Art can-
not become the new religion. This kind of reasoning would reconcile 
religion (or, for that matter, the various religions), philosophy, and art 
into one eviscerated category—leaving them as mere “cultural goods,” 
a desiccated residue that could no longer be taken seriously by anyone 
(680).
VI)  Nonetheless there was a primeval connection between art and religion, 
and as a result, art “bears the imprint of its magical origin: a halo that 
emanates from the artwork’s dual claim to uniqueness and the repre-
sentation of something universal. But to insist upon this magical qual-
ity in the artwork itself actually diminishes it: “Today it is only the hit 
composer and the best seller writer who prate about the irrationality 
and inspiration of their products” (681).
VII)  Artworks function as a Leibnizean monad, representing the universal 
within their own walls but “without windows” (681). The attempt of 
the artist to mediate between the specificity of his word and the uni-
versal or absolute it represents in nuce cannot work. Rather, the most 
successful artists, like Marcel Proust, will invest in the concretion of 
experience; only by precise representation will they create a work that, 
constructed out of the ephemeral details of the world, becomes immor-
tal by touching upon the absolute (682).
 The American literary landscape in the high- and late-modernist periods 
could not but have provoked these observations. Although Adorno only spe-
cifically targets Rilke for his opprobrium, T. S. Eliot associated himself with 
Rilke on numerous occasions, and Eliot was the godfather of the American 
late modernism that The Kenyon Review promoted in its pages. Adorno’s 
theses would have been of immediate interest to Ransom who, following 
Eliot, made the connection between art and religion a central question of his 
critical work. Whereas Eliot and Ransom aggressively sought to hypostatize 
the intimacy of these two entities, Adorno no less aggressively sought to his-
toricize it and dismiss it as obsolete. Theses I and II could apply equally well 
to the critical works of Ransom and Eliot, along with the then-flourishing 
masses of neo-Thomists and Catholic converts swelling the ranks of philoso-
phers, aestheticians, and artists up to the late 1950s. Thesis IV almost surely 
was targeted at Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral, although that was only one 
of myriad attempts to revive the place of mystery in modernist drama. Ran-
som, for his part, had argued that Murder was incompletely poetic because 
it was insufficiently religious (The World’s Body, 166–72); a position he later 
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retracted along with his early pretenses of defending Christian orthodoxy 
(The World’s Body, 366, 377). Thesis V, harking back to the disciples of 
Arnold and Santayana, must surely have registered with Ransom as counter-
ing the arguments in God without Thunder, which he had repented for rea-
sons quite other than Adorno presents here.
 In total, the implication of these theses is to exclude the bulk of Anglo-
phone literary modernism from Adorno’s canon of truly modern artworks. 
More than two decades later, these theses would find more subtle expression 
in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, so it is telling that the modernism defined in 
that book would take James Joyce and Samuel Beckett as the very prototypes 
of literary modernism, rejecting by silence the other major figures who com-
posed the modernist canon at mid-century. It is doubtful that Ransom fully 
grasped the significance of the theses, but he clearly sensed they put under 
erasure the literary modernism his work as a poet and critic had fostered. 
Detecting the western Marxist note in Adorno’s writing, Ransom observes in 
his essay responding to the theses, “Mr. Adorno is evidently for collectivism 
in politics, but not with all the potential ferocity of a partisan, i.e., fanatically. 
His social ideal has no room for religion yet provides a special asylum for 
art” (129). Students of Adorno will doubtless recognize the trace of his ideas 
in this statement, though Ransom has bowdlerized them. Adorno, like the 
poststructuralist philosophers who followed him, did not critique the “ontol-
ogy” of art from the position of an empirical rationalist, but from a phenom-
enological position that was as skeptical of the ideology of rationality as it 
was of romanticism, as unconvinced by the attempt to boil down the indi-
vidual subject to a number of material phenomena or nervous impulses as it 
was of conservative humanist attempts to preserve its unity. Ransom, whose 
philosophical positions were formed in response to German and English ide-
alism as well as American pragmatism, was unlikely to have warmed to the 
nuances of a writer featuring negative dialectics.
 While Adorno had launched an assault on the inherent relationship 
between religion and art, in “Art and the Human Economy,” Ransom took 
some such relationship for granted. But he questioned that this relationship 
could resolve itself into a “unity of culture” within history, because, in his 
view, art always acts in a dialectical opposition to “culture” rather than as 
the adhesive bond within it. From I’ll Take My Stand onward, Ransom had 
assumed just the opposite; religion and art reminded humanity of its insuf-
ficiency, its incapacity to conquer nature absolutely and its responsibility to 
walk uprightly and fear the Lord. Adorno’s second thesis denies the founda-
tional assumption of nearly all of Ransom’s writings (including the poetry). 
Yet, in his response to Adorno, Ransom scarcely registers these attacks. In a 
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stunning reversal of his past position, Ransom instead takes issue with the 
idea that art can hold even so significant a social role as that of opposition or 
agitator. Ransom’s and Adorno’s writings had generally concurred in regard-
ing art as a “check on action.” In this scheme, art was at minimum a retard-
ing force, like that of ritual and ceremony, to prevent a merely pragmatic 
humanity from running into the abyss. Once more embarrassed to find his 
old Agrarian and New Critical positions overlapping with Adorno’s, as they 
had seemed to in Adorno’s “Social Critique,” Ransom swiftly abandons his 
long-maintained position in favor of a patriotic imperative.
 For Ransom in 1945, art has ceased to operate as a response to the ideol-
ogy of everyday life. It becomes for him a mere commemoration of action, 
not stopping human activities but magnifying them through an ideal image. 
To be more precise, art for Ransom has become mere consolation, like that 
found in “Sunday institutions.” If one must modernize six days a week, one 
may at least have one day’s poetic rest: “The arts are the expiations, but they 
are beautiful. Together they comprise the detail of human history” (133). 
The updated prototype Ransom chooses to define this function is that of the 
public statue of a general. Art venerates and improves as an image of reality; 
but both these actions are passive and neither continue nor repel action. Or 
rather, only within the artwork is action checked. The artwork cannot engage 
society in any kind of active dialectic: “Those who are supposed to commem-
orate action are commemorating reaction; they are pledged to the Enlighten-
ment, but, even in Its name, they clutter It with natural piety” (135). Rather 
than an oppositional force to society, art in this view is the compensatory 
beauty that society requires to continue with the Enlightenment program of 
modernization, professionalization, and the division of labor. In this new the-
ory, Ransom suggests that Agrarians of 1930 and the Wordsworthian roman-
tics of every generation do not protest against this project, but offer in their 
poems a patch of pastoral to which one can retreat figuratively while one’s 
literal existence moves forward with the stream of progress.
We have fallen . . . and henceforth a condition we might properly call ‘deca-
dence’ is our portion; guilt and repentance, guilt followed by such salvation 
as can be achieved. In the forms which this salvation takes, we do go back to 
our original innocence, but vicariously, symbolically, not really. We cannot 
actually go back. (132)
These comments come as a bemusing anti-climax in Ransom’s career. The 
America of applied science and economic efficiency that Adorno would 
critique thoroughly in his Aesthetic Theory had somehow fought the once 
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“unreconstructed” Ransom to an intellectual stalemate. He had always based 
his theories on a transcendental absolute and an ideal historical past, all of 
which were to serve as guideposts for human action; he now left himself 
with only the images of those things, not the belief in them. Indeed, though 
his comments appear as a rejection of Adorno’s theses, they actually enact 
the third one with distressing exactitude. Ransom’s concept of the religious 
function of art had been reduced to commemoration, what Ransom himself 
would call “nostalgia” (134), and what Adorno mocks with the observa-
tion that such art “glorifies religion because it would be so nice if one could 
believe again” (678).
 Ransom had abandoned his anti-rationalist theory of religion and art 
in his previous exchange with Adorno. We see that he severely reduces the 
connection of art and religion, which had once been a poetic force against 
modernity, to that of a civil religion “central” to modern life only to the 
extent that a public statue might be located in the center of a Midwestern 
town square. These symptoms of Ransom’s final acceptance of the division of 
labor in modern administered society signify his abandonment of the Agrar-
ian cultural theory he had done so much to propagate in the 1930s. He did 
not leave this abandonment to mere suggestion. Ransom wrote “Art and the 
Human Economy” with the state of Germany clearly in mind: perhaps Ador-
no’s identity as a German exile partly stimulated his reflections, as surely as 
his critique of religion and art provoked them. In any case, the recently con-
cluded war directly imposed itself on Ransom’s political ideas. Near the end 
of the essay, he confesses,
I find an irony at my expense in remarking that the judgment just now deliv-
ered by the Declaration of Potsdam against the German people is that they 
shall return to an agrarian economy. Once I should have thought there could 
be no greater happiness for a people, but now I have no difficulty in seeing it 
for what it is meant to be: a heavy punishment. (134)
Caught between antipathy for Adorno’s western Marxism and sympathy for 
Adorno’s homeland, Ransom recognizes the religious and political synthesis 
he had forged in his theory of art could not hold. The work of art must be iso-
lated at once from politics and religion to the extent that a statue—whether 
representing a general or a god—is so isolated. The dialectic by which art 
stood in a meaningful, but by no means easy, relation to society now struck 
Ransom as necessitating political and religious positions to which he could 
no longer assent. As a tenured professor at Kenyon College, and as editor of 
a literary review, Ransom found it necessary to abandon those positions and 
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to content himself with poetry alone, with the “commemoration” of a “natu-
ral piety” left to worry the margins of the otherwise unstoppable American 
juggernaut of industrial modernity. Adorno’s career reached an impasse no 
less troubling. As the axioms of his “Social Critique” indicate, however, he 
had early reconciled himself to the totalitarian direction of modern consumer 
society. Having abandoned all hope of art’s dialectic with society having a 
direct social function, he was perhaps better prepared to take up an intransi-
gent position, accepting the absence of power that the political and religious 
pretensions of art seemed to promise. Adorno therefore could wait without 
hope, preferring to know the truth and see it bowdlerized by ideology, than 
to seek after a reconciliation with the status quo akin to that Ransom effected 
in declaring his patriotic admiration for the naturalism of John Dewey and 
his new aesthetics as one no more troubling than a “stone Bismarck” (135) 
welcomed in the town square.
Notes
 1. See Graff, Guillory, and Schryer.
 2. See Twelve Southerners, and Ransom, God without Thunder, The World’s Body, 
and The New Criticism.
 3. Ransom summarizes the psychologistic strain in Richards’s theory as reductive 
much as utilitarian philosophy is reductive:
The health of the mind depends on its ability to organize its impulses into 
attitudes, and then to coordinate their operation so that there may be maxi-
mum activity and minimum friction among the units, as in the atomic soci-
ety imagined by Jeremy Bentham. Poetry is needed as a complement to 
science because it is prepared to give to the emotions, and through them to 
the attitudes, their daily work-out; science intends to suppress them in order 
to map the objective world without distraction. (The New Criticism, 22)
 4. After the fashion of another American New Critic, Yvor Winters, Adorno decries 
theories of art based on pleasure or enjoyment as forms of subjectivist hedonism: Art 
works are
not a higher order of amusement. The relation to art was not that of its 
physical devouring; on the contrary, the beholder disappeared into the mate-
rial; this is even more so in modern works that shoot toward the viewer as 
on occasion a locomotive does in a film. Ask a musician if the music is a 
pleasure, the reply is likely to be—as in the American joke of the grimacing 
cellist under Toscanini—“I just hate music.” (Aesthetic Theory, 13)
 5. Francesca Aran Murphy’s Christ the Form of Beauty: A Study in Theology and 
Literature (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1995) situates Ransom’s criticism in a tradition 
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of conceptual realism and theological aesthetics extending from Jacques Maritain to Allen 
Tate, and continuing on to include William Lynch and Hans Urs von Balthasar. This may 
in fact be the most fruitful context in which to read Ransom, capturing as it does the real-
ist implications of his poetic theory, despite, as Murphy concedes, the fact that “Ransom’s 
conception of imagination is a partially Kantian one” (73). As it happens, the modernist 
aesthetics grounded in the conceptual realism of Thomas Aquinas, such as those of Mari-
tain, Tate, and von Balthasar, also splice Kantian idealist aesthetics to their metaphysics; 
what distinguishes Ransom is the absence of a conscious effort to conceal this debt.
 6. Introducing Richards’s literary criticism, he notes that its
bias is deeply nominalist, and by that I mean that it is very alert to the pos-
sibility that a word which seems to refer to the objective world, or to have 
an objective ‘referent,’ really refers to a psychological context and has no 
objective referent; this bias has governed Richards’ conception of poetry, 
for one thing, almost from that day to this. And with that bias goes—and 
the combination is a very common one nowadays though almost paradoxi-
cal—a positivist bias, through which the thinker is led to take the referential 
capacity of science as perfect, in spite of his nominalist skepticism; and by 
comparison to judge all other kinds of discourse as falling short. Nominal-
ism and positivism are strange-looking yokefellows for undertaking knowl-
edge, but it must be said that they may work very well together. (The New 
Criticism, 5–6)
 7. Ransom would note in The New Criticism that poetry in its ontological reality bore 
certain resemblance to science, but differed from technology, because its being was not 
immediately subject to uses beyond itself:
art will seem specially affiliated with science, and further away from tech-
nology, in not having any necessary concern with pragmatics or usefulness. 
But in another sense it is closer to technology and further from science. We 
recall our old impression, or perhaps recall our knowledge of the Greek Phi-
losophers, to the effect that art, like technology, is concerned with making 
something, as well as knowing something; while pure science seems con-
cerned only with knowing something. And what poetry makes—and the 
word means a making—is the poem, which at least in respect to its meter is 
a discourse with a peculiarly novel and manufactured form, and obviously a 
rather special unit of discourse. (283–84)
 8. Denis Devlin captures the widespread and troubled meeting of Catholic sacramen-
tality and hieratic symbolism in late modernist poetry in his review, “Twenty-Four Poets,” 
in Sewanee Review 53 (1945): 457–66. Naturally, the early Robert Lowell and late W. H. 
Auden provide the scales in which this phenomenon was hung—to Adorno’s ironic smile 
no doubt.
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New Criticism and Modernism
P A r t  I I

The essays of this second section address relations between the New Criticism and the cultural phenomenon of literary modernism, which 
were significantly intertwined in a number of ways. First, the New Critics, 
along with their predecessors and counterparts, began their careers in a post–
Great War cultural climate in which writers now considered “modernist” 
were on the rise. Critics associated with the formation of the New Criticism 
often shaped their work in response to modernist literature, and especially 
modernist poetry. Cambridge critics such as I. A. Richards and F. R. Lea-
vis, along with the American New Critics who followed their lead, were 
keenly inspired by T. S. Eliot in particular—both by his poetry, whose icono-
clasm caught the imagination of a generation of readers, and his considerable 
body of criticism. In his landmark Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), 
Richards devotes an appendix to explicating and defending Eliot’s poetry; in 
New Bearings in English Poetry (1932), F. R. Leavis showcases the signifi-
cant impact of Eliot on poetry of the years after the war. In 1939, Cleanth 
Brooks would position his reading of The Waste Land as a centerpiece of 
Modern Poetry and the Tradition. Moreover, as Chris Baldick notes, Eliot 
set a new agenda for literary criticism of the early to mid-twentieth century. 
This is not to say that the tenets that came to be associated with the New 
Criticism were coincident with all of Eliot’s critical positions—and in fact, 
by the late 1950s, Eliot sought to distance himself from the New Criticism, 
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disavowing claims about its having derived from him (“Frontiers of Criti-
cism” [1956]). Nonetheless, several of the pathfinding claims Eliot advanced 
in his early essays became foundational for what Baldick terms the “period of 
revolution” in literary criticism between the two world wars—and for much 
New Critical thought specifically. Concepts such as the “Impersonal theory 
of poetry” articulated in Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919), 
the “objective correlative” from “Hamlet” (1919), and the elevation of John 
Donne and kindred seventeenth-century poets in “The Metaphysical Poets” 
(1921)—along with an argument that the canon of English literature needed 
redefinition according to standards derived from the Metaphysicals—would 
underpin the new wave in criticism.
 More generally, the New Critics and their predecessors were responsive to 
modern poetry, Eliot’s and otherwise, as a watershed movement—and partic-
ularly attentive to the “difficulty” associated with modern poetry, on which 
Eliot had famously commented in “The Metaphysical Poets”: “[I]t appears 
likely that poets in our civilization, as it exists at present, must be difficult.” 
In Modern Poetry and the Tradition (1939), whose title echoed Eliot’s “Tra-
dition and the Individual Talent,” Brooks acknowledged such difficulty as a 
signature of modern poetry, which was challenging critics to rise beyond their 
previous standards, zones of comfort, and concepts of poetry.
 During the years leading up to the advent of the New Criticism, recog-
nition of the difficulties of modernism brought criticism to the fore as an 
important source of assistance for the “plain reader” whose usual approaches 
would be baffled by much of the new poetry. In their Survey of Modernist 
Poetry (1927), Laura Riding and Robert Graves underscored the importance 
of devising new, more rigorous methods of reading to accommodate the chal-
lenges of new poetry such as that of E. E. Cummings. In How to Teach Read-
ing (1932), F. R. Leavis called for a new “trained reader.” As Bradley Clissold 
observes, literary modernism served as the dominant “cultural subtext” for 
Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), and Empson’s techniques proved 
among the most apt for unpacking the complexities of the new poetry—tech-
niques upon which the American New Critics would draw. As of the late 
1930s, the New Critics placed themselves as mentors for a new readership 
of difficult modern work, through their essays and textbooks reaching a far 
wider audience than Leavis had imagined. Studies such as Brooks’s Mod-
ern Poetry and the Tradition sought to help readers navigate through the 
new modern poetry; and textbooks like Brooks and Warren’s Understanding 
Poetry set about training college students to engage in what came to be called 
“close reading”—a technique which, to use Bradley Clissold’s phrase, “mod-
ernism’s experimental poetics explicitly demanded, as well as rewarded.”
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 Aside from Eliot, modern poets featured in New Critical demonstrations 
of close reading included Pound and Gerard Manley Hopkins (in Leavis’s 
New Bearings), Frost, MacLeish, and Auden (in Brooks’s Modern Poetry and 
the Tradition), Yeats (in Brooks’s Well Wrought Urn), Stevens (in Ransom’s 
The World’s Body), and Crane (in Tate’s On the Limits of Poetry). New Crit-
ics such as Ransom and Tate were themselves poets; their poetry was also 
sometimes included as exemplary of the new modern poetry. (As Clissold 
notes, even Empson, albeit problematically, was sometimes grouped among 
the moderns.) But this is not to say that the New Critics engaged exclusively 
with modern poetry: classic readings by the New Critics addressed a much 
wider ambit of poets, including Shakespeare, Donne, Herrick, Milton, Word-
sworth, Keats, and Tennyson.
 Even as the New Critics were inspired by, and shaped their criticism 
importantly according to the demands of, the new modern poetry, modern 
poetry and modern literature more generally were legitimated by the work, 
criteria, and methods of the New Critics. Critics such as Richards and Leavis 
advocated for new poets such as Eliot. The American New Critics likewise 
championed the moderns and brought them to the classroom. As Ransom 
defended modern poets in the conclusion to The New Criticism: “[T]hey 
find the old practice trite, and ontologically inadequate . . . and therefore 
they work by taking liberties with the old practice, and irregularize and de-
systematize it, without denying it.” In his study focused on modern poetry, 
Brooks credited the moderns with an artistic revolution “of the order of 
the Romantic revolt” that necessitated a corresponding revolution in critical 
approaches and standards.
 This said, the versions of “modernism” invested in by the New Crit-
ics certainly did not encompass all the work developed during the modern 
period that later critics would find significant: certain poets such as Edna 
St. Vincent Millay and William Carlos Williams, for instance, were noted 
among the moderns but not acknowledged by the New Critics as important 
modernists. Many other writers now read as significant modernists—such as 
H. D., Mina Loy, Muriel Rukeyser, and Jean Toomer—if sometimes lauded 
in early-twentieth-century commentary, were not included in the New Criti-
cal pantheon. As Adam Hammond suggests, what needs to be recognized are 
the contours and limits of specifically New Critical conceptions of modern-
ism. Moreover, as Connor Byrne observes, we should also take care not to 
confuse latter-day caricatures of how the New Critics conceptualized mod-
ernism with the ways in which they actually did. His essay and the others 
in this module aim to enrich understanding of how the New Criticism read 
modernist literature.

Critics, as “barking dogs,” on this view, are of two sorts: those who merely 
relieve themselves against the flower of beauty, and those, less continent, 
who afterwards scratch it up. i myself, i must confess, aspire to the second 
of these classes. . . . 
 —william empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity
for all of his talk of close verbal analysis, William Empson was a liter-ary critic of missed opportunity—which is not to take anything away 
from the fact that he remains a foundational figure in the institutionalization 
and practice of literary criticism in both the twentieth and twenty-first centu-
ries. In fact, his scholarly contribution to the study of literature and culture 
is well-documented across an archive that ranges from reviews of his books 
and Empson’s responses to those critiques, to discursive essay entries about 
him in standard reference texts and a selection of full-length monographs 
committed to renegotiating Empson’s place in the annals of literary criticism. 
That Empson’s name has become synonymous with the use of ambiguity as 
a literary device is both highly reductive and ironically accurate. In fact, it is 
this inescapable association of Empson with his privileging of ambiguity as 
the operative term for literary close reading that throws into relief his fail-
ure to subject experimental modernist texts to the same types of magnified 
verbal analysis that he practiced in Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), some-
thing that modernism’s experimental poetics explicitly demanded, as well 
109
No Two Ways about It
bRadley d. Clissold
William Empson’s Enabling Modernist Ambiguities
C h A P t e r  f I v e
110 • Part II, Chapter 5
as rewarded. This essay attempts to account for both Empson’s conspicuous 
refusal to engage the complex ambiguity in works of modernist literature, 
and the profound implications of that decision for modernist studies and nar-
ratives about the historical development of literary criticism.
 If, according to the discourses of addiction theory, enablers are broadly 
defined as individuals who create environments that support the continued 
practice of specific types of behaviors, then William Empson must be read 
historically as an important enabler of literary modernism, both in terms 
of its production and reception. Specifically, he enabled modernism, first, 
because he helped to enshrine detailed close reading as a methodological 
standard for twentieth-century literary studies; and then, ironically, because 
he did not apply this method of analysis to the more difficult formal features 
of canonical experimental modernist texts. As a result, he further enabled 
modernism because he did not provide constraining procedural models for 
successor modernist critics to follow when it came to reading meaning into 
modernist ambiguities.
 As early as 1938, John Crowe Ransom touted Empson as “one of the 
closest living readers of poetry,” but then posed the question that ultimately 
orients this essay: “What will be the line taken by Mr. Empson when he 
reviews modern poetry?” (“Mr. Empson’s” 91, 104). In his critique of Ambi-
guity, Ransom argues that it is Empson’s “manifest destiny” to explicate lit-
erary modernism because his “interpretations increase immensely the range 
of experience, and therefore the density of lines, beyond what the ordinary 
reader finds of these elements in the poem” (104, 93). However, this obvi-
ous critical fit between Empson’s methods of close verbal analysis and the 
aesthetic formal practices of literary modernism serves only to highlight Emp-
son’s modernist omissions in Ambiguity:
It is remarkable in Mr. Empson that he turns his subtle critical gifts not 
upon the modern poets who are professionally obscure but upon the old and 
established poets whose surface logic is explicit and competent, and whose 
obscurity lies, if anywhere, below, and behind. Mr. Empson hardly notices 
the moderns, or not on his usual scale. Other critics have to do it, with pro-
digious exegesis. (103)
Although reviews of Ambiguity would continue to claim that Empson had 
applied his method of verbal analysis across a range of texts from Chau-
cer to T. S. Eliot—a misleading if technically accurate statement—Ransom’s 
where’s the modernism? question cuts directly to the chase. Indeed, Empson’s 
indirect, career-long answer to this question appears in his subsequent criti-
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cal writings, his correspondence, and his published poetry, all of which attest 
to Empson’s conflicted (perhaps ambiguous) attitude towards experimental 
modernist literature.
 In the “Preface to the Second Edition” (1946) of Ambiguity, Empson spe-
cifically addresses the concerns of his early critics, but his responses continue 
unwittingly to foreground the applicability of his critical methodology to 
modernist aesthetics. He claims he wants “ambiguity” to do broadly con-
ceived interpretive work, wherever there are “possible alternative reactions to 
the [same] passage”: “We call it ambiguous, I think, when we recognise that 
there could be a puzzle as to what the author meant, in that alternative views 
might be taken without sheer misreading” (x). After he rewrites the sentences 
at the beginning of Chapter I, he explains in a footnote that his goal in the 
second edition is to avoid defining ambiguity so broadly that it “becomes 
almost meaningless,” yet paradoxically acknowledges that “the question of 
what would be the best definition of ‘ambiguity’ . . . crops up all through the 
book” (1). In the end, his revised opening statements read just as broadly as 
the originals:
An ambiguity, in ordinary speech, means something very pronounced, and as 
a rule witty or deceitful. I propose to use the word in an extended sense, and 
shall think relevant to my subject any verbal nuance, however slight, which 
gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of literature. (1)
This retrospective desire to maintain a wide breadth of application for liter-
ary ambiguity is not new to Empson’s Ambiguity; in fact, it is evidenced in his 
seven blurred types of ambiguity that range from puns, allegories, and conno-
tations to ambiguities occasioned by syntax, rhythm, and authorial states of 
mind (e.g. judgment, doubt, or confusion), as well as in the summary claims 
he makes for ambiguity as an indispensable tool of literary analysis. Immedi-
ately after defining ambiguity as “any verbal nuance” that allows for “alter-
native reactions to the same piece of literature,” Empson argues that “[i]n a 
sufficiently extended sense any prose statement could be called ambiguous” 
(1). This new claim effectively cuts across any false distinction between poetic 
language and prose by positing all language use as a potential site for ambi-
guity. Although Empson’s critical focus in Ambiguity is poetry, he repeatedly 
acknowledges ambiguity as a general linguistic resource for all literary works 
within a given field of cultural production: “‘Ambiguity’ itself can mean an 
indecision as to what you mean, an intention to mean several things, a prob-
ability that one or other or both of two things has been meant, and the fact 
that a statement has several meanings” (5–6).
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 In Empson’s hands, ambiguity becomes an effective tool for literary anal-
ysis because it involves an aesthetic “heightening of effect” through “verbal 
subtleties”; as such, ambiguity is inseparable from both the semantic and for-
mal properties of literary texts. Nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, even prep-
ositions, according to Empson, all become sources of potentially ambiguous 
meaning such that every word, theoretically speaking, possesses “a body of 
meaning continuous in several dimensions”: “[A] word may have several dis-
tinct meanings; several meanings connected with one another; several mean-
ings which need one another to complete their meaning; or several meanings 
which unite together so that the word means one relation or one process” 
(5).
 Strikingly poststructuralist, as well as distinctively modernist, in its 
commitment to semantic open-endedness and the linguistic proliferation 
of multiple meanings, passages like this one clearly situate Empson’s argu-
ments within larger twentieth-century philosophical debates and aesthetic 
experiences. The strong correlation between Empson’s claims about literary 
ambiguity and experimental modernist texts that exploit this “fundamen-
tal situation” of ambiguity—whereby “a word or a grammatical structure 
is effective in several ways at once” (2)—would seem to recommend literary 
modernism as an obvious testing ground for Empson’s explorations of liter-
ary ambiguity. Indeed, he repeatedly offers readers modernist-sounding state-
ments like “ambiguity is a phenomenon of compression” (31), and
Both in poetry and prose, it is the impression that [ambiguous] implications 
of this sort have been handled with more judgment than you yourself realize, 
that with this language as text innumerable further meanings, which you do 
not know, could be deduced, that forces you to feel respect for a style. (28)
However, Empson never directly turns his critical attention to the same, if 
not more pronounced, aestheticization of ambiguity foregrounded in texts of 
experimental literary modernism, even though literary modernism provides 
the dominant contemporary cultural subtext for Ambiguity.
 When Empson defends his “method of verbal analysis” in the second 
“Preface,” for instance, he ironically cites governing modernist sensibilities as 
the impetus for his research on non-twentieth-century literary ambiguity: “At 
the time Mr. T. S. Eliot’s criticism in particular, and the Zeitgeist in general, 
were calling for a reconsideration of the claims of nineteenth-century poets so 
as to get them into perspective with the newly discovered merits of Donne, 
Marvell, and Dryden” (viii). Moreover, in prototypical modernist fashion, 
Empson finds fault with nineteenth-century poets who are too concerned 
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with atmosphere to practice certain types of grammatical ambiguity; and 
when they do, he argues, they often highlight their use of ambiguity through 
the “vulgar” italicization of words (20, 28).
 In Ambiguity, however, he is equally dismissive of modern poetry that 
foregrounds “straightforward mental conflict” and even critically undercuts 
such modernist examples as “perhaps not the best kind of poetry, but one in 
which our own age has been very rich” (ix). For Empson, modern poetry that 
aped Imagist protocols was too “clinical,” a “mug’s game” (here he borrows 
Eliot’s terminology). In an almost confessional tone, he admits that “I had 
not read Hart Crane when I published the book, and I had had the chance 
to” (ix). Conscious of the fact that he never proffered a sustained interpretive 
account of literary ambiguity in early-twentieth-century poetry when he had 
the chance, Empson claims that “if I had tried to rewrite the seventh chapter 
to take in contemporary poetry I should only be writing another book” (ix). 
Empson’s own awareness of his missed critical opportunity with modernist 
aesthetics (“I had had the chance to”)—here represented by the poetry of 
Hart Crane—indirectly haunts the margins of his entire critical project. The 
modernist intellectual climate of the day helped to focus Empson’s verbal 
analysis on the “intentional heightening of paradoxes,” but he was much 
more concerned with such use in already established literary works (xvi). As 
a result, modernist texts that foreground “ambiguity” and “paradox” as cen-
tral aesthetic devices selectively make their way into Empson’s Ambiguity, but 
only as cursory topics of discussion.
 At the end of Chapter III, for instance, Empson detours momentarily into 
twentieth-century literature when he references Marcel Proust as an exam-
ple of a less obvious form of ambiguity that effectively blurs the distinctions 
between types three and four.1 This is one of the only times in Ambiguity that 
Empson cites a novel—an experimental modern novel at that—thereby sug-
gestively pointing to the applicability of his analysis of literary ambiguity to 
modernist fiction. His passing reference to Proust’s Remembrance of Things 
Past (À la recherche du temps perdu, 1913–27), however, is notable because 
he never specifically names the novel, and never directly cites the correspond-
ing ambiguous passages that highlight the complex interaction of temporali-
ties he foregrounds as “valuable” ambiguity:
[Y]ou remember how Proust, at the end of that great novel, having con-
vinced the reader with the full sophistication of his genius that he is going to 
produce an apocalypse, brings out with pathetic faith, as a fact of absolute 
value, that sometimes when you are living in one place you are reminded of 
living in another place, and this, since you are now apparently living in two 
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places, means that you are outside of time, in the only state of beatitude he 
can imagine. (131)
Empson then glosses his own paraphrase of Proustian modernist sensibilities 
with the summary statement that “[i]n any one place (atmosphere, mental 
climate) life is intolerable; in any two it is an ecstasy” (131). In fact, Empson 
holds up Proust’s novel as an example of writing that affords the “formal 
satisfaction” that comes, not from the modernist “cult of ‘style’” (form for 
form’s sake), but from the pleasure of a stylistic formalism that “is continu-
ally to be explained by just such a releasing and knotted duality, where those 
who have been wedded in the argument are bedded together in the phrase” 
(132). Here literary modernism is temporarily showcased for its strategic use 
of ambiguity, but only in the form of reductive paraphrase that never engages 
the specific ambiguities of Proust’s actual writing.
 Empson, quite simply, had neither the critical desire, nor the energy to 
explicate works of literary modernism that he did not like. Implicit within all 
of the dodges of modernism in Ambiguity is a strong subjective value judg-
ment about where to draw the formal limits of modernist literary experimen-
tation. For instance, when he does analyze literary ambiguity in the verse of 
two of the period’s more notable figures of innovative modernist poetry, T. S. 
Eliot and W. B. Yeats, Empson chooses selections from their poetic oeuvre 
that are not distinctively modernist at all, but instead strongly derivative of 
earlier, more traditional, poetic styles. In the case of Eliot, Empson turned to 
The Waste Land to illustrate how ambiguity of syntax functions. Rather than 
interrogating sections from the poem where more fragmented, experimental 
verse forms produce densely complex semantic ambiguities, he cites the first 
seventeen lines of “A Game of Chess,” which Eliot’s own note claims was 
inspired by and written in a blank verse parody of Shakespeare’s Antony and 
Cleopatra (II.ii.190). Empson completes his critical sidestepping of Eliot’s 
more challenging modernist poetics by reinforcing his first example of syn-
tactical ambiguity with reference to three (unacknowledged) ABCB rhyming 
quatrains from “Whispers of Immortality”—again, not “The Love Song of 
J. Alfred Prufrock” or “The Hollow Men,” but rhymed modern verse that 
closely resembles Empson’s own poetic output (77–79).
 His subsequent use of Yeats’s verse to explore poetic instances of ambigu-
ity that say “nothing” by way of “irrelevant statements,” also sets up unful-
filled modernist expectations. Empson introduces the selection as “One of 
the finest poems of W. B. Yeats,” only to cite (again unacknowledged) the 
entire two stanza poem of “Who Goes with Fergus?” from Yeats’s 1893 col-
lection The Rose. In Ambiguity, therefore, Yeats is represented as a modern 
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poet of literary ambiguity not with a poem from the strikingly modernist 
Michael Robartes and the Dancer (1921), nor from The Tower (1928)—both 
of which were well known by the time Empson was writing Ambiguity—
but rather with an early poem (from the late nineteenth century) that senti-
mentally romanticizes provincial Irish folk traditions. Rather than probing 
the calculated vagueness and semantic ambiguity in lines from “The Second 
Coming,” “Leda and the Swan,” or “Among School Children,” Empson con-
cludes the sixth type of ambiguity chapter with an example of modern poetry 
that is, as is the case with his example from The Waste Land, poetically deriv-
ative in both its form and subject matter. Unlike Eliot, however, Yeats was 
not engaging in playful irony.
 Empson’s revealing omission of literary modernism from sustained 
critical scrutiny in Ambiguity is further highlighted when, in the second 
“Preface,” he specifically credits Robert Graves as the “inventor” of and 
inspiration for his method of close verbal analysis (xiv). The critical work to 
which he refers, yet again does not actually name, is A Survey of Modern-
ist Poetry (1927); and the specific chapter that captured his attention was 
the one in which poet-critics Laura Riding and Robert Graves analyze an 
unpunctuated version of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 129. Incidentally, the chap-
ter is entitled “Wm. Shakespeare and E. E. Cummings: A Study in Original 
Punctuation and Spelling,” so Empson necessarily also read their analysis 
of Cummings’s experimental literary form, which concludes that the poet’s 
“unconventional typography improves the accuracy of the [poem’s] descrip-
tion” (85). Although Riding and Graves do what Empson would not—that 
is, directly engage modernism’s more difficult aesthetic forms and produc-
tively explicate the significance of unconventional typography (syntax, spell-
ing, punctuation) and alternative word meanings—they ultimately shared 
with him a belief that modernist poetry in its more experimental forms had 
effectively divorced itself from the “plain reader” and “common-sense stan-
dards of ordinary intelligence” (9). As their title suggests, they were commit-
ted to finding critical ways to read the formal challenges of modernist poetry, 
and they were convinced that understanding literary modernism required 
close reading methods to interpret its innovative aesthetic practices (258). 
Empson’s 1931 public defense of I. A. Richards’s Practical Criticism echoes 
this sentiment, seemingly unaware of the retrospective irony it casts over his 
work in Ambiguity:
The matter is a topical one nowadays because so much of the best modern 
poetry is so difficult to read, and so hopeless of finding fit readers. It is for 
this reason, I said, that it would be useful nowadays, both for the poet and 
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public, if the “poetical public” had some process of interpretation for the 
verbal subtleties involved in poetry. (Letters, 30)
In 1930, Empson’s critical neglect of landmark experimental modernist texts 
is nothing if not conspicuous.
 Like Eliot, Empson was both a modernist critic and poet, but he was 
highly selective about the types of modernist poetics he valued as actual cul-
tural contributions. If his sparing, misrepresentative use of modernist figures 
in Ambiguity was not statement enough about his preference for modernist 
verse that appears conservative—when compared to more experimental texts 
that foreground avant-garde forms and radical ideas—Empson’s pointed dis-
cussion about elitist modern aesthetics at the end of the book eliminates all 
ambiguity on this point:
Not to explain oneself at length . . . is snobbery in the author and excites an 
opposing snobbery in the reader; it is a distressing and common feature of 
modern aesthetics, due much more to disorientation and a forlorn sense that 
the matter is inexplicable (it is no use appealing to the reason of ordinary 
people, one has got to keep up one’s dignity) than to any unfortunate quali-
ties in the aestheticians. That is one of the reasons why the cult of irrational-
ism is such a bore. (Ambiguity, 251)
Empson simultaneously condemns and forgives the more experimental (and 
disoriented) forays made by modernists into the world of avant-garde aesthet-
ics as poetic misjudgments. Literary movements such as Surrealism, Dadaism, 
Imagism, and the like, are denigrated collectively under “the cult of irratio-
nalism” and deemed a “bore” because they no longer shock and engage in 
meaningful ways.
 Empson’s mixed feelings about literary modernism not only prevented 
him from engaging modernist poetics fully in Ambiguity; he also chose not 
to make modernism a central part of the textual analysis in either of his two 
subsequent books of literary criticism that were decidedly shaped by his work 
in Ambiguity. He similarly circumvents literary modernism in Some Versions 
of Pastoral (1935), where prominent figures such as Proust, Faulkner, Kafka, 
Hemingway, Dostoyevsky, Stein, and Lawrence are considered in passing, but 
left underdeveloped as examples of writers and literary texts that either per-
vert or ignore the tradition of pastoral conventions, which Empson delineates 
in literary production from seventeenth-century poetry to the premodernist 
novels of Lewis Carroll.2 Chronologically and strategically, his final chap-
ter stops short of engaging literature from the modernist period, especially 
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because, for Empson, many of its elitist aesthetic commitments stand in ideo-
logical opposition to the pastoral intentions of proletarian literature, broadly 
defined as “by the people, for the people, and about the people” (13). Like-
wise, The Structure of Complex Words (1951), whose very title suggestively 
evokes the latent multiplicity of meaning characterized by the defamiliarizing 
aesthetics of literary modernism, ultimately remains dismissive of the mod-
ernist examples it cites. “The trouble about the double meanings in Finnegans 
Wake,” Empson argues, “is that since they are wholly artificial one cannot 
tell which way they are meant to go” (65). As a result, he calls Joyce’s final 
novel a “titanic corpse” (66). When Empson returns to Finnegans Wake, 
he negatively compares Shakespeare’s overuse of metaphors drawn from the 
theatre in Hamlet to Joyce’s “appalling persistence” with puns: “Exactly like 
Joyce; and the best thing the public can do is avoid noticing it” (68).
 Empson’s statements on modernist poetry in “Obscurity and Annota-
tion,” an unpublished essay that he wrote in 1930—the same year that he 
published Ambiguity—reinforce his troubled relationship with experimental 
modernist aesthetics:
Poetry at present is in a difficult position. All the recent good poetry is 
obscure, and more recent good poetry is more obscure, and becoming more 
so. . . . [M]ost people will agree that poetry seems, by some inner necessity, 
to be becoming more difficult to read. (Argufying, 70)
From here the essay quickly becomes a throat-clearing defense of authorial 
annotations, theoretically paving the way for Empson’s own inclusion of 
explanatory notes with his published poetry. “Poets, on the face of it,” he 
argues prescriptively, “have either got to be easier or to write their own notes; 
readers have either got to take more trouble over reading or cease to regard 
notes as pretentious and a sign of bad poetry” (70). He labels poetic obscu-
rity “unnecessary pedantry,” claiming further that “not to explain a term 
which competent readers of a poem may have to go and look up is an arro-
gant act” (71, 72).
 Not surprisingly, Empson’s ambiguous relationship with literary modern-
ism (and its attendant difficulties) is also glaringly evidenced in his insistence 
that his own poetry be published with extensive notes of explication. Writing 
to Ian Parsons about the possibility of publishing his poetry in June 1929, 
Empson qualifies his offer of “about twenty poems” with
[o]n the other hand I should want to print very full notes; at least as long 
as the text itself; explaining not only particular references—paraphrasing 
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particularly condensed grammar, and so on—but the point of a poem as 
a whole, and making any critical remarks that seemed interesting. And I 
should apologize for notes on such a scale, and say it was more of an imper-
tinence to expect people to puzzle out my verses than to explain them at the 
end, and I should avoid the Eliot air of intellectual snobbery. (Letters, 6–7)
The allusive use of Eliot’s name as an adjective to identify the specific “air of 
intellectual snobbery” Empson wanted to avoid in his own poetry, at once 
pays homage to Eliot’s landmark contributions to modern aesthetics (even as 
a model of what not to do) and signals Empson’s desire to make his poetry 
notes function differently from Eliot’s: “When Mr. Eliot writes notes to The 
Waste Land so as to imply ‘well, if you haven’t read such and such a play by 
Middleton, you had better go and do it at once’—the schoolmaster’s tone is 
an anachronism, it belongs to a time when knowledge could be treated as a 
unified field” (Argufying, 71). Indeed, Empson advocates a strangely tem-
pered modernism that tries to balance the aesthetics of obscurity and com-
plexity with a concern for reader comprehension and accessibility.
 More strangely still, Empson himself participated in multiple economies 
of modernist cultural production and reception. In 1928, the same year he 
started work on Ambiguity, Empson even co-founded and co-edited, with 
Jacob Bronowski, the avant-garde magazine Experiment. The Cambridge-
based magazine ran for seven issues until May 1931, and, as its provocative 
title suggests, was committed to publishing works of modernist experimenta-
tion broadly conceived as “all and none but the yet too ripe fruits of art, sci-
ence, and philosophy” (Haffenden, Among, 152). Both Joyce and Eliot wrote 
letters of praise to the editors acknowledging the magazine’s contribution to 
modernist thought and aesthetic experimentation, and in 1930, Eugene Jolas 
reprinted a group of modernist pieces first published in Experiment in his 
own Paris-based avant-garde magazine transition.
 Over the seven-issue lifespan of Experiment, the co-editors stayed with 
their original mandate and consistently published innovative
verse of all sorts, critical essays, fiction, portraits, reproductions, transla-
tions, photographs by Cartier-Bresson, paintings by Braque and Ernst, and 
articles on everything from biochemistry to art and theatre design. Every 
genre and medium that was new and vital (and very little that could be called 
phoney with the benefit of hindsight) filled out its pages—and Bronowski 
even had the cocksureness to reject a proposed submission by Ezra Pound. 
(Haffenden, Among, 152)
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According to his biographer, “Empson had editorial control [of Experiment] 
only for the first three issues”; however, even though no longer an official 
editor for the last four issues of Experiment, he still contributed poems and 
articles to every one of the remaining issues. Ironic, then, that the man who 
published works like sections of Joyce’s Work in Progress and Malcolm 
Lowry’s Ultramarine in the avant-garde magazine he co-edited at Cambridge 
should be so dismissive of works like Finnegans Wake in his literary criticism. 
To Empson’s credit as an early enabler of modernist works, he helped provide 
a publication vehicle for a range of experimental literature which he regu-
larly described quite pejoratively as “a collage of logically unrelated images” 
(Argufying, 160).
 Empson’s reservations about literary modernism are even more perplex-
ing because, at the time, he himself was also considered an important poetic 
figure of literary modernism. His poetry began appearing in print as early as 
June 1927, when he anonymously published “Poem about a Ball in the Nine-
teenth Century” in Magdalene College Magazine. However, it was the Hog-
arth Press publication (by Leonard and Virginia Woolf) of Cambridge Poetry 
1929, that publicly established Empson’s reputation as a modern poet; of the 
twenty-three contributors, only Empson and T. H. White shared the distinc-
tion of having the most pieces (six poems each) published in the collection. In 
his review of the collection, F. R. Leavis acknowledged Empson’s modernist 
poetics by highlighting his nuanced originality and difficult poetics:
He is an original poet. . . . His poems have a tough intellectual content (his 
interest in the ideas and the sciences, and his way of using his erudition, 
remind us of Donne—safely), and they evince an intense preoccupation 
with technique. These characteristics result sometimes in what seems to me 
unprofitable obscurity, in faults like those common to the Metaphysicals. . . . 
But Mr Empson commands respect. (qtd. in Complete Poems, xii)
According to Leavis, the critical chatter around Empson’s poetry even led lan-
guage philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein—upon his return to Cambridge in 
1929—to demand, on one occasion, that Leavis read and explain Empson’s 
poetry to him. When Richard Eberhart nostalgically remembered Empson’s 
status as a poet in 1929, he described his poetry in terms conventionally asso-
ciated with iconoclastic experimental literary modernism:
In Cambridge everybody talked about Empson’s poetry. His poems chal-
lenged the mind, seemed to defy the understanding; they amused and they 
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enchanted; and even then they afforded a kind of parlour game, whiling 
away lively hours of puzzlement at many a dinner party. The shock and 
impact of this new kind of poetry were so considerable that people at that 
time had no way to measure its contemporary or timeless value. They were 
amazed by it. Eliot was already enthroned. The “Oxford Group” [led by W. 
H. Auden] had not yet got under way. And Cambridge was buzzing with 
activity. (qtd. in Complete Poems, xiv)
By the end of 1929, Empson had been transformed into a modern poetic 
celebrity—at least around Cambridge; Leavis, apparently, had even started 
citing Empson’s poetry in his classes.3 “The Empson cultus is ubiquitous,” 
wrote one of Empson’s contemporaries; “Public readings of his poems are 
given, as you probably know. Leavis mentions him in every lecture. Some 
poem of his is to be found in nearly everyone’s rooms; even in the possession 
of people who would not dream of reading the work of an ordinary poet” 
(emphasis mine; qtd. in Complete Poems, lii). Modeling his poetry after T. S. 
Eliot’s modernist dictum in “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921) that “poets in 
our civilization must be difficult” (65), Empson’s verse is both difficult and 
erudite.
 His conspicuous use of recondite language and densely abstract extended 
conceits directly links his poetry to both Donne’s and Eliot’s. In “The Meta-
physical Poets” (1921), Eliot called for modern poetry to “produce vari-
ous and complex results,” while commanding poets “to become more and 
more comprehensive, more allusive, [and] more indirect” (65), and Empson’s 
poetry tried to answer the call.4 In 1932, when Hogarth Press again published 
six of Empson’s poems in the collection New Signatures (along with the likes 
of W. H. Auden, Julian Bell, and Stephen Spender), the editor, Michael Rob-
erts, made strong revolutionary claims to market the collection, something 
that J. H. Willis, Jr., in his book on the history of the Hogarth Press, notes 
and develops further:
The poems in New Signatures vigorously announced the arrival of a second 
generation of modernist poets on the Hogarth list. The press was once more, 
if briefly, on the leading edge of modern poetry, a position not enjoyed since 
the Woolfs had hand printed Eliot’s Waste Land in 1923. (qtd. in Complete 
Poems, liv)
Such was the modernist company that Empson’s poetry kept in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, when his poetic output was consistently surrounded 
by the legitimizing rhetoric of modernist aesthetics. In 1932, for example, 
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Leavis again included a discussion of Empson’s poetry in his “Epilogue” to 
New Bearings in English Poetry, where he compares Empson’s verse to that 
of Donne and Eliot, and then emphasizes the distinctive modernism of his 
poetics:
Mr Empson’s poetry is quite unlike Mr Eliot’s, but without the creative stir 
and the reorientation produced by Mr Eliot it would not have been writ-
ten. . . . [H]e has clearly learnt a great deal from Donne. And his debt to 
Donne is at the same time a debt to Mr Eliot. . . . But it will not do to let this 
reference to Donne imply a misleading account of Mr Empson. He is very 
original: not only his ideas but his attitude towards them and his treatment 
of them are modern. The wit for which his poetry is remarkable is modern, 
and highly characteristic. . . . [A]ll of Mr Empson’s poems are worth atten-
tion. He is often difficult, and sometimes, I think, unjustifiably so; but his 
verse always has a rich and strongly characteristic life, for he is as intensely 
interested in his technique as in his ideas. (qtd. in Complete Poems, xiii)5
Empson’s first solo collection of poetry entitled Poems appeared in 1935 to 
mixed reviews: “The volume received extensive critical coverage, much of it 
favorable, though some of the reviewers were perplexed by the density of the 
verse, and by the allusive obscurity” (Haffenden in Complete Poems, xxiv). 
It is precisely this perception of Empson’s “density” of verse and “allusive 
obscurity” that, for some, places his poetic sensibilities squarely within the 
characteristic traditions of early-twentieth-century experimental modernist 
poetry. W. B. Yeats solidified this coterie image of Empson as modern poet 
when he included one of Empson’s poems (“Arachne”) in his 1936 Oxford 
Book of Modern Verse, and, in the same year, Michael Roberts again chose 
to include six of Empson’s poems in The Faber Book of Modern Verse, claim-
ing “I have included only poems which seem to me to add to the resources 
of poetry, to be likely to influence the future development of poetry and lan-
guage” (qtd. in Gardner, 12).
 Whether critics liked or disliked Empson’s poetry, they consistently argued 
their positions through his apparent radical modernism. Virginia Woolf’s 
nephew Julian Bell, for instance, criticized Empson’s “extravagant” obscu-
rity as lacking “discretion,” going so far as to offer the caustic suggestion 
that “[a]nother use for obscurity, Mr. Empson’s, is setting ingenious puzzles 
for old maids to solve in the Spectator” (qtd. in Gardner, 23). In 1930, F. L. 
Lucas similarly critiqued the distinctively modernist inaccessibility of difficult 
poets like Empson, but this time in a parody poem entitled “Chorus of Neo-
Metaphysical Poets”:
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We twist the riddle of things terrene
Into such a riddle as never was seen,
And nobody knows what on earth we mean,
So nobody contradicts us . . . (qtd. in Gardner, 23)
This aesthetic response to Empson’s poetry confirms two important things: 
1) that Empson was considered a modern poet worth recognizing through 
parody; and, 2) that his poetry was read as distinctively modernist because of 
his obscure diction and metaphorically complicated subject matter.
 The majority of Empson’s poetry was written and published between the 
late 1920s and late 1930s, which means that he started writing poetry, and 
continued to do so, during the apex years of Anglo-American modernism. 
Taken together, the more celebrated critical statements made by contempo-
rary readers about his poems and the publication vehicles that featured his 
poetry effectively cast Empson as an impressive and influential figure of poetic 
literary modernism; however, his idiosyncratic versioning of modern(ist) 
poetics—while reminiscent of, if not directly influenced by the likes of Eliot, 
Stein, and Pound—was never consistently experimental enough to rank him 
among modernists who were more conspicuously committed to avant-garde 
aesthetics. At a time when free-verse experimentation with poetic forms and 
poetic diction was defining what it meant to be a modernist poet, Empson 
was still writing verse according to strict rhyme schemes and with an eye to 
maintaining a consistent iambic pentameter, however loosely. In the Journal 
of British Aesthetics, Empson once baldly declared his poetic preferences: “I 
am in favour of rhyme and metre in British poetry” (qtd. in Willis, 23). True 
to his Classicist word, his poetic stanzas are, for the most part, arranged in 
tightly rhyming quatrains or terza rima, and his commitment to elaborate 
interlocking stanza forms is exemplified in the poems “Villanelle” and “Son-
net,” where the practice of form is announced in each poem’s self-reflexive, 
pointedly generic, title. While this juxtaposition of conventional verse forms 
supplying the material support for Empson’s poetic explorations of moder-
nity (such as increased scientific awareness, the ethics of modern warfare, 
new ideas in psychology, and ever-changing social relations) would, in the 
hands of more experimental modernist practitioners, become a potential site 
for contrapuntal irony, Empson intends none.
 In fact, Empson’s poetic commitment to classical form—in terms of meter 
and rhyme scheme—makes his poetry sound and appear artificially elevated. 
His use of traditional verse forms fills his poetry with the poetic archaisms 
and forced syntactical constructions that were anathema to experimental 
modernist sensibilities. In order to maintain metrical rhythms in his poetry, 
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Empson carefully counted feet, and when lines were too long, he resorted to 
recognizably archaic truncations to excise extra syllables: “ere” (“Dissatisfac-
tion with Metaphysics” and “Rolling on the Lawn”); “ne’er” (“Rolling the 
Lawn”); “oft” (“Sea Voyage”); and “o’erthrew” (“To an Old Lady”). These 
efforts were often coupled with Empson’s regular use of hyphenated-adjecti-
val epithets to compress his imagery and make it conform to his fixed metrical 
patterns.6 However, these are not the only seemingly elevated constructions of 
fitted syntax in Empson’s poetry; consider the forced syntactical inversions in 
the following lines designed to preserve patterned end-rhymes and rhythms at 
the expense of lyrical flow: “What though the garden in one glance appears?” 
(“The Ants”); “Can then go munching on unburst” (“Advice”); “Dwarf seeds 
unnavelled a last frost has scolded” (“Value Is in Activity”); “Holding it then, 
I Sanctus brood thereover” (“High Dive”); “(Ambiguous gifts, as what gods 
give must be)” (“This Last Pain”); and, “It lit, like a struck match, every-
thing by” (“Flighting for Duck”). Because there is no indication from either 
Empson’s verse or his accompanying notes of explanation that such decidedly 
archaic poetic practices were ironic parody, they read instead as poetic pos-
turing. Against a benchmark of unconventional modernist poetics, Empson 
seems especially stilted and traditional when he uses dated poetic diction such 
as “Alas” (“The World’s End”) and “delighteth” (“Four Legs, Three Legs, 
Two Legs”), especially when it is completely unwarranted by either metrical 
or rhyme-scheme motivations.
 That said, Empson’s poetry does contain individual lines and isolated 
stanzas that showcase a distinctively experimental modernist poetics. For 
instance, the last stanza of “High Dive” is driven by an elliptical insistence in 
tone and noun-verb imagery that is reminiscent of Vorticism and Imagism:
Leave outer concrete for the termite city
Where scab to bullet and strong brick has grown;
Plunge, and in vortex that destroys it, puppy,
Drink deep the imaged solid of the bone. (Collected Poems, 14)
While these lines are suggestively modernist because enigmatically ambigu-
ous, the dangerous “[p]lunge” inward that leads to destruction described 
in them employs diction that directly recalls specific modernist avant-garde 
movements: Vorticism (“vortex”) and Imagism (“imaged”), even as its com-
pression also recalls uses of language associated with these movements. 
Isolated lines of his poetry, like “Your well fenced out real estate of mind” 
(“Legal Fiction”), “This is the Assumption of the description” (“Doctrinal 
Point”), and “Delicate goose-step of penned scorpions” (“Plenum and Vac-
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uum”), similarly reveal Empson’s strong modernist tendencies towards play-
ful semantics, condensed syntax, elevated diction, and conceptual Imagism. 
In spite of his carefully measured syntax and rhyme schemes, then, such lines 
still express a characteristically anti-traditional modernist style and attitude.
 One poem of Empson’s in particular stands out for its formal experimen-
tation, and its opening stanza is worth quoting at length to highlight the rare 
innovative stylistics he was more than capable of producing. Ironically, it 
was the very first poem Empson ever published, albeit anonymously, and its 
title, “Poem about a Ball in the Nineteenth Century,” strategically juxtaposes 
obsolete Victorian content (a nineteenth-century ball) with radically experi-
mental modernist form:
Feather, feather, if it was a feather, feathers for fair, or to be fair, aroused. 
Round to be airy, feather, if it was airy, very, aviary, fairy, peacock, and to 
be well surrounded. Well-aired, amoving, to peacock, cared-for, share danc-
ing inner to be among aware. Peacock around, peacock to care for dancing, 
an air, fairing, will he become, to stare. Peacock around, rounded, to turn 
the wearer, turning in air, peacock and I declare, to wear for dancing, to be 
among, to have become preferred. Peacock, a feather, there, found together, 
grounded, to bearer share turned for dancing, among them peacock a feather 
feather, dancing and to declare for turning, turning a feather as it were for 
dancing, turning for dancing, dancing being begun turning together, together 
to become, barely a feather being, beware, being a peacock only on the stair, 
staring at, only a peacock to be coming, fairly becoming for a peacock, be 
fair together being around in air, peacock to be becoming lastly, peacock 
around to be become together, peacock a very peacock to be there. (Col-
lected Poems, 10)
In this uncharacteristic aesthetic foray into vers libre and the modern prose 
poem, Empson’s repetitive and riffing involutions of word play (reminiscent 
also of stream of consciousness) read like Stein’s stylized development of 
modernist writing through verbal repetition and the riffing recirculation of 
central motifs. In addition, the poem’s style adheres remarkably to the defin-
ing principles of Vorticism: constant dynamic movement and aggressive for-
mal disruption via non-linear unconventional syntax.
 Not surprisingly, Empson’s note for the poem is a complete disavowal of 
its innovative formalism: “There is a case for hating this type of poetry and 
calling it meaningless; I had better explain, to protect myself, that no other 
poem in the book disregards meaning in the sense that this one does” (Col-
lected Poems, 95). He then proceeds to explicate the multiple meanings of 
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these supposedly “meaningless” lines: “The main idea is the clash between 
pride in the clothes etc. and moral contempt for it. Air: an atmosphere, a 
tune, a grand manner” (Collected Poems, 96). In the 1935 introductory 
remarks to the Notes for his poetry, Empson concedes that in cases like this 
“[i]t is impertinent to expect hard work from the reader merely because you 
failed to show what you were comparing to what, and though to write notes 
on such a point is a confession of failure it seems an inoffensive one” (Col-
lected Poems, 93). This desire not to offend and to produce modern poetry 
that was challenging, yet still accessible, made Empson appear almost anti-
modernist in his dismissive attitudes about the state of contemporary poetry: 
“But it seems to me that there has been an unfortunate suggestion of writ-
ing for a clique about a good deal of recent poetry, and that very much of 
it might be avoided by a mere willingness to explain incidental difficulties” 
(Collected Poems, 93). For Empson, the very presence of explanatory notes—
whether they actually aided in interpretation or not—signify that an “author 
wants to be intelligible” (Complete Poems, 113). They also signify a desire 
to distance one’s poetry from the perceived elitist and unforgiving poetics of 
experimental modernist literature.
 Indeed, Empson practiced a reserved modernism that often appears unde-
cided in its aesthetic commitments. Defending the published notes for his 
poetry, he argues that “partly they are meant to be like answers to a cross-
word puzzle; a sort of puzzle interest is part of the pleasure that you are 
meant to get from the verse” (Collected Poems, 112).7 All Joycean echoes 
of a commitment to aestheticized puzzling (“the only way of insuring one’s 
immortality”) are strongly qualified by this one important distinguishing 
feature that, unlike the “snob interest” in difficult modernist literature, the 
“puzzle interest” in Empson’s poetry “is not offended by seeing the answers 
in notes” (Complete Poems, 113).
 By his own admission, Empson knew his poetry was difficult, or as he 
claimed “too narrow” and “too specialized” (Complete Poems, 123) in its 
erudite use of scientific vocabularies and cultural allusions.8 In the self-reflex-
ive notes for “Your Teeth Are Ivory Towers,” Empson claims that the poem is 
a defense of such difficult modernist poetics, but it is one he makes using strict 
terza rima verse forms. He orients his poetic defense specifically towards crit-
ics who “often say that modern poetry retires into an ivory tower, doesn’t try 
to make contact with a reader, or escapes facing the problems of the time,” 
but his concluding notes for the poem undermine both the poem’s intent and 
his annotated defensive efforts: “I suppose the reason I tried to defend my 
clotted kind of poetry was that I felt it was going a bit far” (Collected Poems, 
110, 111). In fact, within the poem itself, Empson’s defense of evasive and 
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escapist modern poetics gets tempered by an equivocal warning about exces-
sive obscurity:
   But if its parts
Into incommunicable spacetimes, few
Will hint or ogle, when the stoutest heart’s
Best direct yell will not reach; though you
Look through the very corners of your eyes
Still you will find no star behind the blue. (Collected Poems, 47)
The conflicted nature of this poem’s content (inaccessible difficult poetry), 
coupled with its use of a traditional verse form, exemplify the tensions sur-
rounding Empson’s ambiguous relationships with literary modernism.
 The publication of Ambiguity, however, drastically recontextualized 
the reception of Empson’s poetry (arguably placing it even more squarely 
within modernist poetic traditions): prior to 1930, Empson’s poetry had only 
appeared occasionally in various Cambridge publications, often alongside 
the book and movie reviews he also wrote; with the publication of his 1935 
Poems, in the wake of Ambiguity, Empson is again cast as an incarnation of 
Eliot’s modernist critic-poet:
Having shown the ambiguity of great poetry, he seems to wish to prove 
the worth of his own by making it ambiguous, and so ambiguity becomes 
an end in itself. This is particularly obvious in one or two of the later 
poems . . . where it is impossible to see the poems for the puns. (Cooke, 59)
To this particular reviewer, Empson’s “tendency to use words, which bear 
not so much the meaning required, as the greatest number possible” was a 
“defect” that actually got in the way of his poetry. This actually sounds strik-
ingly similar to Empson’s own negative criticism of experimental modernist 
form; however, in the context of this 1935 review, Empson figures as a radi-
cal modernist poet: “The whole charge of ‘obscurity’ against modern verse 
is, of course, based on a lack of general knowledge of even the ‘well edu-
cated’ reader; Mr. Empson, in particular, will suffer for his familiarity with 
subjects that baffle even the minority” (59). In review after review of Poems, 
Empson’s poetry is described using distinctively modernist vocabularies and 
situated in relation to other recognizable works of literary modernism: “Mr. 
Empson, more than any other contemporary poet of importance, seems to 
raise the question of obscurity in verse” (59). Another reviewer argues that 
Empson “is a great hand at words, his syntax arrests, and he can manage the 
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significant pun,” but that he writes “[i]nhuman poetry,” which at best pro-
vides “parlour-game exercise” (MacNeice, 58).
 However, even when other forms of modernist poetry are evoked to con-
trast with Empson’s, the comparison effectively locates the contrasted poetic 
forms within a shared field of modernist cultural production. This occasion-
ally became a complicated process as evidenced in a 1935 review that both 
praises Empson’s poetry as “a long way ahead of the pseudo-Eliot-Pound 
school with their unrhythms, misallusions, and faked significance” and con-
demns it for not privileging “sparseness and clarity” (58). According to this 
review, Empson’s poetry falls uncomfortably somewhere between the mod-
ernist poles of esoteric free verse and Imagistic simplicity. For most reviewers, 
his poetry has a decidedly modernist sensibility that is measured in terms of 
obscurity and elitism—this despite Empson’s annotations. “His poetry is so 
self-enclosed, so perfectly and primly circular,” writes one critic while review-
ing Some Versions of Pastoral, “that for most readers it will probably always 
remain inaccessible—a distant island in the traffic” (Stonier, 62).
 Even I. A. Richards, who was from the outset much more reserved and 
cautious about his student’s contribution to modern poetry, configured Emp-
son in relation to the main currents of literary modernism. In a 1936 review 
of Poems, he noted that “At the worst, Mr. Empson will allow [readers] to 
say that modern poetry is in an even more desperate state than [they] feared,” 
and that the poems “[i]f they do not grow to full life, . . . will show, I think, 
that excessive demands are being made upon words—not that Mr. Empson’s 
poetic powers are too slight, but that he has been there experimenting with 
impracticable modes” (Richards, 76, 77–78). For Richards, Empson is a 
misdirected modernist poet whose commitment to formal experimentation 
(“impractical modes”) and defiant referential obscurity sometimes gets in the 
way of what is otherwise a “superlative book of riddles” (76).
 With the 1940 publication of Empson’s second book of poetry, Gather-
ing Storm, Eliot’s Faber and Faber continued rhetorically to market Empson’s 
poetry as distinctively modernist. The collection’s cover copy hails Empson 
as “the most brilliantly obscure of modern poets” (Complete Poems, xxvi).9 
In fact, it was Eliot’s strong endorsement of Empson’s poetry that—when it 
eventually came (after continued pressure from Empson)—led to the publica-
tion of The Collected Poems of William Empson in the United States. Writing 
to Allen Tate in 1948, Eliot stressed that “until I can get William Empson’s 
poems published in New York I am not so much interested in anyone else,” 
and he later makes another personally invested appeal for a British version 
of The Collected Poems: “I think it would be a great pity if Empson’s poems 
ceased to be available” (Collected Poems, xxvii).
128 • Part II, Chapter 5
 In the decades that followed the American (1948) and British (1955) 
publications of Empson’s Collected Poems, his celebrated status as an early-
twentieth-century critic-poet became even further invested with modernist 
credentials, even though other mid-century poets like Delmore Schwartz 
called Empson an “intelligent,” but “boring” poet (qtd. in Complete Poems, 
lv; n. 42). Reviewers and literary critics alike somewhat (mis)leadingly figured 
Empson as a modernist poet on a par with Yeats, Pound, and Eliot. One of 
the strongest statements to this effect came from John Wain in 1949 when he 
published “Ambiguous Gifts: Notes on a Twentieth-Century Poet”—an arti-
cle-length analysis of Empson’s underappreciated poetic contribution to mod-
ern literature. He begins this essay lamenting that Empson’s name has been 
recently listed in the Sewanee Review’s “Notes on Contributors” as “British 
critic,” to which Wain responds, “but in Empson’s case it would be a pity 
if he were known simply as the ‘ambiguity’ man, and not as a poet” (Wain, 
169). His analysis of Empson’s poems is remarkably balanced, finding both 
fault and value in selected pieces. That said, he evaluates the poetry in light of 
both its “advertised” obscurity and the poet’s own claims that his verse con-
tains “puzzles,” only to conclude that Empson’s “intellectual and elliptical 
poetry,” once again, amounts to a modernist versioning of metaphysical poet-
ics: “a kind of general modernity which leads poets to bring in current ideas 
and current language, and a strong, at times almost perverse, desire to follow 
the argument wherever it leads the poem” (178). Wain tests for literary mod-
ernism in Empson’s poetry and not surprisingly finds it: where “a minor-verse 
form . . . exactly fits its content” in one poem, and where “a riot of subsidiary 
meanings” is grouped around a “hub of meanings” in another (176, 177). 
His critical privileging of Empson’s literary modernism even finds its way into 
passing statements like his concluding observation that “[i]ndeed, [Empson’s] 
two books of criticism are valuable chiefly as a very telling attack on the idea 
that we understand what we read” (175). Here Wain reads Empson’s schol-
arly work in Ambiguity and Pastoral as implicit theoretical endorsements for 
modernist obscurity and semantic ambiguity. According to this view, Emp-
son’s critical search for submerged meaning via close verbal analysis not only 
legitimized modernist aesthetic practice, but, more importantly, it also legiti-
mized the reception of such practice.
 In another 1949 review of The Collected Poems, the reviewer for the 
New Republic does not simply situate Empson’s poetry in relation to land-
mark figures and texts of literary modernism; he actually inflates Empson’s 
verse into an aesthetic benchmark for modernist poetics: “If we were to work 
out a coherent view of modern poetry, if it were only to recognize and put a 
proper value on our various appetites and pleasures, we would have to keep 
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the works of William Empson and William Carlos Williams simultaneously 
in mind” (Fitzgerald, 182).
 The review effectively relocates Empson’s modernism within an Ameri-
can context through the contrast with Williams; even though “they repre-
sent the extremes of formal difference in contemporary verse,” they both 
share the modernist commitment to uncompromisingly difficult poetics: “the 
refusal . . . to adopt the formulae that come most easily to the mind, with the 
most specious comfort or the most fashionable portentousness” (183). For 
this reviewer, Empson’s poems were already “famously difficult”: “A few of 
them resemble quartzlike fusions that will resist analysis almost as long as 
they will decomposition. All there is to say on this point is that every one of 
them means more the more it is studied, and that the study is always worth 
making” (183). What is described here is the “difficult pleasure” of modern-
ism—the promise of interpretive payoff after sustained critical analysis; it is 
this critical mapping of Empson’s difficult poetry onto American versions 
of literary modernism, to reveal their shared attendant values, that qualita-
tively justifies Empson’s aesthetic choices and marks them as conspicuously 
modernist.10
 If the Empson hype sounds excessively repetitive and hyperbolic, that’s 
because it was. At some level, it doesn’t even matter whether or not Empson’s 
poetry is as legitimately modernist as it was said to be; his poetry was rhe-
torically endorsed as literary modernism by a coterie of reviewers (many of 
them other modernist poet-critics), with the, by this point, institutionalized 
status of Ambiguity figuring as a central part of the evaluation. In similar 
hyperbolic fashion, A. Alvarez’s book The Shaping Spirit: Studies in Mod-
ern English and American Poets (1958) participates in this public relations 
work of maintaining Empson’s reputation as modernist critic-poet. His chap-
ter devoted to Empson’s poetry (subtitled “A Style from a Despair”)11 appears 
in his table of contents preceded by a chapter on Eliot and Yeats, and one on 
Pound; it is followed by four more chapters each focused on Auden, Crane, 
Stevens, and Lawrence, respectively. Sandwiched between these recognizable 
pillars of modernist literature, however, Empson appears retrospectively as 
the odd modernist out. Alvarez unwittingly acknowledges as much when he 
concludes that Empson is important as a “stylist of poetry and ideas” who 
“took over all Eliot’s hints about what was most significant in the English tra-
dition, and he put them into practice without any of the techniques Eliot had 
derived from the French and Italians” (86).
  Indeed, Hugh Kenner noted this comparative disjunction as early as 1950 
in a review of Collected Poems entitled “The Son of Spiders.” His justifica-
tion for reading Empson’s work as inferior to known and established works 
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of modernist literature is a result of “the late twenties . . . being superimposed 
on the new fifties”; Kenner argues that Empson’s poems necessarily pale in 
comparison with other works of literary modernism currently being read:
[I]t is because they are occurring in America after rather than before the 
impact of Finnegans Wake, Four Quartets, and The Pisan Cantos, three of 
the most considerable works of imagination of the century, that they exhibit 
themselves now in immediate rather than proscriptive relation to final 
causes. (212)
Measured against the tour de force modernist aesthetics found in the later 
works of Joyce, Eliot, and Pound, Empson’s poems figure, according to Ken-
ner, “as contrapuntal outriders commenting on certain features of ‘period’ 
sensibility accidental to Eliot’s analogical drama [The Waste Land]” (214). 
Put differently, Empson’s self-contained poetry has neither the “protuber-
ances,” nor the “excisions,” needed to elevate his modernist practice to the 
level of Joyce, Eliot, and Pound, who necessarily “provide a context for 
assessing the limitations of the sensibility there at work” (216). Empson’s 
poetry—far from exhibiting the paratactic poetic structures of formal frag-
mentation or the dense intertextual networks of elitist allusion exemplified by 
leading modernists—helped to fill in the modernist field of cultural produc-
tion between the formally innovative experimental avant-garde and the blank 
mimicry of conventional forms and traditional literary content inherited from 
canonized predecessor poets. In this comparison, Empson appears as a pro-
cedural modernist, going through the motions of complexity and obscurity, 
always with reservations.
 In a 1933 letter to John Hayward, Empson concludes a discussion about 
cultural production by pondering, “I suppose most of our Great Traditions 
are only histories of refusals to follow up opportunities” (Letters, 57). By his 
own admission “half drunk” at the time of writing, his statement resonates 
prophetically with his choice not to foreground literary modernism in his 
most influential critical works of verbal exegesis, most notably Ambiguity. 
Even his modern poetry evinces a strong discomfort with difficult modernist 
aesthetics in the perceived necessity for accompanying notes of explication. 
As a quick reading through his limited poetic output (seventy-seven published 
poems) will impart, he was a difficult modern poet because he chose com-
plicated metaphorical subjects, not because experimental form complicated 
his poetic reception. With the critical long view of modernism afforded by 
the twenty-first century, it becomes clear that Empson’s direct contribution 
to modernist literature as a poet was negligible. Without question, Empson’s 
Clissold, “No Two Ways about It” • 131
poetry participated in the field of modernist cultural production, but it did 
not define it. In fact, his idiosyncratic version of modernist poetics was devel-
oped largely in opposition to what he considered the elitist formal exper-
imentation of foundational works of literary modernism. He practiced an 
equivocal modernism that, in a 1931 letter, he articulated through (dis)quali-
fying aesthetic commands: “a poet must not pander to a public, but he must 
be intelligible” (Letters, 30).
 This essay has sought to offer a metacritical survey of the multiple inter-
sections among William Empson’s criticism, poetry, and literary modernism. 
Rather than only regarding Empson as one of literary modernism’s critics 
of missed opportunity because he failed to engage representative works of 
modernist literature with the types of verbal analysis he helped to make so 
widespread, I have reconsidered him as an unexpected enabler of difficult 
modernist poetics. Indeed, Empson served to enable both literary modernism 
and modernist studies because he helped to create a reception environment 
(as well as helping to institutionalize close reading practices) that supplied the 
critical means of exploring experimental modernist forms of semantic uncer-
tainty and open-endedness. The very terms the New Critics used to expli-
cate (and domesticate) literary modernism are evidence of Empson’s enabling 
ambiguities: irony, tension, paradox. Empson knew all too acutely that the 
power of ambiguity lies in its ability to open up critical space for things to be 
alternative and otherwise—this is why so many modernists exploited it and 
why Ambiguity still has, what one 1933 Scrutiny reviewer called “unusual 
fertilizing power” (Bradbrook, 53). As a methodological primer for close 
reading literary modernism—and as a modernist text in its own right—Ambi-
guity, one might say ironically, helped set the institutional stage for studying 
literary modernism by avoiding it.
Notes
 1. John Crowe Ransom describes Empson’s third and fourth types of ambiguity as 
“III. Where one locution simultaneously has two meanings, and only one of them has 
logical relevance. This type includes pun” and “IV. Where one locution has two or more 
meanings which do not agree very well” (“The New Criticism,” 112).
 2. T. S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and Virginia Woolf also make appearances in the 
book, but for their critical perspectives as readers of the texts under scrutiny.
 3. According to both John Wain (“Ambiguous Gifts”) and A. Alvarez (The Shaping 
Spirit), I. A. Richards also quoted Empson’s poetry in his lectures at Cambridge.
 4. In 1926, at Trinity College, Cambridge, Eliot entitled his Clark Lectures, “The 
Metaphysical Poets of the Seventeenth Century.” Empson apparently did not attend any 
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of the lectures, but met with Eliot informally over breakfast to discuss literature and criti-
cism.
 5. Twice, Leavis somewhat misleadingly draws critical attention to what he calls 
Empson’s poetic focus on “technique”; however, “technique” for Leavis does not mean 
“technique” in the Shklovskyan sense as strategically innovative formalism that creates 
experiences of modernist defamiliarization. Instead, it means Empson’s penchant for elab-
orately artificial stanza forms with strict rhyme schemes and regulated meter.
 6. Consider the following representative sampling from Empson’s poetry: “nos-
trum-plastered” (“The Ants”); “glass-cautered,” “blood-gorged,” and “void-centered” 
(“Plenum and Vacuum”); “Earth-bound” and “Blue-sea-bound” (“Sea Voyage”); “wolf-
chased” (“High Dive”); “Day-cycled,” “iron-fruited,” “sag-fruited,” “sand-born,” “mail-
dark,” and “grit-silted” (“Part of Mandevil’s Travels”); “many-fingered” (“Letter II”); not 
to mention “gulf-sprung,” “Snow-puppy,” and “rose-solemn” (“The Scales”).
 7. Empson defends the comparison between modern poetry and crossword puzzles as 
historically contingent: “the fashion for obscure poetry, as a recent development, came in 
at about the same time as the fashion for crossword puzzles; and it seems to me that this 
revival of interest in poetry, an old and natural thing, has got a bad name merely by failing 
to know itself and refusing to publish the answers” (Complete Poems, 113).
 8. The pool of allusions in his poetry ranges from classical to contemporary. Direct 
references to recognizably important figures of modern thought and literary modernism 
serve not only to self-reflexively legitimize Empson’s status as modern poet, but also to sig-
nal his invested participation in and engagement with the ongoing cultural conversations 
of and about modernism. Darwin appears in “Invitation to Juno,” Wittgenstein in “This 
Last Pain,” Piaget and Leavis in “Your Teeth Are Ivory Towers,” Dostoevsky in “Success,” 
Freudians in “Ignorance of Death,” Marx in “Just a Smack at Auden,” and both Freud 
and Marx in “Autumn on Nan-Yueh,” along with additional references to Yeats, Woolf, 
and Fraser’s The Golden Bough.
 9. In his introduction to Empson’s Complete Poems, John Haffenden argues that the 
blurb on the jacket of Gathering Storm—although unattributed—is Eliot’s: “there really 
can be no doubt that it is Eliot” (xxv–xxvi).
 10. In a subsequent parenthetical observation, the legitimacy of such canonical posi-
tioning gets confirmed when Empson is compared to another foundational icon of Ameri-
can modernist poetry: “(He has, for example, taken over and extended E. E. Cummings’ 
structural stunt of writing one poem in parenthesis inside another.)” (184).
 11. Originally published as A. Alvarez, “A Style from Despair: William Empson,” The 
Twentieth Century 161.962 (April 1957): 344–53.
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along wITh the plural modernisms, we might well do these days to   speak of New Criticisms. No longer regarding it as a monolithic (or 
malevolent) critical enterprise, scholars of the New Criticism now recognize 
the diverse array of nuanced theoretical positions held by its progenitors. But 
this is not a new development. Nearly thirty years ago, in his retrospective 
“The New Criticism: Pro and Contra,” René Wellek addressed the miscon-
ceptions surrounding the so-called movement, just as key New Critics had 
themselves done nearly as many years before (Cleanth Brooks’s 1951 essay 
“My Credo—The Formalist Critics” is a prime example).1 If it bears repeat-
ing that the New Criticism has been and continues to be misunderstood, this 
is due to the institutionalization within the academy of only a limited range 
of its shared reading and pedagogical practices. As Gerald Graff has shown, 
the New Critics solidified their position with respect to the reigning scholarly 
approaches to literature of the time—philology and historical/biographical 
scholarship—by cultivating the serious study of literature as primarily an end 
in itself, isolating the text for analysis and bringing logical evidentiary argu-
mentation to bear on it, thus at once illuminating the unappreciated richness 
and complexity of the literary work and gainsaying charges of impression-
istic criticism.2 The legacy of the New Criticism is the university English 
department as we know it. As Richard Ohmann puts it, the close reading 
advocated by the New Critics “taught us how to write papers as students, 
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how to write articles later on, and what to say about a poem to our students 
in a fifty-minute hour” (79). The key text in this process—for both teach-
ers and students—was Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren’s Under-
standing Poetry. This textbook’s status as a means by which New Critical 
reading strategy and pedagogy were proliferated in American universities is 
legendary. Part manifesto, part guide, part anthology, Understanding Poetry 
functioned on many levels to bring to the classroom a new way of looking at 
and discussing literature. Brooks and Warren took very seriously T. S. Eliot’s 
imperative that “poets in our civilization . . . must be difficult” (65), and in 
adopting Eliot’s perspective they staked out a secure, and ultimately stable, 
position within the academy against the established scholars.
 Like Eliot’s comment, however, this academic tussle was born out of a 
more general cultural debate over the function and value of literature, primar-
ily poetry. The New Criticism rose to prominence on the heels of a general 
popularization of poetry and a rise in classroom study of modernist poetry 
in the United States. But as Craig S. Abbott explains, this popular modern-
ism was of a decidedly different order than the Eliotic modernism espoused 
by Brooks and Warren, as well as others advocating serious academic crit-
icism. This was the work of poets such as “Vachel Lindsay, Amy Lowell, 
Edgar Lee Masters, and Carl Sandburg—poets not thought especially difficult 
then or now” (Abbott, 209). Popular anthologies such as Louis Untermeyer’s 
Modern American Poetry (1st ed., 1919) and Modern British and American 
Poetry (1st ed., 1920) were, at least initially, filled with the work of such fig-
ures. Espousing a poetic of simplicity and sincerity, Untermeyer—and others 
such as Harriet Monroe and Marguerite Wilkinson—felt poetry ought to 
speak to everyday experience, and made it a point to facilitate this process of 
democratization. Abbott points out, for example, that Untermeyer surveyed 
high school teachers to get a sense of which poets they wanted to see in text-
books. Abbott argues further that although Untermeyer would eventually 
include the more complex, difficult modernist poetry of Eliot and Ezra Pound 
(among others), the popular modernist aesthetic came to be well established, 
and thus the opponents of popular modernism had much ground to make up 
(213).
 Enter Understanding Poetry. With its “Letter to the Teacher,” its lengthy 
introduction, its structured division into sections concerned with specific 
aspects of poetic discourse (narrative, description, metrics and so on), and 
its selection of analytic mini-essays throughout (there are over forty in the 
first edition), Brooks and Warren’s textbook provided an antidote to popu-
lar modernism—at least in the classroom—by developing both an analytic 
methodology and a canon with which to support it. Ultimately, however, 
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with a successful professionalized praxis and secure place in schools came 
what Graff calls a “routinization” of the discipline (Professing, 227), as the 
new and sophisticated approach to literature cultivated by the New Critics 
was simplified and distorted with widespread use.3 Hence the claim by oppo-
nents of the New Criticism that it “had trivialized literature and literary study 
by turning critical interpretation into an over-intellectualized game whose 
object was the solution of petty interpretive puzzles” (Graff, Literature, 129). 
Further, students of literature felt alienated by works of literature as pre-
sented to them by the new generation of English teachers. As Frank Lentric-
chia explains, the New Critics’ expert ability to analyze and understand the 
text itself (especially the difficult text)—its complexities, ambiguities, and iro-
nies—fostered perceptions of the movement as deeply elitist: the New Critic’s 
work reflected a “priestly understanding,” and as a result, “too many genera-
tions of students came out of New-Critical classrooms convinced that their 
teachers possessed knowledge of the hidden meanings of texts to which there 
was no systematic and disciplined access” (Lentricchia, 5).
 The cultural tensions Abbott outlines between popular modernism and 
the burgeoning New Critical (read high) modernism resemble the academic 
tensions that would contribute to toppling the New Criticism after it had 
reached its peak in the 1950s and early 1960s.4 Even well beyond the heyday 
of the New Criticism, figures outside the university remained vocal against 
the New Criticism and the damage it had apparently done to both the instruc-
tion of literature and literature itself. In his 1969 book The Pursuit of Poetry, 
for instance, Untermeyer is particularly disparaging of the New Critical ana-
lyst who in Untermeyer’s view sucks the life right out of poetry. These critics 
treat poetry as “a mine of buried meanings, irresistibly tempting to anyone 
intent on digging the last nugget from seemingly inexhaustible lodes” (81). 
“Confounded by a complex of explanatory ambiguities,” Untermeyer claims, 
“the reader, lost in a network of allusions, is too dismayed to enter, let alone 
find his way through, the labyrinth” (82). Untermeyer’s frustration could 
only have been aggravated by the fact that such an approach—one so trying 
for students—had become so prolific. As Lentricchia’s plural “generations” 
testifies, this was no fad but an entrenched practice.
 Is Brooks and Warren’s Understanding Poetry to blame for this situation? 
In some respects, yes. As Alan Golding illustrates, Understanding Poetry, 
along with Brooks and Warren’s other important textbook, An Approach 
to Literature, circulated widely. In addition to identifying numbers of print-
ings for each of the textbooks’ editions over the years, Golding highlights the 
editors’ selection of poems and poets in order to illustrate that Brooks and 
Warren’s canon was—despite some idiosyncrasies (chiefly Robert Frost)—a 
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high modernist canon (102–7). Certainly these famous New Critical text-
books made space for difficult poetry that demanded analysis. But as for the 
ways in which these texts were analyzed—the ways, in other words, instruc-
tors across the United States put the textbooks to use; the ways in which they 
presented poetic analysis to students—this is not as easy a matter to evaluate. 
There is much that we will never know about how teachers actually delivered 
this material.
 In other respects, then, Understanding Poetry cannot be held responsi-
ble for the brand of analysis attributed to the New Criticism by the likes of 
Untermeyer. For certainly close reading as practiced and promoted by Brooks 
and Warren was not about uncovering nuggets of meaning, nor was it about 
solving puzzles. Brooks argues as much in his 1962 essay, “Literary Criti-
cism: Poet, Poem, and Reader.” Such “symbol mongering”—as it had come 
to be known—was antithetical to a New Critical interest in articulating how 
a poem’s form and content are inextricably related, such that to extract a 
simple meaning from a poem—such as the answer to a puzzle—is to do it 
the worst of injustices (95). If there is a puzzle here, then, it is that surpris-
ingly, in certain important respects, these two opposing camps (for my pur-
poses here, New Critical editors Brooks and Warren, and Louis Untermeyer, 
popular anthologist and amateur critic) share a similar approach to reading 
and understanding literature—one that treats poetry as poetry without losing 
sight of its propensity to excite the emotions as well as the intellect.
 The seeming antipathy between these figures is thus deceptive. To illus-
trate the complications inherent in this ostensible conflict, this essay examines 
a small but significant area of ground shared by these opponents: William 
Carlos Williams’s famous poem, “The Red Wheelbarrow.” Both Brooks and 
Warren’s textbooks and Untermeyer’s anthologies and critical work address 
Williams’s poem at length and, importantly, arrive at similar conclusions 
about it. By reading closely each of their responses to Williams’s poem, I 
complicate the picture put forth by Abbott of the divide between popular and 
high modernism, and between the advocates thereof. “The Red Wheelbar-
row” is an appropriate ground for comparison for a number of reasons. First, 
Untermeyer, along with other opponents of the New Criticism, turns to the 
poem in order to ground his critique of New Criticism, a curious situation 
given Williams’s secure position today within the modernist canon—a canon 
that still bears the imprint of the New Criticism. Williams was never really a 
New Critical favorite, so it would be inaccurate to position his work squarely 
within the New Critical high modernist canon (Williams’s well-known dis-
gust at Eliot’s The Waste Land suggests as much). But he was certainly “mak-
ing it new,” and his inclusion in Understanding Poetry and An Approach 
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to Literature signals that Brooks and Warren recognized this. His presence 
in Untermeyer, moreover, attests to the fact that such seeming advocates of 
popular modernism were, like the New Critics, reshaping their own canon—
and moreover, were doing so according to certain critical assumptions that 
accord to a degree with the more serious and professionalized aims of the 
New Criticism.
 The similar ways in which Brooks and Warren and Untermeyer under-
stand “The Red Wheelbarrow” illustrates both the flexibility of New Critical 
analysis and the critical acumen displayed by the extra-academic Untermeyer. 
Like more recent work by critics re-examining important distinctions among 
New Critics, and work considering the similarities between New Critics and 
their critical descendants and opponents,5 my discussion advocates a recon-
sideration of the relationship between documents like Understanding Poetry 
and Untermeyer’s anthologies, attending to the points at which they intersect, 
while also recognizing that both were subject to change over time. In order 
to counter the persistent typical perception of New Critical analysis—and, 
moreover, of literary criticism in general—as essentially elitist and excessively 
difficult, critics would do well to consider such meeting points between aca-
demic and popular discourse. Doing so can break down the barriers, both 
personal and cultural, that continue to limit the roles of literature and criti-
cism according to an unfortunate cultural divide.
ouTsIde Spring and All, which appeared in 1923, Williams’s “The Red 
Wheelbarrow” first appeared in a collection compiled by William Rose Benét 
entitled Fifty Poets: An American Auto-Anthology (1933). Benét assembled 
the anthology to give voice to some of his favorite modern American poets: 
“I thought it would be especially interesting to write to those I conceived to 
be the best fifty poets in America and to see whether it were not possible for 
them to select from all their published work one of their shorter poems by 
which they would like to be remembered” (vii). Benét asked the poets, “what 
poem of yours would you choose to represent you?” (vii) and requested an 
explanation for their particular choice, expressing his interest in the events 
surrounding its inception (viii). Williams was forthcoming in his response:
 I am enclosing a favorite short poem of mine for your anthology with the 
paragraph to accompany it which you asked for. It’s a nice idea. The wheel-
barrow in question stood outside the window of an old negro’s house on a 
back street in the suburb where I live. It was pouring rain and there were 
white chickens walking about in it. The sight impressed me somehow as 
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about the most important, the most integral that it had ever been my plea-
sure to gaze upon. And the meter though no more than a fragment succeeds 
in portraying this pleasure flawlessly, even it succeeds in denoting a certain 
unquenchable exaltation—in fact I find the poem quite perfect. (60)
By contrast, Williams’s friend and fellow proponent of the “new” literature, 
Ezra Pound, responded much less agreeably to Benét’s request. “I invited the 
vials of Mr. Ezra Pound’s wrath,” writes Benét, recounting Pound’s convic-
tions that the collection would “aid in further muddling the critical sense (if 
any) of the pore bloody ole public”; that Benét and his colleagues were “pre-
serving mildew” and “falsifying critical standards”; and that their anthol-
ogy would contain only the “‘sobstuff’ of the ‘personal touch’” despised by 
Pound (qtd. in Benét, ix, x). Pound’s typical nastiness springs from his dis-
taste for anthologies, but it also falls in line with the sentiments of the new 
generation of critics in advocating a more sophisticated, critical approach to 
literature. Indeed, other notable figures also recoiled from such an apparently 
anticritical, antimodern anthology, if less violently. According to Benét, E. 
E. Cummings recommended not one of his own poems but one of Marianne 
Moore’s; New Critical heavyweight-to-be, John Crowe Ransom, neglected to 
respond despite several attempts made by Benét to reach him; and, unsurpris-
ingly, ruling literary patriarch T. S. Eliot also declined to participate: “I have 
no poem which I should care to have presented to the public as my favorite. I 
am very sorry, but I am afraid there is nothing to be done about it” (Eliot in 
Benét, viii).
 “The Red Wheelbarrow,” now one of modernism’s most identifiable 
poems, thus begins its anthology career in a collection deemed inappropri-
ate, even detrimental, by many of the figures whose work has come to con-
stitute—and who had a hand, through their criticism, in constituting—the 
modernist canon. As noted above, Williams’s place in this canon has been 
secured in recent years, but it was not a given then. The position he occu-
pies within Fifty Poets—one in relative opposition to Pound and Eliot, who 
would not allow their work to appear in such a context—speaks to his lim-
inal position within this cultural debate. On the one hand, for instance, Wil-
liams disliked Eliot’s poetry, especially The Waste Land, which in Williams’s 
estimate “gave the poem back to the academics” (Autobiography, 146); and 
Williams’s critical work was far less important to him and far less systematic 
than both Eliot’s and Pound’s. On the other hand, however, much of Wil-
liams’s work aligns with the Poundian imagism so important to the modernist 
break with tradition. Williams’s placement in Fifty Poets thus points nicely to 
his status as a bridge, as it were, between these two rival factions; moreover, 
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it presages his ultimate position with respect to the New Critical and Unter-
meyerian anthologies.
 Turning first to Untermeyer’s Williams, note that “The Red Wheelbar-
row” is used in fact to bolster the point made in The Pursuit of Poetry about 
the “dismayed” reader in the New Critical labyrinth of literary analysis. For 
Untermeyer, the poem has been subjected to “the academic wrecker who 
tears into a poem and reduces it to a pile of literary rubble” (86):
[It] has been subjected to interpretations that are as absurd as they are 
astonishing. Looking for the ineluctable meaning beyond the meaning, 
one searcher found that the solid utility of the wheelbarrow was a stand-
ing reproof to the short-lived foolishness of the chickens, that the poem 
was a picture of contemporary life with its utilitarian values ignored by the 
younger generation, while another explicator discovered that Williams was 
making a veiled statement about sexuality, the hard male impulse (red) being 
pitted against a flutteringly female (white) virginity. (85–86)
Such readings, anathema to Untermeyer, are the same kind of “absurd” inter-
pretations he describes the “young offshoots of New Criticism” giving in 
response to his showing them Lewis Carroll’s “The Walrus and the Carpen-
ter,” of which they were of course, as modern critics, unaware:
One of the students maintained that the poem was an allegory of the world 
today, its speed, its cruelty, its apathy, its loss of security—“the fate of the 
oysters shows that we rush too fast, that we cannot trust anyone, and that 
no one cares.” Another found that the meaning of the poem was in the lines 
about the quantity of sand:
  “If this were only cleared away,”
  They said, “it would be grand.”
“That is a symbol of the poverty that surrounds us,” declared the young 
critic, “and it is an appeal for us to clear up the mess.”
 A more startling interpretation was presented by a student who was 
specializing in political economy. He saw the figure of the Carpenter as the 
image of Soviet Russia, the Walrus as its weak willing ally, and the Oysters 
as the gullible satellites who were bound to be gobbled up. (84)
To Untermeyer’s pleasure and relief, however, there is a student in the class 
yet uncorrupted by the critical disease: “Only one student—a fifteen-year-old 
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girl who had not been sufficiently exposed to the New Criticism—ventured a 
bald opinion. ‘I may be wrong,’ she said timidly, ‘but I thought it was funny’” 
(84). Not needing to belabor the obvious, from here Untermeyer’s discussion 
moves coolly to something new. This last student’s response to Carroll’s poem 
is clearly the proper one, and for Untermeyer responses to Williams’s poem 
ought naturally to display the same degree of honesty, without searching 
reductively for a single—and comically elaborate—meaning and thus reduc-
ing the pleasure afforded by the poem.
 Untermeyer first includes “The Red Wheelbarrow” in one of his anthol-
ogies in the 1950 edition of Modern American Poetry. Because these col-
lections are not explicitly instructive, however, a better place to look to see 
his thoughts on the poem is The Pursuit of Poetry. The semi-anthological, 
semi-instructional work announces itself as “a guide to [poetry’s] under-
standing and appreciation with an explanation of its forms and a diction-
ary of poetic terms.” Its aversion to the criticism of the academy is clear, 
as in his foreword Untermeyer asserts that “The book is not addressed to 
the advanced scholar or to the trained analyst” (11). It need not be, for as 
Untermeyer maintains (admittedly somewhat naively), “Poetry presented no 
problems either to the ancients or to those who, until the industrial revolu-
tion, lived on the land. Its comprehension was there from the beginning; the 
poetic impulse and its reception were taken for granted. Poems were not dif-
ficult to understand” (36). Published well after the advent and rise to promi-
nence of New Criticism, Untermeyer’s text looks back to a foregone age 
of poetic simplicity, lamenting its loss. The Pursuit of Poetry’s prologue—
seventeenth-century poet Edmund Waller’s “Of English Verse”—multiplies 
this sense of nostalgia, as Untermeyer harks back to a poet himself harking 
back:
But who can hope his lines should long
Last in a daily changing tongue?
[. . . . . . . . ]
Chaucer his sense can only boast
The glory of his numbers lost!
Years have defaced his matchless strain,
And yet he did not sing in vain. (9)
Untermeyer’s choice of Waller’s poem may also very well reflect his suspicion 
of the modern turn from traditional form, in which case his taste for Williams 
is, again, curious (albeit telling of his taste for certain forms of difficulty, 
despite his assertions to the contrary).
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 The Pursuit of Poetry is full of jabs at the “advanced scholar” and the 
“trained critic,” one of the most amusing of which is a lengthy digression on 
the subject of gardening. Untermeyer could hardly be more heavy-handed in 
his critique of the analytic language used by critics to treat poetry, selecting as 
he does the well-worn metaphor of flower picking to deliver it:
[F]eeling for poetry is found in countless ways, in none more charming than 
in the field of flowers. . . . Contrast, for example, the language used by the 
botanist and the wildflower gatherer. In every instance the common country 
name is not only more charming than the botanist’s appellation but also far 
more poetic. The object, a flower or a fern, is even more accurately described 
because it has been more lovingly observed. (37)
In Untermeyer’s view, this is the emotion which difficult modern poets neglect 
but which is essential to the poetic experience. And where else does Unter-
meyer see proof of this but in Williams’s “The Red Wheelbarrow”?
For Williams nothing was without beauty and a significance waiting to 
be perceived. An emotion may be stripped to a single sensory image, but 
bare though the image may be, it does not lose emotional impact. Williams 
proved it in the verbal economy of “The Red Wheelbarrow.” [Untermeyer 
quotes the poem] The precision, the final effect—the red of the wheelbar-
row heightened by the glaze of rainwater and the contrasted whiteness of 
the chickens—suggests and even intensifies the emotions “that come from 
everywhere” and emanate from the very thinginess of things [Untermeyer 
here refers back to a quotation he takes from a discussion of Picasso’s notion 
of artistic receptivity]. (25)
Despite Untermeyer’s obvious anticritical stance, however, he has still offered 
what is essentially a close reading of Williams’s poem, attending to Williams’s 
juxtapositions and linguistic concision and thus treating the poem critically 
as poem even as he stresses its “emotional impact” upon the reader. Indeed, 
notwithstanding his attacks on the “trained critic,” his book is a critical text, 
with its “dictionary of poetic terms” and measured discussions of poems 
such as Williams’s, which do much more than simply paraphrase—unlike the 
simplistic allegorical equations and summations offered by the “searching” 
“young offshoots of the New Criticism.”
 Of course, the ridiculous overreadings at which Untermeyer scoffs could 
hardly be classified as strictly New Critical, and so we cannot conclude with 
Untermeyer that Williams’s poem functions as a condemnation of New Criti-
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cal reading strategies. Quite the opposite: ultimately (and likely unbeknownst 
to Untermeyer) both he and the New Critics demonstrate serious concern 
over “the academic wrecker” born of the routinization of New Critical close 
reading strategies. In fact, amateur status, such as Untermeyer’s, is one key 
element offered up by New Critics as a way to avoid and respond to profes-
sionalist routinization. Golding underscores the New Critics’ loyalties to writ-
ers like Eliot, I. A. Richards and William Empson, who were not entrenched 
in the university environment and who were poets as well as critics. The goal 
was “to establish a professional criticism while maintaining a sense of its 
non-academic, amateur, or maverick origins” (82–83). Ironically, then—and 
quite tellingly—while New Critic Allen Tate contrasted Brooks and Warren’s 
Understanding Poetry with the likes of Untermeyer’s and Wilkinson’s anthol-
ogies in an effort to promote the New Critical textbook, he would later call 
for a dose of just that brand of Untermeyerian criticism conveyed by Unter-
meyer’s anthologies and, later, his work in The Pursuit of Poetry (Golding, 
83).
 Moreover, as the twentieth century unfolded, anthologies like Untermey-
er’s would play a major role in shaping conceptions of modernism. Untermey-
er’s concerns were not, like those of the New Critics, related to the goals of 
the academy (professionalization, pedagogy, and the like), but still they betray 
his critical faculty, in this case his awareness of poetry as cultural analysis. So, 
despite Abbott’s claim that popular modernism “was not characterized by 
intellectual complexity or informed by any sense of cultural crisis” (210), by 
1930 Untermeyer proclaimed in the preface to his Modern American Poetry 
that “The poets of the [modern] period answered the demands put upon them 
by a rapidly changing civilization. They reflected the paradoxical energy of 
the age and its sterility, its contradictory appetite for realism and fantasy, its 
skepticism and the faith submerged beneath doubtful searching” (32). Unter-
meyer makes clear his aim to promote the enjoyment of poetry—as opposed 
to, we can assume, the lifeless, academic, analytic study of poetry. But the 
province of this enjoyment includes poems that Untermeyer studiously rec-
ognizes are marked by these crises; poetry, furthermore, that generates such 
crises, such that readers are challenged to re-examine and reform worn-out 
reading practices. If this is enjoyment, it is certainly not of a simple kind:
the best of [these contentious poets], oppressed by the dead hand of the past, 
were effective in their revolt; they destroyed that semi-comatose condition 
which so often attends the reading of poetry and (being a criticism of bad 
poetry as well as of the reader) revealed new wit, new vitality, new signals of 
beauty beneath the surface oddities. (29)
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Clearly responding to the new poetic forms emerging in the early decades of 
the twentieth century—and, even more, highlighting them as exemplary—
Untermeyer’s anthologies move beyond the gentility widely associated with 
popular modernism, casting a critical eye on what constitutes valuable mod-
ern verse (he even calls his collection a “critical anthology”) and promoting 
an engaged reading practice sensitive to the complexities of the modern age 
and aesthetic.
 Untermeyer’s work clearly accords with the modern poetry anthologies 
that, according to Leonard Diepeveen, give shape to a concept of modern-
ism by framing a narrative of rupture in which modern poetry breaks from 
a fictitious singular Victorianism characterized by stifling conventionality.6 
Diepeveen’s work illuminates the crucial role such simplifying narratives play 
within literary history, as proponents of burgeoning modes of literary and 
critical discourse aim to establish firm, and thus necessarily oppositional, 
positions with respect to their forebears or opponents. Certainly the many 
New Criticisms were also guilty of such strategic critical positioning with 
respect to the literary past. More important to my purposes here, however, 
is the similar distortive narrative about the relationship that obtains between 
Untermeyer and Brooks and Warren—a narrative that can be destabilized by 
tracing the affinities between these apparent adversaries, taking account of 
the ambiguities within their projects.
 Such affinities are evident in Untermeyer’s and Brooks and Warren’s treat-
ment of Williams’s “The Red Wheelbarrow,” as there are significant similari-
ties between Brooks and Warren’s account of the poem in both Understanding 
Poetry and An Approach to Literature and Untermeyer’s treatment of it in 
The Pursuit of Poetry. The poem first appears in the third edition of Under-
standing Poetry, within the section on “Metrics.” The editors discuss the 
poem in terms of its use of free verse and highlight what they perceive to be 
the “arbitrariness” of Williams’s line divisions:
[T]he very arbitrariness is the point. We are forced to focus our attention 
upon words, and details, in a very special way, a puzzling way. Now the 
poem itself is about that puzzling portentousness that an object, even the 
simplest, like a red wheelbarrow, assumes when we fix our attention exclu-
sively upon it. Reading the poem is like peering at some ordinary object 
through a pin prick in a piece of cardboard. The fact that the pin prick 
frames it arbitrarily endows it with a puzzling, and exciting, freshness that 
seems to hover on the verge of revelation. And that is what the poem is actu-
ally about: “So much depends”—but what, we do not know. (UP, 3rd. ed., 
173–74)
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I will consider more fully Brooks and Warren’s discussion of the poem’s struc-
tural arbitrariness in a moment, but first let me emphasize that like Unter-
meyer—for whom the “precision” of the poem’s focus “intensifies” the 
emotional experience it provides—Brooks and Warren are stimulated by 
Williams’s sharp “pin prick” focus and the sense that the object under con-
sideration is somehow associated with something significant beyond itself. 
For Untermeyer these are the “emotions ‘that come from everywhere’”; for 
Brooks and Warren, this is the ineffable “so much” of Williams’s poem.
 Subsequent editions of Understanding Poetry and An Approach to Lit-
erature reveal subtle but key changes in Brooks and Warren’s approach to 
their subject matter, “The Red Wheelbarrow” included. The editors them-
selves do not comment on the poem in its first appearance in An Approach to 
Literature’s fourth edition (1964), but they do offer a quotation from Philip 
Wheelwright and ask students if they agree with his take on Williams’s poem. 
Wheelwright argues that the poem’s attempt to convey the import of the 
moment fails because the reader, who can only look to the poem itself, can-
not connect to the poet’s “personal associations” which lie outside the poem 
(qtd. in Approach, 4th ed., 304). Given its hallmark New Critical attitude, 
we might anticipate that Brooks and Warren would agree with Wheelwright’s 
assessment, but this is uncertain here; they leave it up to the reader to decide. 
In the next edition of An Approach (1975), however, the editors directly 
address Wheelwright in an expanded discussion of the poem, arguing that 
while his criticism cannot be dismissed outright, it is nevertheless worthwhile 
to consider what Williams means by “so much depends.” “Is he not saying,” 
Brooks and Warren ask, “that life is grounded in the world and that we must 
not lose ourselves in abstractions and intellectual bemusement?” (364). As a 
basis for their interpretation, Brooks and Warren refer to Williams’s apho-
rism “No ideas but in things” and note that as “a physician with the scien-
tific training of that profession, [he] could have intended that slogan only in 
a special context; as a reminder of the fundamental concreteness of poetry” 
(364). I must admit I do not quite follow this last assertion—the sugges-
tion that Williams’s medical training leads him to hold that the Aristotelian 
notion that ideas inhere in things must apply to poetry alone. More impor-
tant, though, than debating Williams’s ontology and its relation to his poetry, 
is that in terms of typical understandings of the New Criticism, Brooks and 
Warren’s discussion of “The Red Wheelbarrow” makes some apparently very 
un-New Critical moves. First, they offer a paraphrase of the poem (“life is 
grounded . . . ”)—contra Brooks’s own admonition against this “heresy” in 
“The Heresy of Paraphrase”; and, ironically enough, one that sounds a lot 
like what opponents of the New Criticism would say of the movement (“we 
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must not lose ourselves in abstractions and intellectual bemusement”). Sec-
ond, they appeal to the author’s intentions—contra Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
infamous intentional fallacy.
 This discussion (and the near identical one found in the fourth and con-
current edition of Understanding Poetry [1976]) may mark a response to 
general critiques of New Criticism—of the movement’s notions of the anti-
propositional nature of poetry, for example, or of its bracketing of the text. 
But even if the editors do make some concessions, they hardly expose any crit-
ical inconsistencies and ultimately still give voice to the position they articu-
lated at the outset of their critical endeavor. After all, Understanding Poetry’s 
first “Letter to the Teacher” addresses the issues of paraphrase, intentionality, 
and historicity, recognizing their significance, but arguing for a better under-
standing the specific functions unique to poetic language and structure:
Of course, paraphrase may be necessary as a preliminary step in the reading 
of a poem, and a study of the biographical and historical background may 
do much to clarify interpretation; but these things should be considered as 
means and not as ends. And though one may consider a poem as an instance 
of historical or ethical documentation, the poem in itself, if literature is to be 
studied as literature, remains finally the object for study. Moreover, even if 
the interest is in the poem as a historical or ethical document, there is a prior 
consideration: one must grasp the poem as a literary construct before it can 
offer any real illumination as a document. (UP, 1st. ed., iv)
To level criticism at Brooks and Warren’s discussions of “The Red Wheel-
barrow,” as I have done, is thus not to disparage the textbooks’ analyses, 
but rather to highlight their divergence from the stereotyped form of New 
Critical discourse which Untermeyer sketches, and which ultimately distorts 
the relatively balanced reading strategies promoted in Brooks and Warren’s 
anthologies.
 If Brooks and Warren’s analysis of Williams’s poem in Understand-
ing Poetry is strikingly in line with Untermeyer’s, it is even closer in An 
Approach to Literature. While Brooks and Warren place equal emphasis in 
An Approach on the arbitrariness of the poem’s lineation, they conclude fur-
ther that this aspect of the poem’s structure turns one’s attention—to use 
Untermeyer’s words—towards “the very thinginess of things”:
by refusing to consider syntax, phrase structure, or idea as related to the line 
division, Williams asserts the minimal, sharply focused “things” and aspects 
of things so that they stand forth clearly in their own right, whatever their 
own right may be. Even the word upon—which is certainly not a “thing”—
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is isolated in its own special “thing-y” significance. We focus upon “upon-
ness” as it were; for this is what Williams uses as the key to his poem. (365)
Thus, faced with “The Red Wheelbarrow,” what are supposedly two diamet-
rically opposed reading strategies yield highly similar interpretations: “The 
Red Wheelbarrow” stresses the significance of experience in itself and under-
scores the crucial role played by the relations between the objects that consti-
tute experience. Both, moreover, are attuned to the poem’s emotional charge, 
to what Williams himself described (perhaps a touch hyperbolically) as an 
“unquenchable exaltation.”
 There is a further irony to this comparison: not only do Untermeyer and 
Brooks and Warren react similarly to Williams’s now-famous poem; while 
Untermeyer turns it into an anti-New Critical advertisement, Brooks and 
Warren may well have turned it into an exemplary model highlighting their 
key poetic theories. After all, the call of the “The Red Wheelbarrow” to expe-
rience the poignancy of an isolated moment with its significant related com-
ponents is almost a perfect analog of the ideal New Critical poetic experience 
of a single, self-contained poem. If this looks like “overreading,” certainly 
Brooks and Warren could have extended their examination of the poem’s 
particular form-content relationship. Building upon their analysis—consider-
ing the relation between the poem’s formal structure and its ideas—reveals 
the continued relevance and effectiveness of their close reading strategies. 
Brooks and Warren emphasize the arbitrariness of the poem’s structure. But 
by their very own analysis, one would think they could arrive at the oppo-
site conclusion—that Williams is hardly being arbitrary in his treatment of 
these elements. Consider that Brooks and Warren emphasize both the sharp 
focus on things in themselves and the concern over the relation between those 
things—their dependence “upon” something else, that ineffable “what.” 
Given this, they point out that Williams underscores that sense of depen-
dence—that “upon-ness”—by isolating “upon.” The next logical step would 
be to conclude that Williams underlines what Untermeyer terms “thingi-
ness”—what Brooks and Warren term as “‘thing-y’ significance”—precisely 
by isolating “barrow,” “water,” and “chickens,” each of which has its own 
line in the poem, like the isolated “upon.” But Brooks and Warren fail to 
make this explicit and insist upon Williams’s arbitrary use of line.7 Moreover, 
by separating each of the three compound “things” presented in the poem 
(wheelbarrow, rainwater, and white chickens), Williams focuses our atten-
tion on discrete components of these entities—not on the “wheelbarrow” as 
thing but on both “wheel” and “barrow” as thing—and furthermore leads 
us to consider again the sense of “upon-ness,” as each of these—“barrow,” 
“water,” and “chickens”—depends respectively upon “wheel,” “rain,” and 
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“white” to fulfill its compound nature. The lineation and syntax are thus 
crucial to the ideas raised by the poem; Williams clearly employs them with 
purpose. Even the stanza form suggests the notion that “so much depends 
/ upon,” as each group of three words that composes the first line of each 
stanza is positioned above each of the four isolated words that composes the 
second line of each stanza. In each case, the three words resting above the 
single, isolated word are supported by it; they “depend / upon” it.
 By offering a closer reading than the close readers themselves, I aim less to 
highlight the limitations of Brooks and Warren’s understanding of Williams’s 
poem than to illuminate the continued relevance of their legacy.8 Importantly, 
though, I would not want this attention to specifics to overshadow the famous 
anthologists’ awareness of the affective impact of “The Red Wheelbarrow,” 
for to do so would be to lose sight of key intersections between Brooks and 
Warren’s academic discourse and Untermeyer’s amateur criticism—intersec-
tions that reveal, on the one hand, the openness of New Critical literary criti-
cism and pedagogy, in contrast to charges of elitism and hyperdifficulty; and 
on the other hand, the relatively critical eye of this balanced popular modern-
ist reading strategy.
 To find something of Untermeyer in Brooks and Warren is thus to make 
more accessible the oft-conceived fortress of New Criticism, as well as the 
works which support it. Equally, to find something of Brooks and Warren in 
Untermeyer is to validate widespread unintimidated critical attention to an 
area supposedly reserved for specialists. If there is a place to make such iro-
nies clear, it is in the classroom, where students’ guards come up in the face of 
the ostensibly insurmountable difficulty of literature, particularly poetry, and 
literary analysis. For in the classroom, there is a sense that analyzing litera-
ture is inevitably about a new form of symbol mongering, such that the skep-
ticism about over-reading that Untermeyer values in certain of his students 
has, depending on how you look at it, either faded away entirely, or become 
so distorted as to turn into an outright rejection of certain poetic modes as 
poetry.
 For instance, upon encountering Williams’s “The Red Wheelbarrow” in 
my introductory poetry class, one of my students stood firm in her conviction 
that it was not a poem at all, admitting that she had been forced previously 
to write on it and had “given in,” producing what she felt was the required 
analogical reading (in this case one involving political tension in communist 
Russia). That for her there were only two possibilities—that such an artifact 
could not possibly be a poem, or that it was simply a puzzle needing to be 
solved in order to fulfill a course requirement—is a sign of the obvious gap 
still remaining between a more hospitable, though not simplistic, approach 
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to literature (one similar to that of popular modernism) and the “default 
aesthetic” of difficulty (Diepeveen, Difficulties, 223) initiated by New Criti-
cism and then distorted by a routinization of its practices. Witness my student 
who, while continuing to participate in the process of reading with and for 
difficulty, had given in, or given up, disenchanted by the extreme lengths to 
which this activity had led her. The irony, of course, is that here the student is 
unable to identify with the work not necessarily because of the poem’s inher-
ent difficulty but because of the cultural assumptions governing her response.
 Leonard Diepeveen’s assessment in The Difficulties of Modernism of the 
vexing legacy of the New Criticism accords with my analysis of the conflu-
ence between the work of Untermeyer and Brooks and Warren. Routinized 
analysis predicated upon difficulty is, as Diepeveen notes, a “mind-numbing 
exercise” (243); but importantly, it is one in which neither Untermeyer nor 
Brooks and Warren engage. And although Untermeyer fails to see past the 
prevalence of this routine to recognize the nuances of his supposed critical 
adversaries, the two groups’ similarities allow us to recognize such subtleties 
and correct misconceptions and misrepresentations surrounding both Unter-
meyer’s critical work and Brooks and Warren’s New Critical pedagogy. As 
for “The Red Wheelbarrow,” if it continues to puzzle students and gener-
ate outlandish readings, we can be thankful that its visible position within a 
tradition of “difficult” works allows us to shed light on this tradition, so as 
to understand the formative conditions of its reading practices and unsettle 
authorized modes of analysis made inflexible by routine.
Notes
 1. Both essays are reprinted in the very useful Spurlin and Fischer.
 2. See Graff, Professing Literature, especially 121–82.
 3. Graff , Professing Literature, 226–43.
 4. Lentricchia’s After the New Criticism investigates this changing critical and theoret-
ical landscape, taking up the criticism of Northrop Frye, Paul de Man, and Harold Bloom, 
among others.
 5. See Spurlin and Fischer’s collection, especially sections II and III: “Reflections since 
the New Criticism” and “New Approaches to the New Criticism and Contemporary The-
ory.”
 6. See Diepeveen, “When Did Modernism Begin?”
 7. As Alan Golding helpfully pointed out to me in response to an earlier version of 
this paper, Brooks and Warren’s insistence in this regard may spring from their inability or 
perhaps unwillingness—given a New Critical organicism—to recognize Williams’s use of 
syllabics. See Robert Duncan’s perceptive reading of the poem in “Ideas of the Meaning of 
Form,” in Duncan, A Selected Prose, ed. Robert J. Bertholf (New York: New Directions, 
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1995), 26–29. My sincere thanks also go to Erik Bachman for his most insightful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper.
 8. Many critics have already established this fact, for example, by tracing the con-
nections between the New Criticism and its theoretical successors in the academy. See, for 
example, in Spurlin and Fischer, eds., The New Criticism and Contemporary Theory, Paul 
A. Bové’s “Variations on Authority: Some Deconstructive Transformations of the New 
Criticism,” 161–84, and Michael Fischer’s “The New Criticism in the New Historicism: 
The Recent Work of Jerome J. McGann,” 321–32.
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In a work that predated even his own proto-modernist poetry, Charles Baudelaire, whom T. S. Eliot called “the greatest exemplar in modern 
poetry of any language” (426), produced in his Salon de 1846 a pre-emptive 
prescription for a productive and positive engagement between modern art 
and the city. “La vie parisienne,” he declared, “est féconde en sujets poé-
tiques et merveilleux. Le merveilleux nous enveloppe et nous abreuve comme 
l’atmosphère; mais nous le voyons pas” (Œuvres, 496).1 The role that Baude-
laire saw for the modern artist, as he had argued in the Salon de 1845, lay in 
discovering the forms by which the shock and disruption of urban life could 
be redeemed for art: “Celui-là sera le peintre,” he wrote, “qui saura arracher 
à la vie actuelle son côté épique, et nous faire voir et comprendre, avec de la 
couleur ou du dessin, combien nous sommes grands et poétiques dans nos 
cravates et nos bottes vernies” (407).2 While Baudelaire’s subsequent poetry, 
however, and many strains of twentieth-century modernism embraced the 
life of the city, modernism has often been caricatured as an art of despair 
and disillusionment especially remarkable for its laments about the horrors 
of urban life. As Desmond Harding notes in Writing the City: Urban Visions 
& Literary Modernism, “a consensus emerged” in the early twentieth cen-
tury “of the city as a menacing force beyond the capacity of human experi-
ence to control or even sometimes comprehend” (13). The text that would 
become the paradigm of English modernism—“T. S. Eliot’s excoriation of the 
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cultural and spiritual topos of London in The Waste Land—the ‘unreal city’ 
of modernity” (13)—enshrined, Harding argues, this modernist antipathy for 
the urban.
 While Harding’s work—which considers writers such as Joyce and Dos 
Passos in order to recover a positive strain of modernist urban thought, or 
the “possibilities [the city] provides as a site of liberation from the very forces 
that would seem to crush the individual” (13)—is representative of a new 
strain in modernist scholarship, it does little to address the role that previ-
ous scholarship played in enforcing the increasingly discredited conception 
of modernism as a city-loathing art form. Indeed, as modernism’s origins in a 
redemptive Baudelairean poetics suggest—and as the very fact that Harding 
is able to carry out his analysis supports—the “consensus” of which Harding 
speaks emerged largely from the institutions which arose in the modernist 
period to account for and interpret contemporary art, rather than from that 
art itself. This is a view strongly supported by James Baldwin’s peculiarly 
and periodically modernist 1962 novel Another Country. Indeed it is a text 
whose denunciations of modernism’s anti-urban bias demand a parallel inves-
tigation of its author’s ambivalent relationship with the New Criticism, that 
unabashedly city-phobic and conspicuously Eliot-centered school of criticism 
that popularized not only the conception of modernism as a form directed 
against the urban, but also popularized modernism itself. In Another Coun-
try, Baldwin both vehemently attacks and helplessly reproduces the New Crit-
ical conception of modernism, one that attracted him as an aesthetic means 
of countering the effects of industrialization and urbanization, but also one 
which, for this very reason, failed to develop a redemptive discourse on the 
city.
 After nearly four hundred pages in a naturalist mode, Another Coun-
try switches abruptly in Book Three into an idiom that recognizably and 
polemically engages with modernism. It is a switch signalled initially by its 
portentous title—“Toward Bethlehem,” an allusion to the slouching figure in 
Yeats’s “The Second Coming”—but perhaps most obviously and most self-
consciously by the visit paid by Eric and Cass to the Museum of Modern Art. 
Though it remains unclear whether he does so in his own voice or through 
those of his characters, Baldwin presents in this MoMA scene the specific 
grounds for his denunciation of modernist art. As Cass and Eric meet to 
commiserate over Richard’s discovery of their affair, the scene is described as 
follows:
They reached the first of a labyrinthine series of rooms, shifting and crack-
ling with groups of people, with bright paintings above and around them, 
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and stretching into the far distance, like tombstones with unreadable inscrip-
tions. The people moved in waves, like tourists in a foreign graveyard. Occa-
sionally, a single mourner, dreaming of some vanished relationship, stood 
alone in adoration or revery before a massive memorial. (402)
At the level of the aesthetic, modern art is dismissed here as garish (“bright 
paintings”), lifeless (“tombstones”), and—though the critique of the con-
tainer (the MoMA) and its contents becomes somewhat confused—as mono-
lithic and alienating (“labyrinthine”; “stretching into the far distance”). It is 
not merely the quality of the signifier itself that comes under attack in this 
passage, however, but also the absence of its relationship to any signified. 
Inscrutable, confusing, and “unreadable,” the modernist paintings described 
in this scene are pure, unreferential surface. As such, the paintings are not 
merely symbols of death—“tombstones”—but are themselves dead symbols: 
tombstones whose markings can’t be made out. Analogous to Walter’s Ben-
jamin’s analysis in the Trauerspiel of allegory as “in the realm of thoughts, 
what ruins are in the realm of things” (178), works of modern art become in 
this scene “ruins”: not merely gazed upon by mourners, they are mourning in 
their very mode of representation. Signposts of unsuccessful representations 
pointing in vain at their putative signifieds—mere sites of “vanished relation-
ships”—they become utterly detached from the real, purely abstract, and thus 
merely (and paradoxically for such a “garish” style) aesthetic.
 While presenting a similar critique, a passage further on in the MoMA 
scene reveals also Another Country’s complicity with the modernist mode it is 
so intent on denouncing. Following Cass’s initial description of her conversa-
tion with Richard, the scene is described thus:
They passed not far from a weary guard, who looked blinded and dazzled, 
as though he had never been able to escape the light. Before them was a 
large and violent canvas in greens and reds and blacks, in blocks and circles, 
in daggerlike exclamations; it took a flying leap, as it were, from the wall, 
poised for the spectator’s eyeballs; and at the same time it seemed to stretch 
endlessly and adoringly in on itself, reaching back into an unspeakable 
chaos. It was aggressively and superbly uncharming and unreadable, and 
might have been painted by a lonely and bloodthirsty tyrant, who had been 
cheated of his victims. (405)
Here, in amplified form, are the scene’s principal arguments against modern-
ism. An ugly, abstract, brashly colored, violent and “daggerlike” art form, it 
succeeds neither in pleasing its audience aesthetically nor in awakening their 
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critical intelligence; instead it leaves them—like the hapless guard who spends 
his days in its baffling proximity—“blinded and dazzled.” Failing to establish 
any representational connections with the world beyond the museum, more-
over, it becomes involuted, self-referential, and also self-satisfied, stretching 
“endlessly and adoringly in on itself.” This very critique, however, could just 
as easily be applied to Book Three of Another Country itself. While it is pos-
sible to read this passage as the free-indirect discourse musings of Cass rather 
than as the direct pronouncement of the Baldwinian narrator, its analysis of 
modernist aesthetics cannot be entirely detached from a book that begins in 
a representational mode just as violent, garish, and disorienting as the paint-
ing on the wall. Indeed, this denunciation of modernist self-referentiality is at 
same time paradoxically a reference to the book’s own recognizably modern-
ist aesthetic. That it is unclear who is speaking in this passage only heightens, 
in ways that further disorient its reader, the passage’s hints of self-parody.
 Much like the MoMA paintings that attract the narrator’s ire further in, 
Book Three begins decisively detached from the real in a disorienting, gar-
ishly rendered dream-space filled with jarring symbols in need of decoding. 
The content of Vivaldo’s dream reads as a clumsily rendered allegory: he is 
running in the rain towards a high wall topped with broken glass which, 
once ascended, is revealed as dividing a cold, nightmarish landscape from a 
pastoral space. On one side is Rufus; on the other is Ida. If the final mean-
ing of the dream-allegory is ultimately irresolvable, its general sense is quite 
clear. The passage serves to introduce the novel’s most conspicuous scene 
of male homosexuality: that between Vivaldo and Eric. And though a first 
reading—unaware of the impending context—might not reveal the depth 
of the imagery, a second shows the scene to be a sort of proleptic phallic 
dystopia: Vivaldo is torn by “thorns and nettles”; the broken glass takes 
the form of “sharp points standing straight up, like spears”; the rain falls 
in “long, cruel, gleaming shafts.” Observing the interplay of rain and glass, 
Vivaldo feels “an answering rearing in his own body . . . such as he might 
have felt for a moment had there been the movement and power of a horse 
beneath him” (381); when he falls onto “the rearing, uplifting glass,” he 
“[feels] again the random, voluptuous tug” (382). Even to the dreamer, how-
ever, this homosexual content remains hidden behind a frustrating veil of 
modernist figuration. Vivaldo, much like the reader, is “blinded by the rain 
beating down” (381) and troubled by his failing comprehension (“He had 
forgotten—what? how to escape or how to defeat his enemy” [382]). More 
specifically, he complains—much like the reader seeking to recover from the 
insistently bleak Another Country some positive commentary on the libera-
tory character of homosexual love—that whatever redemptive kernel might 
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exist in the dream remains obscure to him: he is “made sick by the certainty 
that he had forgotten—forgotten—what? some secret, some duty that would 
save him” (381).
 While this dream-sequence arguably functions as an implicit critique of 
modernism, then—exposing how its difficult symbolism, disorientations of 
narrative, and garish style blunt its political content—it is also a viable tar-
get of its own objections. Indeed, while realism struggles to reassert itself 
within the ensuing detailed and explicit account of the lovemaking of Viv-
aldo and Eric (384), the narrative seems to reduce homosexuality itself to a 
parodic symbol of its own modernist representations. As he and Eric lie with 
“the hand of each on the sex of the other,” for example, Vivaldo offers a 
description of homosexuality-as-tautology: “It was strangely and insistently 
double-edged, it was like making love in the midst of mirrors, or it was like 
death by drowning. But it was also like music, the highest, sweetest, loneli-
est reeds, and it was like the rain” (385). Like the modernist monstrosities 
that “stretch endlessly and adoringly in on themselves,” homosexuality itself 
becomes in this description a death-like closed loop: a figure of involution 
and disengagement. And if the “But” clause seems to offer a positive counter-
point, the closing reference to the “rain”—a dominant motif in Book Three—
deflates it forcefully. For as in Vivaldo’s dream, the rain that falls throughout 
the chapter serves as yet another self-reflexive figure of the distorting, obfus-
cating, ontologically confusing nature of modernist form. Describing Eric’s 
preparations to meet Cass at the MoMA, Baldwin notes, “He forgot about 
going to the store, and merely watched the rain, comforted by the anonym-
ity and the violence—this violence was also peace. [ . . . T]he speeding rain 
distorted, blurred, blunted, all the familiar outlines of the walls, windows, 
doors, parked cars, lamp posts, hydrants, trees” (393). A violent, abstract, 
and anonymous veil that obscures the meaning and the urban setting of Bald-
win’s novel, the rain presents a further manifestation of Another Country’s 
self-loathing modernism.
 Though it is centered on notions of self-containment, the pointed ambiva-
lence of Another Country’s engagement with modernism is one with a his-
tory. It is a history dating back, in fact, to Baldwin’s earliest publication, his 
1949 essay “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” where he champions modernism as 
a political aesthetic preferable to the target of his polemic, Wrightian natu-
ralist protest fiction. According to Baldwin’s essay, the problem with protest 
novels is that rather than offering a credible challenge to a racist, homopho-
bic society, they play into its hands by tacitly accepting its assumptions. In 
his analysis of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, for instance, he argues that in attempting 
to counter the stereotype of black men as savage, angry, and hyper-sexual, 
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Stowe simply inverts it. Beholden to a racist society for the terms of her rebut-
tal, she produces a picture of black men as false and one-dimensional as that 
of her rivals: “She must cover their intimidating nakedness,” Baldwin argues, 
and “robe them in white, the garments of salvation . . . Tom, therefore, her 
only black man, has been robbed of his humanity and divested of his sex” 
(14). Baldwin argues that this situation is internalized in the character of 
Bigger Thomas from Richard Wright’s Native Son. Bigger too has accepted 
the racist simplification of his character, and through his efforts to disprove 
it succeeds only in reinforcing it. “Bigger’s tragedy,” Baldwin says, “is not 
that he is cold or black or hungry, not even that he is American, black; but 
that he has accepted a theology that denies him life, that he admits the pos-
sibility of his being sub-human and feels constrained, therefore, to battle for 
his humanity according to those brutal criteria bequeathed him at his birth” 
(18). Protest novels, in other words, fight caricatures with caricatures: they 
resort to the same simplifications of black/white, straight/gay, human/subhu-
man against which they purport to “protest.”
 Baldwin’s essay sees such simplifying modes of thought as the master-
cause of racism, and attributes them to industrialized, urban modernity. If, as 
Baldwin argues, “It must be remembered that the oppressed and the oppres-
sor are bound together within the same society; that they accept the same cri-
teria, they share the same beliefs, they both alike depend on the same reality” 
(17), he is quite specific in identifying which society and which beliefs they 
share. It is, he argues, “our glittering, mechanical, inescapable civilization 
which has put to death our freedom” (15):
We have, as it seems to me, in this most mechanical and interlocking of civi-
lizations, attempted to lop this creature [the Human] down to the status of a 
time-saving invention. He is not, after all, already a member of a Society or 
a Group or a deplorable conundrum to be explained by Science. He is—and 
how old-fashioned the words sound!—something more than that, something 
resolutely indefinable, unpredictable. In overlooking, denying, evading his 
complexity—which is nothing more than the disquieting complexity of our-
selves—we are diminished and we perish; only within this web of ambiguity, 
paradox, this hunger, danger, darkness, can we find at once ourselves and the 
power that will free us from ourselves. (12–13)
The impetus to reduce a complex and ambiguous creature to a finite set of 
traits is one that is not only shared by the racist, the homophobe, and the 
protest novelist, but one which is at the root of a mechanized, positivist, 
industrial economy. As a result, the naturalist, realist protest novel is generi-
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cally anathema to the project of true protest. “What is today parroted as [the 
novelist’s] Responsibility,” Baldwin observes,
which seems to me to mean that he must make the formal declaration that he 
is involved in, and affected by, the lives of other people and to say something 
improving about this somewhat self-evident fact—is, when he believes it, 
his corruption and our loss; moreover, it is rooted in, interlocked with, and 
intensifies this same mechanization. (13)
Baldwin’s decidedly political solution to the problem of the naturalist protest 
novel, then, is one of form rather than of content. As he argues later in the 
essay,
One is told to put first things first, the good of society coming before nice-
ties of style or characterization. Even if this were incontestable—for what 
exactly is the “good” of society?—it argues an insuperable confusion, since 
literature and sociology are not one and the same; it is impossible to discuss 
them as if they were. (15)
To reject the oppressor’s mechanistic reality—“his terror of the human being” 
and “determination to cut him down to size” (13)—means for Baldwin to 
draw upon what is unique to literary language and to exploit its resources of 
paradox, ambiguity, and obscurity in order to challenge that reality’s most 
fundamental assumptions. In other words, it means to write in the difficult, 
inscrutable mode so strongly critiqued in Book Three of Another Country: 
modernism.
 To endorse an aesthetic of “ambiguity” and “paradox” in the year 
1949 was not, of course, to go out on a very precarious limb, nor was it 
to endorse a peculiar conception of modernism. Indeed, coming at the end 
of the decade in which critics such as John Crowe Ransom, Robert Penn 
Warren, and Allen Tate carried out a somewhat hostile takeover of Ameri-
can English departments, Baldwin’s prescriptions read almost as doctrinaire 
New Criticism. But while the New Criticism—whose methods are most 
often seen as deliberately apolitical, ahistorical, and conservative—would 
seem to make strange bedfellows with a black gay writer who, despite his 
rejection of the naturalist protest novel, nevertheless did so from genuine 
political motivation, there is nonetheless much commonality of purpose 
between them. Though it is often forgotten, the New Criticism in fact began 
as a political movement. All three of these New Critics—Ransom, Warren, 
and Tate—were committed Southern Agrarians, and each had published an 
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article in the 1930 manifesto I’ll Take My Stand. As that collection’s intro-
duction states, the book’s purpose was to “support a Southern way of life 
against what may be called the American or prevailing way,” and its argu-
ment was predicated on the simple opposition “Agrarian versus Industrial” 
(ix). Believing, as Baldwin did, that scientific rationalism and industrial cap-
italism were to blame for an increasingly mechanized and dehumanizing 
modern society, the Agrarians argued for a return to a pre-capitalist, farm-
based economy. As the introduction to I’ll Take My Stand makes clear, their 
appeal was directly political: “If a community, or a section, or a race, or an 
age, is groaning under industrialism, and well aware that it is an evil dispen-
sation, it must find a way to throw it off. To think that this cannot be done 
is pusillanimous” (xx). Not succeeding in their efforts to elect agrarian sena-
tors and representatives, however—and reluctant to be charged with pusilla-
nimity—Ransom, Warren, and Tate decided upon a different strategy rooted 
in literary criticism.
 The three-point hermeneutic program laid out in the prefatory “Letter to 
the Teacher” from the New Critics’ 1938 polemical textbook Understanding 
Poetry stands as an unlikely call to arms:
1. Emphasis should be kept on the poem as a poem.
2. The treatment should always be concrete and inductive.
3.  A poem should always be treated as an organic system of relationships, 
and the poetic quality should never be understood as inhering in one or 
more factors taken in isolation. (Brooks and Warren, ix)
While precepts such as these have generally been taken—and indeed have 
functioned in practice—as conservative, apolitical, and ahistorical, recent 
criticism such as Mark Jancovich’s The Cultural Politics of New Criticism 
has worked to recover the genuinely subversive intentions behind them. For 
readers like Jancovich, the insistence of the New Critical methodology that 
attention be focused on the language of a poem could be seen as “radical” 
because the New Critics believed that poetic language—ironic, paradoxi-
cal, ambiguous, not resolvable to any scientific or mechanical “truth,” and 
thus “organic”—presented an implicit challenge to the rationalistic bases of 
the capitalist economy. As Allen Tate argued in his 1940 essay “The Present 
Function of Criticism,” literary criticism as it was being practiced—in his 
arguably reductive account, historical scholarship and source-hunting which 
paid little attention to the language of poetry itself—was complicit in the 
industrial economy:
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These attitudes of scholarship are the attitudes of the haute bourgeoisie that 
support it in the great universities; it is now commonplace to observe that 
the uncreative money culture of modern times tolerates the historical routine 
of the scholars. The routine is “safe,” and it shares with the predatory social 
process at large a naturalistic basis. (201–2)
The New Critics were thus drawn to the difficult, fragmentary, arguably anti-
rational work of the modernists, which in their reading of it became delib-
erately and radically anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, and thus paradoxically 
anti-modern. As Tate argued in another essay, “Modern Poetry,” such work 
“resisted the strong political pressures which ask the poet to ‘communicate’ 
to passively conditioned persons what a servile society expects them to feel”; 
and by expressing itself in “rhythms and insights that one has not already 
heard and known” (217), it promoted an ambiguity- and paradox-attuned 
“mode of perception” in the reader that served as prophylactic against the 
mechanistic, black-and-white world view of capitalism. To a writer like Bald-
win interested in challenging the epistemological underpinnings of racism and 
homophobia, New Critical modernism thus represented a surprisingly coher-
ent political strategy.
 Of course, there were a number of serious problems with Baldwin’s 
espousal of a New Critical aesthetic. For all their shared opposition to indus-
trial capitalism, the interests of a black gay city-dweller and a group of 
Southern Agrarians were bound to diverge. A particularly salient point of 
departure was that the pre-capitalist society to which the New Critics hoped 
to return America was substantially identical with the slave-based economy 
of the Old South. I’ll Take My Stand indeed included a defense of racial 
segregation, Robert Penn Warren’s “The Briar Patch,” and laments such as 
Frank Lawrence Owsley’s that abolition and the attendant “loss of nearly 
$2,000,000,000 invested in slaves” turned the South ruinously over to “the 
three millions of former slaves, some of whom could still remember the taste 
of human flesh” (62).3 As might be expected, then, there was vigorous oppo-
sition to New Critical modernism as a politically viable black aesthetic during 
the Civil Rights era, and this opposition was based heavily on its perceived 
racism. In his 1963 “Black Boys and Native Sons,” for example, Irving Howe 
cast Baldwin’s rejection of naturalism as both premature and immature. In 
the context of arguing that Another Country represented a return to natural-
ism, he argued that between 1949 and 1962 “Baldwin [had lived] through 
some of the experiences that had goaded Richard Wright into rage and driven 
him into exile” (100). This maturation process, Howe argued, produced a 
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realization that “to write simply about ‘Negro experience’ with the aesthetic 
distance urged by the critics of the fifties, [was] a psychological impossibility, 
for plight and protest [were] inseparable from that experience” (114). It was 
not Baldwin himself but Ralph Ellison, however, who received the harshest 
attacks for his perceived complicity with New Criticism. Howe, for example, 
called Ellison “‘literary’ to a fault” (112). In a 1970 article in Black World, 
Ernest Kaiser, noting the Southern and racist origins of Ellison’s adoptive 
movement and characterizing its practitioners as “art for art’s sakers in the 
extreme” (1), said “the creative writing called for by the New Critics” was 
“unemotional, uncommitted and uninvolved in the people’s problems” (1). 
It thus failed utterly, he argued, in its putative anti-capitalist program: “It 
is the antithesis,” he said, “of progressive writing and art committed to and 
concerned with the people’s problems and struggles” (1). Written in this cold, 
apolitical mode, Invisible Man stood for Kaiser as a “nightmarish, escap-
ist; surreal, non-social protest, existential novel” (2). As Addison Gayle, Jr., 
noted in the introduction to his 1971 collection The Black Aesthetic, “A criti-
cal methodology has no relevance to the black community unless it aids men 
in becoming better than they are”: “such an element,” he concluded, “has 
been sorely lacking in the critical canons handed down from the academies 
by the Aristotelian Critics, the Practical Critics and Formalist Critics, and the 
New Critics.” By the time of his 1975 The Way of the New World, Gayle 
called the formalism of New Criticism a strategy for eviscerating the subver-
sive content of black art. “To evaluate the life and culture of black people,” 
he wrote,
it is necessary that one live the black experience in a world where substance 
is more important than form, where the social takes precedence over the aes-
thetic, where each act, gesture, and movement is political, and where contin-
ual rebellion separates the robot from the revolutionary. (Qtd. in Gates, 65)
Gayle’s statement stands as evidence of the vanished credibility by the mid-
seventies of Baldwin’s 1949 belief in the inseparability of aesthetics, form, 
and social change.
 Baldwin’s own rejection of New Critical modernism in Book Three of 
Another Country, however, is based upon a different element. It is neither 
the racism of the New Criticism nor the perceived conflict between formal-
ism and black emancipation that he attacks in the MoMA scene, but rather 
the New Criticism’s anti-urban bias. The Southern Agrarian opposition to 
industrialism, to science, to machines, and to “progress” itself, was, one must 
remember, also an opposition to the spatial locus of these modern ills: the 
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city. As John Crowe Ransom made clear in his contribution to I’ll Take My 
Stand, “Reconstructed but Unregenerate,” that volume’s “Agrarian versus 
Industrial” opposition could also be written as “Rural versus Urban.” Look-
ing to the South itself, he charged its cities with complicity with “American,” 
as opposed to “Southern,” values and located defiance in the countryside: 
“The urban South, with its heavy importation of regular American ways and 
regular American citizens, has nearly capitulated to [industrial] novelties. It is 
the village South and the rural South which supply the resistance” (20). Call-
ing his fellow Southerners to armed violent conflict against Northern forces, 
he maintained that “it will be well to seize upon and advertise certain North-
ern industrial communities as horrible examples of life we detest—not failing 
to point out the human catastrophe which occurs when a Southern village 
or rural community becomes the cheap labor of a miserable factory system” 
(23).
 As he formulated it in his appeal to conservatives all across the nation 
to rise up against the encroaching catastrophe of industrialism, “The unify-
ing effective bond between these geographically diverse elements of public 
opinion will be the clean-cut policy that the rural life of America must be 
defended, and the world made safe for the farmers” (25). As Ransom made 
emphatically clear in these passages, the New Critical critique of industrial 
capitalism exhibited and reflected a spatial as well as racial bias. It could dis-
miss modernity and its metropolitan centre because its analysis was carried 
out from the putatively pure, pastoral, agrarian South. But while the New 
Critics had a distinct space from which to launch their attacks on New York, 
Baldwin, as a black Northern urban writer, was not only unlikely to see the 
Old South in the same nostalgic light as they were, but also actually lived in 
the city against which they railed.
 Given the spatial problematic of the New Criticism, it is significant 
that Baldwin stages his rejection of modernism in the distinctive space of 
the museum. First, this is important because the institution which mediates 
between art and the public is denounced as forcefully as the art itself. Indeed, 
much as the New Critical appropriation of modernist art as anti-urban and 
anti-industrial became inseparable from the concept of “modernism” itself, 
so too in Baldwin’s rendering does the institutional container become indis-
tinguishable from the artwork it contains. Like the art that “blinds and 
dazzles” visitors to the museum, the museum itself is described as a “cold, 
dazzling place” (402); where the art “[stretches] endlessly and adoringly in 
on itself”; the museum exhibits a similar spatial mise-en-abîme, consisting of 
“a labyrinthine series of rooms” (402). In one of his most characteristically 
muscular examples of modernist prose, Baldwin writes that Cass and Eric
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continued their frightening promenade though the icy and angular jungle. 
The colors on the walls blared at them—like frozen music; he had the feel-
ing that these rooms would never cease folding in on each other, that this 
labyrinth was eternal. And a sorrow entered him for Cass stronger than any 
love he had ever felt for her. She stood as erect as a soldier, moving straight 
ahead, and no bigger, as they said in the South, than a minute. (404)
As abstract, unreadable, violent, and inescapable as the art on the walls, the 
museum also becomes here a figure of political disinterest and stagnation. 
Converting all movement and rhythm into stasis—both the “frozen music” 
of the exhibited artwork and the spatializing clichés of Eric’s language (“no 
bigger than a minute”)—the only action the museum permits is that of the 
vortex, slowly spiraling and folding in on itself.
 Forming this synecdochial relationship with the art it contains, the 
MoMA is significant secondly because it provides an entry into the twenti-
eth-century debate about the proper role of the museum in relation to the 
industrial city. In Museums and American Cultural Life, Stephen Conn reads 
the “extraordinary institution building” that characterized the period 1876–
1926 as responding to the same twin impetuses as those of the New Criti-
cism: “Americans erected imposing edifices of many kinds,” he writes, “At 
one level a part of,” and “at another a reaction to the dislocation brought 
about by rapid industrialization and urbanization” (9). In his analysis of the 
art museum in particular, Conn reads Philadelphia’s Pennsylvania Museum 
against New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art as embodying a struggle 
between notably different visions of the museum’s role in reacting to urban-
ization. The Pennsylvania Museum, he argues, took after London’s South 
Kensington Museum and oriented itself as a school and a force for manag-
ing the rise of industry. Taking an active role in the city’s economy as both a 
laboratory for the improvement of industrial design and “a place where all 
city residents . . . might learn lessons to be put later to productive use” (203), 
the museum was for Philadelphians “an indirect way to increase the value 
of industrial production in the city’s factories” (200). The Met, on the other 
hand, was modeled on the Louvre, and was characterized by its paradoxical 
rejection of industry and the urban. Though linked to the industrial economy 
by the vast fortunes of its founders and donors, and though complicit in 
promoting a “culture of acquisitiveness” through its department-store-like 
displays of treasured objects, Conn argues that the Met positioned itself as a 
“place of ritual” set apart from the forces of mechanical reproduction: “the 
objects inside continued to retain their ‘aura’” (194). The Met-style rejection 
of modernity, Conn argues, won out over the Pennsylvania Museum’s efforts 
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to deal positively with it: “The ‘losers’ . . . were those who envisioned a dif-
ferent kind of art museum, one . . . which would be not merely a cultural 
antidote to the vulgar materialism of the late-nineteenth-century world, but 
an uplifting part of that world” (193). Like the New Criticism that voiced 
its polemic against industrial capitalism from the perspective of the South, 
the art museum in New York construed itself as a space detached from and 
opposing the life of the city.
 In this context, the MoMA presents an interesting case, initially envision-
ing its role as one of involvement with the industrial economy but transform-
ing over time from a laboratory into an archive. Founded in November of 
1929—by no means a bright time for the modern economy—the MoMA 
nevertheless took its roles as those of “establishing and maintaining in the 
City of New York, a museum of modern art, encouraging and developing 
the study of modern arts and the application of said arts to manufacture and 
practical life, and furnishing popular instruction” (qtd. in Alexander, 69). For 
Hilton Kramer, this South Kensington–style mandate was best carried out by 
Alfred Hamilton Barr, first director of the MoMA. Under Barr’s influence, 
Kramer argues, “what governed the museum’s outlook from its earliest days 
was a vision that attempted to effect a kind of grand synthesis of modernist 
aestheticism and the technology of industrialism” (422). Influenced by the 
rejection of aesthetic hierarchies at the Bauhaus, where “a poster might be 
equal to a painting, a factory or a housing project as much to be esteemed as 
a great work of sculpture,” Barr nonetheless divorced this Bauhaus perspec-
tive from its radical politics. The “great success” of the Barr-directed MoMA, 
Kramer argues, was that “the aesthetic that originated at the Bauhaus and 
other avant-garde groups [was] stripped of its social ideology and turned 
into the reigning taste of the cultural marketplace” (422). For critics like 
Carol Duncan and Alan Wallach, this deliberate depoliticization made the 
MoMA complicit with “the ideology of late capitalism.” While such a policy 
engaged the museum in a relationship with the city and with industry, they 
argue, it was a relationship of simple submission, and the MoMA became “a 
monument to individualism, understood as subjective freedom” (485). As the 
“modern” art within its walls ceased to be “contemporary,” however, and 
came increasingly to represent an art-historical period, Kramer argues that 
the MoMA’s role was forced to change entirely. In 1984, the year in which 
Kramer wrote, the choice was between “MoMA as historical archive and 
MoMA as a living artistic force” (424). The MoMA’s only choice, Kramer 
argued, was to sever its direct productive engagement with the city and to 
adopt an outlook “of art-historical formalism”—effectively to sever the tie 
of its paintings to the contemporary world surrounding them, to detach the 
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signifier from the signified, to turn modernism into a historical and aesthetic 
phenomenon: to accept modernism, in the most pessimistic formulation, as a 
ruin.
 In Baldwin’s 1962 text, this severance of city from artwork is already well 
underway, though his presentation is somewhat contradictory. On the one 
hand, the space of the museum—cold, labyrinthine, self-enfolded—is criti-
cized as the apolitical and aloof, “sacred and sterile” (401), preserve of polite 
society. When Eric first steps into the MoMA, “The museum was crowded, 
full of the stale, Sunday museum stink, aggravated, now, by the damp. He 
came through the doors behind a great cloud of windy, rainy, broad-beamed 
ladies; and they formed, before him, a large, loud, rocking wall, as they 
shook their umbrellas and themselves and repeated to each other, in their tri-
umphant voices, how awful the weather was” (401).
 Employing once again the imagery established in Book Three’s opening 
dream sequence, in this passage Eric runs up against the barrier of triviality 
that separates the MoMA from its urban context. The lone force of transit 
between inside and out is the paradoxically “windy” wall of the “broad-
beamed ladies”: the undifferentiated mass of unthinking politeness which 
comes and goes, to pun on a favorite poem of the New Critics, talking of 
Picasso. On the other hand, Baldwin seems also to dismiss the MoMA as an 
institution too beholden to the mass public. The scene of the denunciation 
is set, after all, on a Sunday: the one day of the week that a factory worker 
would be able to visit an art gallery, and a day on which the Met agreed to 
open only after what came to be known as the “overalls controversy” (Conn, 
204). There is a distinct narratorial distaste, moreover, not only for the small 
crowd of the ladies, but also for the public at large, who “[move] in waves, 
like tourists in a foreign graveyard” with what Baldwin describes sarcasti-
cally as a “democratic gaiety” (402). When Eric finally manages to pass into 
the museum, it is paradoxically through the sinister interaction of these two 
competing forces: “People now came crushing in through the doors behind 
him, and their greater pressure spat him past the ladies” (401).
 Baldwin’s frustration, however, is not with the presence of the public in 
the MoMA—not with the fact that they’re looking at the art—but with the 
fact that it can mean nothing for them in this context. His concern is with the 
urban public’s blind acceptance of an aesthetic antipathetic to their interests:
Three young men and two young girls, scrubbed and milky, gleaming with 
their passion for improvement and the ease with which they moved among 
abstractions, were surrendering their tickets and passing through the barriers.  
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Others were on the steps, going down, coming up, stationary, peering at 
each other like half-blinded birds and setting up a hideous whirr, as of flying 
feathers and boastful wings. (401)
If the “improvement” they seek is more substantive than the “status” that 
draws the ladies to the MoMA, these young people have come to the wrong 
place. Already comfortable with the “abstractions” of modernist form, no 
longer faced with the shock of a contemporary phenomenon but rather in 
the presence of Kramer’s canonized “art-historical formalism,” the MoMA’s 
guests are reduced to the sort of mechanized slavery from which Baldwin in 
1949 believed modernism would save its audience: once inside the museum, 
they too become mindless puppets, following whatever pre-determined paths 
the MoMA’s hallways offer. If they sought an aesthetic capable of reaching 
beyond the museum’s walls and effecting positive change in the city, they 
get instead the despair of a modernism paradoxically displayed only to 
mourn and reject the urban. Showing herself an adept New Critical reader 
of modernism, Cass looks at the aforementioned “large and violent canvas 
in greens and reds and blacks” and tells Eric almost immediately, “I’m begin-
ning to think . . . that growing just means learning more and more about 
anguish. That poison becomes your diet” (405). In a passage that cannot 
escape the tint of meta-commentary, Cass responds wearily to Eric’s question, 
“You think that there isn’t any hope for us?”: “‘Hope?’ The word seemed to 
bang from wall to wall. ‘Hope? No, I don’t think there’s any hope. We’re too 
empty here’—her eyes took in the Sunday crowd—‘too empty—here’” (406). 
“Here,” amidst the claustrophobic echoes of the Museum of Modern Art, 
and “here,” in Baldwin’s modernism-denouncing-yet-modernist Book Three, 
modernism stages its own defeat.
 Again evincing complicity with the aesthetic it attacks, Another Country 
ends by enacting exactly that which it criticizes, producing a bitterly ironic 
New Critical modernist representation of the city. The final chapter of Book 
Three and of Another Country begins with Yves’s airplane approaching New 
York:
The sun struck, on steel, on bronze, on stone, on glass, on the gray water 
far beneath them, on the turret tops and flashing windshields of crawling 
cars, on the incredible highways, stretching and snarling and turning for mile 
upon mile upon mile, on the houses, square and high, low and gabled, and 
on their howling antennae, on the sparse, weak trees, and on those towers, 
in the distance, of the city of New York. (432)
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The insistent alliterations on harsh “s” and “z” sounds (“sun,” “struck,” 
“steel,” “bronze,” “stone,” “glass”) combined with the passage’s hard, cold, 
and sharp imagery of “steel,” “turret tops,” “flashing windshields,” and 
“howling antennae,” produce a tableau as verbally violent and alienating 
as the most garish abstract canvas. The city’s “incredible highways,” which 
stretch vortex-like “snarling and turning for mile upon mile upon mile,” baf-
fle the comprehension. From the air, the city is an abstraction, populated not 
by people but by anthropomorphized metonyms: “crawling cars.” Fittingly, 
then, Another Country, a book that succeeds in identifying the problem with 
its own aesthetic mode but remains powerless to address it, concludes on a 
note of resigned and indignant sarcasm: “and he,” the innocent and unknow-
ing foreigner Yves, “strode through the barriers, more high-hearted than he 
had even been as a child, into that city which the people from heaven had 
made their home” (436).
Notes
 1. “The life of our city is rich in poetic and marvellous subjects. We are enveloped and 
steeped as though in an atmosphere of the marvellous; but we do not notice it” (The Mir-
ror of Art, 129).
 2. “The painter, the true painter for whom we are looking, will be he who can snatch 
its epic quality from the life of today and make us see and understand, with brush or with 
pencil, how great and poetic we are in our cravats and our patent-leather boots” (The Mir-
ror of Art, 38).
 3. David A. Davis in “Climbing Out of ‘The Briar Patch’: Robert Penn Warren and 
the Divided Conscience of Segregation” places the article in relation to Warren’s later repu-
diation of his support for segregation and active involvement in civil rights activism. He 
offers the somewhat pat conclusion, “As a young man, Warren fell victim to misplaced val-
ues, but he eventually found the vision and the courage to face his heritage and the public 
and to overcome the split in his own conscience” (120).
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Legacy and Future Directions
P A r t  I I I

ThIs secTIon of the volume features essays that, together with the Epi-logue, meditate on how we might draw upon the New Criticism with the 
benefit of hindsight—as body of theory, repertoire of critical practices, and 
cultural development—toward future work in literary studies and neighbor-
ing fields. As Cecily Devereux’s essay underscores, “close reading” is now 
widely invoked by diverse commentators from different sectors of literary 
studies as what we need to revive toward a strengthening of disciplinary 
identity, health, rigor, value, and continuation. Many advocating renewed 
emphasis on close reading concomitantly espouse a renaissance of attention 
to literary form. Others urging a return to close reading, such as Jane Gal-
lop, choose not to accent “formalism” per se. According to Gallop, what 
we read when we close read is “what the text actually says,” whether we 
attend to form or otherwise. In this volume, Tara Lockhart’s essay addresses 
how careful historical engagement with how the New Critics themselves 
developed pedagogical methods for teaching close reading can enrich current 
approaches for the classroom.
 A second related legacy of the New Critics is the theoretical attention 
they devoted to defining the specifically “literary” dimension of texts, critical 
engagement with which required, in their view, a disciplinary-specific critical 
lexicon and range of techniques. As Devereux notes, we need to reflect again 
on how to distinguish “literary studies” from such adjoining fields as history, 
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sociology, and philosophy—much as Ransom and his compatriots did in the 
1930s.
 Alexander MacLeod’s extensive rereading of the evolving careers of sev-
eral prominent New Critics models yet another way of considering the legacy 
of the New Criticism. MacLeod addresses how the New Critics, before they 
were established as such, theorized regionalism with a subtlety and sophis-
tication that anticipates the work of contemporary geographers such as 
Edward Soja, and from which theorists today might learn. MacLeod’s exam-
ple gestures toward the possibility of recovering little-acknowledged dimen-
sions of the work of New Critics such as Ransom and Warren, apart from 
their literary criticism and theory per se, and finding in them ways to speak to 
contemporary theory, both within and beyond literary studies.
 While stressing the importance of not discarding valuable legacies of the 
New Criticism, Devereux also emphasizes the importance of remaining mind-
ful of the question of how to uncouple New Critical techniques and theories 
from the suspect political projects and institutional practices with which they 
came to be associated—which subsequent generations of literary academics 
have rightly challenged. The essays of this volume aim to provide readings of 
the New Criticism that can contribute to this effort to parse the phenomenon 
of the New Criticism into its various dimensions, understand different vec-
tors of its cultural politics, and make decisions about what to preserve, leave 
behind, or adapt for contemporary practice.
Transition and the Individual Talent
In May of 1939, Allen Tate sent an awkward letter to his long-time friend 
and colleague, Donald Davidson. “Alas, it is not a rumour,” Tate opens, “I 
have accepted the Princeton offer” (Fain and Young, 319). As he delivers this 
difficult message, Tate struggles throughout his letter to convince Davidson 
that his reasons for taking the new, higher-profile job have nothing to do 
with Princeton’s prestige, its northeastern location, or the more generous sal-
ary he will be earning. Instead, he focuses on the working conditions avail-
able at the Ivy League institution. The Princeton job will be in the creative 
arts program, rather than the regular English department, and the position 
has been specifically designed for “the writer as writer” (320). It is an oppor-
tunity Tate cannot refuse. He tells Davidson that he has always seen himself 
as a “special man in the academic system” and that at Princeton he will, at 
last, be “used in (his) special capacity” (320).
 Although, then as now, most academics would likely consider Tate’s 
move to Princeton as a step up the professional ladder from his former teach-
ing position at the Women’s College of North Carolina in Greensboro, Tate 
knows the timing of his decision will trigger a political firestorm in the tightly 
knit community of Southern arts and letters that he and his friends helped to 
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“hear the gossip” accusing him of “selling out” to “Yankee Money” and that 
he is well aware that his individual choice to leave the South will be seen as 
part of a much larger, more troubling pattern of intellectual outmigration, a 
1930s Southern brain-drain, during which many of the leading literary art-
ists and scholars left the region behind to further their careers in other places 
(320). Robert Penn Warren, the youngest key contributor to Vanderbilt’s 
celebrated literary journal The Fugitive, left Nashville immediately after his 
graduation and followed his studies from Berkeley to Yale before accepting 
a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford in 1930. He returned to Nashville in 1931 
for a brief but disastrous limited-term teaching appointment in the Vander-
bilt English Department, then left the city for good in 1934. More dramati-
cally, John Crowe Ransom (Tate and Warren’s creative mentor and their most 
influential professor at Vanderbilt) terminated his twenty-three year tenure at 
the school in 1937 and made his infamous move to Kenyon College in Gam-
bier, Ohio. Just months before Tate delivered his news, Lyle Lanier, another 
of the important contributors to the Agrarian manifesto, I’ll Take My Stand 
(1930), announced that he too was leaving Vanderbilt to take a better paying 
job as the chair of the Department of Psychology at Vassar College in Pough-
keepsie, New York. Although Tate is certainly aware of all these departures, 
and of his own shifting status within his home region, he feels compelled to 
restate his passionate support for the South even as he leaves it behind. “I 
would rather be at Chapel Hill than Princeton,” he tells Davidson, and “[i]f 
a southern institution ever makes me a similar proposition, even with less 
money, I will take the first train South” (320).
 As this letter demonstrates, there is an obvious tension developing during 
this phase of Tate’s career between his desire to project and protect a “spe-
cial” status for his literary work and his complex, often confused feelings of 
loyalty toward Davidson, the Fugitive-Agrarian movement, and the South as 
a whole. Like his friends, Ransom and Warren, Tate struggled throughout 
his writing life to reconcile his divergent intellectual commitments, and all 
three men wrestled with a range of often contradictory personal, political, 
and aesthetic concerns. Caught between the history of their home region and 
the future of literary criticism, Ransom, Warren, and Tate were forced con-
tinually to weigh and rebalance their regionalist convictions and their theo-
retical ambitions. As their reputations expanded through local, national, and 
international circles, they faced many of the same challenging questions that 
continue to circulate in regionalist literary criticism today: Was it possible, or 
preferable, to be a thoughtful literary scholar while simultaneously maintain-
ing an authentic regional identity? How (or where) did cultural geography 
and literary theory intersect? Could any worthwhile critic ever be fully com-
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mitted to “literary” and “regional” values at the same time? Where did these 
two terms meet? How did they come together? What would a true “Southern 
Intellectual” look like or do?
 These familiar but conflicted classifications—the literary and the 
regional—have provided generations of scholars with a useful shorthand 
to describe two different historical phases in the theoretical development of 
Ransom, Warren and Tate, as well as two very large, but very different bib-
liographies of critical work that have developed in response to the group’s 
contributions in each of these areas. For one set of scholars, Ransom, War-
ren, and Tate are read as canonical figures of mid-twentieth-century liter-
ary theory and criticism, best known for the widely influential and often 
controversial aesthetic arguments they advanced primarily in the years after 
they moved away from Nashville. When most experts address the relative 
strengths or weaknesses of “The New Critics” and evaluate the signature 
pedagogical methodologies of this school, they are usually referring, at least 
in part, to this trio of thinkers and to works they published after 1941, the 
year that Ransom’s volume, The New Criticism, officially gave the movement 
its name.1
 At the other extreme, a second collection of scholars, interested in South-
ern regionalism and the historical development of the Southern literary 
canon, interpret Ransom, Warren, and Tate in a different way. Although this 
group is smaller than the former group, its members have been more prolific, 
and, revealingly, the essays, reviews, and critical volumes they have produced 
mention the New Criticism only tangentially and rarely devote significant 
attention to works Ransom, Warren, and Tate published after 1941. Instead, 
they expand the famed trio into a quartet and normally include Davidson in 
discussion of the work the group produced between 1922 and 1939.2 For 
them, The New Critics are not nearly as interesting as “The Fugitives,” or 
“The Southern Agrarians,” and though all three groups—The Fugitives, The 
Agrarians, and The New Critics—were dominated by the same key mem-
bers, for those committed to regionalist analyses, Ransom, Warren, Tate, and 
Davidson are celebrated more for the roles they played in ushering in “The 
Southern Renaissance” than for the national and international revolution in 
literary criticism they effected in their later lives.3
 In this essay, I bring these two streams of critical dialogue into closer 
contact with each other. Specifically, I focus on the key period before the 
Agrarian movement ended and the New Criticism began—when the oppos-
ing intellectual commitments of Ransom, Warren, Tate, and Davidson were 
held in a temporary interdependence and the group actively dedicated itself 
to the production of a new model for regionalist literary theory that might 
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somehow blend the core strengths of these two traditionally separate dis-
cursive positions. Although several commentators have already paid con-
siderable attention to this shift from Agrarianism to the New Criticism, the 
reasons and motivations behind the transition remain difficult to identify, and 
we continue to lack a satisfying critical narrative that might explain exactly 
how and why Ransom, Warren, and Tate moved so quickly from the messy, 
overtly political, social, and cultural arguments they endorsed in I’ll Take My 
Stand in 1930 to become, only ten years later, the key members of a literary 
movement which, according to some scholars, “eschewed sociology and poli-
tics altogether” in an effort to isolate the literary work from any contaminat-
ing contact with the real world (Spikes, 7).4 This drastic swing from one form 
of extreme social and political engagement to another equally extreme form 
of separation certainly re-charted the course of literary theory in mid-twenti-
eth-century North American literature—and it unquestionably contributed to 
the dominant misreadings of the New Criticism which continue to circulate 
in the academy today. As I hope to demonstrate, however, the pure literary 
ambitions of the New Critics and the messy political regionalist loyalties of 
the Agrarians were never quite so easy to separate.
 The Fugitive-Agrarians’ quest for an alternative version of regional-
ist discourse—a new, more theoretically advanced model that might better 
understand, interrogate, and articulate the complex relationship between a 
literary work and the real-world social spaces it both creates and represents—
pushed this group of friends to their social and intellectual limits. The search 
opened bitter divisions which would never completely close between David-
son and his former colleagues, and it ignited several long-burning personal 
feuds within the group. Although the death of Agrarianism may not have led 
directly to the near simultaneous birth of the New Criticism, the end of one 
movement and the beginning of the other were not unrelated; and the transi-
tion from aggressive political action to contemplative literary criticism can 
be traced back to the group’s passionate and seemingly irresolvable debates 
over the true nature, purpose, and possibilities of regionalist theory. In the 
1920s and1930s, Ransom, Warren, Tate, and Davidson wrestled with the 
same questions that continue to haunt regionalist criticism today: Was liter-
ary regionalism simply a form of patriotism in disguise? Did it demand and 
require a blind loyalty to the home place? Were Southern critics expected or 
forced to appreciate Southern writing simply because both came from the 
same place? Or could regionalism be theorized in different ways? Rather than 
simply replicating a stable social reality and mimetically representing a fixed 
geographical place, was it possible that regionalist discourse might be pow-
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ered by a different kind of motivation and that, instead of reproducing partic-
ular places, it might actively explore the broader social, political, and cultural 
forces that combined to produce any type of social space?
 If we follow the key exchanges of this debate through selected essays, 
letters and reviews produced by Ransom, Warren, Tate, and Davidson dur-
ing this period, we can begin to appreciate how advanced their version of 
regionalist discourse actually was and thus better understand the daunting 
challenge it presented within the group. The subtlety of the New Critics’ old 
regionalism has never received the attention it merits because the group’s 
brief commitment in this area is sandwiched between the more fervently 
patriotic work of their collective Agrarian pasts and the fame of their New 
Critical futures. Caught in a destabilized cultural geography where different 
politically charged readings of literature, history, economics and sociology 
were all actively competing to redefine the South, Ransom, Warren and Tate 
grappled with difficult arguments relating to the discursive flexibility of social 
space that were far ahead of their time, and they anticipated some of the key 
insights that currently enliven cutting-edge, twenty-first-century debates on 
the spatialization of critical theory. Though they seem like strange bedfellows 
and improbable allies, it turns out that the conservative, anti-industrial argu-
ments Ransom and his colleagues developed as Agrarians in the 1930s share 
much with some of today’s most widely read analyses of North America’s 
postindustrial (and even postmodern) cultural geography.
Patriots vs. Theorists: 
The Struggle for a Philosophical Regionalism
Anyone familiar with the early careers of Ransom, Warren, Tate, and David-
son will know that this group never felt completely comfortable locating their 
work within the restrictive confines of traditional Southern culture. It was, 
in fact, a collective hostility toward the Romantic stereotypes of Southern 
identity that had brought them together in the first place, initially for their 
informal discussion soirées at Sidney Mittron Hirsch’s apartment and later 
for their more formalized work as the editors and recurring contributors to 
The Fugitive from 1922 to 1925. The early anti-regionalist sentiments of the 
group were easy to identify, not only from the escapist title they chose for 
their journal, but also in the aggressive editorial foreword which ran in the 
first issue in April 1922. Readers coming to The Fugitive for the first time 
quickly learned that this was a magazine on the run from “the high-caste 
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Brahmins of the Old South” and that its contributors strongly believed that 
“the literary phase known rather euphemistically as Southern literature (had) 
expired” (Cowan, 48).
 The Fugitive’s highly stylized flight from the old South was, of course, 
also a journey toward an alternative set of modern European influences, and 
it is important to note that the literary inspiration which helped usher in the 
Southern Renaissance originated not in the South itself, but in literary sources 
far beyond the rather narrow borders of the region. Even at those earliest 
stages—Warren and Tate were only undergraduate teenagers during their first 
Fugitive years—it was clear that the relationship between the region they 
inhabited and the type of literature the Fugitives produced and promoted 
could never be adequately explained by the mechanistic sociology of environ-
mental determinism and its axiom that “the place makes the poet.” As the 
very public squabbles between Ransom and Tate clearly demonstrated, the 
Fugitives of the mid 1920s were anything but traditional regionalists: these 
scholars were more interested in passionately debating the merits and weak-
nesses of T. S. Eliot’s newly published poem, The Waste Land, than they were 
in mimetically capturing an image of the “real” South (O’Gorman, 289).
 During the key years of The Fugitive, Ransom, Warren, Tate, and David-
son were so focused on their literary activities that it took the infamous 1925 
Scopes Monkey Trial in Dayton, Tennessee—and the controversy that swirled 
around that courtroom—to drag them away from their elevated aesthetic 
pursuits and back down to the earthy, blood-feud battles of sectionalist poli-
tics. With newspapers across the country and around the world running sto-
ries about the intellectually backwards South, its crippled civilization, corrupt 
history, inescapable racism and blinkered, anti-evolutionary Christian fun-
damentalism, the Fugitives felt an acute need to strike back against this por-
trayal and promote their own alternative reading of their home place. Years 
earlier, H. L Mencken’s widely read 1917 New York Evening Mail essay, 
“The Sahara of the Bozart” had mocked even the South’s capacity to pro-
nounce the words “Beaux Arts” and described the former confederacy as 
a “stupendous region of worn-out farms, shoddy cities and paralyzed cere-
brums” (157). Mencken even comically suggested that in the early twentieth 
century, a true Southern poet would be as hard to find as “an oboe player, a 
dry-point etcher or a metaphysician” and proposed that contemplating the 
vast intellectual “vacuity” of the South forced one to think of “interstellar 
spaces” and the “colossal reaches of the now mythical ether” (157). For the 
Fugitives, a group that so openly prided themselves on their refined tastes 
and their elite appreciations, such insults were particularly irritating and 
demanded some kind of response.
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 In a letter to Davidson, written in March of 1927, Tate formally cast off 
the disinterested persona of the literary critic and initiated the group’s region-
alist resurgence: “I’ve attacked the South for the last time,” he declared (Fain 
and Young, 191). Davidson enthusiastically encouraged Tate’s rising patriotic 
passion, and both felt the need to re-contextualize their intellectual work and 
rededicate themselves to the Southern cause. Davidson had always been the 
most vitriolic partisan and the most conservative traditionalist in the group, 
and in later years the dangerous racist and paternalistic underpinnings of 
his thought would emerge and eventually come to dominate his readings of 
regionalist discourse. His arguments, some of them collected in his 1957 vol-
ume, Still Rebels, Still Yankees, re-entrenched the most essentialist patriotic 
readings of regionalism and served almost as the unavoidable antithesis of 
the more nuanced theoretical work that Ransom, Warren, and Tate were try-
ing to produce. Throughout his career, Davidson was undoubtedly the most 
polarizing figure in the group; and in some ways, Ransom, Warren, and Tate’s 
migrations away from Nashville in the 1930s can be interpreted as symptom-
atic of their more fundamental intellectual movement away from Davidson’s 
way of thinking about regionalist discourse.
 In 1927, however, before the gaping divisions within the group became 
impossible to ignore, there was still enough common ground for the friends 
to share, and though they bickered continuously amongst themselves, it was 
easy enough for the Fugitives to direct passionate anger outward against a 
common foe. In responding to Tate in May of 1927, Davidson fumed that 
the “progressive” politics of journals like The New South made him “sick 
with black vomit and malignant agues,” and that he was “too mad to die just 
yet, and ichin’ for a fight” (Fain and Young, 201). Even the normally more 
reserved Ransom, the self-appointed philosopher of the group and the most 
theoretically focused member of both the Fugitive and the Agrarian move-
ments, was caught up in this wave of patriotic fervor and openly wondered 
how his introductory “Statement of Principles” for I’ll Take My Stand might 
“properly indoctrinate” enough writers to make the Agrarian project a suc-
cess (Young and Core, 189). In less than one year, the group quickly dis-
avowed their once passionate attacks on the old-fashioned romantic values 
of the South and distanced themselves from their former roles as moderately 
avant-garde Fugitive poet/critics. The newly minted Agrarians emerged as 
a militantly conservative group of pseudo-social theorists committed to a 
defense of the South’s traditional plantation economy, a critique of Yankee 
arrogance and influence, and, most importantly, an all-out assault on mod-
ern America’s infatuation with scientific positivism and industrial progress. 
As Agrarians, the Fugitives abandoned their former aversion to Southern 
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stereotypes and instead took full rhetorical advantage of the regionalist cli-
chés they once mocked. The Agrarians’ first symposium took its controversial 
title from the lyrics of “Dixie,” the near-national anthem of the confederacy, 
and when I’ll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition appeared 
in 1930, its contributors identified themselves not as individual authors but 
rather as a solid patriotic collective of “Twelve Southerners.”
 Though the quality of writing in I’ll Take My Stand wavers dramatically, 
and the longed-for Agrarian revolution ended ultimately in failure, the sym-
posium itself has been recognized as one of the most important texts in the 
cultural and political history of the South (Grammer, 127). As John Shelton 
Reed observes, “whatever else it may be, I’ll Take My Stand is a very south-
ern book” (43). Freely intermingling aesthetic, sociological, religious, his-
torical, and economic concerns, the Agrarians argued that a clear, regional 
distinction could be drawn between “a Southern way of life” and the scien-
tific abstraction that characterized the “American or prevailing way” of life 
(xxxvii). In almost every essay, the Twelve Southerners criticized the abstract-
ing tendencies of positivist philosophy and they stormed against the “Cult of 
Science” and the “uncritical” dominance of “industrial logic” in American 
life (xxxix–xl). Rather than endorsing the bland nationalist generalizations 
that promised a single coherent but conformist American identity stretching 
from sea to sea, the Agrarians, explicitly locating their claims always in the 
Southern context, argued for a more diverse understanding of the country’s 
cultural geography and suggested that such a diversity needed to be protected 
from the homogenizing forces of the “American industrial ideal” (xxxviii).
 Despite its perceptive critique of industrialism, I’ll Take My Stand is still a 
product of its time and should be interpreted as a deeply flawed text, scarred 
by the divisive politics and the systemic prejudice of a troubled period in 
the history of the South. For Warren in particular, the symposium—domi-
nated by its conservative “backward” look, racism, paternalistic antebellum 
nostalgia, and near mystical embrace of the Southern landscape—was prob-
lematic from its very inception and, as the book moved toward completion, 
he became increasingly aware of the chasm that was opening up between 
his Southern loyalties and his broader literary consciousness. He detested 
the title “I’ll Take My Stand” and tried to suppress it, and he struggled to 
produce his contribution for the symposium, a controversial segregationist 
essay entitled “The Briar Patch” (Blotner, 113). When Davidson (the true, but 
often unacknowledged editor of the symposium) first read Warren’s essay, he 
was so angry he almost refused to publish the piece because he felt that the 
“‘progressive’ implications” of Warren’s work might “irritate and dismay the 
very Southern people to whom we are appealing” (Fain and Young, 251). In 
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later decades, as I’ll Take My Stand’s influence expanded and generations of 
Southern scholars organized special anniversary events to commemorate the 
volume’s publication, Warren, who later became a strong advocate for deseg-
regation and the Civil Rights movement, insisted that he be recognized only 
as a contributor to the symposium rather than as a true member of the Agrar-
ian movement (Blotner, 301–2, 344).
 Though I’ll Take My Stand raises many undeniable challenges and most 
contemporary critics would likely want to avoid any direct association with 
the symposium’s social or political arguments, the text should still be read as 
an essential document in North American literary history, especially for schol-
ars interested in literary regionalism, socio-spatial theory and cultural geog-
raphy. The volume’s introductory “Statement of Principles” is particularly 
significant because even as the essay seems to officially initiate the Agrarian 
movement, it also provides a fascinating glimpse into Ransom’s thinking dur-
ing this key interval and reveals the latent irresolvable theoretical tensions in 
his work that would eventually overwhelm his Agrarian politics and make his 
migration into the New Criticism almost unavoidable. At the time of its origi-
nal publication, the “Statement of Principles” appeared as an anonymous 
text designed by Ransom to function as a manifesto for the Agrarian move-
ment, “a test of faith” that would demand each of the Twelve Southerners be 
“committed equally to the cause” (Young and Core, 189). Today, however, 
with the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious that even in 1929 and 1930, 
Ransom’s broader theoretical ambitions were already making themselves felt 
in his political writings, making it difficult for him to endorse one-dimension-
ally patriotic readings of the South (189).
 The “Statement of Principles”—like so much of the regionalist criticism 
Ransom produced later and like so much of the regionalist work that contin-
ues to be produced today—struggles to reconcile the most brutal materialist 
conventions of traditional environmental determinist doctrines with a more 
fluid idealist reading of Southern cultural discourse. Ransom seems unsure 
if the “South” he is defending should be considered as a thing or an idea: 
an inert and objective “natural” geography that can be mimetically repro-
duced; or a discursively active ensemble of historical, political and socio-
logical forces. Even as he ploughs through his Agrarian call to arms, Ransom 
can never settle the issue and never comfortably rely on the stable natural-
ized option on which so much traditional regionalism is based. Though the 
“Statement” is designed as a political defense of Southern culture and though 
such a defense would normally require an appeal to nature and an argu-
ment in favor of a direct connection between that Southern culture, its Agrar-
ian economy and its natural environment, Ransom never once suggests that 
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such a linkage even exists. Instead his version of Agrarianism is framed very 
clearly as a set of principles, a discursive construction that actually has very 
little to do with the natural environment. His defense of the South’s right to 
live its own kind of life is based not on environmental determinism, but on 
his long-held belief in the ontological specificity of this particular social space 
and the clear ontological differences he sees between different types of Ameri-
can cultural geography. The “Statement” is essentially comparative and, at its 
most fundamental level, its defense of Agrarianism is also an explicit critique 
of Industrialism. For Ransom, this is a clear question of choice: Agrarian-
ism and Industrialism are read as two different discursive models of Amer-
ican cultural geography that create two dramatically different ontological 
experiences of social space. Because I’ll Take My Stand is designed as an 
antagonistic document, these two positions are never far from each other, 
and Ransom’s passionate argument in favor of Agrarianism functions simul-
taneously as one of the most explicit and aggressive anti-industrial statements 
ever recorded in early-twentieth-century American literature.
 In his influential chapter devoted to Ransom’s transition from his Fugitive 
past to his New Critical future, “The Critical Theory of Defensive Reaction,” 
John Fekete argues that the rise of the New Criticism should be interpreted as 
a kind of scholarly surrender or capitulation to the forces of industrial capi-
talism which forced the marginalized Southern critics to shed their former 
regional commitments before they could move into “a new social location as 
part of the new professional (academic) intelligentsia” (46). Fekete suggests 
that Ransom eventually reconciled his “escapist” Fugitive tendencies and his 
failed “Agrarian protest” into the “cultural apology” of the New Criticism 
(47). In a dense but fascinating analysis of Ransom’s intellectual migration 
through these three phases, Fekete observes:
The important point is that through his concerns with a traditional ontol-
ogy slipping away from him in the social economic, cultural and religious 
spheres, and through his search for a new ontology, Ransom is able to 
develop out of the internal dialectic of his own historical position outside 
and somewhat distanced from the society as a whole, the adequate cultural 
ideology for a social formation itself in transition of social ontology, of the 
basic forms of its life, of the production, reproduction, and communication 
of its world. (47)
Although many critics have suggested, following Fekete’s example, that Ran-
som’s regionalist writings (as well as his later New Critical formulations) 
were essentially and even primarily concerned with this conservative idea 
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of preserving a lost tradition that was “slipping away,” the essays he actu-
ally produced during this period suggest instead that Ransom’s version of 
regionalist theory shared very little with traditional models of the discourse–
as well as that his emphasis on shifting socio-spatial ontologies was actually 
far ahead of its time. In contemporary scholarship, for example, many influ-
ential voices associated with the “spatial turn” in critical theory—including 
thinkers as diverse as Edward Soja, David Harvey, Derek Gregory, Gillian 
Rose, and Doreen Massey—have argued that most of the readings of place 
on which we rely today need radically to reconsider exactly the type of “spa-
tialized ontology” Ransom first recognized in the 1920s and 1930s (Soja, 
Postmodern Geographies, 118).5 Soja, in particular, drawing much of his 
inspiration from Henri Lefebvre, has argued convincingly that the simultane-
ously “real-and-imagined” qualities of cultural geography have never been 
adequately theorized and that scholars in all fields of humanities research 
need to re-examine carefully their most basic assumptions about “the onto-
logical priority” of social space and the “essential connection between spati-
ality and being” (Postmodern Geographies, 119).
 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Ransom’s essays on regionalism were 
consistently focused on these kinds of questions; and his work continually 
drew connections between social space and ontology and interpreted the 
South as a discursive, intellectual construction. Throughout “Statement of 
Principles,” Ransom argues that if the South wishes to lay claim to its own 
unique experience of place, then the same, equally unique linkages between 
human cultures and the physical geographies they produce and inhabit must 
exist elsewhere throughout the country and around the world. Ransom rou-
tinely equates “The South” with other “minority communities opposed to 
industrialism” and argues that since the “proper living” Agrarianism endorses 
“does not depend on the local climate or geography” and is “capable of a 
definition that is general and not Southern at all,” the Southern Agrarian 
movement must “seek alliances with sympathetic communities everywhere” 
(xxxix). As far as Ransom is concerned, if Agrarian economic principles are 
to be endorsed as the potential savior of a unique Southern culture, those 
principles must be intellectually defensible on a broader scale, and any patri-
otic defense of the home place must rest on a solid theoretical foundation.
From Place to Poem: Regional and Textual Ontologies
The challenging relationship between Ransom’s theory and his politics which 
was only beginning to emerge in “Statement of Principles” becomes the 
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primary focus and later an irreconcilable conflict as his work progresses. 
Although his early commitment to the Agrarian cause had been strong and 
sincere, by the mid-1930s the signs of strain were evident, and it is clear that 
Ransom’s writing was moving away from a defense of the South and toward a 
broader engagement with aesthetic theory. In one very important year, 1934, 
Ransom produced his two most explicit statements on regionalist discourse—
“The Aesthetic of Regionalism” and “Regionalism in the South”—as well as 
his most explicit statement thus far on New Critical doctrine—“Poetry: A 
Note on Ontology.” In retrospect, this twelve-month period seems a criti-
cal crossroads in his intellectual development. Both regionalist essays are 
directed by wider theoretical ambitions, and by 1938—a year after Ran-
som made his move to Kenyon and formally disassociated himself from the 
cause of regionalism—the true significance of “Poetry: A Note on Ontology” 
would be confirmed by its republication as the concluding chapter of The 
World’s Body.
 Although these three texts seem to be speaking to very different constitu-
encies and addressing very different topics, there are startling structural simi-
larities among them. Both regionalist texts were produced after a summer 
trip Ransom made to an academic conference in New Mexico in 1933, and 
in both essays Ransom’s reflections on regionalism seem very different from 
his 1929 work. In “The Aesthetic of Regionalism” and “Regionalism in the 
South,” Ransom’s vision expands; he reflects on general principles of region-
alist thought and continually portrays himself as a “philosophical regional-
ist” trying to elevate the discourse out of its marginalized and paralyzing 
local status (“Aesthetic,” 45). Despite its title, there is nothing patriotic about 
“Regionalism in the South,” and the text does not even offer a particularly 
positive analysis of Southern writing. Throughout the essay, Ransom strug-
gles with his own terms and strains for clarity. In one revealing moment of 
frustration, he even mocks the entire critical category of Southern Regional-
ism. He notes:
It is just as difficult in the South as it is elsewhere to tell precisely in what 
the regionalism consists. We hear it said here that the South has some char-
acteristic arts, or a characteristic culture, or an economy, or a philosophy, or 
a “way of life,” that sets the region apart from other regions, and we hear 
it asserted that pains must be taken to make this differentiation persist. But 
how shall it be defined? (108)
Traces of Ransom’s earlier Fugitive-era skepticism toward romanticist ste-
reotypes resurface in “Regionalism in the South,” and he resists the easy 
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temptation to ally his new model of regionalist discourse with its traditionally 
naturalized predecessors. The question, “But how shall it be defined?” is an 
obstacle he cannot easily overcome; he returns to it again and again. “What 
shall the Southern apologist name as the sacred essence?” he asks:
Is it the magnolias, the banjoes, and pickaninnies? I cannot but sympathize 
with the gentlemen of the New Republic in detesting these pretty properties 
as the way of salvation. Is it the drawl of the Southern speech, and the ritar-
dato of labor? Or is it fundamentalism, agrarianism, classicism, the Demo-
cratic party, or some other variety of abstract doctrine? It is probably a great 
many things at once. (108)
The tone is important here. Ransom, in an essay ostensibly devoted to region-
alism in the South, openly criticizes the most basic (and often the most 
beloved) tenets of environmental and/or cultural determinism. In his new for-
mulation, it obviously cannot be the magnolias, banjoes or “pickaninnies,” 
nor the accents, the fundamentalism nor, very interestingly, not even the 
Agrarianism, which make or unmake the regionalism of the South. Instead, 
Ransom’s argument moves away from such one-dimensional essentialisms 
and embraces a more textured model which recognizes the simultaneous and 
continual re-combination of all these physical and imaginary elements; he 
argues that “there cannot be a regionalism at one place without there being 
a general philosophy of regionalism, and a number of distinct examples” 
(“Regionalism in the South,” 109).
 Just as Ransom struggled to articulate the core insights of his general 
philosophy of regionalism, contemporary scholars descend into a similarly 
tongue-tied state whenever they attempt to explain the relationship between 
a located subjectivity and the seemingly objective conditions of social space. 
The same seventy-five-year-old question (“How shall it be defined?”) remains 
a common refrain in most scholarship today: for nearly a century, regional-
ist criticism has been at a loss for words, unable to locate, define, or pre-
cisely identify even its own object of study. As Michael Kowalewski observes, 
regionalism has been “condescended to by critics or simply ignored as a cat-
egory because many of them simply lack a vocabulary with which to ask 
engaging philosophical, psychological, or aesthetic questions about what it 
means to dwell in a place whether actually or imaginatively” (174). David 
Jordan outlines the problem in a similar way when he observes that scholars 
who rely on terms such as the “‘the mystery of place’” or the “‘indefinable 
air’” of regionalism only “hint at the limitations of empirical observation, 
but they do little to clarify exactly what it is that the regionalist author is try-
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ing to represent” (“Representing Regionalism,” 105). As Ransom discovered 
decades earlier, the lack of a sufficiently sophisticated critical vocabulary has 
been the single most influential factor in regionalism’s arrested development.
 In “The Aesthetic of Regionalism,” Ransom embarks on his most ambi-
tious and sustained effort to test his localized philosophy of regionalism 
against a foreign cultural landscape and establish a new working critical 
vocabulary for regionalist criticism.6 Though the climate, the history, the 
economy and the landscape change as Ransom moves across the continen-
tal United States into New Mexico, the formal structure of his argument 
remains consistent, and he sees many analogous socio-spatial forces at work 
in both the South and the Southwest. In “The Aesthetic,” he returns to his 
high religious rhetoric—the essay was originally presented as a public lec-
ture in Baton Rouge—and the document captures perhaps the last gasp of 
his near fanatical faith in the discourse. Rather than view region as an intel-
lectual construct that comments only on where people live—their physical 
location against an inert and stable objective reality—Ransom uses the term 
to describe how people live, how they interrelate with the economic, aesthetic 
cultural and historical processes that both produce and are produced by any 
particular place. He argues that “regionalism is as reasonable as non-region-
alism” and that “cosmopolitanism, progressivism, industrialism, free trade, 
interregionalism, eclecticism, liberal education, the federation of the world, 
or simple rootlessness” should be considered only as equivalent alternatives, 
rather than superior theoretical models to describe the relationship between 
the self and social space (47). For Ransom, regionalism produces a better 
local economy and a better local society, as well as a better local art, because 
it encourages an understanding of social space that is more intimately materi-
alized and “less abstract” than the economic logic of “big business” (48). He 
believes that regionalism encourages an aesthetic potential that is unavailable 
in an over-rationalized industrial system and that “the machine economy, 
carried to the limit with the object of ‘maximum efficiency,’ is the enemy 
of regionalism” (54). In his formulation, the whole history of capitalism in 
the United States is seen as an unrelenting attack on regionalist values. Ran-
som claims that Americans suffer from a “mortal infatuation” with progres-
sive philosophy and are consciously or unconsciously destroying the various 
regional identities that once made up the country (54). With obvious envy, 
he points to the ecological balanced existence of aboriginal communities of 
New Mexico and argues that, unlike the rest of “white America”—for whom 
regionalism “is so little an experience that it is often obliged to be a the-
ory”—the cultural lives of the natives are so completely interwoven with 
their physical landscape that they “do not have to formulate the philosophy 
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of regionalism” (48). As one of the few American cultures that continue to 
exist outside the industrial economy, the “noble” aboriginal community of 
1933, at least as Ransom imagines it from his seat in a passing railway car, 
seems able to isolate and insulate itself from the homogenizing effects of the 
mass market (55).
 The spiritual component of Ransom’s argument here cannot be denied. 
In his rapturous appreciation for the aboriginal community and the nearly 
impossible to articulate linkages it forges between subjects and the social 
space they inhabit and create, he characterizes the interdependence of this 
relationship as “the birth of a natural piety: a transformation which may be 
ascribed to man’s intuitive philosophy” and “to the operation of a transcen-
dental spirit which is God (“Aesthetic,” 49). For Ransom, at this stage of 
his development, a true region with a true regionalist culture is interpreted 
as a sacred site where a miraculous transubstantiation perfectly counterbal-
ances the strict geographical materialism of nature with the more fluid cul-
tural idealism of the local custom. “(R)egionalism is a compound effect with 
two causes,” he writes; it is a discursive construct, formed by the dialectical 
engagement which results when “the physical nature of the region” interacts 
with “genius of human ‘culture’” (49). Ransom sees this carefully balanced 
relationship between nature and culture, materialism and idealism, things 
and ideas, as the true achievement of any regionalist art and calls it “the 
best gift that is bestowed on the human species” (49). This is the core asser-
tion that dominated his engagement with regionalist discourse from the very 
beginning. In his mind, regionalism captures a completely different type of 
social space, a different order of ontological being in comparison with the 
positivist options promised by the abstracting idealism of industrialism. Just 
as his embrace of Agrarianism was essentially defensive, Ransom sees the 
fragile ontological specificity of the distinct cultural geographies of America 
as the only alternatives to the mindless positivist aggression of industrialism.
 In Mark Jancovich’s seminal rereading of this phase in Ransom’s career, 
he rightly identifies the shift from Agrarianism to the New Criticism as an 
“active tactical manoeuvre” that allowed Ransom, Warren and Tate to adapt 
and extend their economic and political criticisms into the aesthetic realm 
(12). According to Jancovich, “[t]he appeal of this cultural criticism was not 
that it failed to challenge capitalist relations or that it submitted to capitalist 
rationality”—as Fekete and many others have argued—“but that it argued 
for the need to reorganize aspects of society and culture” (13–14). For Jan-
covich, Ransom’s regionalist and New Critical projects are directly linked by 
their common hostility toward the intellectual abstractions of positivism and 
their common defense of complex cultural ontologies. “Poetry: A Note on 
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Ontology” (1934) changes the object of study from the region to the poem, 
but in many ways Ransom’s oft-cited literary essay replays and reapplies the 
arguments from his almost forgotten regionalist work. Much as “The Aes-
thetic” argued that regionalism was a compound effect with two causes, cre-
ated by the dialectical tension which results when the physical nature of the 
region interacts with the genius of human culture, the “Note on Ontology” 
rejects both the overly materialist tendencies of Physical poetry (“too realis-
tic”) as well as the rarefied abstractions of Platonic poetry (“too idealistic”) 
to argue in favor of the dialectical tension which exists in an integrated meta-
physical poetry (92). Both essays map out ontological differences between 
types of regions and types of texts, and both essays defend the fragile meta-
physically balanced sites they prefer against what Ransom sees as the homog-
enizing effects of positivist discourse. In the regionalist debate, positivism is 
represented obviously by an industrializing economy that sweeps across the 
landscape leveling all difference into one blandly conformist cultural geogra-
phy; and in the literary debate, the same kind of positivism is represented by 
an equally bland and one-dimensionally utilitarian type of writing or socio-
historical scholarship that cannot or purposely does not recognize the unique 
ontological status and possibilities of the literary text. Much as a region can-
not be defined entirely by a materialist analysis of its physical landscape, nor 
by a completely idealist analysis of its cultural discourse, the literary text, in 
Ransom’s infamous formulation, is more than just a thing or an idea.
 With so many common methodological parallels between the two argu-
ments, it shouldn’t be surprising that the same religious rhetoric Ransom 
employed when describing the compound effect in “The Aesthetic of Region-
alism” returns in “Poetry: A Note on Ontology,” and we see the unique re-
combination of materialist and idealist components in metaphysical poetry 
described as a kind of supernatural “miraculism” (87). For Ransom, the 
metaphysical literary text, like an authentic regionalism, possesses a different, 
and clearly sacred, ontological status. He claims that the “little secular enter-
prises of poetry” have a similar ontological status to religions and that, in an 
interesting interdependence, “[r]eligion depends for its ontological validity 
upon a literary understanding” (91). At the close of the essay, the metaphor 
of transubstantiation returns, and Ransom suggests that the type of poetry he 
favors functions very much like religion and crosses over that materialist/ide-
alist divide to provide readers with “a God who has his being in the physical 
world as well as in the world of principles and abstractions” (92).
 Most of the structures, metaphors, and methodologies that Ransom ref-
erences in these three 1934 essays on regionalism and poetry can be traced 
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back to the mysterious, failed critical manuscript he abandoned and eventu-
ally burned in 1927. Provisionally titled The Third Moment, this book would 
have been Ransom’s first real contribution to criticism; and though no copy 
of the text exists, the core of its argument can be reconstructed from a letter 
Ransom wrote to Tate in 1926. Here, Ransom once again moves through 
his three phases or “moments” of literary experience, and he breaks these 
up into a first moment of purely materialist perception, a second moment of 
purely intellectual conception and a third moment of reconciliation, “a mixed 
world” and a “very advanced state” where art can be “conscious of the scene 
as we might have conceptualized it, and at the same time of the scene as we 
actually do persist in intuiting it” (Young and Core, 156). Although Ransom 
abandoned The Third Moment before even the Agrarian cause demanded 
his attention, it is clear that this structural and methodological template 
remained almost as a kind of default intellectual framing device for much of 
his subsequent work.
 Although I do not wish to overstate this point, the tripartite structur-
ing of Ransom’s literary and regionalist analysis anticipates almost exactly 
the kind of “Thirding-as-Othering” advocated by Soja in his landmark 1995 
text, Thirdspace (60). Ransom’s early regionalist discourse and Soja’s con-
temporary readings of spatialized cultural geography are not identical, but 
the similarities between Ransom’s Third Moment and Soja’s Thirdspace 
are nevertheless quite remarkable. As Ransom called for a passage through 
his First and Second moments, before the “advanced” possibilities of his 
“mixed world” could be achieved, Soja’s contemporary analysis of social 
space rejects both the materialist assumptions of Firstspace analyses and the 
idealist assumptions of Secondspace analyses and calls instead for a similar 
“ontological restructuring” of the way we read and understand cultural geog-
raphy (Thirdspace, 81). Like Ransom’s Third Moment, Soja’s Thirdspace 
“draws upon the material and mental spaces of the traditional dualism” but 
also “extends well beyond them in scope, substance and meaning” (Third-
space, 11). A detailed comparison of these two arguments would extend well 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that in their shared rejection 
of exclusively materialist or exclusively idealist readings of social space, as 
well as their shared endorsement of “mixed,” “ontologically restructured” 
interpretations of place, Ransom and Soja’s work suggest that a conservative, 
anti-positivist, anti-industrial regionalist critic from the Agrarian South of the 
1930s and a Marxist, postmodern, postindustrial critic from the L.A. School 
of contemporary cultural geography might actually have more in common 
than we might assume or anticipate.
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“We are too far apart on these matters”: 
Regionalist Resignation
History tells us that Ransom’s efforts to redefine regionalist discourse and to 
extend the theoretical foundations for Agrarianism beyond the immediate 
confines of the South were ultimately unsuccessful. I’ll Take My Stand never 
attracted the national audience its leading contributors sought to address and 
in the end, the fragile, more fluid and complex model of regionalism Ransom 
advocated in his later essays could never escape the overpowering influence 
of Southern politics. The challenges of regionalist theory were more daunting 
than the Agrarians first realized; and eventually, Ransom, Warren and Tate 
grew more and more frustrated with the patriotic demands of the discourse. 
In a letter to Tate in 1936, Ransom announced his formal shift away from 
regionalist questions and his new desire to pursue the New Critical possi-
bility of “an objective literary standard” (Young and Core, 217). As he sets 
out to establish his American Academy of Letters—even going so far as to 
include a rough canonical list of twenty-five poets who be welcomed into his 
elite institution—Ransom stresses that his quest for a new, more standard-
ized evaluation of literary work will share nothing with the fool’s errand of 
his regionalist past. He tells Tate that this purer form of literary criticism 
will be strategically free from political influence and that it will “counteract 
the Agrarian-Distributionist Movement in (their) minds” (217). It is clear 
that Ransom is leaving regionalism behind because the social implications of 
defending the South have had negative effects on his national reputation and 
his literary work. “Patriotism has nearly eaten me up,” he writes, “and I’ve 
got to get out of it” (217). Though he admits that it will be “hard to reject 
the brethren and sistren,” Ransom is fully committed to the break and wants 
Tate to understand that his new Academy will never be “confused with a 
Fugitive or Agrarian organization” (219).
 As we have seen, many different personal, professional, and theoretical 
influences combined to trigger the end of Fugitive-Agrarian movement and 
the beginning of the New Criticism. By 1940, one year after Tate’s controver-
sial move to Princeton and still one year before the publication of Ransom’s 
famous text, Davidson was the only one of the key Agarians still living in 
Nashville and still committed to his traditional definitions of the old regional-
ist cause. He had been intellectually abandoned by his friends; and in a letter 
written to Tate in February, Davidson churns through an emotional mix of 
sadness and scholarly outrage. Although the letter overflows with self-pity 
and anger, Davidson’s diagnosis of his own position within the group is cor-
rect, and his descriptions capture the unique tensions of regionalist criticism 
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and map out the exact point at which the literary ambitions of the New Crit-
ics finally overwhelmed their patriotic loyalties to their old friends and their 
home region. “We are too far apart on these matters,” Davidson tells Tate: 
“[w]e have not understood each other” (Fain and Young, 322). In one par-
ticularly revealing moment, he admits:
I am decidedly grieved by being isolated from my friends. I don’t mean 
physical isolation, deplorable though that is. I mean that I find myself sud-
denly at a disagreeable intellectual distance for reasons that I do not in the 
least understand. . . . It is this intellectual isolation, this lack of communion, 
which I feel the most. And it began before any of you left these parts. Why, 
is a mystery I can’t solve. What fault was I guilty of? Did I just fail to keep 
up with the pattern of your thinking, and, though once worthy, thus become 
unworthy? I felt, more than once, that there was a cloud between me on 
one side and you, J. C. R., and perhaps more on the other side. We were all 
apparently as good friends as ever, yet there was this cloud. I am not speak-
ing, of course, of mere differences of personal opinion, about this or that, at 
any given time, but of something more impalpable. . . . I have been almost 
forced into isolation by my own friends. (323–24)
It is difficult not to feel sympathy for Davidson during this period of loss. But 
apart from his frustration and his isolation from the group, his overview of 
the Agrarian movement’s last days is accurate, and it provides contemporary 
scholars with an insightful analysis of both how and why the New Critics left 
their old regionalism behind. Although Davidson does not want to admit it, it 
is simply true that he did not “keep up with” his friends’ thinking: while they 
persistently tried to steer regionalist thought away from Southern politics and 
the objectifying pretensions of pure mimetic representation, he stubbornly 
refused to dilute his most troubling and offensive political commitments. 
The “cloud” that descended over the group was one of mutual frustration. 
Ransom, Warren, and Tate could not accept the limitations of a regionalism 
exclusively tied to the South, and Davidson was unwilling to support a more 
theoretical model of the discourse that explicitly abandoned its connection 
with these cultural and political indices.
 Though this position will run counter to much critical opinion, I would 
maintain that many North American scholars have ignored regionalism’s 
continuing relevance in twenty-first-century criticism not because the dis-
course is simplistic, too conservative, or old-fashioned, but because it repre-
sents too much of a theoretical challenge. The highly charged personal and 
public arguments which tore the Agrarian movement apart in the late 1930s 
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continue to be replayed in contemporary regionalist debates; and the same 
disagreeable intellectual distance between patriots and theorists that once 
separated Davidson from his friends remains “in place,” as it were, today. 
Even the briefest survey of recent regionalist criticism will show that in the 
twenty-first century most of the criticism written about Southern, Western, 
Midwestern, Eastern, Prairie, or Maritime literature of North America con-
tinues to be published by journals or university presses from within these 
same geographical areas and that broader, general examinations of region-
alist theory are still very rare and difficult to find. Rather than returning to 
Ransom’s failed quest and re-attempting the important but arduous work of 
constructing an entirely new critical vocabulary for regionalist discourse, and 
rather than rethinking the many fertile connections that might exist between 
literary regionalism and the expanding fields of contemporary spatial theory, 
most contemporary scholars have gone back to Davidson’s methodology and 
relied too heavily on the problematic critical inheritance of most traditional 
nineteenth-century versions of the regionalist discourse. Before we can even 
begin to evaluate regionalism’s role in a contemporary postindustrial North 
America that is so obviously dominated by shifting social spaces and by a 
cultural geography that is at least as imaginary as it is real, scholars first have 
to find a way to talk about regionalism’s function, and to explain exactly 
what it is that the regionalist text is exploring. The experience of the Fugi-
tive-Agrarians in the 1920s and 1930s reveals this as a difficult task. But as 
Kowalewski accurately observes, “not knowing what kind of link can be 
established between self and environment is clearly not the same as deny-
ing that there is nothing to be known”; and moreover that “[h]aving doubts 
about the possibility of adequately defining regional identity is not the same 
as asserting that it does not exist” (175).
Notes
 1. Every undergraduate textbook on literary theory contains a reference to the New 
Criticism and a historical description of the role it played in helping to define the study of 
literature within the North American academy in the postwar period. For the most influ-
ential contemporary scholarly characterizations of the movement, see Lentricchia, Fekete, 
Eagleton, and Selden and Widdowson.
 2. Southern literary scholarship is a broad and multifaceted field that cannot be 
quickly defined or summarized. Working from a wide variety of different positions, 
Southern academics have moved through many of the most challenging and controver-
sial regionalist debates in North American literary criticism. See Gray, Beck, Bradbury, 
Conkin, Cowan, Kreyling, and O’Gorman.
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 3. Though they were closely related and shared their four most famous members, the 
Fugitives and the Agrarians were two separate groups. Beyond Ransom, Warren, Tate, 
and Davidson, the Fugitive group included Merrill Moore, Laura Riding, Jesse Wils, Alec 
B. Stevenson, Walter Clyde Curry, Stanley Johnson, Sidney Hirsch, James Frank, William 
Yandell Elliot, William Frierson, Ridley Wills, and Alfred Starr. The eight others of the tit-
ular Twelve Southerners who contributed essays to I’ll Take My Stand were Andrew Lytle, 
Stark Young, John Gould Fletcher, Frank Lawrence Owsley, Lyle Lanier, Herman Nixon, 
John Donald Wade, and Henry Blue Kline. For more on the founding of The Fugitive and 
its membership, see Cowan. For biographies on the Agrarians, see Virginia Rock’s “The 
Twelve Southerners: Biographical Essays,” an appendix to the 1962 edition of I’ll Take My 
Stand. For a more detailed account of the relationship between the two groups, see John L. 
Stewart’s The Burden of Time: The Fugitives and Agrarians.
 4. The best analyses of this transition are found in Fekete, Jancovich, O’Kane, Gray, 
and O’Gorman.
 5. For a good overview of the spatialization of contemporary critical theory, see the 
essay collections edited by Keith and Pile and Dear and Flusty.
 6. For a contemporary reappraisal of “The Aesthetic of Regionalism,” see Wyile.
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if your educational experience in any way resembled mine, you have been 
uncertain about what style is. style was a familiar enough word for you, 
but your concept of style was probably vague . . . because our own teach-
ers spent little or no time talking about style. . . . if we listed ourselves as 
members of that post–world war ii generation of students who regularly 
practiced the brooks-and-warren method of close analysis, we could talk 
about the linguistic features of a poem with great specificity. yet we may 
well have been stymied when we wanted to talk about the linguistic fea-
tures of a prose text.
 —edward P. J. Corbett, “teaching style”
In a 1954 article for The Journal of Higher Education, Clarence Kulisheck assessed the influential and “widely used . . . storm center” of Understand-
ing Poetry—the most famous textbook by Robert Penn Warren and Cleanth 
Brooks—and the consequent entry of New Criticism into the “hurly-burly 
of the sprawling undergraduate world” (174). Positioning Brooks and War-
ren’s collections as the primary texts which “herald[ed] the entrance of the 
New Criticism into the textbook field,” Kulisheck maintained that works 
such as Understanding Poetry were “so conceived and so constructed as 
to change radically conventional conceptions of how literature should be 
taught . . . and what literature should be taught” (174–75). Arguing that 




C h A P t e r  n I n e
Brooks and Warren’s Literary Pedagogy
196 • Part III, Chapter 9
apparatus designed to acquaint the student (and the teacher, too . . . ) with the 
exacting techniques of close reading,” Kulisheck identified several “radical” 
features of these textbooks: an “introductory essay on applied aesthetics as it 
relates to the particular type of literature under consideration”; “detailed edi-
torial analysis” following the excerpts of literature; “questions and exercises 
designed to stimulate further analysis along the same lines” of the criticism 
provided; and a glossary highlighting critical, often specialized, terminology 
(175). Kulishek concluded that the “elaborate apparatus was perhaps the 
most controversial feature of the original Brooks and Warren text” (176).
 In 1953, a year before Kulisheck’s article, the field had already felt the 
need to evaluate the mark made by the New Criticism, as evidenced by Ran-
dall Stewart’s article in College English, which summarized the results of 
a questionnaire administered to thirty-four “New Critics” and “old schol-
ars” alike. In nearly all the replies, professors noted re-animated attention 
to both literature and the teaching of literature, asserting that New Criti-
cism prompted a productive move away from locating the “sources” of liter-
ary influence or inspiration, shifted graduate study toward critical subjects, 
and “tended to encourage the Socratic method in teaching and to discourage 
straightaway lecturing” (106–9).
 In this article, I consider the specific pedagogical innovations Brooks and 
Warren introduced across editions of their first textbook, An Approach to 
Literature. I have deliberately chosen to investigate a New Critical textbook 
which has not received nearly as much critical attention as the Understand-
ing Poetry series. Moreover, I focus on what I read as the most challenging 
literary genre the textbook duo tackled—the essay. In addition to surfac-
ing the pedagogies involved in addressing a less central area of New Critical 
interest—nonfiction prose as opposed to the poetry typically venerated by 
the New Criticism—An Approach to Literature provides an especially useful 
site for considering the wider pedagogical practices that Brooks and Warren 
encouraged, practices which continue to be used not only in introductory 
English courses, but in literary studies and the humanities more widely.
 What is most interesting and instructive about Brooks and Warren’s 
theory and pedagogy on the essay emerges through small changes from one 
edition to the next, as the team encounters difficulty describing the essay’s 
slippery, semi-literary form. The challenges of this task are registered through 
discussion of the essay’s “style” and the necessary evolution of the textbook’s 
pedagogical apparatus (the questions, exercises, definitions, explications, and 
structure that implicitly and explicitly “teach”). Brooks and Warren thus use 
the undertheorized genre and style of the essay as ground on which to build 
an increasingly useful apparatus.
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 The section that follows first provides a brief sketch of Brooks and War-
ren’s relationship and the exigency for developing New Critical practices, 
as well as a consideration of the critiques the broader movement received. 
It then turns to the historical reception of An Approach to Literature and 
my analysis of its evolution across editions. By providing a genealogy of the 
changes made across editions, the final sections illuminate the texture of a 
particular form of New Critical pedagogy in order to demonstrate how close 
attention to texts read qua literature—in the manner Brooks and Warren 
advocated through their work with the essay—remains useful today.
Pedagogical Beginnings and the Growth of New Criticism
The story of the Brooks and Warren textbooks begins at Louisiana State 
University, where the two men were reunited as colleagues and as teach-
ers. Although they had worked together previously as friends and fellow 
students—at both Vanderbilt and Oxford—it was at LSU that, faced with 
teaching four classes each semester in addition to producing scholarship and 
editing the journal The Southern Review, they developed a pedagogy of close 
reading for the classroom. The aim of such a pedagogy was democratic: to 
provide students a method and the necessary tools to interpret texts on their 
own, especially at large state universities such as LSU. Brooks later recalled 
the beginning of four decades of collaboration with Warren:
Robert Penn Warren and I found ourselves in the mid 1930’s teaching at the 
Louisiana State University. . . . Among other things, each of us was teaching 
a section of the department’s course in literary forms and types. Granted that 
Warren and I were young men excited by the new trends in literature—War-
ren was already a published poet—and granted that our heads were full of 
literary theory—drawn from the poetry and critical essays of T. S. Eliot and 
from the then sensational books on theory and practical criticism written by 
I. A. Richards—nevertheless, our dominant motive was not to implant new 
fangled ideas in the innocent Louisiana sophomores we faced three times a 
week. Our motive was to try to solve a serious practical problem.
 Our students, many of them bright enough and certainly amiable and 
charming enough, had no notion of how to read a literary text. (“Forty 
Years of ‘Understanding Poetry,’” 167–68)
As Jewel Spears Brooker notes, Brooks was clearly “stimulated in part by 
pedagogical earnestness” in his drive to move beyond early-twentieth-century 
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textbooks whose “theories of mimesis, of genesis, and of reception seemed 
to have exhausted themselves” (131). According to Brooker, Brooks did not 
exclude these approaches as entirely unproductive, but read them as often 
ineffective in pedagogic isolation, instead favoring “an approach that stimu-
lated readers to focus with intelligence on the text” (131).
 Brooks and Warren began working on this “serious practical problem” 
by collaborating on Sophomore Poetry Manual, a pamphlet which expanded 
upon notes that Warren had developed for teaching an LSU poetry class. This 
initial foray into pedagogy was then expanded to include a range of genres; 
Brooks and Warren (along with John Thibaut Pursur) entitled this reader An 
Approach to Literature, which was printed by LSU in 1936. Thus began a 
sustained collaborative endeavor on textbooks. A few years later, as Brooks 
and Warren began revising a second edition of An Approach to Literature 
(1939), their next textbook, Understanding Poetry, had already hit the stands 
in 1938. This frenetic pace of textbook publishing continued for the next 
four decades, with new textbooks such as Understanding Fiction (1943) and 
Modern Rhetoric (1949) rounding out the mix. In addition to their creative 
and scholarly work, Brooks and Warren released or revised a new textbook 
every few years.
 Understanding Poetry undoubtedly came to be the best known of their 
textbook series. First used at LSU and soon taught across the United States, 
notably at Yale where Brooks and Warren would later teach (Brooks arrived 
1947; Warren in 1950), this popular volume was regarded as instituting the 
“New Critical approach.” Each textbook aimed to establish links across sev-
eral spheres of academe in order to allow critics authoring textbooks, teachers 
using them, and students studying from them to work together on problems 
of interpretation. The introduction to Understanding Poetry indicates the 
broad goals of the textbooks: to “dispose of a few . . . basic misconcep-
tions . . . and therefore to prepare the student to enter upon an unprejudiced 
study of the actual poems” (xviii). These “misconceptions” are pithily named 
as “message hunting,” “pure realization,” and “beautiful statement of some 
high truth” (10–18), statements which still capture prevalent ideas about the 
interpretation of literature today. This opening statement in Understanding 
Poetry also makes evident New Critical assumptions broadly present across 
the textbooks: that students are intelligent yet prejudiced, and that students 
will easily relinquish their prejudices and misconceptions through exposure 
to the methodology of the volume.
 This excerpt also assumes and addresses an implied teacher.1 Faced with 
an enormous influx of students after the Second World War, many teachers 
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were both overworked and undertrained. Accordingly, the editors seek to 
cleanse them of unwanted prejudices as well, to create the kind of level play-
ing field that would be assumed by the New Critical methodology. Such an 
approach is democratic, then, not only because of the range of readers toward 
which the text directs itself, but also because of the ways that it discounts 
prior knowledge and experience, so that all readers may proceed in the same 
manner. Indeed, democratization of literary study, and of reading practices 
more broadly, was among the most prominent goals of the Brooks and War-
ren textbooks. To allow all readers equal access to textual interpretation, the 
textbooks focused on what was theorized as “the text itself,” establishing as 
the object of study the words in front of the reader, whose accessibility did 
not depend on esoteric bibliographical knowledge that some students might 
possess and others might not.
 From the outset, Brooks and Warren advanced their New Critical strate-
gies as a corrective to approaches associated with other “popular” or current 
textbooks, which in their view often substituted for the primary object of 
study—the poem itself—other foci: paraphrase, biography, “historical mate-
rials,” and/or “inspirational and didactic interpretation” (iv). The authors 
aimed to defend students from these practices by encouraging them to strive 
for precision, ground their analyses and interpretations in the primary texts, 
attend to all aspects of the text instead of isolating out particularities, and 
proceed through a series of questions toward articulation of the “grounds” 
for certain interpretations. The apparatus accompanying each primary text 
established, and implicitly theorized, a new pedagogical method which would 
persist for many decades.
 A key implication of the textbook apparatus was that students could be 
liberated via the New Critical method, through both their increased knowl-
edge and their increasing engagement with the particulars of literary work. 
This liberatory aspiration dovetailed with Brooks and Warren’s effort to res-
cue literary theory from the limited interpretive frameworks of philology and 
literary biography that had marked pedagogy well into the twentieth century. 
Regarding these approaches as elitist and dilettantish, they sought to combat 
these with a democratic, reasoned, and incisive method.
 Even now, though the field of “English” perceives itself as beyond the 
New Criticism, commentators such as Gerald Graff and Frank Lentricchia 
agree that the specters of the New Critical perspective continue to haunt con-
temporary theory and practice. Lentricchia notes that the New Criticism lives 
on not only as an “imposing and repressive father-figure” but also in the 
ways that contemporary theory is connected to, rather than discontinuous 
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from, New Criticism (xiii). Graff further suggests that even opponents of the 
New Criticism often use the very methods and tenets of New Criticism in 
order to critique it.2
 From our contemporary vantage, the tenets of New Criticism—and their 
attendant dangers—ring familiar in English departments across North Amer-
ica. The roster of charges usually runs somewhat like this: that the New Crit-
ics treated literature as a sacred text cordoned off from the world and from 
history, regarding it as art for art’s sake; that the “Intentional” and “Affec-
tive Fallacies” theorized by the New Critics assisted in this exclusion, thus 
constricting the range of fruitful reading practices; that the focus on organic 
unity in texts, combined with a drive for recognizing universal systems of 
humanistic understanding applied in a scientific manner, flattened the dialec-
tic between reader and text and among conflicting ideas; that these practices 
implicitly sought to establish a limited canon out of highly privileged, arbi-
trary and elitist values; and that New Critical tenets resulted in a hierarchy 
of proper reading practices (and thus “proper” readers), often elevating aca-
demic critics to its apex. These portraits of de-historicized, exclusive, mecha-
nized practice persist in representations of the New Criticism. And there is 
truth to many of these charges.
 Yet, as Gerald Graff suggests, such representations always risk oversim-
plification and caricature, and often fail to distinguish between what the New 
Critics initially advocated and how their methods later came to be “routin-
ized” and broadly applied. Accordingly, Graff’s discussion of New Criticism 
is crucial for understanding the original impetus of New Critical methodol-
ogy, as well as why it ultimately faded from dominance—and, some would 
say, failed. Some of the reasons for this failure can be gleaned from the list 
of charges listed above: as Graff puts it, “the necessity to fight battles on so 
great a variety of fronts forced the New Criticism to stretch its concepts till 
they became ambiguous,” and moreover, muddled and contradictory (141). 
To ward off the “hedonistic impressionism and genteel moralism” residual 
from earlier periods, the New Critics advocated an interpretive practice 
that did not linger in rapturous pleasure or didactic lessons (140). To guard 
against the popular practices advocated by biographers and philologists, the 
New Critics recommended concentrating on the text itself. And in order to 
defend literature from scientific positivism, the New Critics argued for lit-
erature’s connection, as Cleanth Brooks put it, to the “facts of experience,” 
a realm which could be objectively recognized as its own mode of knowledge 
(The Well Wrought Urn, qtd. in Graff, Literature against Itself, 142).
 Literary works in this view were thus both objective and self-sufficient, 
while still somehow connected to the larger world and worldly experience.3 
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From this New Critical perspective, focusing on the text in isolation was 
(also paradoxically) a way to restore literature’s place and value against the 
mechanistic, industrial, positivistic forces of society—a way to train students, 
as Mark Jancovich puts it, to be aware of “the paradoxes and contradictions 
repressed by capitalist rationality” (88). The method designed to fulfill these 
contradictory goals was, of course, close textual analysis. Graff summarizes 
the range of critiques this method was intended to dispel:
The method of close textual analysis was a response on one side to those 
who dismissed literature as a frivolity and on the other side to those who 
defended it in terms which rendered it frivolous. Close textual analysis, pro-
ducing evidence of the richness and complexity of literary works, simultane-
ously answered the impressionist, who viewed the work as a mere occasion 
for pleasurable excitement, the message-hunter or political propagandist, 
who reduced the work to mere uplifting propositions, and the positivist, 
who denied any significance to the work at all. And close analysis of mean-
ing could also demonstrate to the historians and biographers that a literary 
work was more than a datum in the history of ideas or the life of the author. 
(141)
The New Critical method of textual analysis, though often perceived in retro-
spect as isolationist, was intended to result in precisely the opposite phenom-
enon: it sought to restore to literature a central place in the culture at large. 
Moreover, the New Critics sought to extend the values associated with litera-
ture to all, employing a democratic method of criticism to allow readers of all 
kinds to cultivate humanistic endeavors.
 Given the number of challenges this method set out to correct, it comes 
as no surprise that it ultimately fell from disciplinary dominance. Part of the 
problem was the New Critics’ oversimplification of the foes they set out to 
attack. As Graff suggests, for instance, the New Critics mistakenly equated 
rational thought with the mechanized societal forces they sought to disrupt, 
which prompted them to “oppose rational objectivity to experience and doom 
themselves to the polarizations they aimed to heal” (149).4 And in attempting 
to save literature from its host of differently antagonistic opponents, the New 
Criticism was not only pulled in too many directions to sustain itself, but also 
experienced a fundamental dislocation of its body of theory from its methods 
of textual interpretation.
 However, from a pedagogical point of view, the effects of this dislocation 
are minimal, particularly in the Approach to Literature series. Indeed, the 
pedagogical apparatus analyzed below reads as an important site from which 
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theoretical nuances can emerge: I argue for this analysis as a new avenue into 
the theory associated with the New Criticism. In the sections that follow, I am 
particularly interested in the theorization of style as a literary feature, a way 
to reveal and access what is specifically “literary” about a text. As Brooks 
and Warren develop their handling of style via the pedagogical apparatus 
across editions, they also explore and refine their theoretical commitments. 
This is evidenced most clearly when style as a topic vanishes from the theo-
retical discussion of the essay, only to be pursued in the pedagogical appa-
ratus. The apparatus thus becomes the central site for finding language to 
describe the workings of style and “literariness,” so that students might learn 
to recognize, discern, and describe stylistic effects as part of their interpretive 
repertoire.
Barely Literary: An Approach to Literature
Although Understanding Poetry is popularly understood as the textbook 
which institutionalized the New Critical approach, An Approach to Litera-
ture—Brooks and Warren’s first textbook—also importantly disseminated the 
New Criticism beyond LSU. As James Grimshaw, Jr., notes, as early as 1939, 
An Approach to Literature was being taught at institutions as geographically 
diverse as Auburn, Tufts, Cornell, Colgate, and North Dakota (27). As the 
textbooks swept the nation and as theoretical scholarship related to New 
Criticism continued to grow, the reception of Brooks and Warren’s textbooks 
grew as well.5 The textbooks ushered in new pedagogies that quickly gained 
ground. Josephine Miles describes the influence of the textbooks in a 1947 
review:
I do not think that any younger writer growing up in the 1930s and reading 
one or two years of the Southern Review and later the Brooks and Warren 
textbook could have failed to absorb some of the patience . . . some of their 
straight attention to every complex structure and every simple whole. . . . 
Every poem makes the more sense by such treatment. (185–86)
Generally positive, reviews of the literature-based textbooks note their wide 
influence on the field and the productive pedagogies they fostered.
 Indeed the only critique the literature textbooks typically received consid-
ered the extent to which the text should offer a pedagogical apparatus. Geof-
frey Wagner, for instance, reviewing in 1956, writes that
Lockhart, “Teaching with Style” • 203
The Brooks and Warren readers . . . consist of admirably selected pas-
sages of literature—poetry, prose and drama—with pertinent and often 
profound comments. They are challenged as being too pedantically the 
fruit of the American school of New Criticism, of which Professor Brooks 
is allegedly the Dean. However, I personally feel that this is one place [the 
undergraduate classroom, especially in the first two years] where the New 
Criticism–close textual analysis keeping historical and biographical data to 
the background—is vitally to the point. My only criticism of the Brooks and 
Warren textbook is that it tends to do too much for the teacher: the numer-
ous questions appended after each selection exhaust the topic and tend to 
rob the teacher of opportunities for exercising his own gifts. (227)
The problem that Wagner notes is certainly always an issue in textbooks; they 
walk a fine line between pedantry and providing a range of materials useful 
to both teacher and student. As Brooks and Warren often note in their intro-
ductions, volumes are rarely used from cover to cover, exercise by exercise; 
accordingly, their aim is to present more material than necessary from which 
the teacher may choose.6
 Given the impact of the Brooks and Warren textbooks, as well as the 
ways that An Approach to Literature preceded and influenced the approaches 
later featured in the ubiquitous Understanding Poetry, this understudied vol-
ume merits enhanced critical attention. As the textbook where Brooks and 
Warren specifically considered differences between genres as well as differ-
ences between poetic and prosaic form, An Approach to Literature provides a 
valuable site for assessing the evolution over forty years of both New Critical 
pedagogical and theoretical approaches to the essay, as well as their theoreti-
cal premises and allegiances more broadly. I first sketch the editors’ efforts to 
describe the relationship between the essay’s content and its form, attempts 
which initially read as somewhat muddled. The section that follows illumi-
nates how Brooks and Warren develop richer and more productive attention 
to the form of essays—and to their “style”—across revised editions of the 
textbook via the pedagogical apparatus.
 An Approach to Literature addresses not only the essay, but several lit-
erary genres, seeking to “bring into the classroom some of the insights that 
had been provided by criticism since Coleridge and to set these insights, 
especially when dealing with more mature students, in some context of liter-
ary and social history” (v). The textbook devotes a section to each featured 
genre—fiction, poetry, biography, the essay, and drama—accompanying most 
selections with exercises. The preface details primarily the fiction and poetry 
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sections, devoting less attention to the other three generic divisions, which 
mainly serve as connective devices between earlier selections.7
 By the time we reach the introduction to the section on the essay—framed 
as one of the “most flexible of forms” and one which has suffered with the 
rise of the modern short story—we have already learned much about the 
authors’ understanding of form and style as they operate within literary texts. 
Here, however, the authors do not spend as much time with how essays “are 
made” as they do when addressing fiction; nor do they fully elucidate top-
ics such as “style,” “movement,” or “exposition” as they do in the section 
on fiction. Instead, the introductory section on the essay seems more intent 
on differentiating the essay from other prose forms through defining what 
exactly makes an essay an essay. They begin by addressing content:
Of all the various forms of literature, the essay comes closest to having as its 
purpose merely the presentation of facts—for the sake of the facts. The essay 
lies therefore in a sort of borderland which touches on the one side the realm 
of “pure” literature and on the other the realm of practical and scientific 
writings, the realm of chemistry texts and medical prescriptions and cook 
books. In the essay the writer is concerned primarily with the explanation of 
a set of facts or perhaps with convincing the reader of the truth of a particu-
lar set of ideas. (113)
In this first nebulous attempt at defining the essay, the authors situate it 
broadly within the vast “borderland” between strict exposition and what 
they demark as “pure literature.” Crucial, they point out, is the essay’s pur-
pose of relaying information that is chiefly factual. As the editors develop this 
basic definition, they elaborate the purpose of the essay as employing a story 
or incident as the means by which to illustrate or explore a general idea or 
position. This “separates the essay as a form rather sharply from the other lit-
erary forms we have mentioned,” in that the “particular” is used in service of 
exploring the more “general” (509). This definition reads as both purposely 
broad and unnecessarily vague: the authors have a feel for what qualifies as 
essays—not magazine articles, for example—yet they can only begin to artic-
ulate the boundaries of the essay, primarily via taxonomies.
 The introduction’s discussion of the role of style in the essay highlights 
Brooks and Warren’s tendency toward both categorization and broad descrip-
tion, as well as underlines the characteristics that, in their reading, qualify a 
text as “literature.” Arguing that the essay may be “heavily burdened by the 
weight of facts,” they note that the essay “can become literature,” although 
the assumption remains that it must aspire more than other literary forms 
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to do so (113). Despite the implication that the essay is more burdened by 
its content and accordingly less literary, however, the authors are at pains to 
point out that “form and style have an important and necessary place even 
when the main interest of the author may be in convincing his reader of the 
truth of some practical proposal” (113; original emphasis). Thus they empha-
size what qualifies as a “literary” dimension of the essay: since the essay uses 
language, and language is interpretative and expressive (words are not, as the 
editors put it, “exact”), the way in which ideas are presented is constitutive 
of the essay’s meaning. Thus, “form and style”—what they read as “literary” 
characteristics—are important to consider even when analyzing more factu-
ally driven pieces of writing. “Colored by the writer’s own special and per-
sonal conception of them, and colored by his attitude toward them,” the facts 
that the essayist presents always have—as even a cook book does, the editors 
remark—“the possibility of going off into poetry” through style and form 
(113).
 Brooks and Warren provide several different ways of considering the con-
tent the essay details—the facts, as it were–and the form through which these 
facts are presented. Variously, the editors refer to “not statements of fact,” 
but “comments on the facts and opinions about the meaning of the facts”; 
“an arrangement of facts”; “an interpretation of facts”; and finally, facts 
which are “shaped by his [an essayist’s] writing to win the reader to his own 
interpretation” (509–10; original emphasis). Here the editors begin to move 
from content to the style of the piece—the ways in which the author shapes 
the content so as to persuade and engage. Brooks and Warren name this rhe-
torical impetus “emotional coloring”: “The essay, then, may attempt to stir 
the emotions as well as offer facts to the intellect; and, therefore, it may be 
one of the works of the imagination, and as such, a form of literature” (510). 
The process leading up to the possibility that the essay might operate as a 
form of literature reads as arduous indeed, as the logic moves from content, 
to how content is shaped and presented, to the effects of this presentation, 
and finally, via imagination, to the possibility that some essays may therefore 
be understood as literature. Hence the essay is in some respects not literary—
due to its factual content—while in other ways it is crucially literary, particu-
larly by dint of the artistic arrangement of its parts which combine to create a 
“style” perceivable by the reader.
 In an attempt to clarify the matter, the editors take pains to discuss the 
style of the essay as it both relates to and differs from those associated with 
other forms of literature (115). They note, for example, that the structure–in 
addition to the tone and atmosphere—may have a more “informal quality” 
(115). The structure of what they name the “informal essay” proves particu-
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larly difficult to pin down. The structure “at its best . . . is not a haphazard 
one”:
Ordinarily, the logic of exposition or the logic of the argument determines 
the arrangement of the essay. But since in the informal essay this matter does 
not bulk very large, the arrangement of the material often follows the appar-
ent whim and impulse of the author himself or the apparently casual associa-
tion of ideas. . . . (115)
However, the editors are careful to point out, twice, that this impression of 
random or chaotic “arrangement” of the essay’s structure is only “apparent,” 
and is most likely constructed purposefully to give that impression. After this 
round of vague clarifications, Brooks and Warren arrive at the final para-
graph, where they most clearly attempt to define essayistic “style”:
It is this fact that sometimes causes us to think of the informal essay as hav-
ing preeminently style and the other types of essays as lacking it. But the 
proposition is true, of course, only in a very special sense. It is impossible to 
have style in a vacuum. The style, in its broadest sense, is the arrangement 
of the writer’s materials, the adaptation of his means to his ends in the use 
of language. If style is an arrangement, there can never be just style—there 
must be an arrangement of something. But the statement is true in this sense: 
namely, that in the familiar essay the material is not so much objective fact 
as it is the sort of fact which one finds in a poem or short story. Conse-
quently, the form is prominent in the familiar essay for the same reason that 
it is prominent in the poem or short story. (115; original emphasis)
Despite its somewhat circular reasoning, this argument makes common sense: 
informal/personal essays “seem” as though they have more “style” in part 
because they have less “fact”; thus their material bears greater similarity to 
that of a poem or short story, and likewise, they are more literary than those 
essays the authors have deemed formal or factual.
 Definitional slippages here mark the authors’ attempts to acknowledge 
the more literary dimensions of the essay. They begin with the term “struc-
ture,” which is related to the tone and the atmosphere of the piece and which 
comes to be synonymous with the essay’s “logic” and its “arrangement.” Yet 
the “arrangement of the writer’s materials” is also the way that the editors 
broadly define “style.” To add a layer of complication, the term “form” is 
introduced at the end of this exposition: “Consequently, the form is promi-
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nent in the familiar essay.” Although not clearly defined, “form” is under-
stood here to be associated with the style and arrangement of the essay; and 
form, like style, becomes more visible in the informal/personal essay than 
those essays more driven by factual content. Despite the overlap in these defi-
nitions, the goal remains the same: to acknowledge, pinpoint, and describe 
the essay as a literary genre.
 These attempts at defining the essay, its style, and accordingly how it func-
tions as a form of literature remain fraught for Brooks and Warren through-
out the four editions of An Approach to Literature. The relationship of form 
to content within the essay reads as at the heart of these difficulties. The edi-
tors consider content to be the driving force of factual, personal, and specu-
lative essays; and this, their maneuvering implies, threatens the ability of the 
essay to operate as literary text. Although the editors aim to narrow the gulf 
between “fine literature” and the essay’s “practical exposition of facts,” ulti-
mately they present the essay as a genre that is barely literary, bound and 
determined by its content and the attendant presumptions of truth, fact, and 
the author’s direct and sincere presence on the page (509). Over the course 
of the four editions, however, and despite their struggles to describe and deal 
with the literary aspects of the essay, Brooks and Warren eventually develop 
more effective ways to guide students’ work with essays. For all of its murki-
ness, the struggle to elucidate how the essay works gives rise to a consider-
able enhancement and refinement of their pedagogical apparatus. In turn, the 
apparatus acts as a whetting stone which further sharpens the articulation 
of the textbook’s theoretical assumptions—for students, teachers and for the 
editors themselves.
Pedagogy in Action: 
Defining Essays and Student Reading Practices
The organization of the first edition of An Approach to Literature provides 
a point of departure from which Brooks and Warren then adjust and diver-
sify the pedagogical points they wish to emphasize. In the first edition, selec-
tions are organized thematically, and most of the questions which follow 
each selection focus on content. The editors do encourage dialogue between 
the readings, often asking students to compare two essays or points of view. 
But by and large, the apparatus in this first edition remains (like the authors’ 
definition of the essay) focused on the facts. Typical questions address what 
Author X says about Subject Y or how a student would define the essay’s 
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key words or concepts. The handful of questions that encourage attention 
to style—and the relationships among author, text, style, and reader—focus 
almost exclusively on discerning the author’s “real attitude” toward his sub-
ject or his reader.
 There are two notable exceptions to the first edition’s pedagogical focus 
on “what” based questions. The first is a question about Montaigne’s “Of the 
Resemblance of Children to Their Fathers”: “Does this essay have any formal 
structure or is it merely haphazard? If it has a structure, what determines that 
structure?” (195). Attentive students will remember similar language from 
the Introduction to the Essay and thus assume that the question leads them 
away from the “haphazard” and toward finding a meaningful logic for the 
essay’s organization. The second exception to the apparatus’s focus on con-
tent also raises the question of style specifically, here in response to Arnold 
Bennett’s piece “Literary Taste: How to Form It” (one of the few initial essays 
that disappears from the textbook in the revised edition). The authors ask, 
“What does Bennett say is the relation of style to content?” (206). Although 
this question might get students thinking about this relationship, the question 
itself guides students to report what Bennett “says” without obliging them 
to engage the connection Bennett makes. Other than the question regard-
ing Montaigne’s formal structure then, the pedagogical principles of this first 
edition steer students toward identification, comprehension, classification, 
and straightforward questions about the soundness or fairness of particu-
lar arguments—what Brooks and Warren read as the essay’s “non-literary” 
dimensions.
Revised Edition, 1944
Although the revised edition’s Introduction to the Essay remains exactly the 
same as the original edition’s text, significant changes emerge in the peda-
gogical apparatus which indicate Brooks and Warren’s attempt to supplement 
their theories of the essay and the ways they ask students to read and interact 
with essays. A key new feature is a series of several paragraph-long discus-
sions that follow new essay selections. In these responses which precede the 
set of questions, the authors highlight specific features of the essays, draw 
connections between essays, and discuss the more challenging essays which 
do not fit neatly into the paradigm of a “closely knit, logical development” 
(133). In addition to the authors’ discussion of the essay, each selection is fol-
lowed by five to eight questions (rather than the two or three in the first edi-
tion) which are much more thorough in their efforts to engage students in the 
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work of textual analysis. Many of these questions enact similar work as that 
described above, although in this edition the student is called upon more fre-
quently to explain differences among authors’ arguments and lend their own 
views to the discussion.
 Despite the fact the revised edition constantly raises style—such as in the 
exposition following Emerson’s essay—it often retreats to the “examination 
of ideas” as the best way to explain the essay’s work. Such a move is likewise 
reinforced in the final question about Emerson’s piece which reads, in part, 
“Even an evaluation of Emerson’s style—if style is functionally related to the 
author’s purpose—will be impossible, finally, without a broad basis of com-
parison. In general, this statement applies to all the essays; we can evaluate 
the style only in terms of the general intention” (133). It’s difficult to discern 
how to interpret this statement, just as it’s difficult to tell what action stu-
dents are supposed to take in response. Such confusing directives co-mingle 
in this edition’s apparatus with questions which ask students to grapple with 
the rhetorical and stylistic features of the text, such as “How does Pater make 
his answer to the question seem plausible and inevitable?” This question 
marks the first “how” question in the Approach to Literature series, ask-
ing students to account for how a particular effect—here, plausibility—is 
achieved.
 The clearest development of this new line of questioning appears in four 
of the eight questions following Arnold’s “Culture and Anarchy.” These 
questions best illuminate the detailed analysis of both form and content to 
which this edition aspires. After asking students to compare the definition of 
culture and the key points Arnold makes to elements of another essay selec-
tion, the apparatus poses a series of questions aimed at uncovering how the 
essay is constructed and how its construction contributes to its work. First, 
students are asked to reread the essay, paying attention to “Arnold’s method 
of presentation and argument. What has he gained by his special ordering of 
the ideas which he has used?” (167). This emphasis on the essay’s structure 
is strengthened in the next two questions, which ask students to attend to 
Arnold’s use of examples and metaphors/similes. Each question encourages 
students to justify how these elements assist or detract from the essay’s per-
suasiveness. Finally, the last question turns explicitly to style: “Consider, for 
example, the difference in style between the concluding paragraphs of the 
essay, and, say, the section on Puritanism and the Nonconformists. What 
accounts for this difference?” (167). Although the phrasing of the question 
suggests a “haphazard” selection of two sections to compare, questions like 
these pave the way for ensuing editions of Approach to develop attention to 
more than the essay’s content.
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Third Edition, 1952
Although there are only slight changes between the revised second edition 
and the 1952 third edition, a few changes begun in the revised edition begin 
to come to fruition. The third edition elaborates the questions about style 
and advances a more substantive taxonomy differentiating kinds of essays. 
Brooks and Warren note differences between the “perceptible logic” typi-
cal of argumentative essays and the characteristics that mark personal essays 
in which “the organization and the tone are more complex—and in a sense, 
more important” (591). This edition also offers a new synopsis of what the 
authors perceive as key differences between these kinds of essays:
[The personal essay] tends to emphasize attitudes and moods rather than 
a process of logical exposition; and consequently, it characteristically uses 
a great deal of concrete illustration, imagery, narrative, etc. In its extreme 
form, as a matter of fact, this type of the essay may seem to be little more 
than a presentation of the author’s personal prejudices and whimsies. Often, 
writers of personal essays will prefer to approach their material by present-
ing some paradoxical situation or idea, or by an overinsistence on some 
aspect of an idea. (591)
This additional explanation moves beyond the organization and tone men-
tioned in the first part of the discussion to a more adept description of the 
form and structure of the personal essay, including its emphases, devices, 
approach, and movement. Additionally, the editors introduce a spectrum of 
essay-writing—from formal to informal and from more extreme forms of 
each to less extreme forms—alongside the spectrum of essay readers, who, 
the authors hope, are able to perceive the logic and complexities of these mul-
tiple essays.
 Remembering how the editors previously characterized the personal 
essay as following the “apparent whim and impulse of the author himself 
or the apparently casual association of ideas” (the Montaigne question from 
the first edition, “Does this essay have any formal structure or is it merely 
haphazard? If it has a structure, what determines that structure?” is a good 
example) helps to pinpoint the development of stronger questions in the third 
edition. Specifically, in this edition Brooks and Warren pay greater attention 
to how the reader is figured in the essay, as well as the tone the essay estab-
lishes in relation to the reader.
 Reader-oriented questions in this edition include the following:
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•	 What is the tone of the essay? What do the allusions and quotations used 
by Lamb tell us of his attitude toward the reader? On what terms does he 
stand with the reader? What kind of reader does he envision?
•	 To whom is this essay addressed? The author writes: “We have forgotten, 
etc.” Who is we? What is the tone of the essay?
Furthermore, the third edition offers more precise questions helping the stu-
dent to engage style. Through modeling, the pedagogical apparatus asks stu-
dents to articulate similar comparisons between essays. In some cases, the 
authors encourage students to account for and describe elements of tone, 
implied content, and specific textual devices—in order to home in on the style 
of the essay.
•	 Why does Lamb recur to China teacups at the end of his essay? Is he 
merely trying to justify the title? Or is some artistic function accom-
plished by this return? (592)
•	 Discuss the style of this essay, noting particularly the means by which the 
author establishes a particular tone. (579)
•	 How would you describe the style of this essay? The first paragraph, for 
example, has a number of echoes from the King James version of the 
Bible. (Can you point them out?) In what other ways is the style “liter-
ary”? Compare and contrast it with the style of Hemingway, of Bishop, 
and of Lamb in his informal essay, “Old China.” (523)
•	 Is there any difference in style between Churchill writing as a historian 
and Churchill speaking as an orator? In this connection, consider very 
carefully the style of the last paragraph. (588)
•	 As a historian, Churchill is necessarily interested in giving facts—precise 
dates, places, even tables of statistics. Does he manage to make his facts 
“come alive”? Does he succeed in presenting the dramatic excitement 
as felt by himself and the British people? If so, how has he done this? 
Consider carefully the diction, the comparisons, and the rhythms of the 
relevant passages. (588)
•	 What is the function of the French quotations? Thurber sometimes trans-
lates the relevant passages. Would anything be lost if he used no quota-
tions in French at all? (601)
Instructed by these precise directives to consider specific words and sentences, 
students are called upon to describe how textual elements work in concert 
to achieve a particular tone, style, and overall effect. Moreover, in the final 
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question students are asked to pay attention to the intricate ways the text is 
constructed by considering how the text might change if it were missing one 
or more of its elements. This encouragement to engage style is developed still 
further in the next edition.
Fourth Edition, 1964
The fourth edition, the last to include essays, exemplifies many of the changes 
Brooks and Warren struggled to implement in their earlier discussions of the 
essay. Especially since the fifth edition omits nonfiction prose entirely, it seems 
that the genre of the essay posed challenges not usually present in Brooks and 
Warren’s other textbooks: reading and interpreting literature not easily cat-
egorized as “imaginative” or “pure.” Indicative of these challenges is that 
essays in the fourth edition now fall under the category of Discursive Prose. 
This is a substantial reorganization of the section on the essay: the rubric 
of “Discursive Prose” now combines four categories—the personal essay, 
the essay of idea and opinion, the critical essay, and biography. Surveying 
textbooks from 1956 to 1960, Richard M. Eastman observes that the genre 
of prose nonfiction “is virtually confined to the freshman course” and thus 
to the texts and anthologies marketed toward such a course (221). Clearly, 
this redesignation seeks to align forms of the essay more squarely with other 
modes of discourse—narration, persuasion, exposition, and description—on 
which another of their textbooks, Modern Rhetoric, relied throughout its 
editions.
 The change of Approach’s overall heading to Discursive Prose also indi-
cates larger theoretical changes within the text.8 The fourth edition is more 
grounded in rhetorical purpose, a point emphasized at the beginning of each 
subsection through a discussion of the “occasion” to which writers respond 
(whether writing a personal essay, an essay of idea, a fictional story, etc.). 
This stronger focus on occasion usefully complicates the division between 
literary/belletristic writing and utilitarian writing which underlay earlier edi-
tions of the textbook. Moreover, rather than present form and style as merely 
aesthetic categories, this edition instead frames them as part of a rhetorical 
project, focusing on the connection of style and structure to “the writer’s con-
cern for precision and expressiveness in his exploration and discrimination of 
meanings” (432).
 This shift toward a more rhetorical understanding of literature allows 
Brooks and Warren to expand their lexicon for and attention to the elements 
of style in writing, especially through developing richer questions for the 
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apparatus. Nonetheless, their methods of reading poetry persist as a central 
way to attend to style, as demonstrated in the exercise example: “Study the 
characteristic sentence structure. Read sections aloud and catch the natu-
ral rhythm of the prose” (436). New to the pedagogical approach, however, 
is the opportunity for students to respond to readings by generating their 
own sets of questions. Instead of being directed by the editors, students are 
encouraged to develop questions that “would serve as a guide to a critical dis-
cussion of both content and method” as well as to make pertinent “compari-
sons with content or method of other essays” (491).
 New questions also more fully interrogate sentence, paragraph, and holis-
tic stylistics. One set focuses on “effective” parts of the text—“bits of descrip-
tion, turns of phrase, or bits of dialogue” that stand out to the student (517). 
The fourth edition also generally applies more pressure to essayistic structure 
and how essayistic prose differs from fictional prose. More questions emerge 
in the fourth edition that ask students to attend to specific stylistic and struc-
tural moments: “Consider the structure of the next to the last paragraph. 
By ordinary standards it is wandering and pointless. Do you find it effective 
here? If so, why?” (440)
 The authors also finally return to some of their key essays, by Lamb and 
others, which have appeared throughout several editions. Although Brooks 
and Warren typically innovate most in the apparatus around new readings, 
this edition also presents a productive expansion of the questions for read-
ings retained from edition to edition, which have seen only small modifica-
tions over several editions. The result is a more comprehensive and consistent 
method across the essays. This more even development of the apparatus also 
allows a new type of second-order question to surface: “What different kinds 
of styles does Whitman, according to this critic, employ? What examples 
of critical analysis do you find Jarrell using in distinguishing these styles?” 
(545). Here students are asked to not only locate and describe multiple styles 
used by a single author, but to also take into account the types of analysis 
used to make judgments about style.
 In its greater attention to particular uses of structure and style in a wider 
array of the essay selections, Brooks and Warren’s fourth edition thus illus-
trates the growth of seeds planted in earlier editions. Although a few of 
the questions still contain vestiges of earlier editions—such as a focus on 
discerning the “personality” of the author via the text—and although the 
rubric of clarity is often used to explain stylistic choices, the fourth edition 
of An Approach to Literature demonstrates the fruit of an evolving process 
whereby the editors grappled with essayistic style and how to help students 
to think about style outside the realms of fiction and poetry.9 Reading across 
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editions makes visible the strategies that Brooks and Warren used to adapt a 
literary approach to a genre that, for them, involved both literary and non-
literary elements. The result was not only an enhanced theorization of how 
style functions in the genre of the essay, but also a more adroit effort to focus 
student attention on this important literary question.
 Thus for Brooks and Warren, the essay—as a creature both literary and 
non-literary—was decidedly a critical problem, and a generative one. Most 
interesting is that their shifting pedagogical approach to essays over the 
course of this textbook’s editions allows them eventually to accommodate in 
a “literary” way this not altogether literary genre. Struggling with the genre 
of the essay enabled Brooks and Warren to fine-tune their pedagogical meth-
ods—and indeed their understanding of essays and their style. The result was 
a more developed and consistent approach to the essay and essayistic style, 
as well as more fruitful questions for assisting students in reading and inter-
preting these challenging texts. With each new edition there was more to say, 
more to consider, and more attention to be paid to essays, their construc-
tion, and how their style mattered in rhetorical terms. Concomitantly, with 
each new edition of Approach, what students were asked to do and the types 
of readers they were asked to become shifted and developed. Students were 
encouraged to become more capable of pursuing their own inquiries and 
more competent at generating critical responses to complex textual questions. 
Imagined as careful readers who could make a case for what they noticed in 
texts, students were asked to become more focused and precise in both their 
responses to stylistic questions and in the way they noted connections and 
distinctions among genres.
 Mark Jancovich notes that one reason Brooks and Warren’s literature-
based textbooks were so immensely influential is that they
appeared at a time when there was no coherent practice for the teaching of 
literature as literature. Their strength was that they addressed this absence, 
and presented a series of pedagogical activities which could be used both 
inside and outside the classroom. More than any other New Critical activity, 
these text-books were responsible for redefining the object of literary study. 
They directed attention to the linguistic forms of the text, and defined the 
terms of reference within which literary studies largely continues to operate. 
(87)
Jancovich’s point—that it was textbooks that largely developed and defined a 
practice of literary study (the study of “literature as literature”) still largely in 
use today—rightly focuses our efforts to understand New Criticism through 
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the enterprise that I would suggest mattered most to the New Criticism: help-
ing students to read and study literature qua literature. Investigating the 
changes to this methodology as they were most present to students—that 
is to say, via textbooks and their complex, integrated, evolving pedagogical 
apparatuses—offers the richest site for rediscovering the analytical and inter-
pretive practices Brooks and Warren actually advocated. Moreover, attending 
to these practical instantiations of New Criticism best reveals the pedagogi-
cal imperative at the heart of the New Critical project: how to teach teachers 
how to teach and students how to read texts as literature.
 Made particularly evident through Brooks and Warren’s struggle with 
the slippery genre of the essay is their strenuous commitment to empowering 
readers to consider form in rigorous ways. That they did so even when facing 
a genre whose literary style was less privileged and less well theorized than 
that of other genres demonstrates their marked dedication to this objective. 
Despite—perhaps because of—their anxious relationship to the elusive genre 
of the essay, over four editions of An Approach to Literature they continued 
to refine their pedagogical apparatus in service of this commitment, adapt-
ing their techniques for analyzing form used elsewhere to a genre usually not 
regarded as meriting such attention and formal analysis.
 Through this examination of An Approach to Literature’s pedagogical 
trajectory, I aim to encourage more work of this kind—work that reveals 
specific acts of teaching—in order to illuminate more richly historical teach-
ing practices in context, as well as their lasting influences on current ped-
agogy. The development of New Critical pedagogical practices, especially 
those showcased through Brooks and Warren’s ongoing efforts to make inter-
pretation of the essay and its style available for students, displays the diffi-
cult balance which must be struck between literary and rhetorical education, 
between the text and the reader. Noting even small changes across editions is 
important in discerning innovations in both literary and genre theory, as well 
as the ongoing process of adapting pedagogy to achieve the most effective 
classroom practices.
 To enlist the concept of “style” differently, the style in which the New 
Critics taught has been so thoroughly absorbed into today’s classroom prac-
tices that we tend to respond to it as we do a longstanding habit, as a “style 
to which we have become accustomed.” Revisiting the particulars of how 
that pedagogical style entered North American classrooms to begin with, and 
how it developed productively over time, can help us respond to New Critical 
teaching methods not as mere customs used and abandoned without reflec-
tion, but rather as thoughtfully developed resources potentially adaptable for 
coming days.
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Notes
 1. For more on how textbooks instruct, interpellate, and discipline teachers in addi-
tion to students, see Hawhee, Libby Miles, and Reynolds.
 2. Graff characterizes the context of the New Criticism as “part of the general revolt 
against empiricism which characterizes modern intellectual history—and which today ani-
mates those who believe themselves to be opponents of the New Criticism” (Literature 
against Itself, 137).
 3. All of the primary scholars of New Criticism I’ve cited here agree that the New 
Critics did not, as usually charged, divorce the text entirely from historical contexts. 
Reviews at the time support this more nuanced understanding. See Jancovich, particularly 
Chapter 8, “Understanding Literature: Textbooks and the Distribution of the New Criti-
cism.”
 4. The New Critics are not the only school of thought that Graff charges with falling 
into this trap. By Graff’s account, many interpretive communities (up to 1979 when Liter-
ature against Itself was published) fell prey to the same binary oppositions, the result being 
that they “assigned ambitious cultural functions to literature while defining literature in a 
way that obstructed carrying out these functions” (147).
 5. For an illuminating history of the collaboration on and release of these textbooks, 
see the introduction in Grimshaw. Apropos of the influence of An Approach to Literature 
specifically, sales of textbooks are notoriously difficult to gauge, but one number refer-
enced in the correspondence between authors may act as a rough illustration: in under 
two years, a fourth edition of An Approach to Literature (1964) sold over 99,000 copies 
(Grimshaw, 264).
 6. In his chapter on textbooks in Fragments of Rationality, Lester Faigley notes that 
studies focusing primarily on textbooks lack the ability to determine how these texts were 
used, appropriated, or challenged by teachers and students. Yet his assertion that “if text-
books are not a reliable source of data for how writing is actually taught, they do reflect 
teachers’ and program directors’ decisions about how writing should be represented to 
students” makes a useful distinction and, coupled with the context this chapter provides in 
terms of the reception of these texts, points to the ways that textbook study is important 
for understanding the representations of writing and reading, students and teachers (133).
 7. Citations in this section reference the revised edition, published by F. S. Crofts, Inc.
 8. As Kulisheck notes, textbooks such as An Approach to Literature furthered a 
“genre-approach in preference to the period or chronological approach,” resulting in a 
curricular sea change as well: many liberal-arts colleges “completely revised . . . their cur-
ricular offerings . . . on an exclusively genre basis” (177).
 9. For an alternate view on style—style as pleasure and not as clarity—see the work of 
Richard Lanham.
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The new crITIcIsm is a school of thought now so old that it seems oddly anachronistic to discuss it in relation to contemporary reading 
practices. The dominant mode for literary analysis and the teaching of lit-
erature in North American post-secondary contexts from the 1930s until 
well into the 1970s, the New Criticism fell radically out of favor during 
the so-called theory wars of the last three decades of the twentieth century, 
when the discipline of English appeared to fracture along a line between 
“new,” theoretically situated, historically contextualized critique and “old,” 
putatively ahistorical analysis, which focused on language and form as it 
produces meaning in texts outside of—or without regard to—temporal and 
contextual referents. The New Criticism was justly accused of being myopic 
in its disposition to situate “universal” meanings not only without reference 
to cultural specificities, but also in the form and language of poetry largely 
written by white male writers; it thus acted as a primary factor in the forma-
tion of a canon whose aesthetic criteria excluded everyone else. As a result, 
while the New Criticism constituted a radical and invigorating school of 
thought in the early to mid-twentieth century (it was demonstrably new in 
relation to the late-nineteenth-century historicist approaches to reading it 
contested), by the last quarter of the century it had become a substantial 
impediment to development within a discipline no longer dominated—or, at 
any rate, less dominated—by white male academics.
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 Close reading, the New Criticism’s primary gesture and most significant 
legacy, worked precisely against the kind of situated reading that character-
izes theorized analysis. Because, that is, it is a practice of reading that attends 
to the ways in which a text produces values in relation to itself, as a more or 
less autonomous object that can be detached from its author and from the 
circumstances of its production, close reading did not lend itself well to late-
twentieth-century investigations, for instance, of the conditions of author-
ship: the ways in which marginalized constituencies use language; the extent 
to which literature is imbricated in the reproduction of systems of power; and 
the social and political work of representation. Indeed it did not lend itself to 
any ideologically situated critique of literature undertaken in the necessary 
late-twentieth-century return to the foundations of an academy that, given 
the continued gaps between academic salaries along the lines of race and 
gender, proved an uneasy intellectual home for scholars “outside,” as Spivak 
famously put it, “in the teaching machine.”1
 Within an academic discipline that itself foundationally and pervasively 
reproduced a system of social and political inequity, then, the New Criticism 
and its practice of close reading came to be understood as instruments for 
maintaining that system. In some late-twentieth-century debates about the 
destructive implications for English studies of race theory, feminist critique, 
postcolonialism, queer, class, cultural, and popular culture studies, close read-
ing came to be represented by scholars outside the theory camp as the whip-
ping boy of various leftist agendas. But the New Criticism and its practices 
were not simply and arbitrarily destroyed like the art of a deposed regime by 
bloodthirsty revolutionaries. Rather, as a school of thought that provided no 
strategies for assessing the social and political determinants in the production 
of language in specific contexts at specific times, the New Criticism really did 
function as what Audre Lorde would describe in 1979 as “the master’s tools” 
(331).
 Thus if exclusionary, male-dominated, and patriarchal scholarship char-
acterized English studies during the first three quarters of the twentieth cen-
tury and accordingly comprised what Lorde calls the “master’s house,” New 
Critical close reading could not be particularly useful to the work of disman-
tling that house—in the field of English, the university, and more widely. The 
New Criticism’s role in an unequal workplace had to be assessed, and its 
effects on the discipline had to be addressed. As Jane Gallop suggests, “The 
time was ripe for . . . a course correction: ahistoricism had been persuasively 
linked to sexism, racism, and elitism; attacks on the canon had called into 
question the notion of timeless works; literary studies had been ahistorical for 
too long” (181).
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 By the end of the 1970s, close reading, under pressure from what were 
often represented as “special interest groups” (constituencies rendered “spe-
cial” by virtue of their exclusion from the dominant category, most often 
through “differences” in gender, race, or sexuality), had largely vanished 
from classrooms and the analysis of literature. At any rate, it had ceased 
to function as the core of the discipline’s training and critique—even to be 
acknowledged a valued practice. Close reading, as Terry Eagleton observes 
became “[l]ike thatching or clog dancing, . . . a dying art” (1), a vestige of the 
New Criticism that had, by then, as Frank Lentricchia puts it, met its “offi-
cial” demise (xiii). No longer taught, no longer studied, no longer accorded 
any authority in the analysis of literature, the New Criticism was “dead”—
as Lentricchia suggests, “an imposing and repressive father-figure” (xiii)—
brought to its end through an act that might be understood, as Jonathan Arac 
has likewise intimated, as a kind of disciplinary “parricide” (347). The often 
vitriolic late-twentieth-century debates about whether theory or close reading 
was the better system for teaching and interpretation and about whether or 
not the New Criticism was really more historically engaged or less focused 
on the text as an autonomous artifact than it appeared to be gradually faded, 
displaced by other debates. With only a few exceptions—for instance, Len-
tricchia’s volume, After the New Criticism (1980); Chaviva Hosek and Patri-
cia Parker’s 1985 collection, Lyric Poetry: Beyond New Criticism (1985); 
Mark Jancovich’s study, The Cultural Politics of the New Criticism (1993)—
hardly anyone mentioned the New Criticism in a direct and sustained way, 
indicated much concern with its demise, or mourned the loss of what Parker 
describes as its “program” (11–12).2
 Now, however, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, many academics have begun to reconsider the function of this school 
of thought as it pertains to critical practice and to pedagogy, with particular 
reference to close reading. Such reconsideration underpins recent analysis 
of the New Critical moment, such as that of Andrew DuBois and Frank 
Lentricchia in their 2003 edited volume, Close Reading: The Reader; Car-
oline Levine in a 2006 essay in Victorian Studies (“Strategic Formalism: 
Toward a New Method in Cultural Studies”); Stephen Schryer in a discus-
sion in PMLA in 2007 (“Fantasies of the New Class: The New Criticism, 
Harvard Sociology, and the Idea of the University”); Andrew DuBois in a 
consideration of ethics, critics, and close reading in University of Toronto 
Quarterly in the same year; Garrick Davis, founder of the Contemporary 
Poetry Review, in an anthology of New Criticism titled Praising It New: The 
Best of the New Criticism; as well as many others, including, of course, the 
authors in this volume. Moreover, critics notably not associated with New 
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Critical practices, such as Gayatri Spivak (“Close Reading”) and Jane Gallop 
(“The Historicization of Literary Studies and the Fate of Close Reading”), 
have called for a review of the work of close reading. Marjorie Levinson has 
weighed in with an extensive review of current writing on or within what 
she designates “the New Formalism,” which aims, as she puts it, “to recover 
for teaching and scholarship in English some version of their traditional 
address to aesthetic form” (559).3 Eric Savoy has made a case for what he 
calls “Queer Formalism.” Perhaps most unexpectedly, in 2007 Terry Eagle-
ton published How to Read a Poem, suggesting the importance for read-
ers (of poetry, specifically) of attending to matters of form and language 
(“Tone, Mood and Pitch,” “Syntax, Grammar and Punctuation,” “Rhythm 
and Metre”) historically associated with the domain of what I. A. Richards 
in 1929 called “Practical Criticism” rather than with ideologically situated 
analysis.
 Given the emergence of the majority of these discussions of close read-
ing from such contexts as feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonial critique, 
queer theory, and Marxism, it cannot be suggested that there are many aca-
demics who advocate a full-scale return to a school of thought whose time 
has come and gone, and in whose recession from classrooms and scholarly 
inquiry many still active in the profession were involved. Professional equity 
along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality has certainly not been fully 
achieved, and salary and promotion gaps between nonvisible-minority men 
and visible-minority women are still acutely evident across North American 
universities; and if New Critical practices can be understood to be implicated 
in creating these gaps, it is hard to make a case for taking them up again. 
Moreover, although in English studies, old exclusionary canons have been 
largely displaced as structuring principles for course syllabi and programs of 
research, dominance and marginality still obtain in many textbooks, antholo-
gies, and areas of inquiry throughout the discipline. Thus the need to main-
tain pressure on the practices that demonstrably reproduced and reinforced 
the patriarchal academy continues to exist; and it is doubtful that any of the 
critics cited above, whatever their theoretical affiliations, could be accused of 
leading a retro-guard to restore a system whose unsituated formal analysis 
serves as index of the academy’s inequities.
 Nonetheless, these critics, along with many others, are making a collec-
tive and increasingly urgent call for some version of the old New Critical 
practice of attending to form and language, and, in particular, to return to 
teaching the “art” of close reading. Like Gallop, they argue that close read-
ing was “the most valuable thing English ever had to offer” (183) and like 
Savoy, “invite the fainthearted formalists to overcome their embarrassment 
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and institutional abjection” (80) and return to doing what they used to do. 
“Forward,” as Eagleton puts it, “to antiquity!” (16).
 If there is not, in fact, a rearguard plot to reaffirm patriarchy in the uni-
versity (as some feminists have suggested there is in the various performances 
of “backlash” since the early 1980s4), then the rationale for the call to close 
reading is obscure. Why do so many scholars want close reading back? What 
has been lost with its eradication from scholarship and classrooms? What 
will be gained with its reinstatement? How is what happens in English studies 
now less than it was before—before theory, before new historicisms, before 
situated, archive-based critique? And, most importantly, what conditions in 
the discipline and the academy are indicated by the desire to return to close 
reading? The university, Bill Readings suggested a decade ago, is palpably 
“in ruins”; disciplines across the academy are charting decline5; apocalyptic 
reports of imminent disappearance, diminishing value, and disciplinary frag-
mentation proliferate, in English studies and elsewhere. The New Criticism 
“died” a long time ago; more recently the discipline has seen not only the 
“end of reading” (Eagleton, 1) but the “death” of theory itself—or, at any 
rate, as Jonathan Culler suggests, widespread reports of its death (Culler, 
1). The disciplinary moment symptomized by the call for a return to close 
reading, then, is characterized by postness: “after the New Criticism” (Len-
tricchia, 1980), “after theory” (Eagleton, 2003), poststructuralist, -modern, 
-colonial, -feminist, and -human, what, as a 2003 Readers’ Forum in English 
Studies in Canada (ESC) asked, is “left of English studies”?6 What do we 
study? How do we teach it? And, crucially, how do we train others to do the 
work of the discipline?
 The ESC Forum and many other such investigations, in tandem with the 
broad call for a return to close readings, suggest that the discipline of English, 
if not in ruins, is broadly aware of an identity crisis. Unlike the situation in 
the seventies and eighties, however, the current crisis is an effect less of politi-
cal infighting or ongoing contests of margin versus center than of decentering 
itself, both as it involves repositioning what had been marginalized in relation 
to the dominant and as it signifies a gap at the core of disciplinary identity. 
Although the proliferation of disciplinary self-analysis in this first decade of 
the twenty-first century has yielded a substantial catalogue of concerns per-
taining to the profession (what it is, what we do, why it matters), what is at 
the heart of this discussion across all its categories—what defines the gap—is 
what used to be called literature. Evident in discussions of the state of the 
discipline is an intuition that what has been lost is a coherent, collective, and, 
if always conditionally and provisionally, shared idea of the object of disci-
plinary study. The focus of English studies has become unclear, shifting over 
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the past twenty-five years from literature through text across a range of dis-
cursive registers to a kind of studies that are sometimes Cultural Studies and 
sometimes just culturally situated, and not necessarily textual or language-
based at all. Literature, it might be argued, is no longer the focus of English 
studies.
 In fact, we, if there is any kind of first-person plural subject at all, do not 
teach what used to be called literature, but instead a range of cultural docu-
ments and practices that function not so much to demonstrate to students 
the lineaments and terms of “English” as a discernible disciplinary body but 
rather the extent to which what used to be called literature operates across 
disciplinary boundaries and is comprehensible not through the study of lit-
erature itself but through the lenses and positions of theoretical tools and 
systems that are mobilized in many disciplines. Accordingly, sociologists, his-
torians, musicologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and English scholars 
might all “use” the same references to explore and articulate values in the 
material they study and teach. Although, as Terry Eagleton rightly observes, 
it is “one of the great myths or unexamined clichés of contemporary criti-
cal debate” that close reading was “destroyed” by “theory, with its soulless 
abstractions and vacuous generalities” (1), it is true, as Culler points out, 
that theory breaks down disciplinary boundaries. If we understand theory, 
as Culler defines it, “as work that succeeds in challenging and reorienting 
thinking in fields other than those in which it originates” (3), then it is, as 
he suggests, “inescapably interdisciplinary” (4) and minimizes distinctions 
between disciplines—at the level both of “approach” or methodology and 
of the object of inquiry. This effect is certainly evident in English, as schol-
ars find themselves in a location that is still nominally identified as a dis-
cipline while becoming increasingly undifferentiated from other disciplines 
by methods and objects of analysis. While there is not necessarily any loss 
in this configuration—scholarship is unquestionably enriched by the move-
ment of ideas across disciplinary boundaries—the effect for English studies, 
perhaps uniquely in the academy, has been a demonstrable diminishment in 
its engagement with its former object of inquiry, as well as of the disciplinary 
sense of what that object is. What has been lost is a shared sense of literature: 
what it is and why it matters.
 In many ways, what there is to study in English is much more than was 
there before: the political critique of the literary that informed the theory-
driven canon wars in the late twentieth century stretched the boundaries 
of “literature” to include writing by women and marginalized categories, 
non-English or colonial English and sometimes translated texts, nonliterary 
genres, print culture, and non-language-based symbolic systems and media. 
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It also gave rise to new canon of key theoretical, philosophical, historical, 
and scientific commentary that would constitute the groundwork of critique 
in English as in other disciplines. In other ways, however, interdisciplin-
ary boundary-crossing has meant that this terrain is wide open and not the 
“property” of English studies. That is, if literature is not to be differentiated 
from any other kind of cultural production, the point of a discipline whose 
purpose is the study of literature becomes unclear. Anybody in English stud-
ies can read anything across any disciplinary terrain, and, indeed, can bring 
that reading to research and teaching as the knowledge in relation to which 
any text or process signifies; conversely, anybody equipped with the same 
theoretical toolbox can read literature and situate it in relation to the cultural 
context it reproduces, with and in relation to other documents and processes 
doing related work. English studies might thus be seen to have expanded to 
become, in one sense, everything, while in another, to have diminished into 
nothing.
 Thus what is at stake in the current discussion of close reading is what 
close reading functioned to define and validate—both literature and the pro-
fession of literary studies. On the one hand, the question “What’s left of 
English studies?” speaks to the problem of a discipline whose identity in the 
academy has been mystified; on the other hand, to the problem of literature 
itself as an identifiable, distinct, and meaningful element in of the field of 
cultural production; as a mode of discourse whose characteristics differenti-
ate it from other kinds of discursive production and merit, if not problem-
atic placement above other kinds of cultural production, at least attention to 
what it does and how it does it. The current conversation invites discipline-
specific methodologies, practices of analysis that attend to the work itself and 
not only, as in some historicized or situated readings, its function as evidence 
or “symptom” of systems in which it is implicated. The call for a return to 
close reading is thus a call for English studies to define itself again with ref-
erence to what it is that English studies studies—just as it was for the New 
Critics, who undertook to “redefine the literary institution and its claim to 
professional status” (Jancovich, 144).
 Gallop notes that it was the New Criticism and close reading that trans-
formed studies in English from “a gentlemanly practice of amateur history” 
or what Searle describes as “the genteel cultivation of taste and sentiment” 
(528) into a profession (183): “We became a discipline, so the story goes, 
when we stopped being armchair historians and became instead painstaking 
close readers” (183). By this logic, without a definable, teachable methodol-
ogy such as close reading, we are in danger of losing disciplinary identity. 
Indeed, Gallop suggests, we are in danger of becoming a “practice of amateur 
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history” all over again: “While,” she argues, “today’s literary historians with 
their leftist leanings and insistence on understanding literature in a generally 
cultural and especially political context are hardly gentlemanly, still I fear 
they are—despite their archival work—amateurs. Certainly that is what our 
colleagues in history think” (183). In other words, according to Gallop, the 
archival and historical turn in English studies, while crucial to redefining the 
discipline and working toward forms of equality in the academy, has not only 
blurred the boundaries of the discipline but brought it back to much the con-
dition in which the New Critics found it early in the early twentieth century 
when they developed a system of reading that would address the specificity 
and function of literature.
 Although the New Critics were often accused of making the analysis of 
literature too “scientific,” the effect of “practical criticism” was in many 
ways to affirm not the value of the discipline as an enterprise that is like sci-
ence, but at a fundamental level the value of literature as cultural production. 
The New Critical canon registered the pervasively patriarchal structures—
socially and of course also in the context of the university—from which close 
reading emerged; and New Critical analysis, obscuring the social and politi-
cal circumstances in which authors and readers are imbricated, inevitably 
reproduced that patriarchal structure. But as Jancovich argues, the New 
Critics
stressed that [literature or] the aesthetic was not inherently separate from 
human activity, but a form which should be fully integrated with all activi-
ties; that it should be established within a way of living that had acknowl-
edged, and come to terms with, human nature. As a result, their literary 
criticism was not a form of scientism, but developed out of a reaction against 
positivist concepts of science. (144)
What Stephen Schryer describes as “the discipline’s specialized techne” not 
only worked to “make criticism more scientific—that is, more predictable 
and rigorous” (665), but also “distinguish[ed literary texts],” Searle suggests, 
“from other texts or other uses of language (particularly scientific language)” 
(528). The New Critical sense of literature, in other words, is that the ways 
in which humans negotiate language in texts whose function is artistic or 
aesthetic constitutes a vital area of scholarly inquiry, and, moreover, that the 
criticism of literary texts is a meaningful “form of activity itself” (Jancovich, 
144), not so much because it elucidates cultural events or the circumstances 
conditioning an author’s performance of identity but because it enables con-
sideration of the text’s own negotiation of language processes and attention 
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to how constructions in form and language speak to and engage with con-
temporary moments.
 The New Criticism thus both “redefined the profession of English” (Jan-
covich, 138) and reaffirmed the importance of literature as a human activity 
that merits systematic study. Its processes can be identified and named; its 
effects traced through analysis. Its negotiation of language to investigate com-
plex and contradictory responses to environment, experience, and identity 
can be understood to be sufficiently complex to justify sustained, rigorous 
analysis. If, that is, the ways in which humans engage through language with 
the conditions that language both represents and constitutes is meaningful, 
then the systematic analysis of its meanings is also meaningful.
 It is this kind of idealism that motivated the New Criticism and its work 
to develop a discipline dedicated to the study of literature. It is likewise this 
kind of idealism that motivates the current wave of critics calling for a return 
to close reading. The problem confronting these critics, however, is twofold. 
On the one hand is the question of the literary itself, and the problem of 
affirming the value of this form of human engagement in and with language 
without reconstructing old hierarchies separating “art” from other cultural 
work and “high” from “low” art. On the other is the problem of the New 
Criticism as an apparatus that simultaneously affirms through its practice 
of close reading the specificity of literature as a form of cultural production 
and reproduces a system within which the conditions of textual production 
and circulation are not considered as factors in the ways in which literature 
signifies. The problem, in other words, is how to reaffirm the literary with-
out undermining the crucial late-twentieth-century expansion of the literary 
(and the aesthetic) beyond a male-dominated, Anglocentric, white canon of 
specific texts and particular genres and without undoing the expansion of the 
discipline as workplace and intellectual home for scholars whose marginal-
ity has only recently and tenuously been redressed. The problem is, in effect, 
how to dislodge the historicism that, in the view of scholars such as Gallop, 
has turned English studies away from the textual production of meaning to a 
consideration of its function, as Culler puts it, as “a symptom, whose causes 
are to be found in historical reality” (9)—and, importantly, how to do this 
without disarticulating analysis from history. The question is how to inte-
grate close reading with social and political critique.
 Jancovich maintains that the New Critics did undertake such an inte-
grated practice, making “the critique of modern society the centre of their 
argument and approach” (144). By the same token, Eagleton argues that 
close reading has in fact always informed the practice of what he describes, 
in a kind of Arnoldian swerve, as “the twentieth century’s towering literary 
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scholars,” for whom, he suggests, “there is a politics implicit in the painstak-
ing investigation of the literary text” (8–9); and Culler holds that “formal-
ism does not involve a denial of history, as is sometimes claimed” and that 
“it is precisely because language is historical through and through . . . that 
we must relate any linguistic event to the synchronic system from which it 
emerges” (9–10). But the fact remains that the New Criticism represents a 
problematic, exclusionary, and deeply biased notion of the literary and of 
the discipline, and that the New Criticism did not consider the historical as 
an integral factor the work of close reading—as contemporary critics suggest 
that any “new” practice of close reading must do.
 In the current project of defining a disciplinary practice, Levinson 
describes a “new formalism” that takes up a “project of cultivating ‘a his-
torically informed formalist criticism’” (559). Caroline Levine, meanwhile, 
traces a movement toward what she calls “strategic formalism,” a cultur-
ally situated method premised on the idea that “literary forms do not merely 
reflect social relationships but may help bring them into being” (625) and 
that demonstrates how “literary forms participate in a destabilizing relation 
to social formation, often colliding with social hierarchies rather than reflect-
ing or foreshadowing them” (626). And Eagleton observes what he calls “a 
kind of dual attentiveness: to the grain and texture of literary works, and to 
those works’ cultural contexts” (8). Such gestures, Levine suggests, do not 
disregard the cultural as a central location for the production of meaning, 
but emphasize it; they do not, Eagleton holds, diminish “the critic’s social 
and political responsibilities” (16) but compellingly affirm them; they do not, 
Gallop suggests, return to what has often been seen in relation to New Criti-
cal practices (as it was for the philologically and historically oriented models 
of English studies prior to the New Criticism) as an authoritarian model of 
reading and teaching, but revitalize what she describes as “our most effective 
antiauthoritarian pedagogy” (185).
 None of these critics proposes a reduction of the expanded literary field 
of the late twentieth century; what they all do propose, however, is a method, 
inspired by the methods of the New Criticism, that makes it possible to see 
cultural texts not necessarily as autonomous objects but nonetheless as works 
that generate their own meanings through the organization and particular 
use of language, not detached from social and political contexts or histo-
ries, but equally not detached from symbolic practice. What close reading 
thus seems to mean as it is represented by scholars calling for its return, is a 
not a de-emphasis of content per se (although, Gallop recommends teaching 
course materials with less reference to extradisciplinary and already estab-
lished knowledge that must be given to students as context for understanding 
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a text), but an emphasis of form as itself a symbolic practice and, as Fredric 
Jameson suggests, itself ideological. Caroline Levine draws attention to Jame-
son’s “attention to the ideology of form as an effort to grasp the ‘symbolic 
messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which 
are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production’” (Jameson, 
qtd. in Levine, 625). Where the “dually attentive” practice of close reading 
that is tentatively identified as “new formalism” and “strategic formalism” 
differs from the older New Critical practice is precisely in its understanding 
of form as it produces values.
 Formal practices have of course been productively charted over the dis-
cipline’s history and formed the basis of New Critical analysis of rhetoric, 
narrative, genre, poetic meter and poetic form, structure, and figure. They 
represent what Eagleton describes as “the grain and texture of literary 
works.” To consider them is thus to affirm “the literary”; to situate them 
in relation to “works’ cultural contexts” is to affirm the extent to which lit-
erature—albeit an expansive and flexible category—is also distinct from cul-
tural production generally. It is not that literature is more or less important 
than other kinds of writing and symbolic representation, but it does produce 
effects in language and sign systems in different ways. If disciplinary identity 
and distinctness matter, and if literature is the lost object of English studies 
and the thing sought in the impulse to return to close reading, then recogniz-
ing and engaging with those differences matters too.
 There is always a danger in fundamentalism: this has been as evident in 
what Savoy describes as “the self-perpetuating circularity of raceclassgen-
der” (80) or what Gallop suggests is the authority of historicism as it once 
was in New Critical practices of insisting on the autonomy and discrete form 
of the literary text. There is thus a clear danger in arguing for a critical prac-
tice necessary to the survival of the discipline. The point, however, is not 
necessarily to articulate an imperative with regard to the specifics of what 
we teach and study, nor to construct factions across the battlefield of the text 
and its interpretation (theorized close reading versus theory without close 
reading; literary versus nonliterary), but rather to continue to develop under-
standing of how what we teach and study shapes the discipline in which we 
work and the social structures we inhabit. The recent interest in returning to 
close reading in the context of ideologically situated criticism and in relation 
to the conditions of the academy might most compellingly indicate that the 
problems evident in the New Critical moment, while lessened, have not alto-
gether disappeared. These systemic problems may well be similarly repro-
duced to some degree in a discipline organized around history and theory. If 
historicism and theory have not produced an academic ecosystem that has 
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managed to move beyond the terms of the dominant and the marginal and 
is radically more equitable than that which characterized the New Critical 
moment, then there is still work to be done—the work of dually attentive 
close reading.
Notes
 1. Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine (1993). With regard to continued ineq-
uity in the academic workplace, see, for instance, the data published by the Canadian Fed-
eration for the Humanities and Social Sciences (CFHSS) in 2006, which indicates that in 
Canadian universities in 2001 the salaries of nonvisible-minority women represent 68.9% 
and those of visible-minority women 55.4% of those of nonvisible-minority men. Statis-
tics related to hiring and promotion in Canada in the first decade of the twentieth century 
are similar to widely published records in the US: in 2003 women, 59% of graduating 
students, comprise 31.7% of university teachers; First Nations, people with disabilities, 
and visible minorities represent, collectively, 22.5% of university teachers. Women occupy 
29.9% of the highest ranking positions at American universities and 18.1% at Canadian 
universities (2003). See “Feminist and Equity Audits 2006” <www.fedcan.ca/english/pdf/
issues/FEAAuditpostcardEng.pdf>.
 2. Parker outlines the New Critical “program of treating the literary text as an iso-
lated artifact or object, dismissing concern with author’s intention and reader’s response, 
and the tenet of the text’s organic wholeness, its reconciliation of tension or diversity into 
unity” (11–12).
 3. Levinson’s essay provides an important overview of current criticism engaged with 
questions of form and formal analysis across a range of fields.
 4. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War against American Women (New 
York: Crown, 1991).
 5. See, for instance, Spivak on comparative literature in Death of a Discipline (2003).
 6. Jo-Ann Wallace, ed., “Forum: What’s Left of English Studies?” English Studies in 
Canada 29.1–2 (2003): 1–84.
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as we enTer a new millennium, our experiences of reading, once chiefly   associated with the printed page, have undergone radical changes. Given 
the recent proliferation in our culture of digital text and hypertext, a dizzying 
array of new social media, storage devices, and e-readers, all of which present 
verbal text in new forms, we are increasingly prompted to take stock of our 
habitual reading practices and how they need to be adapted to new modes of 
transmission. We encounter verbal text on the web, in text messages, updates 
on Facebook, and blog posts. Accordingly, contemporary culture is proving 
fertile ground for the reconsideration of reading practices—and within liter-
ary studies, for a reevaluation of the approaches to reading associated with 
the New Criticism, suspicion of which for many years served as a kind of dis-
ciplinary shibboleth. In recent years, methods of close reading in particular 
have been increasingly invoked as they bear not only upon the category of 
“literature” but also on a much wider range of verbal text in various media, 
as well as on the semiotics of cultural texts more broadly.1
 In “The Historicization of Literary Studies and the Fate of Close Read-
ing,” Jane Gallop laments what she perceives as a decline during the late 
1980s and 1990s in literary studies of methods of close reading that have, 
in her view, provided the most valuable skills that the field offers. Even 
during the first days of “high theory” in the late 1970s and 1980s, when 
those committed to new currents in theory were refusing the “elitism” and 
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“ahistoricism” of the New Criticism, approaches such as deconstruction in 
many respects carried on careful close readings whose maneuvers were very 
much indebted to the New Criticism. By the turn of the century, however, 
she notes, New Historicism and other historicizing approaches—at least as 
widely practiced—had contributed to a decline of close reading. And by this, 
Gallop means what most contemporary commentators who note the wan-
ing of close reading usually mean: the general assumption is that what close 
reading “reads” is, broadly speaking, aesthetic form. As Marjorie Levinson 
has recently noted, certainly the founders of New Historicism, themselves 
deeply invested in close reading, were not responsible for this trend; Thomas 
Laqueur likewise notes that the “new historicism, at least in its Berkeley ver-
sion, engaged passionately with what are traditionally taken to be formalist 
questions” (50). But later New Historicist and related work was often read 
as displacing the emphasis on close reading for form with historical research. 
As Gallop observes, by 2000, archival work was regarded as paramount for 
jobseekers in the field, and many students were emerging from doctoral pro-
grams in literary studies without skills in close reading.
 Gallop contends that if, in the name of removing from literary studies 
the dimensions of New Critical work with which we no longer want to be 
associated, we also jettison close reading, we lose an approach that has not 
only been crucial to the formation of the discipline of literary studies, but that 
is what we, distinctively, have to offer, both to our field and to neighboring 
disciplines. Insofar as it promotes active learning and empowers students to 
assert claims based on evidence they themselves can find, Gallop maintains 
that close reading provides our best defense against authoritarian, top-down 
forms of pedagogy. Like many others in the field today—Paglia, Graff, Eagle-
ton, as well as those such as Heather Dubrow, Susan Wolfson, and Charles 
Altieri whom Levinson associates with the “New Formalism”—Gallop calls 
for a reinvigoration of close reading.
 Such appeals have clearly constituted a major impetus for this volume. 
Likewise forming an important point of departure for the project and under-
scoring the importance of the historically reevaluative work undertaken by 
its essays is recent attention to a related phenomenon that Sharon Marcus 
and Stephen Best term “surface reading.” In the introduction to “The Way 
We Read Now,” their special issue of Representations published in fall 2009, 
Best and Marcus highlight this set of allied interpretive practices as playing a 
fundamental role in the “way we read now.” Surface reading responds to an 
interpretive practice (which, following Fredric Jameson, they call “symptom-
atic reading”) that has held significant sway over literary–critical practices 
since the 1970s, when New Criticism faded from the scene and the “meta-
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languages” of psychoanalysis and Marxism began to exert significant influ-
ence. This approach entails what Paul Ricoeur dubbed a hermeneutics of 
suspicion—i.e., proceeding with skepticism about what texts apparently pres-
ent—and reads texts for latent content: manifest content is read as merely 
“symptomatic” of a deeper underlying logic, narrative, or ideology that waits 
to be uncovered by the discerning, “heroic” critic. As Best and Marcus have 
it, “when symptomatic readers focus on elements in the text, they construe 
them as symbolic of something latent or concealed” (3). According to Jame-
son, the “strong” critic has to “unmask” the text and “restore” to “the sur-
face the history that the text represses.”
 By contrast, the essays gathered in “The Way We Read Now” feature 
recent critical approaches that depart from such symptomatic reading and 
turn, in some cases return, to varieties of “surface reading”—which involve 
attending to, interpreting, and evaluating what is evident in texts, rather 
than assuming that their most important dimensions are to be derived from 
distrusting what the textual surface suggests and exposing hidden depths. 
Among the contemporary varieties of surface reading they note, Best and 
Marcus highlight a practice of close reading that derives from the New Criti-
cism, which focuses on revealing the “‘linguistic density’ and ‘verbal com-
plexity’ of literary texts” (10). More generally, surface reading involves a 
“willed, sustained proximity to the text,” directly reminiscent of the “aims of 
the New Criticism, which insisted that the key to a text’s meaning lay within 
the text itself, particularly in its formal properties” (10).2
 Animating the project of Rereading the New Criticism is an argument that 
Best and Marcus do not address but that their comments imply: that today’s 
reinvigorated forms of close and surface reading can valuably be informed 
by—in fact, need the support of—historically based reevaluations of the New 
Criticism of the kind this volume offers. Most obviously, such reevaluation 
can bring forward specific classic readings from the New Critics and their 
predecessors that can guide contemporary close readings. While latter-day 
critics would no doubt not always wish to emulate the letter of these readings 
(we may not want to read for irony, ambiguity, and paradox), their spirit of 
close critical attention can nonetheless inspire today’s work, and their read-
ings can shape contemporary commentary both through what they model 
and how they go awry. As Connor Byrne’s article notes, such approaches are 
especially useful when confronting literary texts that present forms of read-
erly “difficulty,” which the New Critics, championing the difficulty of both 
modernist writers (such as Eliot) and their predecessors (such as Donne), 
prided themselves on being able to meet with specific critical techniques.3
 What the New Critics sought to discover in a text through close reading 
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were those aspects of it beyond its thematics—what comprised its “form”—
which in their view constituted the dimensions of it that made it distinctively 
“literary,” and thus in need of specifically literary analytical and interpre-
tive practice. In these days of anxious reassessment of what literary studies 
itself studies, this indicates another issue that reengagement with the history 
of the New Criticism can illuminate. Much recent interest in the New Criti-
cism stems from its signature theoretical concern: how to read a literary text 
qua literary text, rather than as historical document, registration of a moral 
or philosophical position, set of themes, or witness to the cultural currents 
of an era. What dimensions—what “differentia” or “residuary tissue” (as 
Ransom put it in “Criticism, Inc.” [349])—remain when one turns aside from 
what the text provides at the level of content? And what difference do these 
dimensions make to the text’s content? One of the prime New Critical con-
tentions was that, if read closely for this “residuum” (Brooks, ii), “poetry 
gives us knowledge” of a kind not otherwise available, not accessible through 
other modes of discourse.4 Recent work from Charles Altieri, whom Marjo-
rie Levinson associates with the New Formalism, engages these New Critical 
efforts to theorize such “literary knowledge,” reads them as having fallen 
short and considers how to follow this lead of the New Critics into deeper 
knowledge of the value of “dispositions”—states of mind, body, and feel-
ing—that poetry, if closely read with attention to what it does distinctively 
qua poetry, can uniquely help us to achieve. “For me,” Altieri notes, “all the 
ladders start with the New Criticism” (259).
 But all this should not imply that renewing engagement with New Criti-
cal close reading and its theoretical underpinnings pertains only to literary 
studies. The relevance of close reading to other disciplines constitutes another 
compelling issue toward which this volume gestures. As Best and Marcus 
note, since the 1980s, literary critics have felt “licensed to study objects other 
than literary ones, using paradigms drawn from anthropology, history, and 
political theory”; and by the same token, other such fields have “themselves 
borrowed from literary criticism an emphasis on close reading and interpreta-
tion” (1). In this new era, approaches to reading and interpretive techniques 
honed in the domain of literary studies have come into increasing use in 
neighboring disciplines.
 In another special issue of Representations, appearing in Fall 2008 and 
entitled “On Form,” members of the journal’s editorial board present essays 
that variously insist upon the rich potential inherent in reading for form 
across the disciplines. Encapsulating the issue’s mission, Thomas Laqueur 
recalls that the interdisciplinary journal was in fact originally established out 
of interest in how texts in different fields often employ similar forms: the 
founders shared a concern with “genre and plot that seemed to structure 
McIntyre and Hickman, “Toward a New Close Reading” • 235
events in the world as well as on the page and on canvas; in the figures of 
metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy that informed novels, political theory, 
and legislation alike . . . in historical isomorphism, that is, an ‘identity’ or 
‘similarity’ . . . of form between seemingly different contemporaneous or tem-
porally distant domains” (51).
 It is in this spirit that the contributors to this special issue of Representa-
tions bring self-consciously formalist interpretive strategies to their objects 
of study—whether the British film documentary Seven Up, passages from 
Flaubert and Melville, the Florentine Codex, military history, the evolution of 
the modern crematorium, a specific edition of Rousseau’s Social Contract, or 
the ephemera of notes and meeting agendas associated with Representations 
itself. Considering the “intellectual and emotional responses” that prompt 
many commentators today to return to formalist readings, Samuel Otter sug-
gests that their keywords “often signal . . . a sense that there has been a loss 
of recalcitrance, idiosyncrasy, and surprise in textual analysis.” A prevailing 
feeling animating the return to form is that “Critics move too quickly through 
text to context or from ideology to text, without conceding the ‘slowness of 
perception’ that the Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky described as charac-
teristically produced by verbal art” (117). Otter’s invocation of a giant figure 
from an earlier stage of formalist interpretation reminds us that the New 
Critics were certainly not the only voices advocating for varieties of “close 
reading”during the first half of the twentieth century5: Otter highlights the 
importance of a careful engagement with that earlier history with an eye to 
enriching contemporary critical practices. Marjorie Levinson likewise notes 
in “What Is New Formalism?” that when reassessing formalisms of the past, 
we should not focus exclusively on the New Criticism, though it is still the 
New Criticism that is most closely associated in contemporary North Ameri-
can contexts with early to mid-twentieth-century formalist analysis: we need 
also to “introduce students to a wider array of formalisms: Russian formal-
ism; Aristotelian and Chicago school formalism; the culturally philological 
formalism of Erich Au erbach and Leo Spitzer; the singular projects of Wil-
liam Empson, F. R. Leavis, I. A. Richards, Northrop Frye, Kenneth Burke, 
Wayne Booth” (563).
 Such historical work can not only inform new varieties of close read-
ing, but can also foster close critical reading of the very critical strategies 
involved in different forms of close reading. Bradley Clissold’s reading of 
William Empson comes to mind here, with its suggestion that the tools of 
formal analysis can yield valuable and provocative results when brought to 
bear not only on Empson’s poetry but also on his literary criticism, as well 
as the relations obtaining between the two. And in rereading the New Criti-
cism itself closely, we need to consider the ethical implications of bringing 
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into play again its techniques, theoretical concerns, and assumptions. As Cec-
ily Devereux’s essay emphasizes, among the reasons for the New Criticism’s 
fall from dominance was its inter-imbrication with understandings of literary 
canon, academic culture, and aesthetic and literary values that today’s aca-
demics can no longer countenance. She stresses the importance of remember-
ing, in other words, the ethical blind spots of the New Criticism, especially in 
its institutional varieties, that involved it in the perpetuation of a patriarchal, 
Eurocentric, elitist academy many have labored over the past four decades to 
overturn. This, coupled with the emphasis of the New Critics themselves on 
ethics—as Robert Archambeau points out—can sensitize us anew to the ethi-
cal valences of acts of close reading.
 Archambeau suggests that New Critical work itself, with its indebted-
ness to the “Romantic tradition of aesthetics-as-ethics launched by Schiller 
and Coleridge”—which advocated balanced, disinterested subjectivity, devel-
oped through engagement with aesthetics, as a precondition to citizenship—
indicates an important form of ethical thought for our time. In this vein, 
another insightful recent meditation on the ethics associated with New Criti-
cal thought is Jane Gallop’s “The Ethics of Reading” (2000). Reflecting upon 
her pedagogical experiences, Gallop argues for the widespread applicability 
of close reading to the study of texts, whether literary or otherwise. Gallop 
goes so far as to locate the sine qua non of literary studies not in the objects 
that it addresses—always a problematic paradigm—but rather in the specific 
interpretive approaches it takes to those objects. For Gallop, what makes 
her courses specifically “English” courses “are not the books we read, but 
the way we read the books we read”—that is, “close reading” (7). Starting 
from this cue, Gallop argues for a return to careful close reading as the best 
way of attending to what texts actually communicate, rather than to what we 
assume they say because of our own projections. In Gallop’s view, close read-
ing provides a crucial way of contending with, and learning from, the “other-
ness” of texts: paying close attention to the claims by which they transport us 
beyond what we already think.
 In both their acts of historical reevaluation and the interpretive methods 
they enact, the essays in this volume demonstrate the cogency of this claim. 
For Gallop and for us, the value of close reading extends even beyond what 
it has to offer to interpretive rigor, pedagogical strategies, and the process of 
defining and legitimizing the discipline of literary studies: the value of close 
reading resides also in how it can help us to attend to, and engage with, the 
voices which fill the world around us. “Close reading,” Gallop points out, 
“can thus be a crucial part of our education. . . . Close reading can equip us 
to learn, to be open to learning, to keep on learning” (11). Notwithstanding 
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her reservations about the relationship of close reading to the exclusionary 
canon that New Criticism fostered, Gallop’s remarks here notably emphasize 
the “openness” of close reading, in marked contrast to the now longstand-
ing (and as we hope to have shown, misguided) claims for its prohibitively 
“closed” nature. Instead of a practice of close reading which would seek 
to keep the world out, a carefully articulated and historically engaged close 
reading “is not just a way of reading but a way of listening. It can help us not 
just to read what is on the page, but to hear what a person really said. Close 
reading can train us to hear other people” (12).
 As close reading enjoys a renaissance not just within English departments 
but throughout the academy; as we find ourselves, accordingly, focusing once 
again upon “reading for form,” it is for something more than just a simple 
lesson in literary history that we return to the work of critics such as Rich-
ards, Empson, Ransom, Tate, Brooks, and Warren. We can return profit-
ably to them better to appreciate the complex relationship that has always 
obtained among strategies of close reading, disciplinary practices, and ethical 
principles.
Notes
 1. In “The Strategy of Digital Modernism,” which investigates “DAKOTA”—a digital 
text by Young-Hae Chang’s Heavy Industries putatively developed out of a “close read-
ing” of Ezra Pound’s Cantos I and II—Jessica Pressman observes that there has been much 
discussion in recent work on digital literature about the applicability of traditional literary 
methods of “close reading” to digital text and the distinctive, “media-specific” reading 
experiences it generates. She suggests that
Digital literature demands a close reading practice that incorporates not 
only the external cultural and historical influences affecting the text (for 
example the politics, historical perspective, or embodiedness of the reader 
and/or author), but also the media-specific aspects (for example the speci-
ficities of Flash as an authoring tool and the significance of the work’s dis-
tribution online rather than on CD-Rom). YHCHI’s statement that Dakota 
is “based on a close reading” demands that we read Dakota in relation to 
The Cantos and at the same time reflexively reassess our own close reading 
practices. YHCHI’s claim thus poses a challenge to investigate the relation-
ship between the texts in question and presents an opportunity to consider 
the efficacy of applying the print-based standard of literary criticism, close 
reading, to electronic literature.
 2. In our view, it is somewhat of a misnomer to call such New Critical reading “sur-
face reading,” since, though it does not approach texts with “suspicion,” it often does 
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move from the more to the less evident, the apparent to the hidden—if not always in the 
spirit of “unmasking,” at least to uncover what is not initially apparent.
 3. In Cultural Capital (1993), John Guillory notes that “difficulty itself was positively 
valued in New Critical practice. . . . [I]t was a form of cultural capital” (168).
 4. See the introduction to Brooks and Warren for the concept of “literary knowledge” 
(xiii); see also Tate.
 5. As much commentary has pointed out, the New Critics shared many fundamental 
assumptions with the Russian formalists—about, for example, the importance of focusing 
on the literary text qua literary text, and about the autonomy of literature; but as Donald 
Childs notes, the New Critics would not become familiar with Russian Formalist work 
until the late 1940s (120).
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